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We Nisga’a have always organized our lives and society around a concept 
called Saytk’ilh Wo’osim, which means “Our Common Bowl.” Under this 
principle, it is understood that since everyone relies on the same 
resources and community, all must contribute. It’s about sharing energy, 
wisdom, spirit, joy, and sadness and it touches all aspects of life. It means 
no one gets left behind. Nisga’a government uses this principle to guide 
the delivery of healthcare, education, and social services.  
—Chief Joseph Gosnell, “A First Nation, Again: The Return of Self-Government 
and Self-Reliance in Canada’s Nisga’a Nation,” 2003 
All the members of human society stand in need of each others [sic] 
assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where the 
necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, 
from friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy. All the 
different members of it are bound together by the agreeable bands of love 
and affection, and are, as it were, drawn to one common centre of mutual 
good offices.  
—Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759 
Our work has been guided by a vision of British Columbia becoming a more just society. 
A society where, in Adam Smith’s words, the assistance we need from each other is 
“reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem.” A society 
where the recognition of the richness of life so eloquently described by Chief Joseph 
Gosnell leads us to the conclusion that we must act so that “no one gets left behind.” 
While there are almost as many visions of what a just society looks like as there are 
people in this province, we believe that the shared vision of these expressions of hope 
and principle coming from such different cultures and times points to a way forward. All 
notions of justice arise from the idea that we owe each other the bases of self-respect 
and dignity and that we should treat each other as equals deserving of our respect.  
The American philosopher Elizabeth Anderson (2017) provides a more concrete 
description of these bases of self and social respect: “We owe each other the rights, 
institutions, social norms, public goods, and private resources that people need to avoid 
oppression (social exclusion, violence, exploitation, and so forth) and to exercise the 
capabilities necessary for functioning as equal citizens in a democratic state.”  
Clearly, government policy on its own cannot deliver everything on this list of what we 
owe each other. But we believe that making positive changes in government policy can 
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help in moving B.C. toward becoming a more just society. Our charge was to think 
about both whether a basic income in and of itself is the most positive change B.C. can 
make, and how the principles that underlie the basic income concept can be used to 
inform other changes in policy.  
We were guided by notions of what constitutes a just society, comparing existing and 
potential policies against a list of (always competing) characteristics that must be 
balanced to achieve just policies and programs: adequacy, accessibility, security, 
responsiveness, opportunity, social connection, policy stability, and reciprocity.  
A central theme in our approach is that changes should be made not from the top down 
but in close consultation with groups who are affected by those changes: a consultation 
ultimately rooted in the human rights recognized in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and through Canada’s signature on international agreements. Indeed, this is what it 
means to consider policy from the perspective of creating a more just society. It means 
a shift from seeing the most vulnerable as others in need of help, to seeing them as 
equal participants in creating a better society. 
We approached our task through consultations and discussions with affected groups, 
with citizens in general, and with the people in government who would be charged with 
making changes real and effective. We were greatly heartened by those conversations 
and the way they reflected the spirit of the words of Adam Smith, Chief Joseph Gosnell, 
and Elizabeth Anderson. We also commissioned and based our work on over 40 
research projects from experts across Canada and beyond, examining elements of a 
basic income and of other prospective policies. This work also delved into the complex 
web of existing income and social support programs, as well as their gaps and 
interactions. 
From our investigations, we have come to realize that the existing set of policies and 
programs provides a solid basis for reform. These policies and programs have been 
introduced and adjusted by various governments over decades and, in our opinion, 
have been substantively improved by changes in the last three years. Nonetheless, the 
current program environment does not constitute a system. Many gaps and 
inconsistencies remain, hampering the ability of the committed resources to provide the 
self-respect and social respect associated with a just society. Moreover, the program 
complex—built like a house that has had many renovations undertaken without an 
overall plan—treats some people without the dignity they deserve, despite the best 
efforts of the people working within the system to provide quality service. One of our 
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goals as a panel has been to propose changes that create a more complete, purposeful, 
and interactive approach to fulfilling society’s common aims.  
We were asked to “consider the viability of a basic income in B.C.” We have concluded 
that moving to a system constructed around a basic income for all as its main pillar is 
not the most just policy option. The needs of people in this society are too diverse to be 
effectively answered simply with a cheque from the government. A basic income is a 
very costly approach to addressing any specific goal, such as poverty reduction, which 
is part of our reasoning. We also found that many of the claims of the advantages of a 
basic income put forward by proponents are hard to substantiate and that the policy 
goals implied by these claims can be achieved as well or better with other approaches. 
Beyond that, though, we have concerns about what a basic income approach would 
imply for society. A basic income emphasizes individual autonomy—an important 
characteristic of a just society. However, in doing so it de-emphasizes other crucial 
characteristics of justice that must be, in our view, balanced: community, social 
interactions, reciprocity, and dignity. The basic income approach seems to us to be 
more individualistic than the way we believe British Columbians see themselves.  
We share the belief in individual autonomy that proponents of a basic income express, 
but we believe that true autonomy is found only partly in monetary resources. It is also 
found in building supportive, mutually beneficial communities, and that is one of our 
underlying goals. In keeping with that goal, we believe all of this should be done with 
careful concern for building public trust—not just among those who most need support 
but also among those who will see themselves mostly as paying into the system. Our 
guiding philosophy is one of reciprocity, which inclines our analysis to address issues of 
economic impacts, incentives of policies, financing requirements, and B.C.’s fiscal 
capacity.  
We were also asked if there were any areas that require further exploration with a basic 
income pilot. We have concluded that a pilot is not warranted. Many of the proposed 
benefits of a basic income have to do with changes people might make because they 
have a long-term, stable income source—changes such as investing in an education or 
starting a business. Even a five-year pilot would not be long enough to allow us to 
assess these claims. We already have plentiful evidence on shorter-term impacts from 
other research and pilots. Our preferred approach is to implement new policies 
incrementally, evaluating them rigorously and, most importantly, consulting thoroughly 
and widely, then making adjustments. 
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Finally, we were asked whether the spirit of a basic income could be applied to 
transform and enhance the current income and social support system. We have 
concluded that this is the best approach. B.C. needs a mixed system that applies 
different approaches in different circumstances. Our approach is twofold: identifying 
those groups most in need of improved support and proposing improvements focused 
specifically on them; and identifying how the system can be improved by enhancing 
consistency and the benefits delivery platform on which specific programs are built. Our 
evidence led us to conclude that the broad group whose basic needs are least well 
served are single, working-age adults, both single parents and those without children. 
Within that group, people with disabilities, youth aging out of care, women fleeing 
violence, the long-term unemployed and the working poor would benefit most from 
reform and expansion of specific supports. 
Our set of 65 recommendations, summarized below, combine short- and longer-term 
measures to reform the current system using a diverse set of tailored policy 
approaches:  
• Generally available basic services addressing unmet basic needs, like extended 
health supplements and rental housing assistance 
• Targeted programs that combine cash transfers with wraparound social support 
for groups in transition, like youth aging out of care and women fleeing violence, 
and those facing high barriers to employment, who have more specific needs 
• Targeted basic incomes where they are most helpful, such as for people with 
disabilities and youth aging out of care 
• An overhaul of the Disability Assistance system, including for those with mental 
health and addiction issues, that emphasizes dignity and support for work for 
those who want it 
• A reformed Temporary Assistance program, providing monetary benefits in a 
dignified and respectful way to those able to work and better facilitating transition 
to employment  
• Adjustments to tax system–delivered benefits, such as an improved earnings 
supplement for the working poor and targeting the Child Opportunity Benefit 
more directly to children living in poverty 
• Regulatory reform to create a more just labour market, improving wages and job 
conditions for low-skill, low-income workers—particularly beneficial for people 
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whose often precarious situations have been highlighted by COVID-19: women, 
people with limited education and work skills, and Indigenous and racialized 
people 
• Reforms to make the current set of programs more of a coordinated, consistent, 
and accessible system 
Another way to look at our conclusions and recommendations is from the perspective of 
work. We have found that, despite claims to the contrary, any viable basic income would 
have disincentives to work similar to those of the current Income Assistance system. 
Throughout our recommendations we have sought to encourage work, including by 
lowering the “welfare wall” across the Income Assistance program and by providing 
extended health benefits generally to low-income individuals; providing supports to 
lower barriers to work; reforming labour regulation to improve wages and conditions for 
low-wage, low-skill jobs; and enhancing earnings supplements to benefit employed 
people with low incomes. All of these changes will improve the attractiveness of work 
more effectively than receiving cash benefits, reducing the emphasis on a requirement 
to work in favour of support for work. The result will be the dignity and self-respect 
provided by work for those who are encouraged to work, and economic and fiscal gains 
for society. 
What does the future we envision look like? It is a future in which British Columbia is a 
place of mutual concern and mutual respect, where each person is supported to make 
the fullest contribution they can. Where no one is left behind. It is a place where 
government policy supports a strong sense of mutual concern, striving to use the full set 
of tools at its disposal to balance the desire for individual autonomy and the need for 
community. And it is a place where the reciprocity needed to build and maintain public 
trust is at the core of public discourse. Where everyone, from those whose contributions 
bring them the largest incomes to the most vulnerable, is treated as an equal whose 
opinions are listened to with respect. In short, it is a vision of a British Columbia that 
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Summary of recommendations  
Reform Disability Assistance (DA) into a targeted basic income 
1. Replace disability-related designations 
2. Reform application process 
3. Revise application forms 
4. Eliminate DA asset test 
5. Relax DA income test 
6. Reform adjudication process 
7. Eliminate reassessment 
8. Convert DA to a targeted basic income 
9. Increase DA benefit to the poverty line 
10. Lower DA benefit reduction rate and maintain income exemption 
11. Create public and community employment 
12. Integrate support for addiction and mental health 
13. Review addiction support  
Reform Temporary Assistance (TA) to reduce the “welfare wall” 
14. Eliminate work-search requirement 
15. Engage federal government on COVID-19 recovery benefit rationalization 
16. Initially maintain current TA income test 
17. Increase TA income test threshold in medium term 
18. Eliminate TA asset test 
19. Extend TA streamlined reapplication 
20. Increase TA benefit levels by making COVID-19 emergency $300 supplement permanent 
21. Lower TA benefit reduction rate and maintain income exemption 
22. Evaluate training support 
23. Expand earnings supplement 
Provide extended health-care benefits to all low-income individuals 
24. Convert extended health supplements to a basic service 
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Provide housing support to all low-income renters 
25. Combine Income Assistance support and shelter allowances  
26. Expand targeted supportive housing  
27. Institute a B.C. Rent Assist refundable tax credit 
Provide intensive work support to targeted groups 
28. Establish Assisted to Work basic service 
29. Establish a joint rehabilitation and work support agency 
Enhance support for low-income families with children 
30. Refocus the Child Opportunity Benefit 
Enhance financial and support services for young adults 
31. Increase Ministry of Children and Family Development resources 
32. Enhance transition planning and community support capacity 
33. Extend Agreements with Young Adults education and training duration 
34. Enhance Agreements with Young Adults life-skills support 
35. Extend Assisted to Work eligibility to former youth in care 
36. Create targeted basic income for former youth in care 
37. Initiate basic income with community support engagement 
38. Mandate a ministry to support former youth in care 
39. Establish a B.C. Learning Bond 
40. Contribute to B.C. Learning Bond for children in care 
41. Create a B.C. Career Trek program 
Enhance financial and support services for people fleeing violence 
42. Enhance housing for people fleeing violence 
43. Create a three-tiered domestic violence program 
Improve precarious employment through labour regulation reform 
44. Develop gig work employment standards 
45. Review Employment Standards Act exclusions 
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46. Enhance proactive Employment Standards Act enforcement 
47. Improve employment standards for fissured work 
48. Review Labour Relations Code unionization provisions 
49. Proactively facilitate industry advisory councils 
50. Extend Labour Relations Code successor rights 
51. Rationalize employee definitions across programs 
Improve the way benefit delivery platforms function 
52. Combine refundable tax credits into Dogwood Benefit 
53. Rationalize income definition for income-testing purposes 
54. Engage federal government to reduce tax-filing barriers 
55. Engage federal government to increase tax and benefit delivery responsiveness 
56. Engage federal government to streamline administrative tax data–sharing 
57. 
Develop an identification and verification platform for non–tax filers to increase 
benefits access 
58. Automate informing applicants of eligibility for other programs 
59. Enhance cross-program system navigation 
60. Establish system governance 
61. Index Income Assistance rates to changes in the poverty line 
62. Increase Income Assistance staff resources 
63. Rigorously evaluate major reforms 
64. Create linked administrative data for policy development 
Make ongoing engagement a permanent part of all policies 
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Glossary 
basic income: a policy that guarantees all members of a society a minimum amount of 
income in a given period  
basic services: a set of publicly provided in-kind benefits that ensure that people can 
meet important basic needs, which generally include services associated with 
health, housing, education, security of people and property, transportation, and 
others 
benefit: a payment or service provided by the income and social support system 
benefit reduction rate (BRR): the rate by which the guarantee amount is reduced by 
other income 
break-even income (BE): for a basic income (refundable tax credit or negative income 
tax), the level of income above which basic income payments are no longer 
received 
Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB): a benefit available to those affected 
by the COVID-19 pandemic 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA): the federal tax collection authority 
cash transfers: payments that provide people with additional financial resources to 
meet their basic needs 
Current Population Survey (CPS): U.S. survey roughly equivalent to the Canadian 
Labour Force Survey 
Disability Assistance: the component of Income Assistance that provides assistance 
to those who have been designated as a Person with Disabilities (PWD) as 
defined by the program and who meet other eligibility criteria  
fissured workplaces: workplaces owned by firms that focus on their core business and 
leave other tasks (such as food preparation, security guards, care home 
services, and janitorial services) to subcontractors 
generally applicable basic income: a basic income that applies to the entire 
population 
guarantee (G): the minimum income guaranteed by the basic income, or in the case of 
an income-tested cash transfer other than a basic income, the maximum benefit 
payable 
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Gini coefficient: a measure of inequality that falls in a range between 0 (perfect 
equality in which everyone has the same income) and 1 (perfect inequality in 
which all income goes to one person) 
goods and services tax (GST): the federal value-added tax on most goods and 
services 
harmonized sales tax (HST): a provincial value-added tax on most goods and services 
harmonized with the GST and collected on behalf of the province by the Canada 
Revenue Agency 
home owner grant: property tax reduction program for B.C. primary residences 
income and social support system: the set of cash-transfer programs (income 
support programs) and in-kind benefit programs intended to benefit those in need 
because of limited resources (social supports) 
Income Assistance: the core of B.C.’s income and social support system, providing a 
mix of cash-transfer and basic service supports to eligible people  
in-kind benefits: goods and services, often referred to as basic services, that help 
people meet specific needs 
Labour Force Survey: a monthly Statistics Canada survey that measures the current 
state of the Canadian labour market  
marginal effective tax rate (METR): measures the tax loss from earning one more 
dollar of income, beginning at some initial level of income.  
Market Basket Measure (MBM): the approach taken by Statistics Canada to 
measuring poverty by setting the poverty line in relation to the cost of a basket of 
basic needs in a particular location for a particular type of household 
negative income tax (NIT): a form of basic income that adjusts benefits on the basis of 
income data collected periodically within the year 
participation tax rate (PTR): the total tax loss and benefit reduction at given levels of 
income compared with not working (the loss from moving from not working to 
taking a job with a given income) 
Persons with Disabilities (PWD): the Income Assistance designation for people who 
are eligible for Disability Assistance (Note: Throughout this report, PWD is used 
only for those eligible for DA; no abbreviation is used when people who have 
disabilities are referred to without reference to DA) 
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Persons with Persistent Multiple Barriers (PPMB): the Income Assistance 
designation for people who have a persistent medical condition as well as at 
least one other barrier to employment that seriously impedes their ability to work 
and who meet other eligibility criteria 
refundable tax credits (RTC): tax credits that provide a set level of benefits for a year 
at a time based on income earned in the previous year; a form of targeted basic 
income 
rent geared to income (RGI): a subsidized housing program in which eligible families 
pay no more than an established proportion of their family income in rent and 
direct housing costs, usually 30%; eligibility is determined by residency status 
and family income, which varies by location within the province 
targeted basic income: a basic income design that limits benefits to people who meet 
defined eligibility criteria 
Tax Collection Agreement (TCA): an agreement between British Columbia and 
Canada under which Canada collects income taxes on behalf of the province 
(other provinces have similar agreements) 
Temporary Assistance: the component of Income Assistance that provides cash 
transfers and in-kind benefits to those in need who meet eligibility requirements 
universal basic income (UBI): a basic income in which everyone receives a cash 
transfer in every period, with no conditions, no eligibility requirements except 
residency in the jurisdiction, and as a result, everyone is guaranteed a minimum 
amount of income 
welfare wall:  a notional barrier created by various features of traditional income 
support programs that both limit access to the program as the funder of last 
resort and discourage recipients from exiting the program for work, particularly 
high rates of benefit clawback due to earned income  
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1. The task 
On July 3, 2018, the Government of British Columbia announced the creation of an 
expert committee to “test the feasibility of a basic income in BC and help find ways to 
make life better for British Columbians.”1 This is the report of that committee, the Expert 
Panel on Basic Income, which is composed of: 
• David A. Green (Chair), Professor, Vancouver School of Economics, University 
of British Columbia 
• Jonathan Rhys Kesselman, Professor Emeritus, School of Public Policy, Simon 
Fraser University 
• Lindsay M. Tedds, Associate Professor, School of Public Policy, University of 
Calgary 
The report is authored by the panel members and Daniel Perrin, Principal,  
Perrin, Thorau and Associates Ltd. 
1.1 Terms of reference 
The Expert Panel on Basic Income was established in response to a commitment in the 
2017 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the BC Green Caucus and the BC 
New Democrat Caucus. Among the policy initiatives that the two parties agreed to 
pursue under the agreement was the following: 
4.  Making life more affordable 
a. Design and implement a province wide poverty reduction strategy 
that includes addressing the real causes of homelessness, 
including affordable accommodation, support for mental health and 
addictions and income security.  
i.  One aspect of the poverty reduction strategy is to design and 
implement a basic income pilot to test whether giving people a 
basic income is an effective way to reduce poverty, improve 
health, housing and employment.  
 
1 Terms of Reference: BC Basic Income Pilot Assessment (see Appendix 1-A). 
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In March 2019, the Minister of Social Development and Poverty Reduction introduced a 
provincial poverty reduction strategy that served as an overarching framework for the 
panel. 
The terms of reference for the panel, included in Appendix 1-A, stated that we had two 
broad tasks, which were to:  
1. “consider the viability of a basic income in BC and support the simulation of 
various basic income models in BC to identify impacts and financial implications,” 
and 
2. “look at BC’s existing income and social support system and how elements and 
principles of a basic income could be used to transform and enhance it” 
The panel was also expected to “outline any areas that could be explored further 
through a basic income pilot, as well as pilot design.” 
The tasks set out for us were both a daunting challenge and a rare opportunity to make 
recommendations for reshaping the current system to make life better for British 
Columbians. 
1.2 Our approach 
Our work has been guided by a vision of British Columbia becoming a more just society. 
A society where, in Adam Smith’s words, quoted at the outset of our report, the 
assistance we need from each other is “reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, 
from friendship, and esteem.” A society where the recognition of the richness of life so 
eloquently described by Chief Joseph Gosnell leads us to the conclusion that we must 
act so that “no one gets left behind.” While there are almost as many visions of what a 
just society looks like as there are people in this province, we believe that the shared 
vision of these expressions of hope and principle coming from such different cultures 
and times points to a way forward. All notions of justice arise from the ideas that we owe 
each other the bases self-respect and dignity and that we should treat each other as 
equals deserving of our respect.  
The American philosopher Elizabeth Anderson (2017) frames the bases of self- and 
social respect in terms of what we owe each other as fellow citizens: “We owe each 
other the rights, institutions, social norms, public goods, and private resources that 
people need to avoid oppression (social exclusion, violence, exploitation, and so forth) 
and to exercise the capabilities necessary for functioning as equal citizens in a 
democratic state.”  
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Clearly, government policy on its own cannot deliver everything on this list of what we 
owe each other. But we believe that making positive changes in government policy can 
help in moving B.C. toward being a more just society. Our charge was to think about 
both whether a basic income in and of itself is the most positive change B.C. can make, 
and how the principles that underlie basic income concept can be used to guide other 
changes in policy.  
We were guided by notions of what constitutes a just society, comparing existing and 
potential policies against a list of (always competing) characteristics that must be 
balanced to achieve just policies and programs: adequacy, accessibility, security, 
responsiveness, opportunity, social connection, policy stability, and reciprocity.  
A central theme in our approach is that changes should be made not from the top down 
but in close consultation with groups who are affected by those changes: a consultation 
ultimately rooted in the human rights recognized in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and through Canada’s signature on international agreements. Indeed, this is what it 
means to consider policy from the perspective of creating a more just society. It means 
a shift from seeing the most vulnerable as others in need of help, to seeing them as 
equal participants in creating a better society. In practical terms, it means that we see 
our recommendations not as a menu of fully developed and immediately implementable 
policies but as a starting point for the conversations we see as part of the definition of a 
just society. 
We approached our task through consultations and discussions with affected groups, 
with citizens in general, and with the people in government who would be charged with 
making changes real and effective. A wide set of groups with interests ranging from 
poverty reduction to the dignity and well-being of vulnerable women, from assistance for 
people with disabilities to business competitiveness, have provided input through a 
variety of means. We also solicited submissions from the general public to inform our 
work and undertook a survey of British Columbians to gauge their opinions on specific 
forms of a basic income. We were greatly heartened by those conversations and the 
way they reflected the spirit of the words of Adam Smith, Chief Joseph Gosnell, and 
Elizabeth Anderson.  
Key to our approach is an extensive program of research consisting of over 40 studies 
produced by a multidisciplinary team of researchers associated with universities and 
research organizations throughout Canada and beyond. This research has not only 
provided the evidentiary basis to support our work but also represents a significant 
contribution to the knowledge base for many topics related to social supports and basic 
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income. An important innovation underlying the quantitative part of the research agenda 
was the use of linked, de-identified comprehensive public sector databases. All of the 
research papers are available in a companion website along with other materials 
supporting this report,2 and much of the knowledge contained in them will also be used 
to support further publications authored by members of the research team.  
The research program has produced papers related to several themes, including: 
• a description of the current system 
• the gaps in the current system and their impacts on the lives of British 
Columbians 
• design and implementation considerations for a basic income in the B.C. context 
• the programs and system reforms that could or should be considered to move 
B.C. toward a more just society 
Further information on the papers is provided in Part 3, Section 6 (Panel Engagement). 
We have authored or co-authored several of the papers, acting in our capacity as 
individual researchers rather than as members of the panel. These papers are not 
always fully consistent with the conclusions and recommendations presented in Part 6 
of the report, or with the analysis presented throughout the report. That should not be 
interpreted as a difference of opinion among us; we are all fully in agreement with and 
have signed off on the report. Rather, the differences should be taken as evidence of 
our evolving thought process on this complex issue, to which there are no absolute right 
answers. In many cases, the papers were prepared over several months before we 
began to deliberate, or were prepared as the basis for further discussion that led to our 
ultimate consensus.  
Just as the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected virtually all aspects of daily 
life, so too has it affected our work. It has limited some of the quantitative research that 
was in progress when the facilities being used to access data were closed. It has raised 
the public profile of a basic income as a policy option, with several commentators 
proposing it as a mitigation measure. The pandemic has also altered the policy 
landscape in fundamental ways, creating a new starting point from which to consider 
adding a basic income. It has raised the issue of how best to provide social support 
when financial crises hit. And it has served to reinforce many of the observations and 
 
2 See http://www.bcbasicincomepanel.ca  
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conclusions that we had already reached, all of which are addressed in the report. 
Nevertheless, the report remains focused on the tasks set out for us. 
1.3 Indigenous people and communities 
When planning our work, one of the issues we grappled with was how best to approach 
questions related to a basic income and current system reforms within an Indigenous 
context, acknowledging our lack of expertise and experience in this area. We quickly 
recognized the importance of including a research study focused on income and social 
support issues unique to Indigenous Peoples.  
To ensure that this critical element of work was undertaken in an effective, respectful, 
and inclusive manner, ministry staff engaged with B.C.’s First Nations Leadership 
Council (FNLC). In consultation with the FNLC, a collaborative partnership was 
established between the FNLC and Dr. Anke Kessler of Simon Fraser University. 
Additional academic support was also provided by Dr. Fernando Aragon (Simon Fraser 
University) and Dr. Jacqueline Quinless (University of Victoria). The main goal of this 
project is to gather data on the incomes of Indigenous people. 
This partnership model ensured that First Nations leadership was at the forefront of all 
aspects of the project, including developing the research questions and methodologies, 
and involving First Nations communities across the province. 
Initially, the project gained traction and momentum; we proceeded with collecting and 
analyzing the data, and, in collaboration with the FNLC, reached out to all B.C. First 
Nations communities, inviting them to participate in the project through community-
based research surveys. However, much of this work was either precluded or hindered 
by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
It is critical that this work be done in a way that is respectful and inclusive of the people 
and communities who will be affected by any recommendations and resulting changes. 
That means taking the time necessary to include the input and perspectives of those 
impacted.  
From our efforts to date, and from studying publicly available secondary data and 
existing literature, some key themes are beginning to emerge. However, given the 
limitations we faced due to the pandemic, we recommend postponing any discussions 
or decisions until this aspect of the research can be fully completed through a process 
that includes respectful and inclusive consultation with Indigenous Peoples.  
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We understand that both the Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction and 
FLNC are committed to continuing this process and that Anke Kessler will continue to 
lead the team undertaking this important work.  
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2. Report summary 
Through this report, we endeavour to present comprehensive, consistent, and evidence-
based advice to the B.C. government in response to the tasks set out in the terms of 
reference. We do this in six parts, which:  
• introduce our task and provide a summary of the report (Part 1)  
• present a justice-based framework within which we can analyze the alternatives 
(Part 2)  
• provide background information used throughout the report (Part 3)  
• describe and analyze the current system (Part 4)  
• describe and analyze potential basic income programs (Part 5)  
• present our vision for the future and a set of recommendations that will move 
B.C. on the path toward that vision (Part 6) 
The following sections summarize the topics addressed, and the main insights and 
conclusions we came to, in Parts 2 to 6 of the report. 
2.1 Part 2: Analytical Framework 
Our mandate included the directives to both consider a basic income as a policy tool on 
its own and examine “how elements and principles of a basic income could be used to 
transform and enhance” the existing support systems. We quickly realized that focusing 
on the principles of a basic income tended to steer us back toward choosing a basic 
income and that we needed a broader perspective from which to compare different 
policies. We found that perspective by framing our evaluations in terms of the impacts of 
policies in making British Columbia a more just society. Admittedly, though, the 
standard of justice is potentially vague. Moreover, we were keenly aware that British 
Columbians hold many different ideas of what constitutes a just society, and we wanted 
a standard that is commensurate with as many of those ideas as possible. In Part 2 of 
the report, we specify an analytical framework for evaluating how well alternatives are 
aligned with a goal of justice, broadly defined. In this section of the report, we attempt to 
make the justice theme concrete enough to be practically applied as the basis for 
analysis. 
In an attempt to find a common basis from which to discuss what constitutes justice, we 
start Part 2 with a discussion of the fundamentals of human nature. As Aristotle 
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famously stated, humans are social animals in need of each other’s support both for 
productive reasons and as the source of our feelings of well-being. This is the sentiment 
described in the quote from Adam Smith at the beginning of our report. The most 
effective societal institutions recognize and enhance our social nature as well as our 
individual nature. Smith himself argues that while one can construct a functioning 
society based only on self-interest, it will not be as good as one that also acknowledges 
our mutual sympathy.  
At the same time, we are individuals with very heterogeneous notions not only of our 
own goals and preferences, but also, often, of what makes a fair society. In practical 
terms, that means public policy choices should support individual liberties, including 
people’s right to hold their own notion of justice rather than imposing a specific theory or 
emphasizing a certain notion of fairness. 
Recent liberal thinkers, including John Rawls, argue that the central problem of justice is 
how to balance our social nature with individual rights. Rawls also argues that just 
institutions are equilibrium constructs: they should embody notions of justice but also 
engender support for those notions of justice among citizens, who are free to exercise 
their rights. That implies a need to build trust both in the institutions and in fellow 
citizens. A key question concerning a big policy tool like a basic income, or alternatively 
a fundamental reform of the existing income and social support system, is whether it 
supports that trust. Is it something that both the beneficiaries and those who ultimately 
pay for it see as part of a just society? Searching for policies that form an equilibrium in 
this sense is of central importance if we want the policies to last and to help in creating 
a society in which “assistance is reciprocally afforded.” 
How, then, does one find a basis for standards that would be recognized as just by wide 
sets of people with differing views? We argue that virtually all discussions of justice—
from the Nisga’a notion of the Common Bowl to Adam Smith to those of modern 
philosophers such as John Rawls or Elizabeth Anderson—are rooted in providing the 
means of self-respect and social respect (the respect we get from others in our 
community). The bases of self-respect and social respect are found in the very structure 
of society. They are founded, in part, on family arrangements and social arrangements 
in a community. For that reason, it is important to consider how any policy affects 
people’s ability to make social connections and children’s ability to form key 
attachments that support their future ability to feel like they have autonomy, control, and 
social connection. Self- and social respect are also founded on the roles that people 
play in the productive process, broadly defined. This does not have to be limited to roles 
as employees in public or private enterprises—though that is certainly a key element—
but also roles such as caring for others, helping to construct community projects, 
building human capital, and creating new enterprises. Public policy and institutions alter 
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people’s roles in society and, with them, their sense of self- and social respect. In this 
sense, notions of justice cannot be separated from the functioning of the economy. 
Focusing on respect reveals an immediate, practical implication: this focus is 
inconsistent with the idea of social support as charity rather than as an element of a just 
society. Charity, historically often the impetus behind traditional income and social 
support programs, is laden with moral judgment about who deserves support, and that 
very judgment saps self- and social respect. By underpinning our principles with the 
idea of justice, from the outset we reject the use of distinctions between the “deserving” 
and “undeserving” as a basis for the design of support systems.  
Self- and social respect are concepts that are tightly tied to what psychologists describe 
as the needs we all must have fulfilled in order to have a sense of living a good life: the 
need for a sense of autonomy; the need for a sense of efficacy or competence; and the 
need for social connection. We use the insights from these descriptions of human needs 
to form a list of characteristics that a policy would have to exhibit to fit with our notion of 
justice based in self- and social respect. We can divide that list of characteristics into 
groupings based on the three psychological needs: autonomy, efficacy, and social 
connection. 
Autonomy 
1. Adequacy. True autonomy means that a person’s resources must be adequate to 
raise them above destitution, which would instead require them to adopt positions of 
subservience in order to survive. The term “resources” is used here advisedly 
because, as will be seen throughout the report, access to both cash and services 
respectfully provided can support autonomy. 
2. Accessibility. Supports that are adequate on paper provide no support at all if they 
are not accessible in practice. To be accessible, policies must be simple and 
understandable from the user’s perspective, supporting rather than challenging 
people’s notions of dignity.  
3. Security. To be effective, and to promote dignity, policies should aim to provide 
people with a clear and reliable sense of being supported through difficulties. The 
ability to plan for the future and to play a full role in your community is only possible 
if you don’t feel it could all be taken away in an instant. In part, this is a component 
of building strong communities—communities that engender people’s capacity to 
support each other in hard times.  
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4. Responsiveness. Policies must be responsive both to differences in needs between 
different people and to changes in circumstances for individuals, households, and 
communities. Responsiveness requires flexible programs, allowing evolution in 
directions needed to address changing circumstances at the community level, with 
input from and influence of both those who need support and those who will pay for 
the support to be provided. Responsiveness also means that those using the 
program have some sense of autonomy—the ability to make decisions rather than 
simply being directed to particular outcomes. 
Efficacy 
5. Opportunity. A lack of genuine opportunity means that the person cannot truly 
exercise their autonomy and competence, even if the right to do so exists in a 
formal, on-paper sense. A movement toward a more just society means providing 
more people with the opportunity to pursue what they value—in their family, mental, 
physical, emotional, and work lives. This is not a guarantee of success in their 
endeavours but support for the central human desire to try. Opportunity links directly 
with breaking the cycle of poverty and preventing poverty, and with the goal of 
ending systemic racism and gender-based inequities. 
Social connection 
6. Social connection. Policies should provide the material basis for making supporting 
and loving attachments, but they should also take into account impacts on building 
and supporting communities. 
Public trust 
In addition to these characteristics of just policies that are grounded in an attempt to 
support self- and social respect, we also set out two characteristics that fit with the idea 
of justice set out by being an equilibrium construct in which the policies themselves 
engender public trust and support.  
7. Policy stability. By this we mean that the policies have sufficiently broad support 
that they will not simply be undone in the next political cycle and that they are 
economically sustainable. It incorporates giving due consideration to economic and 
fiscal impacts. The economic impacts of policies and their finance relate directly to 
the incentives they create for paid employment, training, and investment, as well as 
for caregiving, volunteering, and community building. Transparency of costs and 
expenditures is a key feature of building public trust and, therefore, policy stability. 
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8. Reciprocity. By this we mean that the policies have the quality of generating a 
society of mutual respect. For those who need support, this is respect for their needs 
and for the contributions they make. For those who are mainly paying to fund 
supports, it is the respect shown by not treating the funds as coming from some 
nameless source that can be drawn from at will.  
These eight characteristics are often in conflict with each other, requiring policy 
decisions that balance the considerations and acknowledge their inherent trade-offs. 
Where that happens, we point it out in our deliberations. We do not view this list as 
providing a checklist of answers but rather as a basis for discussion about the justness 
of policies and for comparing alternatives—discussions that are part of the process of 
creating a more just society and that will never end.  
In the last section of Part 2, we compare our set of characteristics of just policies to the 
list of principles provided in the terms of reference in order to tie our analysis directly 
back to our charge. 
2.2 Part 3: Background—Information Applicable Throughout the Report 
Part 3 provides key background information that supports our conclusions and 
recommendations, especially in the areas of: 
• understanding poverty in B.C. and the groups most significantly affected 
• the fiscal context and potential funding sources for increased expenditures due to 
basic income or reforms of the current system  
• what technological change means for the future of work, among other labour 
market-related observations  
• how income testing works, whether for a basic income or for other social 
programs, and the disincentive effects of income testing  
• how we engaged with the public, interested parties, and academic researchers to 
gather the information and evidence that provide the foundation for our work 
Poverty in British Columbia 
While poverty is a difficult and contentious concept to measure accurately, both B.C. 
and Canada use the Market Basket Measure (MBM). Under MBM, thresholds equal to 
the cost of goods and services required to satisfy basic needs are estimated annually 
for many specific locations and family configurations. Those MBM thresholds are the 
official poverty line. 
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Figure 1-1: MBM poverty rates, Canada, B.C., and Vancouver 
The poverty rate is the 
proportion of the population 
with income below the MBM 
poverty line. Poverty rates for 
Canada as a whole fell by 
almost half between 2006 
and 2018, and by over 55% 
for B.C. and Vancouver in 
the same period (Figure 1-1). 
B.C. has gone from having 
poverty rates significantly 
higher than the national rates 
to rates that are almost 
identical to the national rates. 
Breaking that down by age group shows that the biggest decrease has been for 
children, where the poverty rate fell from almost 30% in 2006 to 8.9% in 2018. Seniors 
have the lowest poverty rate in B.C., at 5.1%. But working-age adults experience a 
higher poverty rate, at 10.5%. B.C. has set legislative targets to reduce the overall 
poverty rate by 25% from 2015 levels by 2024 (a 9% target), and the poverty rate for 
children by 50% from 2016 levels by 2024 (a 6% target). B.C. met its legislative target 
for overall poverty in 2018 and is very close to meeting its child poverty target.  
Child and senior poverty rates have fallen significantly, reflecting the success of federal 
government programs targeting these groups—the Canada Child Benefit for children 
and Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement for seniors—both targeted basic 
incomes. Our task of considering whether B.C. should undertake a basic income is 
really about the working-age population.  
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Figure 1-2: MBM poverty rates for ages 18–64 by family type 
The overall working-age 
poverty rate is only slightly 
higher than the child poverty 
rate for B.C., but when 
broken down by family type, 
significant differences are 
apparent (Figure 1-2). 
Specifically, single parents 
and single adults without 
children are the groups with 
the highest rates, several 
times more than couples with or without children. 
Poverty reduction is not only about reducing the poverty rate. For us, it also includes 
reducing the depth of poverty (how far those living in poverty are below the poverty line) 
as well as preventing poverty and breaking the intergenerational poverty cycle. Of 
these, depth of poverty is the most easily measured, using the average gap between 
income and poverty line for those living in poverty. A lower gap ratio is better.  
As with poverty rates, it is the working-age population that has the greatest depth of 
poverty, at about 41%, compared with children (26%) and seniors (22%). Within the 
working-age group, the depth of poverty is greatest for single adults, and even greater 
for the subgroup of single adults aged 18–24, making both groups policy targets for us.  
Fiscal context 
Introducing a basic income or reforming the existing system would almost certainly have 
significant fiscal implications, and public acceptance of increased government spending 
is a significant factor in our considerations. While we have not been asked to 
recommend how any changes we propose should be funded, some context about B.C.’s 
capacity to do so is important. 
Our first question is whether B.C. has the capacity to fund additional spending 
commitments. Our analysis of B.C. fiscal sustainability concludes that, due to an aging 
population, rising health-care costs, and the likelihood of declining real estate activity, 
B.C. faces important fiscal pressures over the medium to long term. The estimated long-
term fiscal gap is about 3% of GDP, or about $7.5 billion, without taking COVID-19 
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over time but suggests that significant increases in expenditure will require new sources 
of funding. 
After examining potential funding sources, we have concluded that there are some 
significant limitations. Revenues from existing B.C. taxes could be increased, but there 
is more potential from increasing tax rates than from expanding existing tax bases,3 and 
there would be competitiveness and other economic implications associated with almost 
any of these changes. For example, an $8 billion cost funded equally by B.C. income 
tax and sales tax increases would generate the highest rates in Canada for each. 
New revenue sources are possible, and the best options are those related to economic 
rents and negative externalities—excess profits from monopolies or resource extraction 
and activities that damage society as a whole, such as pollution. In B.C. the greatest 
source of economic rents is the value of land in urban areas. Steps have been taken 
recently to capture some of these rents, but there may be ways to capture additional 
economic rents from land.  
Labour market trends 
Labour market trends over the past few decades provide important background 
information for this report for two reasons.  
The first is the claim by some basic income advocates that technological disruption is 
fundamentally changing work, justifying a basic income. The more that happens, the 
less we can rely on work and work-related transfers such as Employment Insurance to 
distribute what society produces. A basic income, it is argued, could fill that gap. To 
evaluate this argument, we need to know whether jobs are becoming increasingly 
precarious, with a widening skills gap, and whether demand for labour is falling, as 
would be expected if work is coming to an end. 
Second, and just as important, is understanding the structure and trends in the current 
labour market as the basis for improving working conditions and wages, especially for 
low-income workers. For all that we can do to support people with money and services, 
improving their lives by making jobs better is perhaps the most direct approach to 
creating a more just society based on self- and social respect, our goal. 
 
3 An exception is the personal income tax, which has numerous omissions from its base and where B.C.’s upper tax 
rates are close to the highest in Canada. However, in order for B.C. to expand its base for that tax, it would have to 
abandon its tax collection agreement with the federal government, and competitiveness issues could still arise. 
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Figure 1-3: Standard and unstable employment 
 
Precarious work is work that is not standard, full-time, permanent employment, and is 
often associated with the “gig” economy. Four types of employment are associated with 
precarity: self-employment, contract work, part-time jobs, and short-term jobs, all of 
which can be measured using Canadian Labour Force Survey data. 
Figure 1-3 charts, in three panels, standard employment and the four non-standard 
employment types for females and males in Canada from 1997 to 2019. The stability of 
standard and precarious employment over the past two decades is striking. There was a 
big shift toward precarity in the 1990s that coincided with a weak labour market, 
deregulation, and reductions in Unemployment Insurance coverage (pre–Employment 
Insurance). Since then, the proportions of employees in each of the four types of 
precarious work have also been generally flat, though there are more males than 
females in standard employment and more females than males in part-time jobs.  
While precarity in general is not on the rise, there is some evidence of an increase in 
the number of “fissured workplaces”—a term referring to the practice of firms focusing 
on their core business and leaving other tasks (such as food preparation, security 
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have shown that this domestic outsourcing of work reduces wages and worker 
protections. The proportion of workers in low-wage industries with large concentrations 
of fissured workplaces increased substantially prior to the 2009 recession and has 
remained flat since then. 
This evidence supports two conclusions. First, there is limited evidence of the shift 
toward more precarious work patterns predicted by basic income advocates over the 
last two decades in Canada or B.C. We also believe that a future shift to increased 
precarity because of technological change is possible—but not inevitable. Second, the 
level of precarious work should be of concern, and the shift to fissured workplaces has 
reduced the proportion of low-skill jobs that can be considered “good” jobs in terms of 
working conditions and wages. 
The obvious question is whether a basic income is the right policy response to 
persistent precarity and increased fissuring of work. Proponents argue that a basic 
income would allow workers to turn down these work arrangements, ultimately 
bargaining for better wages and working conditions on the basis that they don’t need the 
work to survive. But the opposite might happen: workers may be less concerned about 
precarious work arrangements because of the basic income, resulting in even greater 
fissuring. The much more direct policy response is greater support for workers in 
precarious jobs through enhanced employment standards and labour relations 
regulation.  
Income testing and effective tax rate implications 
Much of the analysis in this report revolves around the use of income testing in the 
delivery of benefits. Almost every program in the current income and social support 
system is income-tested, as are many basic income variants. Although it may seem like 
there is a lot of diversity in these arrangements, there is a general approach that can 
help describe all of the income-testing schemes and make them easier to compare. The 
main parameters in all income-tested benefits are:  
• the maximum benefit amount  
• the benefit reduction rate (BRR)—the proportion of income earned that is 
deducted from the benefit to phase it out as income increases 
• the break-even point, the level of income at which the benefit is fully phased out  
Another common feature is an income exemption threshold, below which the maximum 
benefit applies without deduction based on income earned. 
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These parameters are important because the BRR is effectively a tax related to income. 
Taxes, whether direct or “effective” taxes, affect the behaviour of the people subject to 
them. Those effects are cumulative, with income tax rates combining with BRRs 
associated with benefits and other effective taxes to generate an overall effective tax 
rate. Higher average and marginal effective tax rates act as disincentives to work, either 
at all or in terms of the number of hours worked. They can also affect various other 
incentives, such as whether to work off the books and income-reporting decisions. 
While the evidence shows that the various incentive effects are not large, very big 
changes in effective tax rates can have material effects on the overall supply of labour, 
as well as the cost of benefit programs.  
By applying this approach, we are able to show that when examined in the context of 
the whole tax and benefit system, basic incomes have disincentive effects due to 
income testing that are similar to those of the current Income Assistance program. A 
basic income would also newly impose disincentives on larger numbers of workers 
earning above poverty levels. Those outcomes contradict one of the claims of basic 
income advocates—that basic income would be a significant improvement on traditional 
welfare programs in this respect—which falls apart when considered in the broader 
context. 
Panel engagement 
The foundation of our work is engagement with the public, community groups, and other 
interested parties, together with an extensive array of research that we commissioned 
and a public survey. The extensive consultations undertaken by the B.C. government in 
developing its poverty reduction strategy were also important in our work.  
There is one key conclusion from Part 3 that affects the ability to develop, implement, 
and evaluate improvements to the existing system: improved mechanisms are needed 
for combining administrative data from various program areas to facilitate the analysis 
needed to support evidence-based policy-making across government. We were given 
effective assistance in accessing combined (anonymized) administrative data through 
the Data Innovation Program in the Ministry of Citizens’ Services, with the direct access 
and support coming from Population Data BC. We are very grateful for all of their work; 
much of this report would not have been possible without it. We were also given able 
assistance by Statistics Canada in combining some provincial datasets with data under 
their control.  
However, there are two data-access issues that need to be addressed to make the 
system an effective support for the kind of ongoing policy evaluation we are calling for. 
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The first is timeliness. The data in the Data Innovation Program ends with a lag of 
several years. This was not a problem for us since we were examining longstanding 
elements of the existing support systems but would be a problem for analyses 
supporting ongoing policy change. Each ministry, of course, has up-to-date data, but full 
evaluations require bringing that data together, and that requires prompt data 
contributions to the B.C. government’s Data Innovation Program. Second, tax data 
needs to be included in the data linkages, since it has much-needed information on 
earnings as well as income supports and taxes. Including income tax data will require 
federal government co-operation and potentially federal legislative change. 
2.3 Part 4: The Current System 
System description 
We define the income and social support system as the set of cash-transfer programs 
(income support programs) and in-kind benefit programs intended to benefit those in 
need because of limited resources (social supports). Cash transfers provide financial 
resources for meeting basic needs, and in-kind benefits provide goods and services, 
often referred to as basic services, that more directly help people meet specific needs. 
The income and social support system is focused on those with unmet needs, but it 
exists within the context of a broad set of federally funded and largely provincially 
delivered social programs, most of which apply universally, such as medicare, 
education, security of people and property, and others.  
The system comprises 120 provincial programs scattered across 12 ministries through 
23 different points of access. Additionally, the federal government provides 72 programs 
through eight different departments or agencies and 12 different points of access.  
In order to make sense of this extensive and complex set of programs, we have created 
a set of seven sunburst visualizations that enable users to view the system from several 
perspectives. Figure 1-4 shows the full set of programs divided by federal and 
provincial, ministry responsible, delivery agency, and specific program. Readers are 
encouraged to use the web version of the figures to explore the programs further by 
hovering over program names, and by examining each of the different sunburst 
perspectives (http://www.bcbasicincomepanel.ca). 
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Figure1-4: Income and social support system in B.C. 
 
 
The system is wide-ranging and complex. Although B.C. has more programs, federal 
spending on income and social support in B.C.4 significantly outweighs provincial 
spending. Most of the federal programs are fully or mostly automatic, without need for 
 
4 Primarily the Canada Pension Plan, Employment Insurance, Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplement, 
and the Canada Child Benefit, which are all cash transfers. 
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clients to interact with program administrators for eligibility or ongoing benefit calculation 
purposes. Most B.C. programs other than Income Assistance cash transfers and tax 
credits are in-kind benefits directed at specific needs, with eligibility assessment and 
benefit calculations that require ongoing contact with programs because they are 
income-tested and specifically targeted. It would be difficult to replace these in-kind 
benefits with cash transfers and continue to meet people’s needs.  
There is considerable inconsistency across the system, especially in the definition of 
income used for income-testing purposes and, for programs targeting people with 
disabilities, the disability eligibility criteria, adding to the complexity of the system and 
unintended interactions among programs. 
With the notable exception of Income Assistance, all of the major cash-transfer 
programs and almost all of the income-tested benefits, whether cash or in-kind, make 
use of the income tax system, at least to determine the level of income, if not to actually 
deliver benefits. However, there is no requirement to file an income tax return if taxes 
are not owed, and there are significant barriers to filing, including distrust of the tax 
system, years of unfiled required returns, amounts owing from previous years, lack of 
access to tax slips, and the complexity of completing a tax return. This significantly 
limits program access for vulnerable populations. 
Analysis of the system 
Using our analytical framework, we analyze the overall system, largely focusing on the 
trade-offs associated with three of the framework’s characteristics: adequacy, 
accessibility, and opportunity (as realized through transition support).  
In terms of adequacy, our question is whether the scope the system addresses all of the 
basic needs. Our conclusion is that there are two gaps in programming for the single 
working-age population, the group most requiring additional help: supporting vulnerable 
youth transitioning to adulthood and addressing the dignity and accessibility of work. 
The system is a complex set of programs focused on specific needs, which has 
significant advantages and disadvantages when compared with our analytical 
framework. Its advantages are in its diversity of programming, addressing many specific 
needs with specific customized solutions and with the responsiveness to changes in 
people’s circumstances inherent in that approach and in the design of many of the 
programs. For example, Income Assistance responds rapidly to changes in income, 
compared to refundable tax credits delivered by the tax system. But disadvantages 
arise from the same features, in terms of barriers to access associated with complexity 
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and lack of respectfulness associated with the eligibility testing inherent in focused 
supports. 
Our analysis concludes that there are systemic issues that could be addressed to 
improve the system. Addressing the gap due to a lack of a mandate within government 
to address intergenerational poverty among youth aging out of care would extend 
existing programs and build on recent improvements. There is also a gap related to 
“good” jobs in terms of wages and working conditions for low-wage, low-skill workers, 
high barriers to work, and the lack of jobs for those unsuited to standard employment, 
which should also be addressed. Consistency in program design features and better 
system coordination could reduce complexity and other barriers to access. Transition 
support for groups facing life changes could be improved by linking cash income 
support with wraparound basic service support. 
Analysis of specific programs 
Income Assistance 
Income Assistance is at the core of the income and social support system, providing a 
mix of cash-transfer and basic service supports to two broad groups, people with 
impairments that limit work and people without those barriers to work. It is a complex 
system with many features, many of which have changed over time, with significant 
caseload effects. Large caseload increases in the 1990s led to significant tightening of 
eligibility rules in 1996, which were tightened again in 2002. The result was a change in 
emphasis from short-term support for those temporarily without work to a steadily 
growing long-term caseload mostly associated with disabilities. The changes made 
Temporary Assistance less accessible, and its caseload also became more long-term in 
nature. Changes since 2017 have significantly relaxed some of the tight eligibility 
requirements imposed earlier.  
Income Assistance’s design principle is that it is the funder of last resort, intended to 
provide benefits only to those who have no other options or resources. That principle 
underlies several features, including the eligibility tests for Disability Assistance and 
Temporary Assistance, the relatively low rate structure for cash transfers, and the high, 
100% benefit reduction rate by which income above the exemption level reduces cash 
benefits dollar for dollar. These features are intended to limit access. In practice, they 
also create a “welfare wall”—a barrier for those on Income Assistance to exiting the 
program. Recent eligibility changes have made a positive difference and could be built 
on to further improve the program. 
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In terms of our analytical framework, the adequacy and accessibility of Income 
Assistance are limited by the welfare wall features, but it is these features that have 
traditionally enhanced public trust because they limit cost and require reciprocity. They 
create a paradoxical structure in which Income Assistance recipients are required to 
search for work (partly in order to support public trust) but are faced with 100% taxes on 
earnings when they find work. On the other hand, the monthly reporting framework 
ensures that Income Assistance is responsive to changes in personal circumstances, 
and the supplements, especially the health supplements, provide a stable and valuable 
benefit, especially for those on Disability Assistance. Feedback from recipients has 
suggested that more intensive work assistance would enhance future opportunity for 
them. 
Other programs 
Other programs analyzed in Part 4, Section 5, include health-care programs, housing 
programs, the home owner grant, child-care programs, provincial refundable tax credits, 
programs for youth aging out of care, labour market regulation, and earnings 
supplements. The main conclusions by program are as follows. 
Health care 
PharmaCare is a basic service program that is quite consistent with our framework, and 
it could provide a model for other generally applicable health services. The Healthy Kids 
Program is also consistent with the framework, but the Medical Services Plan 
supplementary benefits program is narrow and inadequate.  
Housing programs 
These programs represent a targeted approach to increasing low-income housing 
coupled with rent subsidy programs that have limited accessibility due to eligibility 
criteria and linkage to provincially funded low-income housing. Consistency with our 
framework could be improved with a rental assistance benefit that is easier to access 
and that applies more generally to all who meet income-based eligibility tests and 
whose benefit phases out as income increases. 
Home owner grant 
These grants reduce the property tax on principal residences for most homeowners. 
Our conclusion is that this is a costly program that does not target any group clearly in 
need or achieve any evident public policy objective. 
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Child-care programs 
Support for child care has increased significantly since 2017 with the introduction of new 
programs and reform of other programs, to create a suite of basic service programs that 
help meet an important need, supporting participation in work and other socially 
beneficial activities. The suite of programs is quite consistent with our analytical 
framework, representing a reasonable set of trade-offs. 
Refundable tax credits 
The climate action tax credit, sales tax credit, and Child Opportunity Benefit are cash-
transfer programs delivered through the income tax system, which would all benefit from 
reforms to the tax system to make it a more accessible and responsive benefit delivery 
mechanism. Both the climate action and sales tax credits were introduced as part of 
broader tax policy measures. The Child Opportunity Benefit augments the much larger 
federal Canada Child Benefit. We conclude that it could be redesigned in a revenue-
neutral fashion to focus benefits more precisely on the group most in need, low-income 
parents. 
Youth aging out of care 
This group has traditionally been targeted by few specific programs, but that has 
changed in the past few years, with enhanced education funding and Agreements with 
Young Adults to support specific needs for some former youth in care. Progress has 
been inhibited by the fact that no ministry or agency has a specific mandate to serve 
this group. Beyond establishing that mandate, there is room for additional improvement, 
through more accessible and adequate support, both financial and social, to enable a 
successful transition to adulthood, a transition that can be challenging even for those 
with much less difficult childhoods.  
Labour market regulation 
The conclusion in Part 3, Section 4 (Labour Market Trends), is that precarious work and 
fissured work imply that there are not enough “good” low-wage jobs. Our subsequent 
review of labour market regulation under the Employment Standards Act and Labour 
Relations Code has suggested that there is an opportunity to address that by building 
on recent changes to the legislation. We conclude that there is room for improvement, 
through expanding employment standards coverage for workers in precarious jobs, 
increasing consistency in the definition of “employee” across government programs that 
benefit workers, providing added protections for fissured workers, enhancing the ability 
and capacity to enforce labour regulation, strengthening continuity of work provisions for 
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fissured workers, and accelerating the adoption of newly enabled industry advisory 
councils. 
Earnings supplements 
Earnings supplements are effectively wage subsidies provided to low-income workers, 
usually limited to those whose income exceeds a minimum threshold (indicating some 
labour force attachment) and phased out as income increases above an income 
exception level. In other words, they supplement wages over a low-income earnings 
range, supporting workers living in poverty or near the poverty line and encouraging 
them to work by lifting the hourly wage. The Canada Workers Benefit is the prime 
example, together with three earnings supplement programs in other provinces. B.C. 
does not currently have such a program, but we have identified low-income workers as 
a group particularly in need. COVID-19 has revealed the economic importance and 
vulnerability of this group, consisting predominantly of women and Indigenous and 
racialized people. 
Conclusion 
From this analysis, we conclude that the B.C. income and social support system is not a 
system per se. Nevertheless, it is a set of programs that provides a wide range of 
important supports through a combination of cash transfers and goods and services, 
together with worker protections provided through labour market regulation. We believe 
that such a hybrid system is the best way to achieve our justice-based objective, and 
that by applying the framework significant improvements can be made to the current 
program mix. 
2.4 Part 5: Basic Income 
What is a basic income?  
A basic income is shorthand for programs that embody the idea that society would be 
better off if everyone could count on receiving at least a minimum amount of cash on a 
regular basis. Specifically, we define basic income as a policy that guarantees all 
members of a society a minimum amount of income in a period. An idea that has been 
around for well over 200 years, it is simple to understand but in practice would be 
neither simple to design nor simple to implement.  
The most well-known type of basic income is a universal basic income (UBI), which 
provides periodic cash payments to everyone in a group. This is the simplest basic 
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income design, but there are also many alternative designs. The alternatives can be 
viewed from two perspectives, related to placing conditions on the payments.  
The first type of conditionality is related to whether the basic income applies to everyone 
(in practice, all residents of a jurisdiction) or to a specific group of people. We use the 
term “generally applicable basic income” for designs that don’t require recipients be part 
of a group and “targeted basic income” for designs that limit benefits to people who 
meet defined eligibility criteria.  
The second type of conditionality is related to whether the basic income is income-
tested (i.e., the benefit is conditional on other income received). UBIs are, by definition, 
not income-tested, but they could be either generally applicable or targeted.  
There are two types of income-tested basic incomes, both of which also could be either 
generally applicable or targeted: the refundable tax credit (RTC) and the negative 
income tax (NIT). The difference between these two approaches is in their 
responsiveness to changes in income. RTCs delivered through the income tax system 
generally provide a set level of benefits for a year at a time based on income earned in 
the previous year, just like the current set of RTCs. In fact, some, like the Canada Child 
Benefit, are targeted RTC basic incomes. NITs are defined by the fact that they require 
income data to be collected periodically within the year, with basic income benefits 
adjusted on the basis of reported income.  
Why a basic income? 
Many advocates for a basic income believe that it is a policy panacea that can help 
address many of the issues facing society. Reasons put forward for adopting a 
generally applicable basic income include: 
• eliminating or at least reducing poverty and the intergenerational cycle of poverty 
• transforming society and the economy in response to disruptions such as artificial 
intelligence and other technological changes that are fundamentally changing 
work or even eliminating it for most people  
• responding to other disruptions, such as climate change—and now pandemics 
• reducing stress for many people, which contributes to several of the subsequent 
claims 
• improving health outcomes for recipients 
• improving health and educational outcomes for children  
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• providing a stable basis for investing in human capital and finding a better job  
• raising low-end wages (and thereby reducing wage inequality) by allowing 
workers to reject bad jobs  
• providing a stable basis for pursuing an entrepreneurial idea and thereby 
encouraging innovation 
• building community by allowing people to participate in unpaid work beneficial to 
society, such as caregiving and volunteering 
Many advocates see a basic income, especially a UBI, as a simple and powerful tool 
that can be applied to several important social issues, like poverty, and that will have 
collateral benefits, such as improving health and community development. 
A basic income is seen as such a powerful tool because of the philosophy and 
principles underlying the concept. The philosophical basis of a basic income is the 
improvement of society, with the following four principles as defining characteristics: 
simplicity, respect, economic security, and social inclusion. These principles are often 
used to claim that a basic income is intrinsically preferable to traditional income and 
social support systems, such as B.C.’s existing system, which has significant shortfalls 
in terms of these particular principles.  
The basic income philosophy is conceptually consistent with our stated goal of moving 
to a more just society, and the principles align particularly well with our characteristics of 
accessibility, adequacy, security, opportunity, and social inclusion. However, there are 
two major differences between these and our broader social justice-based framework. 
The first is that basic income principles place considerable weight on the individual’s 
freedom of choice inherent in cash support. While autonomy is an important component 
of our framework, we believe that true autonomy is only possible when basic needs like 
heath care, education, and housing have been addressed by the kinds of basic services 
that form part of the current system. In some ways, this difference is a matter of 
degree—basic income proponents are typically supportive of some basic services—but 
their emphasis on individual choice often casts in-kind goods and services as 
interventionist and paternalistic. We view our approach as putting the emphasis in the 
opposite order and being more balanced.  
The second difference is our emphasis on two elements of public trust that are 
sometimes overlooked by basic income advocates: policy stability and reciprocity. 
Specifically, this relates to the cost of a program, how it would be financed, how those 
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costs would be distributed, and the overall economic effects. Reciprocity refers to 
mutual respect between those who are beneficiaries and those who are mainly paying 
to fund the supports. This second difference is partly a reflection of the first: by 
emphasizing individualism and downplaying the collective interest, important 
considerations related to public trust—cost, economic implications, and reciprocity—are 
also downplayed in the basic income principles. 
Policy trade-offs in basic income design 
Despite advocates’ claims of simplicity, we have identified a long list of policy choices 
that must be made in the detailed design of a basic income, and the specifications 
chosen all represent policy trade-offs that need to be carefully considered.  
The most fundamental choice is whether a basic income should be universal or income-
tested. Based on our background discussion of income testing and effective tax rates, 
the trade-off here is between cost and economic impact. A UBI has little direct work 
disincentive but has a high cost because benefits are paid to everyone, not just those 
most in need. The large distortions for a UBI arise through its heavy financing 
requirements. Income testing targets those most in need, reducing the cost significantly, 
but introduces an economic distortion associated with the effective tax rate (the benefit 
reduction rate—BRR) used to phase out benefits.  
For the two types of income-tested basic incomes, the trade-off is between 
responsiveness to changes in personal circumstances and significant compliance costs 
across the economy, together with significant administrative costs. An RTC would be 
simple and quick to implement using the income tax system to deliver a basic income, 
just as it delivers many other benefit programs, but it can take up to 18 months to 
respond to a sudden significant change in income, positive or negative. An NIT, in 
contrast, would require a new administrative structure with frequent reporting of income 
from all sources, separate from income tax reporting, but would provide benefits that 
adjust quickly to income changes. 
Other significant trade-offs arise in defining the benefit structure (the benefit amount, 
BRR, and break-even point), which pits adequacy against cost and, for income-tested 
basic incomes, work disincentive impacts. The choice between generally applicable and 
targeted basic income again requires a trade-off between cost and accessibility in terms 
of serving particular groups facing higher costs for basic needs, such as people with 
disabilities. Giving everyone enough to address the costs would be prohibitively 
expensive, but focusing on particular groups requires eligibility criteria that, no matter 
how well designed, affect the dignity of those being served.  
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Every design element represents some trade-offs: how it is administered, how 
responsive it is to income changes, whether it is applied on an individual or family basis, 
and so on. And how well a particular basic income conforms with the ideal represented 
by basic income principles depends on those difficult choices. This is what we mean 
when we say that a basic income is not simple to design or to implement. 
Simulation results 
To estimate the budgetary cost of alternative basic income designs and their poverty 
impacts for B.C., we commissioned 1,640 basic income simulations using Statistics 
Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M). We used these 
simulations to compare UBI and RTC types of basic income applied to working-age 
adults, varying several design parameters: the maximum amount of the benefit, the 
BRR, whether income testing is based on individual or family income, and whether 
couples receive double the benefit for singles or a lower, scaled amount. For each 
simulation we calculated the number of recipients, the cost, the poverty rate, and the 
depth of poverty. We also calculated a measure of how cost-efficient each simulated 
design would be in reducing poverty per billion dollars of incremental cost.5 
To get a sense of the costs and impacts involved, consider basic incomes with 
guaranteed income amounts at about the poverty line, $20,000 for singles. A UBI would 
cost $51 billion, almost doubling the provincial budget and effectively eliminating poverty 
as expected, but only lifting about 8,000 people out of poverty for every billion dollars 
spent. In contrast, an RTC with the same maximum benefit but phased out with a 75% 
BRR6 would cost $7.5 billion, reduce the poverty rate by 68%, and lift over 44,000 
people out of poverty for every billion dollars spent. 
The simulations lead to three important observations:  
• UBIs are orders of magnitude more expensive than income-tested basic incomes 
that provide similar poverty reduction.  
• As the BRR increases, the cost decreases.  
• Higher BRRs are generally more efficient in reducing poverty.  
 
5 See http://www.bcbasicincomepanel.ca/ for an interactive visualization of representative simulation results. 
6 The RTC would be calculated based on family income, and benefits for couples would be scaled by 1.41 times the 
benefit for a single person. 
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We also conducted an optimization exercise to seek the best design option at every 
level of budget spending and found that the optimal design suggests that as spending 
on a basic income increases, the BRR should increase as well, from an optimal rate of 
10% at $1 billion in spending to 80% at $7 billion in spending. 
Our conclusion is that if our goal is to reduce poverty, an RTC is the preferred basic 
income approach. But any significant poverty reduction would require a high BRR—and 
the work disincentives that entails. Any feasible basic income that also seeks to sharply 
reduce poverty simply would not reduce the welfare wall in the way many basic income 
advocates claim it would. 
Other basic income claims 
Simulation results show why a basic income may not be the best choice for reducing or 
eliminating poverty. Our examination of labour trends in Part 3 shows that, at best, it is 
premature to consider a basic income as the solution to a technologically induced end 
of work, since there is no evidence of recent changes that would indicate that this is 
happening, at least not yet.  
The other claims made for a basic income listed above receive varying amounts of 
support from empirical investigations done for our panel, as well as work by other 
researchers.  
• The claim that a basic income would be easier to implement than other 
approaches because it can be provided as a tax credit does not hold up. The 
proportion of individuals not in the tax system is substantial, and solving that 
problem would be costly for a basic income or any other approach.  
• There is some evidence that a basic income would lead to a shift from market 
work to child caregiving, though not on a large scale. Potential impacts on 
volunteering are uncertain, but we note that a basic income could lead to a 
monetizing of services that may be detrimental to communities.  
• Existing evidence points to substantial returns in terms of child outcomes from 
providing transfers to low-income households, but there is no clear case that 
such transfers achieve better outcomes if they are delivered via a basic income 
rather than another form.  
• A basic income is likely not effective in increasing entrepreneurial activity. In part, 
it may serve to increase own-account self-employment, which is often a poor 
labour market state that we would want to help people leave, not attract them 
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into. For that group of firm owners, the best approach is probably to give them 
access to training programs to help them leave self-employment. For 
incorporated firm owners, part of what may be needed is reductions in 
bureaucratic, licensing, health, and tax-related barriers to opening a firm, and 
income insurance options for owners. But the best solution to that problem lies 
with improved insurance, not a basic income, which is an imperfect substitute for 
insurance.  
• The claim that transfer income can help in reducing stress and improving self-
perceived mental health is supported in the data. However, new assessments of 
the data on health-care system usage point to a conclusion of no effect or even 
possibly increases in hospital usage when transfer income access is provided. A 
basic income therefore seems to help with health but not in a way that will 
provide health-care cost savings.  
• There is evidence that a basic income will reduce crime rates, though other 
measures may be more effective in this. 
• There is some hope that a basic income could result in higher wages and, 
possibly, better working conditions, though the extent of this effect is currently 
uncertain. And, of course, a basic income would not be the most direct approach 
to achieving these goals. That would be accomplished through labour regulation 
and supporting union bargaining. 
Overall, we found that a basic income would likely have some of the beneficial effects 
claimed by its proponents, but there are often more direct ways to achieve those effects. 
We believe that it would be more effective in general to address these issues directly, 
and that a combination of cash transfers and basic services reformed to better align with 
our justice-based objective would be the better approach. 
Financing a basic income 
It is not enough, in applying our justice-based framework, to consider a basic income in 
isolation. While a basic income can be designed to fit within a given budget constraint, 
it’s clear that even the most efficient basic income in terms of reducing poverty would 
impose significant costs, which would need to be financed, and the policy measures 
chosen to do so would combine with the basic income to amplify the incentive and 
behavioural implications.  
Examining financing options leads to several observations. First, when financing is 
taken into account, the trade-off between the low work disincentives of a UBI and the 
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lower cost of an income-tested basic income disappears. Financing a UBI would 
inevitably have significant implications that would eliminate many of the advantages 
typically suggested by advocates of this form of a basic income.  
Many Canadian basic income proposals suggest eliminating most or all tax credits, 
including the basic personal amount, to create a “self-financing” RTC basic income. This 
would be a fundamental reform of the tax system that would mean tax becomes payable 
with the first dollar earned, increasing disincentives to work for low-income earners not 
on Income Assistance. More fundamentally, this approach to financing would generate 
only limited funds for B.C. on account of the province’s low tax rate for the bottom 
income bracket, and would put the funding burden disproportionately on middle earners 
while sparing those with the highest incomes. These factors imply that B.C. would need 
joint federal funding along with much broader tax increases for an equitable outcome. 
Financing a basic income with income tax rate increases is also problematic. 
Simulations show that feasible basic income designs rival the welfare wall of Income 
Assistance in terms of effective tax rates. Even financing a $10,000 RTC basic income 
with a low BRR would require about a 50% increase in B.C. income tax rates, pushing 
some effective tax rates well over the levels associated with Income Assistance and 
creating economic distortions at every level of income. 
Eliminating programs could be another alternative, but we believe that the many 
services provided by existing programs aimed at meeting basic needs—in combination 
with cash transfers—are essential to a just society. We conclude that there is little or no 
scope to fund a basic income by eliminating some of these programs without doing 
significant harm. We are concerned that, even if basic service and targeted cash 
transfers are not eliminated to finance a basic income, the budget pressure imposed by 
the basic income would preclude needed reforms to these programs and result in 
erosion of the programs over time. 
A basic income pilot 
We were specifically asked to consider whether undertaking a B.C. basic income pilot 
would be useful. We have concluded that it would not be useful. Our reasons include 
the following:  
• Extensive evidence from past pilot projects and other studies is available, and 
there are few important gaps to be filled.  
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• One key outstanding information gap relates to long-term effects in the form of 
changes in habits and practices. Pilots are by their nature temporary and cannot 
provide evidence on these long-term impacts.  
• A basic income must be considered in the context of how it is financed and how 
other requisite policy changes interact with it, elements that are not feasible in a 
pilot project. 
• It is difficult for governments to maintain a pilot for long enough to provide useful 
results without intervening policy changes or cancellation of the pilot. 
• The ethical considerations involved in setting up winners and losers to measure 
basic income effects are not justified.  
Rather, we favour making the best possible evidence-based policy decisions and then 
collecting the data needed to rigorously evaluate the results in order to make continuous 
improvements.  
2.5 Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
Our work has been guided by a vision of British Columbia becoming a more just society. 
A place of mutual concern and mutual respect, where each person is supported to make 
the fullest contribution they can. Where no one is left behind. It was in light of that 
vision, expressed more concretely in our set of characteristics of just policies, that we 
examined a basic income as a key policy goal for B.C. We based that examination on 
extensive consultations and a considerable body of new research.  
Taking a justice-based approach is more than simply forming a list of evaluative 
characteristics. It requires a specific approach to the process of policy-making and 
implementation. It means asking not “How do we help the most vulnerable among us?” 
but “How do we create a more just society together?” It means a shift from seeing the 
most vulnerable among us as others in need of our help, to seeing them as equal 
participants in creating a better society.  
We have woven throughout our recommendations the theme that these proposals 
should be the first step in a consultation with affected groups as well as with people who 
can bring useful evidence and data to the table. These consultations should be ongoing. 
We recommend mechanisms that involve continuing adjustments accompanied by 
continuing consultations—mechanisms ultimately rooted in human rights recognized by 
Canada in its signature on international agreements. We therefore see our 
recommendations not as a final set of proposals but as the starting point for dialogue. 
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The result will be a messier process than simply defining and implementing a pre-
specified efficient solution to a narrow issue, but it will be more just. It will also, likely, be 
more effective and have fewer unintended consequences. 
Specific conclusions and recommendations 
1. The first question put to the panel was whether British Columbia should adopt a 
basic income as the central element of its transfer system. Our answer is no. Moving 
to a system constructed around a basic income is not the most just policy change we 
can consider. The needs of people in this society are too diverse to be effectively 
answered simply with a cheque from the government.  
Effectiveness, in fact, is key to our conclusions. Questions of effectiveness are 
reflected in the fact that a basic income is a very costly approach to addressing any 
specific goal, such as poverty reduction. Further, in our assessment of claims made 
for the benefits of a basic income, we found that for many of the claims there are 
other policies that would provide more effective approaches. Other claims, such as 
that a basic income would be easy to implement through the tax system, or that a 
basic income is needed because we are facing the end of work as we know it, or 
that a basic income would pay for itself through reduced health-care costs, appear to 
us not to be true. 
We are also concerned about the implications of a basic income for the society we 
will share in the future. A basic income emphasizes individual autonomy—an 
important characteristic of a just society. However, in doing so it de-emphasizes 
other crucial characteristics of justice that must be, in our view, balanced: 
community, social interactions, reciprocity, and dignity. The basic income approach 
seems to us to be more individualistic than the way we believe British Columbians 
see themselves. 
2. We propose, instead, a mixed system that applies different approaches in different 
circumstances:  
• basic services, such as extended health supplements and a new, extensive 
rental assistance benefit, both addressing needs common to all low-income 
households  
• targeted supports for groups like youth aging out of care and women fleeing 
violence, who have more specific needs  
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• targeted basic incomes where they are most helpful, such as for people with 
disabilities  
• an overhaul of the Disability Assistance system, including for those with mental 
health and addiction issues, that emphasizes dignity and support for work for 
those who want it  
• a reformed Temporary Assistance program, providing monetary benefits with 
more dignity  
• an improved earnings supplement for low-income earners  
• a more just labour market, to improve wages and job conditions for low-skill, low-
income workers, changes that will be particularly beneficial for people whose 
often precarious situations have been highlighted by COVID-19: women, people 
with limited education and work skills, and Indigenous and racialized people 
We see our recommended policy changes as a complete system that would help 
move B.C. toward being a more just society. 
Our recommendations are closely aligned with the government’s poverty reduction 
targets, though our goals extend beyond simply reducing the poverty rate. One 
important issue that we do not address directly is food insecurity. This is clearly a 
serious and important issue, but we believe it is best addressed by relieving people 
of the other pressures that lead them to have to cut back on food—housing, health, 
and income being among the most central. 
3. While we do not see a system centred on a basic income as a good approach for 
B.C., we recognize that others—including this or future governments—might. We 
believe that many of the reforms we propose would be needed even if a basic 
income were adopted. As many proponents of a basic income recognize, true 
autonomy is found only partly in monetary resources. It is built on a base of 
supportive communities and families, on a fair labour market, and on specific 
services such as health care and education. In the most extreme versions of a basic 
income, those services are expected to be bought in the market using, in part, the 
money distributed through the basic income. We see this as misguided.  
A prime example is youth aging out of government care—perhaps the strongest 
example of a longstanding failure of the existing system to meet the standards of 
justice. For these young adults, financial security is part of the way forward, but 
providing cash transfers without also helping them form supportive attachments is 
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simply not enough. Some steps have been taken to address the needs of this group 
with significant recent improvements to existing programs, but there is much more to 
be done.  
Another example is labour market reform. Labour regulation changes aimed at 
finding a better balance between the interests of workers and firms could provide the 
underpinning for a basic income or other cash-transfer programs, since people are 
more likely to choose work over receiving cash when the jobs on offer are good jobs.  
4. Building the basis for a basic income would also involve a major overhaul of the tax 
and transfer system—another reform that we recommend as an important part of 
increasing the effectiveness of, and improving access to, the current system. Of 
course, this is something that needs to be implemented primarily at the federal 
government level, and we recommend that B.C. add its voice to calls for reform. 
5. Work incentives and disincentives are an important theme running throughout this 
report. We believe that the dignity and self-respect that comes from voluntarily 
chosen work (not the forced work of “workfare”) is important. That means that 
addressing the disincentive effects cash transfers can have on work would be 
justified by reasons related to dignity alone. But beyond that, there are economic 
and fiscal consequences of reduced labour force attachment that further support the 
need for reform. Minimizing these effects is an important consideration for us. 
The redesigned system we are suggesting provides support for work in several 
forms. Our proposed Income Assistance reforms and a generally available extended 
health benefits program for those with low incomes will reduce the welfare wall to 
reduce work disincentives. Intense work assistance will lower barriers to 
employment and bring people the hope of accessing new work opportunities. Labour 
regulatory reform will improve wages and working conditions for low-wage, low-skill 
jobs, improving the attractiveness of work relative to receiving benefit. Enhanced 
earnings supplement benefits will provide direct benefits to an important group, low-
income earners, which consists predominantly of women and Indigenous and 
racialized people, whose importance and vulnerability have been revealed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
6. We were also asked whether there should be a basic income pilot. To this, too, our 
answer is no. Many of the proposed benefits of a basic income are associated with 
changes people might make because they have a long-term, stable income 
source—changes such as investing in an education or starting a business. A pilot 
will not allow us to assess these claims. Even the longest basic income pilots last 
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only five years, and that is not a long enough commitment for people to make 
substantial changes. We already have evidence on shorter-term impacts from other 
research and pilots. 
However, we do believe strongly in the need for policy evaluation to guide effective 
policy-making. Our preferred approach is to implement new policies incrementally, 
assessing them carefully and, very importantly, consulting thoroughly with affected 
groups, then making adjustments. A just policy change process does not involve one 
policy proposal, tested then implemented. It is a never-ending quest. 
Our specific recommendations are listed below. We provide more detail on each of 
them in Part 6, where we also provide cost estimates and an indication of how the 
recommendations would be implemented—both developed with the help of staff in the 
relevant ministries.  
The total of the estimated annual costs for all the proposals combined is $3.3 to $5.0 
billion, a substantial portion of which could be offset by eliminating the home owner 
grant, with a current annual cost of over $800 million. We divide the recommendations 
between those we believe could be implemented in the short term (the total cost of 
which is about $1.4 billion) and those that would take longer to develop (with a total cost 
of $1.9 to $3.6 billion). 
In comparison, according to simulations presented in Part 5, an income-tested basic 
income with a similar budget would have a maximum benefit amount of less than 
$10,000 if applied to family income, with a benefit reduction rate of 30%. Such a basic 
income would reduce the poverty rate by nearly two percentage points, a tangible 
amount. However, the recommended targeted basic income approaches and targeted 
basic services, together with significant improvements to existing programs that we are 
recommending, would direct those tax dollars much more effectively to address unmet 
basic needs.  
We see these recommendations as a cohesive whole that embodies a vision of a 
province that continually strives to use the power of government and the full set of tools 
at its disposal to balance citizens’ desires for individual autonomy and their need for 
community. It is a place where evidence, outcomes, and the lived experiences of those 
most affected drive changes. It is a place where no one is left behind. And it is a place 
where the reciprocity needed to build and maintain public trust is at the core of public 
discourse. In short, it is a vision of a society that always seeks the elusive balance 
inherent in a just society, knowing that is a never-ending quest.  
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3. Summary of recommendations  
Reform Disability Assistance (DA) into a targeted basic income 
1. Replace disability-related designations 
2. Reform application process 
3. Revise application forms 
4. Eliminate DA asset test 
5. Relax DA income test 
6. Reform adjudication process 
7. Eliminate reassessment 
8. Convert DA to a targeted basic income 
9. Increase DA benefit to the poverty line 
10. Lower DA benefit reduction rate and maintain income exemption 
11. Create public and community employment 
12. Integrate support for addiction and mental health 
13. Review addiction support  
Reform Temporary Assistance (TA) to reduce the “welfare wall” 
14. Eliminate work-search requirement 
15. Engage federal government on COVID-19 recovery benefit rationalization 
16. Initially maintain current TA income test 
17. Increase TA income test threshold in medium term 
18. Eliminate TA asset test 
19. Extend TA streamlined reapplication 
20. Increase TA benefit levels by making COVID-19 emergency $300 supplement permanent 
21. Lower TA benefit reduction rate and maintain income exemption 
22. Evaluate training support 
23. Expand earnings supplement 
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Provide extended health-care benefits to all low-income individuals 
24. Convert extended health supplements to a basic service 
Provide housing support to all low-income renters 
25. Combine Income Assistance support and shelter allowances  
26. Expand targeted supportive housing  
27. Institute a B.C. Rent Assist refundable tax credit 
Provide intensive work support to targeted groups 
28. Establish Assisted to Work basic service 
29. Establish a joint rehabilitation and work support agency 
Enhance support for low-income families with children 
30. Refocus the Child Opportunity Benefit 
Enhance financial and support services for young adults 
31. Increase Ministry of Children and Family Development resources 
32. Enhance transition planning and community support capacity 
33. Extend Agreements with Young Adults education and training duration 
34. Enhance Agreements with Young Adults life-skills support 
35. Extend Assisted to Work eligibility to former youth in care 
36. Create targeted basic income for former youth in care 
37. Initiate basic income with community support engagement 
38. Mandate a ministry to support former youth in care 
39. Establish a B.C. Learning Bond 
40. Contribute to B.C. Learning Bond for children in care 
41. Create a B.C. Career Trek program 
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Enhance financial and support services for people fleeing violence 
42. Enhance housing for people fleeing violence 
43. Create a three-tiered domestic violence program 
Improve precarious employment through labour regulation reform 
44. Develop gig work employment standards 
45. Review Employment Standards Act exclusions 
46. Enhance proactive Employment Standards Act enforcement 
47. Improve employment standards for fissured work 
48. Review Labour Relations Code unionization provisions 
49. Proactively facilitate industry advisory councils 
50. Extend Labour Relations Code successor rights 
51. Rationalize employee definitions across programs 
Improve the way benefit delivery platforms function 
52. Combine refundable tax credits into Dogwood Benefit 
53. Rationalize income definition for income-testing purposes 
54. Engage federal government to reduce tax-filing barriers 
55. Engage federal government to increase tax and benefit delivery responsiveness 
56. Engage federal government to streamline administrative tax data–sharing 
57. Develop an identification and verification platform for non–tax filers to increase benefits access 
58. Automate informing applicants of eligibility for other programs 
59. Enhance cross-program system navigation 
60. Establish system governance 
61. Index Income Assistance rates to changes in the poverty line 
62. Increase Income Assistance staff resources 
63. Rigorously evaluate major reforms 
64. Create linked administrative data for policy development 
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Make ongoing engagement a permanent part of all policies 
65. Set up a human rights–based approach to engagement with those affected 
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Appendix 1-A: Terms of Reference—BC Basic Income Pilot 
Assessment 
To support work government is doing to reduce poverty, the Province will look at 
whether a basic income is an effective way to improve income security, reduce poverty 
and address the impact of technological change. Budget 2018 will provide $4m over two 
years to test the feasibility of a basic income in BC and help find ways to make life 
better for British Columbians. To help guide this work, the province will convene a panel 
of experts and consult with stakeholders for input and advice to help address the gaps 
that exist in the critical income and social supports that British Columbians rely on. 
The committee would consider the viability of a basic income in BC and support the 
simulation of various basic income models in BC to identify impacts and financial 
implications. The committee would also look at BC’s existing income and social support 
system and how elements and principles of a basic income could be used to transform 
and enhance it. The committee will also outline any areas that could be explored further 
through a basic income pilot, as well as pilot design.  
The work of the committee would include consideration of the impact that advances in 
technology and automation and other shifts are predicted to have on the labour market 
over the next several decades. Technological advancements are expected to result in 
the elimination of tens of thousands of jobs, particularly lower-skilled jobs in the service 
sector but also in manufacturing and production. The rise in unemployment and 
precarious employment will put additional stress on existing income support systems, 
which were not designed for these situations. The committee will consider both current 
labour market and future labour market conditions. 
The work of the committee would also consider additional social, economic, and health-
related trends and drivers that are anticipated to impact BC’s population and the income 
and social support system for low income people in BC in the coming years including 
changes in disability prevalence and conditions, advancements in medical treatment 
and assistive technology, demographic shifts including changing family composition and 
an ageing population, and shifting public expectations.  
The committee will consider the following principles when evaluating the viability of a 
basic income in BC and the potential for improvements to BC’s income and social 
support system: 
• reduces poverty 
• enhances income security  
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• improves accessibility to supports for people in need of assistance and people 
with disabilities 
• improves accessibility, effectiveness and cultural appropriateness of supports for 
Indigenous people  
• reduces the unnecessary complexity associated with income and disability 
supports 
• promotes social inclusion and socially beneficial activities 
• improves mental wellbeing and quality of life 
• increases program administration efficiency  
• promotes labour market attachment 
• eases work transitions 
• facilitates the pursuit of education and training 
• eases transitions between different income support programs and between 
income support and employment as applicable 
• supports early intervention to mitigate impacts of life on long-term economic 
security 
• reduces associated social costs of poverty (e.g., on the health-care and criminal 
justice systems) 
• considers impact on government’s fiscal plan 
This approach is similar to the one recently undertaken in Quebec, which led to a 
detailed impact assessment of the potential for basic income through simulations of 
basic income and a report with 23 recommendations on how to improve their income 
and social support system to incorporate some of the benefits of a basic income.  
Specific Mandate 
More specifically, the committee’s mandate is to: 
• oversee simulations of basic income in BC;  
• analyze the components of BC’s current income and social support system; 
• identify gaps in the current income and social support system; 
• identify and analyze the impacts of changing trends outlined above on BC’s 
population and income and social support system; 
• provide recommendations for improving income security in BC through 
implementing elements of basic income; 
o For each of these recommendations, analyze the impacts; assess 
feasibility; identify issues 
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• provide recommendations on any areas that could be further explored through 
pilot programs, as well as pilot design. 
Committee Members 
The expert committee will be comprised of the following: 
Chair:  
• David Green    Vancouver School of Economics (UBC) 
 
Members:  
• Jonathan Rhys Kesselman  School of Public Policy – SFU 
• Lindsay Tedds    School of Public Policy – U Calgary  
Timelines 
The expert committee will start meeting in summer 2018. The committee’s findings and 
recommendations are proposed to be released in several reports over an approximate 
two-year period.  
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1. Introduction 
Our terms of reference include an expansive list of principles that we were directed to 
consider. While we agree with the importance of the listed principles, they do not form a 
cohesive whole because they are not organized around an overarching goal for the 
income and social support system.  
We believe that the ultimate standard against which policy proposals should be 
measured is whether those proposals move B.C. toward being a more just society—one 
that improves lives by providing a basis of dignity for all and respect for each other and 
for society.  
Simply stating that we want policies to move B.C. toward being a more just society is, 
admittedly, providing a vague standard. A necessary first step in devising 
recommendations for policy reforms that are both effective and implementable is to 
specify an analytical framework for evaluating how well alternatives are aligned with our 
broad goal. Part 2 of our report attempts to make the justice theme concrete enough to 
be practically applied as the basis for analysis. We accomplish that by discussing the 
ideals that underpin a just society. Those ideals suggest specific characteristics that we 
would expect just policies to embody. In the remainder of the report, we use those 
characteristics as benchmarks against which we assess policy options for achieving our 
ultimate goal—moving B.C. toward a more just society.  
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2. Ideals of a just society 
To put our practical considerations on a firm footing, we start at a deep level by 
considering the nature of human interactions in society and their implications for what 
might constitute just policies and institutions. We find the argument of Adam Smith, in 
his treatise The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759), instructive, even though its 
language usage sometimes differs from current norms: 
It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by nature to 
that situation for which he was made. All the members of human society 
stand in need of each others [sic] assistance, and are likewise exposed to 
mutual injuries. Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded 
from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the society 
flourishes and is happy. All the different members of it are bound together 
by the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn to 
one common centre of mutual good offices. 
But though the necessary assistance should not be afforded from such 
generous and disinterested motives, though among the members of the 
society there should be no mutual love and affection, the society, though 
less happy and agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved. Society may 
subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense 
of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it 
should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any others, it may 
still be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an 
agreed valuation. 
We are, in part, social animals with a fundamental need for societal connection. This is 
the natural “sympathy” that Adam Smith sets out in his treatise, the quality with which 
we were “fitted by nature.” We are most successful in interacting with the physical world 
and creating the means to survival when we work together. The most effective societal 
institutions recognize and enhance our social nature as well as our individual nature. 
Smith himself argues in the passage above that while one can construct a functioning 
society based only on self-interest, it will not be as good as one that also acknowledges 
our mutual sympathy. Moreover, we believe that true freedom requires social support. 
Markets, for example, may emphasize individual decision-making, but they are 
fundamentally a means of societal coordination. 
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We are also individuals with very heterogeneous notions of our own goals and 
preferences, but also, often, of what makes a fair society. Small-l liberal theories of 
justice emphasize liberty, especially individual rights—respect for individual 
preferences, and providing people with the liberty to pursue their own legitimate notions 
of what is good. Most people in Canadian society share this sentiment, even if we might 
not all give it the primacy it attains in many liberal theories of justice. In practical terms, 
that means public policy choices should support individual liberties, including the right of 
people to hold their own notion of justice rather than imposing a specific theory or 
emphasizing a certain notion of fairness.  
In other words, we are searching for a general notion of justice in society that can be 
widely accepted without requiring agreement on the specific details of what is good. 
Two people could agree, for example, that policies that do not treat people with respect 
are unjust while disagreeing on whether that conclusion is ultimately rooted in a 
religious or a secular humanist conception of what is good. 
Recent liberal thinkers, including John Rawls, argue that the central problem of justice is 
how to balance our social nature with individual rights. Just institutions are equilibrium 
constructs—they should embody notions of justice but also engender support for those 
notions of justice among the citizens in society, who are free to exercise their rights. 
That implies a need to build trust both in the institutions and in fellow citizens. A key 
question concerning a big policy tool like a basic income, or alternatively a fundamental 
reform of the existing income and social support system, is whether it supports that 
trust. Is it something that both the beneficiaries and those who ultimately pay for it see 
as part of a just society? Searching for policies that form an equilibrium in this sense is 
of central importance if we want the policies to last and to help in creating a society in 
which “assistance is reciprocally afforded.” 
This latter consideration is intimately linked with the way that social policies interact with 
and impact the functioning of the economy. Too often, discussions of public policy 
separate justice considerations from economic considerations, focusing on one or the 
other. Proposals to enhance justice are often put forward without considering public or 
private costs, while fiscally driven changes or changes directed toward creating a 
particular economic incentive often give too little consideration to justice. A 
comprehensive analysis of ideas like basic income must consider questions about the 
functioning of the economy—such as impacts on behaviour and how the market assigns 
shares of output—at the same time as thinking about just distributions and how a basic 
income relates to them.  
Part 2: Analytical Framework 
December 28, 2020             Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  52 
The idea of wanting to construct institutions that reflect both economic and justice 
considerations and that engender mutual trust may, at first blush, suggest that we 
should focus on a specific notion of justice in order to form a practical solution. If that 
were true, though, it would be problematic, since it is inconsistent with the ideal of 
respecting the rights of individuals to hold different notions of what is good and just. We 
argue, however, that such a stance is not necessary and that there are enough 
commonalities in concepts of justice to direct us toward a more just society (as defined 
under most notions of justice) without having to decide on the exact destination (which 
theory of justice is best). 
Virtually all theories of justice share an emphasis on both self-respect and the respect 
we get from others in our community—social respect. John Rawls defined a key part of 
his set of primary social goods as the means underlying such respect (Rawls, 1999). 
Martha Nussbaum (2011, p. 34) defines as one of 10 key capabilities that we want for 
our fellow citizens as “having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being 
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.” Even 
libertarian theories, as reflected in the work of Robert Nozick (1974), emphasize 
respecting individual autonomy, which is a key input to self-respect. Thus, a move in the 
direction of greater justice is a move toward greater support for the concepts of self- and 
social respect, both of which derive from widely held societal values.  
The two notions of respect are intertwined. Most people’s self-respect is conditioned by 
values held widely in society and thus is also a basis for social respect. For example, in 
societies where work and earnings are assigned a high social value, many individuals 
will derive self-respect from success in working and earning.  
Support for self- and social respect is also inconsistent with the idea of social support as 
charity rather than as an element of a just society. Charity, historically often the impetus 
behind traditional income and social support programs, is laden with moral judgment 
about who deserves support, and that very judgment saps self- and social respect. By 
underpinning our principles with the idea of justice, from the outset we reject the use of 
distinctions between the “deserving” and “undeserving” as a basis for the design of 
support systems. We recognize that individual needs can differ widely, so fairness 
implies that certain attributes will command an entitlement to greater cash or in-kind 
benefits or services. Such differential treatment is a matter of justice and not charity. 
In these respects, and many others, self- and social respect are inherent in the very 
structure of society. They are founded, in part, on family arrangements and social 
arrangements in a community. For that reason, it is important to consider how any 
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policy affects people’s ability to make social connections and children’s ability to form 
key attachments that support their future ability to feel like they have autonomy, control, 
and social connection. Self- and social respect are also founded on the roles that 
people play in the productive process, broadly defined. This does not have to be limited 
to roles as employees in public or private enterprises—though that is certainly a key 
element—but also roles such as caring for others, helping to construct community 
projects, building human capital, and creating new enterprises. Public policy and 
institutions alter people’s roles in society and, with them, their sense of self- and social 
respect. This is the key sense in which we cannot separate notions of justice from the 
functioning of the economy. 
To summarize, moving toward a more just society depends on recognizing some 
fundamental ideals. Humans are social animals that need social connection, leading to 
the ideal of social respect. Humans are also all unique individuals who need the 
autonomy to exercise their individual preferences and maintain the ideal of self-respect. 
Creating a just society must balance social interest and self-interest, a balancing act 
that is and always has been fundamentally at the heart of public policy decision-making. 
Achieving that balance requires building institutions and policies based on justice rather 
than charity. It also requires that those institutions and policies are perceived to be just 
by all those involved, including both beneficiaries and funders. In short, the overarching 
ideal is to treat all people with dignity. 
Moving forward also requires us to keep in mind how interconnected notions of justice 
are with the functioning of the economy, and generally to take a broad, system-wide 
approach to analysis. Partial analysis that respects only justice implications without 
including economic and financial considerations, or that focuses primarily on financial 
considerations or economic objectives to the exclusion of justice, cannot provide 
satisfactory results. 
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3. Meeting key psychological needs 
While these ideals and observations outline what we mean by our stated goal of 
“moving toward a more just society,” to be useful as a framework for analyzing 
proposals and recommendations it is important to distill them into more concrete, 
practical criteria that can be used directly for comparative analysis.  
We can take a step toward more concrete guideposts by noting the overlap between 
elements of self-respect discussed in the philosophical literature and what psychologists 
have determined are the basis of a “good life.” Key psychological needs are being 
whole and healthy individuals, which involves a sense of autonomy, a sense of efficacy 
or competence, and social connection. This list points back to the argument that we are 
complicated animals with both central social tendencies and strong individual interests.  
As described in psychologists Ryan and Deci’s (2000) summary of self-determination 
theory, providing people with the means to fulfill the three needs of autonomy, efficacy, 
and social connection makes both the individuals and the communities in which they 
live better able to adapt to changes in their environment. People with an integrated 
sense of themselves and their freedom to make choices will be able to adapt, filling 
niches that are to the benefit of all. Those who feel that they are effective will use that 
feeling as a basis for taking productive actions. And a feeling of social connection leads 
to co-operation in working toward the achievement of common goals. Not having these 
needs met pushes people into negative spirals where they are de-motivated or worse. 
Thus, to build a society where people can individually withstand negative shocks and 
collectively help each other to weather storms and rebuild afterwards, we must provide 
as many people as possible with the means to meet their underlying psychological 
needs.  
In a world beset not only by the COVID-19 pandemic and a racial reckoning but also by 
extreme events related to climate change, which are expected to increase, it is at least 
as important to meet basic psychological needs as it is to, say, build higher dikes to 
prepare for rising sea levels. That is, even if one were not to root policies in justice (as 
we believe should be done), practicalities point in the same direction. If we ground our 
policy choices not in the fear-based justifications that are sometimes raised (feed the 
poor or they will break down your gate) but in the positive and more hopeful practicality 
of a more resilient and adaptive society, we can better weather storms together. 
The three psychological needs of autonomy, a sense of efficacy, and social connection, 
then, can serve as touchstones against which we can compare proposed policies. 
Policies that do not provide significant weight to one or more of these are to be 
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distrusted. We set out each of these needs and their practical implications in turn. As we 
will see, this helps reveal characteristics that policies must have if they are to fit with our 
goal of making society more just, in the sense of wider access to the bases of self- and 
social respect. It is those characteristics that we will use as the specific benchmarks in 
our analyses of a basic income and other policies in the remainder of our report. In the 
discussion here, we highlight the characteristics in bold when they arise. 
3.1 Autonomy 
A just system will enhance, or at the very least not encroach on, a person’s need to 
make independent choices and feel that they have an integrated sense of self that can 
initiate actions. This is necessary if people are to feel a sense of self-respect and 
motivation. A just system will also afford them input into the form and content of policies 
that affect them, including some freedom of choice within certain boundaries. And it will 
provide both social and financial security, since one cannot make effective, autonomous 
decisions without a feeling of underlying support. 
In practical terms, supporting autonomy means, first, that a person’s resources must be 
adequate to raise them above destitution, which would instead require them to adopt 
positions of subservience in order to survive. The term “resources” is used here 
advisedly because, as will be seen throughout the report, access to both cash and 
services respectfully provided can support autonomy. The adequacy of resources can 
be measured most directly by examining whether policies reduce poverty.  
By “reducing poverty” we mean not just the narrow concept of reducing the number of 
people below a poverty line but also broader considerations of the depth of their poverty 
and the need to prevent poverty, break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, and 
reduce the disparity in rates and depth of poverty across demographic cohorts.7 The 
use of this broad definition aligns poverty reduction much more closely with the justice-
based underpinnings of our thought process than a sole focus on reducing the poverty 
rate. 
Having support that is adequate on paper without being accessible in practice, though, 
is no support at all. To be accessible, policies must be simple and understandable from 
the user’s perspective. Complex programs that are not well understood or that not 
 
7 The poverty rate is the proportion of people falling below the poverty line, however measured, and the depth of 
poverty is the average gap between the income of those in poverty and the poverty line. There are alternative 
statistical measures of the poverty line but, consistent with the approach in the Poverty Reduction Strategy, we use 
the Market Basket Measure (MBM), as published by Statistics Canada, as the poverty line. 
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everyone knows about create barriers to access and compromise adequacy. They also 
directly challenge people’s notions of dignity—feeling effective and respected. Whether 
a proposed program is accessible ultimately depends not only on the program concept 
but also on its design and operational and administrative details. Systemic racism and 
sexism hidden within programs and systems are important aspects that compromise 
accessibility and dignity, and our analyses must join with other reassessments of our 
society’s institutions to take frank account of the sources of systemic racism and 
patriarchy. 
Supporting autonomy also means providing security, in the sense that the 
underpinnings of both quotidian basics and future opportunity are stable and can be 
counted on. To be effective and to promote dignity, policies should aim to provide 
people with a clear and reliable sense of being supported through difficulties. The ability 
to plan for the future and to play a full role in your community is only possible if you 
don’t feel it could all be taken away in an instant. In part, this is a component of building 
strong communities—ones that engender people’s capacity to support each other in 
hard times. Security goes beyond security of income to include security from adverse 
events and circumstances that can destroy lives without adequate protection. As we 
discuss throughout the report, adequate and secure ongoing income is not enough to 
provide that security in every case; assured access to appropriate services is required 
as well. Security is a key element of preventing poverty and breaking the cycle of 
poverty. 
At the same time as providing a secure and stable basis for decision-making, policies 
must also be responsive to both differences in needs between different people and 
changes in circumstances for individuals, households, and communities. That is, 
programs must be designed to enable different individuals and households to respond 
to their particular circumstances. It must also be capable of changing and evolving to 
respond to society-wide changes, and thus must be responsive to input from both 
beneficiaries—and potential beneficiaries—and those whose primary role is likely to be 
as funders. 
Responsiveness requires flexible programs, allowing evolution in directions needed to 
address changing circumstances at the community level, with input from and influence 
of both those who need support and those who will pay for the support to be provided. 
Responsiveness also means that those using the program have some sense of 
autonomy—the ability to make decisions rather than simply being directed to particular 
outcomes. Without that, there will never be true buy-in of the principles of the program, 
and there will be a constant battle, trying to get recipients to conform to principles to 
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which they never agreed at the outset or gaining the level of public acceptance needed 
to maintain the program. This means treating people not as optimizing subjects to be 
incentivized to actions deemed by some program as “right” but as partners in 
developing the means to meet their needs.8  
Public policies can support a sense of autonomy in this direct way—being responsive to 
those most directly affected by them. They should also support individuals and 
communities in controlling other elements of their social and economic environment. For 
example, workers should have some control over work arrangements, such as 
scheduling of work time, and a just set of institutions will support such control. 
3.2 Efficacy 
To have a meaningful, dignified life people need not only an ability to exercise 
autonomy but also a sense that they are competent and capable—a sense of efficacy. 
This is clearly at the heart of feeling self-respect and of acquiring social respect.  
In practical terms, this relates partly to programs being responsive, since 
responsiveness pays users respect by assuming that they are competent people who 
can make effective choices. There will certainly be failures—we all fail in our choices at 
times. Systems should be built to support people through bad initial decisions, imposing 
sanctions only after repeated bad decisions. That is, they should start from a position of 
assumed trust and capability, but with the underlying notion that recipients have an 
obligation to hold up their side in trying to make effective decisions and move toward 
less dependence on transfer systems to the extent that they are able.  
Efficacy is also closely related to the concept of providing opportunity. A lack of 
genuine opportunity means that the person cannot truly exercise their autonomy and 
competence, even if the right to do so exists in a formal, on-paper sense. A movement 
toward a more just society means providing more people with the opportunity to pursue 
what they value—in their family, mental, physical, emotional, and work lives. This is not 
a guarantee of success in their endeavours but support for the central human desire to 
try. The opposite of this is a sense of hopelessness born out of fear that failure in an 
attempt will lead to destitution, or out of a belief that doors that are supposed to be open 
are not actually open to them—the kind of closed doors created by systemic racism and 
 
8 Amartya Sen (1999) expresses this idea as needing to treat people as “agents” who take an active role in what 
happens to them rather than as “patients” who are merely the recipients of targeted policies designed by cunning 
policy-makers. 
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sexism. Enabling self-respect begins early in life with opportunities for children to form 
successful and supportive attachments. It continues into adulthood with opportunities for 
all to play a respected role in society. Opportunity links directly with breaking the cycle 
of poverty and preventing poverty. 
It is through the attribute of personal efficacy that systemic racism fundamentally 
damages societal justice. Systemic racism and the patriarchy reduce or eliminate 
opportunity, limit autonomy, and sap self- and social respect. This, in turn, leads to 
observed adverse outcomes in terms of health, income and wealth, education, and the 
justice system. 
3.3 Social connection 
We all have a need for social connection—“to seek attachments and experience 
feelings of security, belongingness, and intimacy with others” (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 
252). Policies should provide the material basis for making those attachments—which 
takes us back to the point of adequacy and meeting poverty goals. But they should also 
take account of impacts on building and supporting communities. This is true for the 
direct reason that people need social connection. But it is also true because one cannot 
exercise autonomy or be effective without social support.  
3.4 Transition support 
A system that incorporates the characteristics enumerated above—adequacy, 
accessibility, security, responsiveness, opportunity, and social connection—is one that 
will provide effective transition support. This, indeed, is another practical way to judge 
policies: how they respond to and help in transitions. It includes addressing transitions 
caused by the changing nature of work, but it extends well beyond that to addressing 
transitions in the lives of individuals resulting from circumstances as diverse as 
structural economic changes, climate change, and personal events related to health, 
legal, and family circumstances. It means providing not just insurance to backstop 
people but also a secure basis from which to make personal transitions. As we noted 
earlier, the more people in society who can adapt to and take advantage of transitions, 
the better off we all will be.  
One way to view support through transitions is as social insurance against negative 
events. This is the way Leonard Marsh (1943) framed his template for Canada’s welfare 
state in the landmark 1943 Report on Social Security for Canada. It is possible, though, 
that the insurance frame is too narrow and too focused on negative events—losses of 
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employment, the effects of prolonged illness, and the like. Focusing on providing the 
means to a broad equality of self- and social respect may provide a broader and more 
positive framing. Throughout the report, we will mainly rely on this latter framing, but we 
will also continue to use the language of social insurance when it seems most relevant. 
That tends to occur when we are considering large negative events that require 
substantial short-term supports.  
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4. Public trust 
In our initial discussion about justice, we argued for two key features beyond what might 
constitute notions of fairness: that the nature of just institutions and the functioning of 
the economy are intrinsically linked; and that a truly just set of institutions must be seen 
as just by all involved, including those who are more likely to pay into the system than 
draw benefits from it. Together, these considerations point to two further characteristics 
of just policies that address the issue of gaining and maintaining public trust and 
support.  
The first is policy stability, by which we mean that the policies have sufficiently broad 
support that they will not simply be undone in the next political cycle and that they are 
economically sustainable.  
The second is reciprocity, by which we mean that the policies have the quality of 
generating a society of mutual respect. For those who need support, this is respect for 
their needs and for the contributions they make. For those who are mainly paying to 
fund supports, it is respect shown by not treating the funds as coming from some 
nameless source that can be drawn from at will. This goal is achieved most directly by 
the recipients using the supports to engage as fully and actively in the society and 
economy as they can. Of course, there will be disagreements on what it means to take 
an active role and to respect the needs of others, but the policies should be created and 
implemented in such a way that they encourage respectful discussion on these points.  
Reciprocity is a necessary condition for policy stability, but policy stability also 
incorporates economic and fiscal impacts. Policies will not be stable if the implications 
for the provincial budget or tax burdens are perceived to be negative by a large portion 
of society. They will not be stable if perceived as inducing perverse or inefficient 
responses by beneficiaries. They will also not be stable if they are not efficiently and 
effectively administered, since such waste will be seen by taxpayers as not properly 
respecting what is being asked of them. For similar reasons, the expenditures and 
overall costs must be presented in as transparent a manner as possible. The economic 
impacts of policies and their finance relate very directly to the incentives they create for 
paid employment, training, and investment, as well as for caregiving, volunteering, and 
community building.  
Ultimately, how we view stability and reciprocity is based in how we see the functioning 
of the economy. This brings us back to our statement that society and economic 
production are reflections of our being social animals, very much in need of each other’s 
co-operation. The COVID-19 pandemic crisis, with its revelations about the essential 
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nature of work done in grocery stores and delivery vans as much as the work done in 
hospitals, has shone a bright light on that joint need. Related to this is the notion put 
forward by some proponents of a basic income that the proceeds of production should 
really be seen as a common good able to be redistributed. It is certainly the case that 
we are all the beneficiaries of the stable democratic system and economy built by those 
who came before us. In that sense, as proponents of a basic income sometimes argue, 
we all have some claim to the proceeds of the economy’s productivity. The most original 
innovator stands on the shoulders not just of earlier innovators in their area but of a 
society that provides an educated population, infrastructure, and a political system that 
can be trusted not to arbitrarily abscond with the proceeds of work and investment. 
But we are also individuals with heterogeneous aims and desires, and we generally 
share an agreement that each of us has substantial rights over our labour efforts, 
cumulative savings, and tangible and intellectual property and proceeds from them. Our 
economy solves the problem of the need for co-operation by coordination accomplished 
through individual choices and actions determining market prices and wages in the 
economy. We are seeking policies that balance this dichotomy—the rights of all to a 
share in the production that is made possible by our joint co-operation and the rights of 
individuals to their property and proceeds from the ethical use of that property. Finding 
that balance point is needed for policies to be stable and to acknowledge our reciprocal 
relations with each other.  
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5. Comparison with terms of reference principles 
The terms of reference for this project set out specific considerations (labelled as 
principles) that we are expected to take into account in our work. Table 2-1 compares 
the characteristics we have identified in our discussion with the terms of reference 
principles, showing how we are addressing all of the principles, together with additional 
considerations that flow from the social justice perspective underlying our work. 
Table 2-1: Comparison of characteristics with terms of reference principles 
Characteristics Terms of reference principles 
Adequate resources provided, focused on: 
• poverty reduction, including 
o reducing the poverty rate 
o reducing the depth of poverty 
o preventing poverty  
o breaking the poverty cycle 




Supports early intervention to mitigate impacts 
of life on long-term economic security 
Accessible programs: 
• are simple and understandable 
• have low barriers to access, low stigma 
 
Improves accessibility for people in need, 
persons with disabilities, Indigenous people 
Reduces the unnecessary complexity 
associated with income and disability supports 
Security enhancing programs: 
• provide stable, reliable support 
• offer future opportunity 
 
Enhances income security  
Facilitates the pursuit of education and training 
Responsive programs: 




Eases transitions between different income 
support programs and between income support 
and employment as applicable 
Opportunity-creating programs: 
• enable people to exercise autonomy and 
competence 
 
Facilitates the pursuit of education and training 
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Characteristics Terms of reference principles 
Socially inclusive programs: 
• act to build community 
 
Promotes social inclusion and socially beneficial 
activities 
Response to transitions through: 
• creating resiliency to respond to crises, 
personal and societal 
• broad equality of self- and social respect 
 
Eases work transitions 
 
Policy stability requires consideration of: 
• fiscal implications 
• efficient administration 
• economic incentives and impacts 
 
 
Increases program administration efficiency 
Reduces associated social costs of poverty 
(e.g., on the health-care and criminal justice 
systems) 
Considers impact on government’s fiscal plan  
Promotes labour market attachment 
Reciprocity requires: 
• beneficiaries to take responsibility for 
playing the fullest and most active role in 
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6. Conclusion 
We began our discussion by defining the ideals of a just society and economy, arguing 
that they are built on providing the means of self- and social respect to the broadest 
possible set of members of the society. That is not limited to material means but 
includes the bases of social connection and strong communities. We also argued that 
the justice of a society cannot be disentangled from the functioning of its economy, and 
that in a truly just society all of its members will recognize the justness of its institutions, 
even if to varying degrees. From this broad set of considerations we derived a list of 
specific characteristics of just policies: adequacy, accessibility, security, 
responsiveness, opportunity, social connection, policy stability, and reciprocity. In the 
remainder of this report, we will continually refer back to these characteristics, asking 
whether specific policy options—both basic incomes and others—contain these 
features.  
But setting out the characteristics is far from the end of the story, as those 
characteristics are not infrequently in conflict with one another. Thus, any policy 
prescription will of necessity implicitly or explicitly set out a balance that reflects choices 
based on values and relative priorities—which of course is true of every public policy 
choice.  
Differences between characteristics related to individual choice (autonomy and, to some 
extent, efficacy) and those related to social goals (social inclusion, policy stability, and 
reciprocity) reveal a key tension that arises frequently when considering public policy 
choices. Freedom of choice is viewed as being of paramount importance in the 
libertarian framing of the optimal state, pointing toward a minimalist state. Social 
considerations are given more weight in collectivist views in which the state is seen as 
an effective reflection of communal goals. In policy terms, as we will see, a basic 
income fits with a view putting more weight on autonomy and individual choice. The 
core idea is to give people the monetary resources to make the choices that are best for 
them. This potentially includes decisions to use these monetary resources as the basis 
for taking pro-social actions such as volunteering, but those are ultimately a matter of 
individual choice.  
In a different, though related, dimension, policies can vary in their paternalism—how 
much is determined by the government without providing real agency to recipients. 
Even benefits delivered indirectly through community-based charitable organizations, 
including religious organizations are, at least at times, quite paternalistic. A basic 
income is the opposite: individual based and delivered in a way that involves a minimum 
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of paternalism. Our current system is a mixture – focused mainly on delivering benefits 
to the individual rather than being concerned about community building, but with 
intrusive, paternalistic elements. 
We believe that it is possible to find a mid-point where the advantages of social support 
approaches (such as their potential to help in building resilient communities and using 
the more social part of our nature to deliver more effective supports) are balanced with 
providing as much autonomy and sense of self-efficacy as possible. Our discussion—
starting from our dual human natures as both individuals and social beings and working 
to a list of desirable policy characteristics—reflects such a balance. Our goal is to 
present a set of policies that strike this balance. In practical terms, we see potential in 
an approach based on human rights, in which access to supports and services are 
viewed from the perspective of meeting international human rights accords to which 
Canada is a signatory. Taking this perspective means that recipients can interact with 
social programs from a basis of strength rooted in their acknowledged rights. The recent 
federal National Housing Strategy is built on such a human rights approach, leading to 
the development of elements such as an ombudsperson and stakeholder advisory 
councils.  
An important implication of using that approach is that, while one can apply it to specific 
programs and policy alternatives, it is fundamentally a systemic approach that forces 
one to put specific proposals into a broad system context, something that all too rarely 
happens. What matters is not only what services are delivered and that they are part of 
a coordinated system but also how policy change is made and implemented—it must be 
done in a way that includes those affected as equals whose opinion matters. 
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1. Introduction 
Part 3 provides background information that is used throughout our analysis of the 
current system (Part 4) and basic income options (Part 5), and in developing our 
recommendations (Part 6).  
Here we address five topics. In Section 2, we provide an overview of poverty in B.C. 
Although reducing poverty is not our sole concern in this report, understanding how 
poverty is measured, how the rate and depth of poverty have changed over time and 
why, and examining poverty in different demographic groups is an important foundation 
for our work. Among other things, it helps us understand what policies have been 
effective and to identify some of the groups that have been left behind and need 
particular attention. 
In Section 3 we review the B.C. fiscal situation and potential sources of additional 
revenue. Enhancements to the B.C. income and social support system are likely to 
impose additional costs, whether these come in the form of a generally available basic 
income or through reforms to the current system. An understanding of B.C.’s fiscal 
situation and the opportunities to raise additional revenues are important context for 
determining what might be fiscally feasible. 
Section 4 provides a review of labour market trends in B.C. It is useful for two reasons. 
First, one of the reasons commonly put forward for implementing a basic income is that 
work is being changed radically because of technological innovation, leading to a need 
for a policy response. This section tests the assertion that work is already changing. In 
addition, the functioning of the labour market is important in ensuring that workers have 
the opportunity for stable, satisfying jobs where they are respected. The degree to 
which that is the case is a factor in how many people find themselves in need of income 
and social supports.  
In Section 5 we set out an approach for analyzing income-tested programs and their 
economic implications in terms of labour supply, explaining, in part, why giving people 
income-tested resources tends in some cases to affect the amount they work. Most 
income and social support programs are income-tested, and so are the majority of basic 
income proposals. This section helps us analyze these programs throughout the report 
and to design recommended changes to existing programs. 
In Section 6 we outline the basis for our work. We describe the research that we 
commissioned to help answer some of the important questions associated with basic 
income and our current system. It highlights the results of consultations we conducted 
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with interested groups and individuals, which provided us with guidance that was 
instrumental in addressing this challenging topic. We also commissioned a public 
survey to help us better understand public attitudes toward not only the basic income 
concept but also how it might be designed. 
Taken collectively, these five disparate topics all contributed to the approach and 
content of the report, and support our conclusions and recommendations. 
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2. Poverty in British Columbia 
This section is an abridged version of a paper prepared for the panel as part of our 
research program (Petit & Tedds, 2020e). It provides the basic context for what poverty 
is, how it is measured, and the situation in British Columbia. While our goal of moving 
toward a more just society is not limited to poverty reduction, the discussion in Part 1 
and the panel’s terms of reference make it clear that poverty reduction is a key element. 
It is therefore important to start with a clear understanding of what we mean by poverty, 
what the rate and depth of poverty are in B.C. at present, and how different groups 
within the population are affected. 
As discussed in Part 1, we take a broad approach in considering poverty reduction. 
Poverty reduction is often conceptually limited to reducing the proportion of people 
below a poverty line—the poverty rate. Our concept expands that to include reducing 
the depth of poverty—how far people in poverty are below the poverty line—as well as 
preventing poverty, breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty, and ensuring that 
specific groups in society are not disproportionately affected by poverty. However, the 
parts of poverty reduction that can be most easily measured are the poverty rate and, to 
a lesser extent, the depth of poverty; this section focuses on these statistics. It 
discusses the poverty rates for various demographic groups and the depth of poverty for 
each of the groups, after first discussing what poverty is and how it can be measured. It 
also discusses the results of using the Gini coefficient to measure distributional effects. 
It should be kept in mind that most of the statistics on poverty presented here span 
2006–2018. (Unless otherwise noted, all of the figures in this section present data for 
Vancouver,9 B.C., and Canada, 2006–2018 sourced from Statistics Canada data related 
to the 2008 Market Basket Measure base.) The COVID-19 pandemic, which began late 
in the panel’s work, will have a significant impact on poverty in B.C. However, as this 
report is being prepared, the pandemic is far from over and the statistics that will make 
the effects of the pandemic clear will not be available until well after our work has been 
completed.  
2.1 Defining poverty 
Defining poverty is not an easy task; regardless of how one defines it, the definition will 
be contested, disputed, and debated. There is wide variation in understandings of what 
 
9 Specifically, the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area. 
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poverty is. Some poverty scholars focus on (the lack of) economic well-being—that is, 
they measure deficiencies in quantifiable factors such as income, wealth, or 
consumption. Other scholars focus on capability poverty, as advocated by Nobel 
Laureate Amartya Sen, defined as the actual opportunities a person has and their 
capability to achieve the various things a person has reason to value, such as good 
health and participation in society. In Sen’s definition, poverty is complex and multi-
faceted and moves beyond a simple lack of income, with elements that resonate with 
our goal of moving toward a just society set out in Part 2 (Sen, 1999).  
We also recognize that poverty is complex. And while income is only a single aspect of 
poverty, it is the most easily measured indicator. The Government of British Columbia 
has therefore chosen to examine poverty by looking at income (or the lack of it) and has 
set its poverty targets accordingly. As such, this report follows suit and defines the 
poverty rate as the fraction of the population living with low income (i.e., income below a 
specified threshold).  
Statistics Canada has developed three measures of low income for Canada: the low 
income measure (LIM), the low income cut-off (LICO), and the Market Basket Measure 
(MBM) (Statistics Canada, 2015). Both the LIM and the LICO compare a family’s 
income with a predefined income threshold—LIM threshold is one-half of the median 
income in that year; LICO threshold is the income level at which a family is likely to 
spend 20 percentage points more of their income than the average family on food, 
shelter, and clothing. LICO is based on spending patterns measured by the 1992 Family 
Expenditures Survey, adjusted for inflation.  
Until the mid-1990s, the LIM and LICO were relatively consistent, but by 2018 the 
overall Canadian LIM poverty rate was 12.3% and the LICO poverty rate was 7.3%. 
Those arguing that poverty had fallen would point to the LICO, while those arguing that 
poverty had not changed would point to the LIM.  
To address this divergence and issues with both measures, Statistics Canada devised 
the Market Basket Measure (MBM) of poverty in the early 2000s (Statistics Canada, 
2016b). Calculating the MBM threshold involves costing out a basket of goods and 
services associated with a modest standard of consumption adjusted for family size and 
geographical region. The MBM poverty rate compares family disposable income (total 
income less income taxes and non-discretionary spending) with the MBM threshold. 
The use of disposable income is important because it better reflects income available to 
purchase goods and services.  
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The Government of Canada chose MBM as Canada’s official poverty line in 2018; it 
also developed a national poverty reduction strategy and set poverty reduction targets 
in An Act Respecting the Reduction of Poverty (Government of Canada, 2018). B.C. 
has likewise chosen the MBM as its official legislated poverty measure. As a result, the 
MBM is the measure of poverty used throughout this report. It is not a perfect measure 
of poverty, but no measure is.  
In September 2020 Statistics Canada released updated MBM threshold estimates. The 
previously available information was known as the “2008 base,” which is what is 
reported in this paper. The new information is the “2018 base.” The two bases and their 
differences are discussed below. We have chosen to continue to use the 2008 base 
because the 2018 base is only available for the years 2015–2018 and the trends 
evident in the longer 2006–2018 time series available for the 2008 base are important to 
our analysis. 
2.2 Using MBM to measure poverty 
The following MBM statistical measures are available for 2006–2018:  
• Income thresholds—defined as the disposable income below which someone 
would be considered living in poverty  
• Low-income rates—defined as the proportion of people living with disposable 
income below the MBM threshold 
• Depths of low income (average gap ratio)—defined as the gap between the MBM 
income thresholds and the average income of those whose income is below the 
MBM; the bigger the gap, the further below the MBM income threshold the group 
is on average 
Before describing these poverty measures further and providing recent data, it’s 
important to mention some caveats. First, the poverty statistics examined here do not 
provide a complete picture of the circumstances of those living in poverty. Income 
poverty is but one aspect of poverty. In particular they do not provide any information 
about the cycle of poverty—the extent to which a child born into poverty is more likely to 
live in poverty as an adult, or an adult’s likelihood of living in poverty for the rest of their 
life once they become impoverished. Addressing the cycle of poverty is essential to 
ensuring that, once lifted out of poverty, an individual or family remains out of poverty 
forever, the true objective of poverty reduction.  
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Consideration of the various components that lead to the cycle of poverty are the focus 
of several of the papers commissioned by the panel, as are the reasons for poverty, 
along with wage, consumption, and wealth inequality, particularly ownership of assets, 
financial literacy and access to financial services. 
Finally, the MBM framework generally does not include the value of in-kind public 
supports, such as subsidized housing or child care. To the extent that a family can 
access such support, the income they need to be above poverty is lower than these 
statistics show. This measurement issue is important to the extent that future expanded 
benefits mainly take the in-kind format, as recommended by this panel. 
2.3 MBM poverty thresholds 
MBM poverty statistics are calculated by comparing family income with the MBM 
income threshold and aggregating the results across the population to determine the 
poverty rate and average gap ratio for the population. The calculation is complex 
because the applicable MBM income threshold for a given family depends on the size of 
the family and where it resides. 
The MBM is based on an “economic family,” which is a different concept than is used for 
income tax and census purposes. The economic family refers to a group of two or more 
persons living in the same dwelling who are related by blood, marriage, common-law 
marriage, or adoption, including foster children. There is no age limit associated with 
children or other blood relatives included in the economic family group. The census 
family definition treats adult children in the same manner as the economic family 
definition, including adult children living with parents in the census family. 
In contrast, the concept used for income tax purposes is the “nuclear family,” which 
treats each adult child who lives with their parents as their own separate nuclear family. 
That matters because an adult child living with their parents may qualify for income-
tested benefits even though they are not actually living in poverty because of parental 
support, which the tax system does not capture. Many such adult children are engaged 
in post-secondary education or other labour force training, a further complication. For 
poverty policy purposes it would be useful to be able to distinguish in tax data between 
those not being supported, those engaged in education, and those not participating in 
work or education. 
The MBM approach applies a scaling factor of the square root of the family size to 
increase the threshold as family size increases. That is, the threshold for a couple is the 
square root of 2 times the amount for a single person (scaling factor of about 1.41), and 
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for a family of four the scaling factor is 2. For example, if the MBM poverty threshold for 
a single person living alone is $20,000, the corresponding threshold for an adult couple 
residing together is about 1.41 times that amount or $28,200. This reflects the 
economies achieved by living together and is used in Part 5 when we consider basic 
income designs.  
As mentioned above, thresholds also vary with geography. Specific threshold levels are 
estimated for major cities across Canada, as well as for urban areas with different 
population ranges and rural areas for each province. That reflects differences in the cost 
of living experienced in different areas, enabling poverty statistics to more accurately 
reflect the diversity of living costs across Canada. Geographic differences in the MBM 
threshold will be important considerations as the province considers how to devise 
appropriate poverty policies. 
Figure 3-1: MBM 2008 base income thresholds, B.C. 
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Figure 3-1 displays the MBM 2008 base income thresholds for a representative family of 
four (two adults and two children) in B.C. for Vancouver, and regions in three population 
categories. As noted above, the level for a family of four is twice the level for a single 
adult. For different family sizes, divide the amount for representative family by two and 
multiply by the square root of the number of family members. Panel A shows how MBM 
thresholds have changed over time, and how those trends vary with population size. 
Unsurprisingly, Vancouver is the most expensive area to live in B.C., but closely 
followed by other major urban areas. It is also interesting that communities of less than 
30,000 people and rural areas (not shown but with very similar trends) are more 
expensive than mid-sized areas with population up to 100,000 primarily due to 
transportation costs. 
Figure 3-2: MBM 2008 base and 2018 base income thresholds, B.C.  
 
Figure 3-2 compares the MBM 2008 base to the MBM 2018 base for Vancouver and 
CMAs with less than 30,000 population. The bases changed because the methodology 
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used to calculate the thresholds has changed to better reflect the needs of a 
representative family and patterns of spending shown in the 2016 census data.  
Panel A indicates that the thresholds have increased significantly, by 19.8% and 10.5% 
respectively for 2018. That means that the number of people considered to be in 
poverty has increased significantly as a result of adjusting the threshold base. For 
British Columbia as a whole, changing the base has increased the measured poverty 
rate from 8.9% to 12.1%. Panel A also shows that the trend over the past four years (all 
that is available for the 2018 base) has been similar for the two bases. That suggests 
that in terms of longer trends, the 2008 base can still provide useful insights. 
Panel B compares the 2018 threshold components for the two areas under the two 
bases. It shows that there have been no material changes for food and clothing. 
Transportation shows a small decrease in small communities (15%) and a significant 
increase in Vancouver (40%). The major increases in both areas comes in shelter, up 
by 33% and 40% respectively. Other expenses are up by about 12% in both areas. 
The increase in the shelter component has policy implications for B.C. and reinforces 
the ongoing concerns about the impact of rising shelter costs generally, but especially 
on low-income families. 
2.4 Poverty rates in B.C. 
B.C.’s poverty rates have historically been high compared with Canada as a whole, with 
Vancouver being higher than the rest of the province, as shown in Figure 3-3. In 2006, 
poverty rates in B.C. and Vancouver were much higher than the overall rate for Canada. 
Since then, all three poverty rates have declined. The trend has been for the gaps both 
between the Vancouver and B.C. rates and between the B.C. rates and the rate for 
Canada to close. In 2018, the poverty rate was 9.4% in Vancouver, 8.9% in B.C., and 
8.7% in Canada.  
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Figure 3-3: MBM overall poverty rates, Canada, B.C., Vancouver  
 
Poverty rates by age group 
The convergence of the poverty rates for Vancouver, B.C., and Canada, especially 
since 2017, is noteworthy. Yet it leaves unanswered the question as to why poverty 
rates have been and continue to be higher in B.C. than in Canada.  
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Figure 3-4: MBM poverty rates by age, Canada, B.C., and Vancouver 
 
Klein et al. (2017) had previously argued that B.C. had a much higher poverty rate than 
Canada for five reasons:  
• the lack of a provincial poverty reduction strategy, until very recently  
• high child poverty rates  
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• a larger senior population, particularly single senior women with limited work-
related pension income  
• wage rates that do not keep pace with costs, especially housing costs  
• income and disability assistance rates far below the income thresholds needed to 
lift people above the poverty line.  
In 2016 the federal government introduced the Canada child benefit and in 2017 the 
B.C. government introduced a poverty reduction strategy, increased the minimum wage, 
brought in measures to tame housing costs, and raised income and disability assistance 
rates. It may be that these measures contributed to the reduction in poverty seen since 
2017. 
We can explore some of these considerations by breaking down poverty rates by age, 
as shown in Figure 3-4. Panel A shows that in 2006, poverty rates for children10 
(persons under 18 years) in B.C. were substantially higher than for Canada, but that 
gap had closed substantially by 2012. Since then, child poverty rates have continued to 
fall and converge, until in 2018, child poverty rates in Vancouver were 6.1% compared 
with 6.9% in B.C., and the child poverty rate for Canada was higher, at 8.2%. 
Panel B shows poverty rates for working-age adults11 (ages 18–64), which exhibit 
similar trends to child poverty rates. Poverty rates start high in 2006 and since then 
have trended downward and converged substantially. By 2018, poverty rates for 
working-age adults had dropped to 10.7% in Vancouver, 10.5% for all of B.C., and 
10.3% for Canada. 
Panel C shows a different story for poverty rates among seniors (age 65+). Poverty 
rates for seniors in Vancouver and B.C. are and always have been significantly higher 
than for Canada. By 2018, all three rates had dropped to the point where seniors had 
the lowest poverty rates of all age groups, but the geographical differences are 
noteworthy. While only 3.5% of seniors were living in poverty in Canada in 2017, 5.1% 
of seniors in B.C. and 7.6% of seniors in Vancouver were living in poverty.  
 
10 For the child poverty measure, the disposable income of the economic family in which the child resides is 
compared with the relevant MBM threshold.  
11 Working-age adults include both working-age adults in economic families (i.e., couples with and without children 
and singles with children) and persons not in economic families (i.e., working-age single adults with no children). For 
each working-age adult, the disposable income of the economic family (or single without children) is compared with 
the relevant MBM threshold. 
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In summary, poverty rates for all three age groups in B.C. have fallen since 2006, with 
the largest decline in child poverty, which has now fallen below the national average. 
The age group with the lowest poverty rate is seniors, at 5.1%, but this is higher than 
the national average. Working-age adults are close to the national average but have the 
highest poverty rates among the three groups. Note that senior and working-age 
poverty rates have decreased over the period, while the proportion of the population in 
B.C. that is senior and working-age has risen (Statistics Canada, 1996, 2019a). 
Poverty targets and trends in B.C. 
B.C. has set legislative targets for the overall poverty rate and the poverty rate for 
children (there are no specific targets set for Vancouver or other jurisdictions in B.C.). 
Using the 2016 MBM poverty rate of 12% for both overall poverty and child poverty, the 
poverty reduction target is set to reduce overall poverty rates in B.C. by 25% by 2024, 
yielding a target of 9%, and to reduce child poverty by 50% by 2024, yielding a target of 
6%. The dashed lines in Figure 3-5 show that B.C. met its legislative target for overall 
poverty in 2018 and is very close to meeting its child poverty target. Note that these 
targets were established in reference to the MBM 2008 base and it is, as yet, unknown 
whether the targets will be updated as a consequence of the MBM 2018 base being 
introduced. 
Figure 3-5: Poverty rates and legislative targets, B.C.  
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It is also unknown how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected measured poverty rates to 
this point and how those rates will change as the pandemic continues and eventually 
abates, but it is likely the effects will be felt for a considerable period of time. 
Government will be faced with decisions about how best to manage those 
consequences of the pandemic, and to prepare for future widespread disruptive events 
whether related to financial, pandemic, climate change or some other type of crisis. 
Figure 3-6: MBM poverty rates for families with children, Canada and B.C. 
 
Poverty rates by family type 
It is also important to consider poverty rates by family type. Figure 3-6 shows poverty 
rates for families with children. This includes single-parent families and two-parent 
families.  
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Figure 3-7: MBM poverty rates for family types without children 
 
Poverty rates for single-parent families are, unsurprisingly, higher than for two-parent 
families, but they have dropped substantially. 12  As for child poverty rates, single-parent 
family poverty rates in B.C. have fallen from one and half times the national average to 
below the national average over the 12-year period. A similar result occurred for two-
 
12 Due to poor data quality related to poverty rates in Vancouver by family type, only data for B.C. and Canada is 
presented here. However, the trends noted above suggest that poverty rates are regularly higher in Vancouver than 
in either B.C. or Canada, a fact for the province to keep in mind in designing its anti-poverty policies. 
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parent families, but the result is a two-parent poverty rate of only 5.2% and a single-
parent rate over three times as high, at 18.6%. 
Turning to working-age adults (ages 18–64) without children, Figure 3-7 shows that the 
gap between the B.C. and Canada poverty rates has been relatively small, and while 
there has been some reduction in rates since 2015 it has not been as dramatic as the 
reductions seen in the previous figures.  
The key observation is that the poverty rates for single adults are very high compared 
with couples with or without children and single parent families. One in three single 
working-age adults lives in poverty. This is an important fact for the province to keep in 
mind, as the proportion of single working-age adults is increasing in Canada and in B.C. 
If the poverty rate for this group remains high, as the proportion of single adults 
increases it will be increasingly difficult for the B.C. government to continue to meet its 
target for the overall poverty rate in B.C.  
Single working-age adults have historically has not been well served by income and 
social support programs. These observations support considering policies that focus on 
reducing poverty for this group in any policy reform initiative. 
Given the differences between poverty rates for working-age singles and for couples, it 
is worth revisiting poverty rates for seniors. Panel C presents poverty rates for single 
seniors: they are over twice as high as for seniors overall (Figure 3-3, Panel C). Also, 
compared with other groups, the single senior poverty rate has not converged as much 
with the national rate, leaving B.C. with relatively high rates. This shows that the low 
overall senior poverty rate is driven by low poverty rates among seniors in couples.  
Poverty rates by sex 
One final categorization to consider is that related to sex. Figure 3-8 tells a familiar 
story, which is remarkably consistent for the two sexes. While women historically had a 
marginally higher poverty rate than men, their poverty rates have converged. By 2018 
both sexes had similar poverty rates across the jurisdictions, but with women now 
having slightly lower poverty rates than men. Overall, poverty rates in Vancouver and 
B.C. are higher than for Canada for both sexes, but they have converged significantly.  
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Figure 3-8: MBM poverty rates by sex 
 
Figure 3-9 breaks down the poverty rates by sex for single parents, working-age 
singles, and single seniors for 2018.13 Most striking are the rates for single parents and 
seniors. Single childless working-age adults have similarly high rates for men and 
women, although women are somewhat higher for B.C. and Canada. For single parents, 
the surprise is that fathers have a higher poverty rate than single mothers in B.C., and a 
much higher rate than the national rate. Similarly, for seniors, men have a substantially 
higher poverty rate than women.  
 
13 Due to poor data quality related to poverty rates in Vancouver by sex and family type, only data for B.C. and 
Canada are presented here. 
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Figure 3-9: MBM poverty rates by sex and family type, B.C. and Canada, 2018 
 
Poverty rates by Aboriginal identity and visible minority 
Finally, we examine poverty rates for those identifying as Aboriginal14 and those with 
visible minority status in the 2016 census, shown on Figure 3-10. MBM poverty rates 
are not available for these groups in the census data, so the low income measure, after 
tax (LIM-AT) is used to measure the poverty rate. While not directly comparable to the 
MBM poverty rates shown earlier, the relative poverty rates are of interest. 
 
14 Note that low-income concepts are not applied on Indian Reserves by the census because of substantial in-kind 
transfers and barter economies that make interpretation of low-income statists difficult. 
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Figure 3-10: Low income measure after tax poverty rates, Aboriginal identity and visible 
minority, 2016 
  
For both Canada and B.C., poverty rates for those with Aboriginal identity and with 
visible minority status are similar. These reported poverty rates for those with Aboriginal 
identity and visible minorities are about 60% and 40% higher respectively than those for 
the general population. Poverty rates for visible minorities vary considerably across 
visible minority groups.  
This reinforces the need for Indigenous people as a group to be given careful and 
inclusive consideration, as we recognized when planning our work. As indicated in Part 
1 of the report, the pandemic crisis prevented the collaborative process that had begun 
from being completed, and we have recommended that it continue as a separate 
process. 
In addition, the data suggests that visible minorities also require public policy 
consideration in the income and social support policy area, as well as other social policy 
spheres, including health, justice, education, and advanced education, in order to 
address historic and ongoing systemic racism. Income and social support programs can 
be both sources of systemic racism and tools of redress. 
Summary: Poverty rates 
The poverty trends presented here clearly show that single persons have very high 
rates of poverty. The family type with the highest rate of poverty in B.C. (and Canada) in 
2018 is working-age single adults, with working-age single females being the highest 
overall at 32.7%. Policies targeting child poverty reduction have evidently had a 
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discernible impact on poverty rates for both children and their parents. No longer are 
single parents the family type experiencing the highest rates of poverty; however, their 
poverty rates are still high, at 22.3%. It is also clear that couples experience the lowest 
rates of poverty, while singles experience the highest rate of poverty. While this finding 
is not surprising, it is an important fact for the province to note, given that singles are a 
growing form of family type (Statistics Canada, 2017; Tang et al., 2019).  
2.5 Depth of poverty in B.C.  
The next set of statistics considers the depth of poverty, defined as the gap between the 
MBM income thresholds and the average income of those whose income is below the 
MBM. Depth of poverty is measured by the “average gap ratio”—the bigger the gap, the 
greater the depth of poverty.15 The average gap ratio is expressed as a percentage of 
the MBM income thresholds. For example, a family of four living in Vancouver with an 
income of $30,000 and an MBM income threshold of $40,644 would have a gap ratio of 
26.2%. The average gap ratio for a given population (e.g., all families of four) is the 
average of these values as calculated for each family. 
Examining depth of poverty over time is potentially problematic, as interpretation of the 
movement over time is difficult. Consider this example: Suppose there are only two 
families. Family A has an income of $19,000/year and family B has an income of 
$15,000/year. Otherwise, both families are exactly the same. Suppose as well that the 
poverty line is $20,000. Given these incomes, the average gap ratio is 15%. Suppose 
that due to some policy change, both families receive an extra $1,000 of income. Family 
A is moved out of poverty to an income of $20,000 and family B remains in poverty with 
an income of $16,000. After this policy change, the average gap ratio is 20%—the 
average gap ratio has gotten worse even though both families have a higher income. 
Thus, as the average poverty gap increases, it is possible that all families are better off. 
This occurs because as there is an improvement in poverty reduction—that is, there are 
fewer families with income below the income threshold, and the number of 
persons/families over which the average gap ratio is measured decreases.  
Regardless of the fact that care must be taken in interpreting the average gap ratio, it is 
useful in assessing how many resources are needed at a given point in time to 
eradicate poverty through a perfectly targeted cash transfer. For example, an average 
 
15 More specifically, the average gap ratio is computed as follows: AGR = 1𝑛 ∑ (𝑧−𝑦𝑖)𝑧𝑛𝑖=1   where z is the income 
threshold, yi is individual i’s income, and n is the number of persons/families under the poverty line.  
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gap ratio of 15% means that a perfectly targeted cash transfer that is 15% of the poverty 
line is needed to eradicate poverty. This provides a sense of the intensity of poverty. 
Additionally, adding consideration of the average gap ratio to the traditional focus on the 
poverty rate has implications for policy decision-making related to meeting defined 
poverty reduction targets because there is a trade-off between an improved poverty rate 
and an improved average gap ratio. On one hand, the government could focus on 
moving those persons/families just below the poverty line to the poverty line (or above). 
This would decrease the poverty rate but could potentially increase the average gap 
ratio. On the other hand, focusing on those persons/families in the greatest depths of 
poverty and helping them move closer to or above the poverty line would decrease the 
average gap ratio but may have less impact on the poverty rate.  
Figure 3-11: MBM average gap ratio, Canada, B.C. and Vancouver 
 
Figure 3-11 presents the average gap ratio overall in Canada, B.C., and Vancouver. It 
shows that the trend for B.C. has been generally flat, although it has increased 
somewhat for Canada over the period, while the MBM poverty rate has been falling, as 
shown earlier. That demonstrates the point made above and suggests that reductions in 
poverty rates have affected those at all levels of poverty about equally. Those changes 
have benefited both those just below the poverty threshold and those at the very 
bottom. 
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Figure 3-12: MBM average gap ratio by age, Canada, B.C., and Vancouver  
 
Depth of poverty by age group 
The panels in Figure 3-12 present the depth of poverty by age group. What stands out 
is the drop in the depth of poverty for children in B.C. and Vancouver between 2016 and 
2018. The fact that child poverty rates have also declined significantly over this period is 
good news. It will be important to track how the introduction of the new B.C. Child 
Opportunity Benefit in October 2020 affects these trends.  
Part 3: Background 
December 28, 2020             Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  91 
In 2018 working-age adults had the largest average gap ratios, while seniors and 
children had relatively similar average gap ratios. It is also noteworthy that for all 
children and working-age adults, the average gap ratios in B.C. and Vancouver are 
consistent with Canada’s. Overall, this tells us that working-age persons who were in 
poverty were the deepest in poverty in 2018, and it will take a larger cash transfer to 
eradicate poverty for this group. 
Depth of poverty by family type 
Figure 3-13: MBM average gap ratio for families with children, Canada and B.C. 
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Figures 3-13 and 3-14 present the average gap ratio for families with children and 
without children respectively.16 The results over time reveal little, although the 
improvement for two-parent families since 2016 contrasts with the lack of change for 
single-parent families. 
Figure 3-14: MBM average gap ratio for families without children, Canada and B.C.  
 
 
16 Vancouver is omitted here due to poor data quality. Depth of poverty in Vancouver is likely to be slightly higher than 
in B.C. 
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As a result of that drop, in 2018 the average gap ratio for single-parent families is much 
higher than for two-parent families. Comparatively, non-elderly persons/families with no 
children have an even higher average gap ratio than families with children. Working-age 
single adults with no children have the highest average gap ratio across all family types. 
As we saw with poverty rates, this supports two observations made earlier: 
• Child benefits are helping families with children in terms of both the rate and 
depth of poverty.  
• Single working-age adults without children are currently the worst-off 
demographic group we have identified, with higher poverty rates and higher 
average gap ratios. 
Figure 3-15: Income relative to MBM by family type, B.C., 2016 
 
Seniors have the lowest depth of poverty of any age group. While only single seniors 
are shown (because of data quality), their average gap ratio was much lower than for 
seniors overall in 2018—16.8% compared with 21.3%. This means that the average 
income of single seniors in poverty is closer to the MBM thresholds than that of seniors 
in couples. While the poverty rate for seniors in couples is much lower than for single 
seniors, it means that seniors in couples who are in poverty have much lower average 
income relative to their MBMs than single seniors, who have a much higher poverty 
rate.  
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Finally, Figures 3-15 and 3-16 provide a different perspective on the depth of poverty by 
taking a more in-depth look at the distribution of income levels relative to the MBM by 
family type.17 Figure 3-15 shows, for different family types of all ages in B.C., the 
distribution of disposable income relative to the MBM in 2016 with the proportions 
adding to 100% for each for each panel. Families with income below the black dashed 
line are considered to be living in poverty. Single parents and single adults are the most 
likely to have incomes of less than 60% of the MBM (<0.6 on the horizontal axis) 
whereas couples (both with and without children) are the most likely to have incomes 
greater than three times the MBM (>3.0 on the horizontal axis). 
Figure 3-16: Income relative to MBM by family type and age, B.C., 2016 
 
Figure 3-16 presents the distribution of income compared with the MBM by family type 
and age group. For each age cluster in each of the panels, the proportions add to 
100%. For single parents and single adults, persons aged 18–25 are the most likely to 
have an income of less than 60% of the MBM.  
The poverty rates for single persons aged 18–25 should be treated cautiously. While the 
MBM framework uses an economic family definition, these proportions were calculated 
using income tax data. In the tax data, those aged 18–25 are considered an 
 
17 This data analysis uses the T1 Final tax statistics for 2016, and the results were provided by the B.C. Ministry of 
Finance.  
Part 3: Background 
December 28, 2020             Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  95 
independent economic unit even if they live in the same dwelling as their parents. In 
addition, it makes no adjustment if they are in education, employment, training, or none 
of these categories. That is, these figures include both those aged 18–25 who are being 
supported by their parents, some living in their family’s home, and may not be truly 
experiencing poverty and other singles of the same age who are not supported by their 
parents and may be truly experiencing poverty.  
The high poverty rates and depths persist for single adults aged 18–25 and single 
parents as they get older (i.e., 26–55). At age 65, poverty rates and depths diminish for 
single adults. At age 36, poverty rates and depths appear to diminish for single parents; 
however, it should be noted that there are very few single parents over the age of 65. 
Regardless, some older single adults (ages 66–75 and 75+) still have incomes less than 
the MBM, though in the 80–100% of the MBM range, indicating that they are not as 
deep in poverty as those who are under 65 years of age. Age 65 is a turning point in the 
breadth and depth of poverty for single adults, likely due to their eligibility for more 
generous public benefits, such as Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement 
and Canada Pension Plan.  
Also, as shown in Figure 3-16, the breadth and depth of poverty for couples improves 
as they age, and they are best off over age 36–55 in terms of income levels relative to 
the MBM. Beginning around age 56, a couple’s income relative to the MBM begins to 
decline. This trend is opposite to that seen for single adults and single parents.  
Depth of poverty by sex 
The final depth of poverty categorization to consider is related to sex. Figure 3-17 
shows the average gap ratio for males (Panel A) and females (Panel B) for Vancouver, 
B.C., and Canada. While females historically had a marginally higher poverty rate than 
males, females have had a lower average gap ratio than men, and this gap has not 
narrowed at all over the period. Unfortunately, the average gap ratio by sex and family 
type data are of poor quality over the entire period covered, so it will not be analyzed 
here. 
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Figure 3-17: MBM average gap ratio by sex 
 
2.6 Income inequality 
Poverty is closely associated with income inequality and reducing both poverty and 
inequality contributes to moving toward a more just society. Two measures of income 
inequality are briefly examined here: the Gini coefficient and the share of income going 
to different groups of income earners. 
The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality which falls in a range between 0 (perfect 
equality in which everyone has the same income) and 1 (perfect inequality in which all 
income goes to one person). 
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Figure 3-18: Adjusted after tax income Gini coefficient, Canada and B.C. 
 
Figure 3-18 shows that the Gini coefficients for Canada and B.C. track each other 
closely, with B.C. being slightly more volatile. The Gini coefficients decreased in the 
1980s but increased again in the mid-1990s, and they have stayed fairly flat since, 
ending in 2018 almost exactly where they began, at 0.3. Fortin et al. (2012) provide a 
discussion of the path of the Gini coefficient in Canada, noting:  
One possible conclusion from these patterns is that while taxes and 
transfers can work to reduce inequality, the political will to address 
persistent increases in earnings inequality through these policy tools alone 
may not exist. The real solution must have to do with addressing earnings 
inequality directly. (p. 124) 
One such measure of earnings inequality is the share of income going to various 
earners. Figure 3-19 presents various income shares for the top 1%, 5%, and 10%, and 
bottom 50% of income earners in B.C. While income shares among the top earners 
declined during and after the financial collapse in 2009, the graphs show that the 
income shares of all three of the higher-income groups rose significantly in 2017. On the 
other hand, while the bottom 50% made some modest gains in their income shares after 
2010, more recently there have been no gains and there was a drop in 2017. It is noted 
that the B.C. government has recently planned or implemented policies that may help 
reduce inequality, including a plan to raise the minimum wage to above $15, 
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consideration of policies that support living wages, and an increase in the top income 
tax rate.  
Figure 3-19: Income shares for the top 1%, 5%, and 10%, and bottom 50%, B.C.,  
1982–2017 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Section 2 has explored the rate of poverty, depth of poverty, and income inequality in 
B.C. Poverty rates fell significantly, by over 50% overall, between 2006 and 2018 while 
the depth of poverty has remained relatively steady overall.  
Figure 3-20 provides a comparison of poverty rates for various groups with the overall 
poverty rate, expressed as a percentage difference. The striking feature of the figure is 
the degree to which the poverty rate for single adults exceeds the poverty rate for all 
other groups. Not only are single working-age adults in B.C. the most likely to 
experience poverty (over three in 10), but they also experience the deepest level of 
poverty. Single parents, especially those who are younger (i.e., ages 18–24) are also 
relatively more likely to be in poverty and deeper in poverty. People identifying as 
Aboriginal and visible minorities are also more likely to be in poverty. All of these groups 
will often be the focus in the remainder of this report.  
The groups less likely to be in poverty are couples (with and without children), children, 
and seniors, especially elderly couples. Seniors and children both benefit from basic 
income-like federal programs that contribute to their relatively low rates of poverty. That 
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is why when considering basic income design in Part 5 we focus on the working-age 
population. 
Figure 3-20: Poverty rate comparative summary, B.C., 2017 
 
Note: Labels on the bars in the graph are MBM poverty rates for the groups. Red bars represent groups with poverty 
rates below the overall rate, the lower the rate, the larger the bar. The overall B.C. MBM poverty rate in 2017 was 
8.9%, represented by the zero line on the graph. For Aboriginal identity and visible minority, the comparison is with 
LIM-AT rather than MBM poverty rate. 
Source: Compiled from earlier figures 
 
An important group that is not covered above is people with disabilities, a group for 
which Statistics Canada does not provide poverty statistics. This report will also focus 
more on people with disabilities, an important target group for income assistance, but 
for whom aggregate poverty statistics are not readily available.  
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3. Fiscal context 
Providing income and social support has significant fiscal implications, regardless of 
whether that refers to maintaining the current system of programs, using a broadly 
available basic income as the backbone of a reformed system, or finding ways to reform 
the current system based on basic income and other principles. We have not been 
asked specifically to explain how our recommendations would be financed, but we have 
been asked to take fiscal considerations into account in our work. 
This section provides general fiscal context, discussing the B.C. government’s capacity 
to fund substantial incremental spending for any purpose. We start by considering the 
capacity to fund additional spending in the context of B.C.’s long-term fiscal 
sustainability, and go on to discuss both existing revenue sources, and whether and 
how they could be used to generate incremental revenue, and potential revenue 
sources. Finally, we discuss the Canadian fiscal federalism context within which any 
funding would need to be placed.  
This section does not address reducing spending on existing programs as a funding 
source. Rather, cost savings that either are consequential to making changes to the 
system—such as introduction of a basic income or reforming current programs—or 
could be made for the purpose of funding a specific proposal, are discussed in Part 5 for 
basic income and Part 4 for the existing income and social support system. In addition, 
because income-tested basic income approaches interact directly with the personal 
income tax system, combined incentive effects associated with changing the rate 
structure or eliminating deductions and tax credits are discussed in detail in Part 5. 
3.1 B.C. fiscal sustainability and capacity 
One way to address a government’s capacity to fund significant future incremental 
spending is to ask what, assuming no major policy changes, the government’s fiscal 
balance would look like in the long term. That is a hypothetical question, of course, 
since policy decisions are made on an ongoing basis that will affect the future fiscal 
balance.  
B.C.’s fiscal sustainability has been addressed by Tombe (2020) in a paper 
commissioned as part the panel’s research program and summarized here. Because 
governments can be expected to continue to exist indefinitely, and because they have 
the power to tax and to borrow directly on financial markets, future sustainability does 
not require budgets to be balanced, only that debt service costs can be paid or that debt 
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does not grow faster than GDP in the long-run. The sustainability question Tombe 
addresses is whether debt can be serviced in the long run without tax increases or 
spending cuts—that is, on a status quo basis. 
Figure 3-21, excerpted from the paper, is a useful visualization of the starting point, 
showing the major revenue sources and spending categories for the 2019/20 fiscal 
year. It is notable that taxes account for over 57% of revenue and that health accounts 
for over 40% of spending. 
Figure 3-21: Fiscal flows, B.C., 2019/20 
 
Source: Tombe (2020) 
 
As the figure shows, B.C. had a modest budgetary surplus in 2019/20. The budget has 
been in surplus since 2013/14. As a result, at the end of 2019/20 B.C. had no debt 
related to current or previous deficits. However, like all senior governments in Canada, 
B.C. does have debt used to fund capital spending, which is not included in the 
surplus/deficit calculation. Capital spending is largely related to government 
infrastructure projects, such as roads and bridges.  
Tombe developed a model that provides long-term forecasts for several revenue 
sources and spending programs based on their demographic and economic drivers, to 
ultimately forecast the budgetary balance and capital spending. Together these provide 
a status quo forecast of net debt and debt service costs over time.  
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Tombe’s conclusion is that, because of an aging population and the likelihood of 
declining real estate activity, B.C. may face significant fiscal pressures over the medium 
to long term. If no policy changes were made, the fiscal balance would deteriorate over 
time, debt would rise, and the resulting debt service costs would create increasing fiscal 
pressure. The estimated long-term fiscal gap is about 3% of GDP, or about $7.5 billion 
annually at present. By comparison, many of the basic income scenarios reported in 
Part 5, Section 4 (Simulation Results) have costs that are greater than that fiscal gap. 
This is not a prediction; it is a hypothetical analysis based on the assumption that there 
will be no policy changes. Many changes in policy and external events will inevitably 
result in B.C.’s actual long-term fiscal course differing significantly from this result. 
However, it does provide compelling evidence that there is no significant available 
capacity to fund incremental ongoing spending associated with new or reformed 
programs without reallocating expenditure from other purposes. In fact, ongoing fiscal 
pressures are likely to induce the B.C. government to increase revenues and/or reduce 
spending over time. That may make it more difficult to find feasible financing 
mechanisms for incremental costs above a couple of billion dollars annually. 
3.2 Financing incremental spending with existing revenue sources 
To finance significant new programs costs, B.C. could increase its reliance on existing 
revenue sources, seek new sources of revenue, or reduce program spending. Let’s first 
consider existing taxes. 
Table 3-1 shows B.C.’s projected revenues from each major provincial source as well 
as from federal transfers to the province. Total provincial revenues from taxation 
sources are just over $35 billion and constitute about 58% of all revenues. Provincial 
revenues from non-tax sources—such as natural resource royalties, net returns from 
Crown corporations, other revenues (largely miscellaneous fees), and federal 
transfers—are less amenable to increases than taxes because of jurisdictional or 
market factors.18 
 
18 One exception is that provincial excise taxes on alcoholic beverages are subsumed within the net proceeds from 
the Liquor Distribution Branch, a Crown corporation. 
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Table 3-1: Revenue sources and capacity to generate revenue using rate increases, 








Increase $1 billion Increase $5 billion 
% 
increase 
New rate % increase New rate 
Taxation (total) 35.3      
Personal income 11.8 5.1–20.5% 8.5 5.5–22.3% 42.5 7.2–29.2% 
Sales 7.9 7.0% 12.6 8.3% 63.2 11.4% 
Corporate income 4.7 12.0% 21.1 14.6% 105.5 24.7% 
Property 3.0 varies 33.0 varies 165.0 varies 
Carbon 1.9 $40/tonne 51.3 $61/tonne 256.4 $142/tonne 
Employer payroll 1.9 1.95% 51.3 2.95% 260.4 7.03% 
Property transfer 1.6 1.0–5.0% 63.1 1.6–8.2% 315.3 4.2–20.8% 
Fuel 1.0 varies 98.0 varies   
Tobacco 0.8 $5.90/20 131.6 $13.66/20   
Insurance premium 0.7 2.0–4.4% 151.5 5.0–11.1%   
Natural resource 
revenue 
2.2 –     
Other revenue 9.7 –     
Federal transfers 10.0 –     
Crown corporation 
net 
3.4 –     
Total revenue 60.6      
Note: Revenue increases calculated from information on annual revenue and tax rates; all assume no changes in 
taxable bases due to behavioural responses to higher tax rates. 
Source: British Columbia, Budget and Fiscal Plan: 2020/21–2022/23 
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Table 3-1 also displays the rate increases that would be needed to generate an 
incremental $1 billion or $5 billion in annual revenue from each of the tax bases. These 
calculations assume that the rate increases would not induce behavioural changes that 
affected the size of the respective tax base. 
Expanding tax bases 
In general, taxes can be adjusted to increase revenues by increasing their rates or 
expanding their bases. However, B.C. is constrained in its ability to make major reforms 
to the bases of the four largest sources of tax revenue shown in the table—personal 
income tax, corporate income tax, provincial sales tax (PST), and property tax—which 
account for more than two-thirds of the total.  
For personal income tax and corporate income tax, the province is bound under the 
terms of an agreement with the federal government, the Tax Collection Agreement, to a 
common national definition of taxable income, which is the tax base. The tax base 
includes the sources of revenue and the deductions from that revenue that are used to 
calculate taxable income. To reform those bases would entail the province launching its 
own provincial income tax system and administration, which is unlikely to appeal to 
voters, business, or the government. Within the Tax Collection Agreement, though, B.C. 
has discretion to set rates and, within certain limits, establish and change provincial 
refundable and non-refundable tax credits. In effect, any “deductions” that a province 
would like to implement beyond those in the federal tax must be done in the form of a 
non-refundable tax credit. 
B.C. does have statutory discretion over the PST base, as it is not harmonized with the 
federal GST. The largest exclusions from the PST base, and thus potential 
enhancements to it, are food, meals away from home, and many services. However, 
any significant increase in the PST base would be problematic for two reasons.  
First, B.C. implemented an HST in 2010, which had the effect of broadening the tax 
base to include restaurant meals and most services. Strong public opposition focused 
on the newly taxed goods and services, forcing the reversal of that policy. B.C. returned 
to the PST in 2013. This history makes the prospect of increasing the tax base either 
within the PST or by once again moving to an HST likely to be unacceptable to the 
general public.  
Second, the shift back to the PST reinstated burdens on business capital and 
intermediate inputs, which hinder the province’s economic competitiveness. Only a 
limited portion of those sales tax burdens on business are relieved through explicit PST 
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exemption provisions. Raising the PST rate without providing additional exemptions for 
business would harm the competitive position of provincial businesses, particularly in 
the resource sectors. Thus, the potential for generating large additional revenues from 
raising the PST rate would be limited in practice. 
The other major source of tax revenue is property tax, but again there is little or no 
scope for changing the base of the tax. B.C. has a comprehensive property tax base 
with no major exclusions and a long tradition of independent market value-based 
property assessment. Although the property tax base is fully within provincial control, 
there is no practical base increase that could be implemented.  
There is, however, an offsetting exemption to property tax payable for owner-occupiers 
of principal residences in B.C., known as the Home Owner Grant. The grant reduces 
taxes by a basic amount of $570 per eligible home in major urban areas and more 
elsewhere. Seniors, veterans, persons with disabilities, and persons living with 
someone with disabilities get additional tax relief. The grant is reduced for homes above 
a threshold value of $1,535,000. The cost of the grant in Budget 2020 is $817 million, 
which is accounted for as a reduction to property tax revenue.  
Although the Home Owner Grant is popular with residential homeowners, it has been 
criticized as a significant tax expenditure that does not fulfill a clear public policy 
objective (Tedds et al. 2018). In addition, the grant is not targeted in any systematic way 
on need, and it excludes renters with their typically greater housing affordability barriers. 
It is one potential mechanism to fund part of the cost of a basic income or alternative 
program reforms. 
Similar constraints limit the province’s ability to expand the bases of its smaller taxation 
revenue sources. That leaves two potential levers that could be used to increase 
revenue from existing taxes to fund a basic income: tax rates for personal income tax, 
corporate income tax, PST, and property tax; and the elimination of provincial personal 
income tax refundable and non-refundable tax credits. 
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Table 3-2: Interprovincial comparison of tax rates, 2020 
 
Source: B.C. Budget 2020, Table A2, p. 125 
Increasing tax rates  
While B.C. has the authority to raise rates on its major taxes to increase revenues, in 
practice there are also limitations in how much can be raised. In part, those limitations 
depend on the tax structure of other provinces. Tables 3-2 and 3-3 provide 
interprovincial comparisons of 2020 tax rates for various provincial taxes and personal 
income tax, respectively. 
Corporate income tax rates are relatively similar across Canada. At 12%, B.C. is 
consistent with the 11.5% and 12% rates found in provinces from Quebec west, except 
Alberta which dropped its rate to 8% effective July 1, 2020. The more easterly provinces 
have higher rates. The corporate income tax rate is important for tax competitiveness 
reasons, and increases are likely to harm business and reduce taxable income 
allocated to the province. 
Corporation capital tax currently applies in four provinces, not including B.C. In the past, 
B.C. has levied corporation capital tax on the major banks only, and it has the capacity 
to do so again. The potential revenue from B.C. reinstituting a corporation capital tax is 
limited and would need to be weighed against the possible adverse effects on business 
activity in the province. 
In 2019 B.C. levied a payroll tax for the first time to replace MSP premium income, 
consistent with the approach taken and rate chosen in Ontario when OHIP premiums 
were eliminated previously. B.C. joined the minority of other provinces that levy an 
employer payroll tax, and it initiated the tax at a rate on par with the lowest elsewhere in 
the country.  
Part 3: Background 
December 28, 2020             Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  107 
Property transfer tax was increased by B.C. in 2018 to a top rate of 5% for residences 
sold over $3 million; that rate matches the highest elsewhere in the country, for the 
combined Ontario and Toronto land transfer taxes. Any additional revenues from the 
property transfer tax would likely need to tap home sales at lower values rather than 
applying higher rates at the top end. The tax applied to foreign purchasers of residences 
was increased to a rate of 20% in 2018.  
The insurance premium tax base is harmonized across the country, with B.C. rates 
roughly in line with other provinces. 
Fuel tax rates include both motor fuel taxes and carbon tax rates that apply to gasoline 
and diesel, but do not include fuel taxes dedicated to regional transit (12.5 cents per litre 
in Metro Vancouver and 5.5 cents on southern Vancouver Island). Rates in B.C. are 
higher than the rates in other western provinces but lower than the rates from Ontario 
east; including Metro Vancouver transit taxes makes them the highest in Canada.  
Table 3-3: Interprovincial comparison of personal income tax  
 
Note: Taxes payable calculated for a single individual with wage income and claiming credits for Canada Pension 
Plan and Quebec Pension Plan contributions, Employment Insurance premiums, Quebec Parental Insurance Plan 
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premiums and the basic personal amount. Includes provincial low-income reductions, surtaxes payable in Ontario 
and Prince Edward Island, and the Ontario Health Premium tax. Excludes credits for sales and property tax credits. 
Source: Budget 2020, Table A4, p. 128 
 
At 7%, B.C.’s PST rate is at the lower end for those provinces that impose a sales tax 
(Alberta being the exception). However, provinces from Ontario east impose a 
harmonized sales tax that is administered along with the GST by the federal 
government and, as discussed earlier, provides credits to businesses for tax paid on 
inputs. Significant PST rate increases would adversely affect B.C.’s economic 
competitiveness compared with HST provinces and international jurisdictions, assuming 
a value-added tax or something similar is not possible. 
B.C.’s employer payroll tax—called the employer “health” tax—is estimated to yield 
$1.924 billion in the current fiscal year. It has the potential to generate more revenue if 
the current 1.95% rate were increased; Quebec’s rate on a tax of this kind is 4.26%. 
Any increase in B.C.’s recently introduced tax would initially affect businesses and jobs 
adversely, but over several years the burden of an employer payroll tax shifts to 
employees through lower compensation (Kesselman, 1997). 
B.C.’s tobacco tax is in the middle of the pack compared with other provinces. Cross-
border and inter-provincial smuggling have been concerns in the past when a province’s 
tax rate is very high relative to neighbouring jurisdictions. This issue explains the 
relatively low tobacco tax rates in Ontario and Quebec, where cross-border smuggling 
via Indian reserves has been a problem. The adverse distributional impacts of higher 
tobacco taxes may also be a concern when considering higher tax rates, even though 
health benefits of reducing smoking might be paramount. 
As noted, the largest tax source in B.C. is personal income tax. As Table 3-3 shows, 
B.C. has close to the lowest average personal income tax rates in Canada at every 
income level up to $150,000, at which point the average provincial tax paid is slightly 
lower. Based on this comparison, personal income tax might seem to be one of the 
more available sources of incremental funding from the current suite of taxation. 
However, B.C. increased its top bracket rate to 20.5% in 2020;19 this brings it on par 
with the highest rates in other provinces, thus affecting the potential for further 
increases at the top end. The interactions between personal income tax and a basic 
income (discussed in detail in Part 5) raise some additional practical considerations 
 
19 This rate applies to taxable incomes above $220,000, an amount above those shown in Table 3-3. 
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related to personal income tax, depending on the structure of the specific basic income 
being funded. 
It is useful to consider how combinations of tax increases might be used to generate 
given amounts of incremental funding to implement a basic income or other program 
reforms. Note that any significant policy change is likely to affect existing programs in 
some way and impose both new costs and cost savings arising from consequential 
changes. The examples focus on “net budgetary costs,” which is the impact of changes 
on the annual surplus or deficit. 
First, consider a scenario where the program changes would generate a net budgetary 
cost of $8 billion, with the requisite revenue split evenly between increased personal 
income tax and increased PST, with each providing an additional $4 billion. That 
situation yields a top personal tax rate of 27.5%20 and sales tax rate of 10.5%. Each of 
those rates would then be the highest in the country. Moreover, because raising tax 
rates causes taxpayers to change behaviour to reduce the amount of tax paid, an even 
higher rate would be needed in practice to generate the required income (Milligan & 
Smart, 2016). It may not even be possible to generate more revenue above certain high 
tax rates, particularly with respect to personal income tax applied to the highest income 
levels. No doubt both the personal income tax and PST rate increases would create 
significant opposition, based on previous attempts to increase tax rates, and in addition 
to the disincentives to work and other productive activities from the personal income tax 
increase, the PST increase would reduce business competitiveness. 
For the second example, consider the budgetary cost of about $15 billion that would be 
associated with a basic income with more ambitious poverty reduction targets. For this 
example, the revenues are assumed to be garnered from increases in the top six tax 
revenue sources, as shown in Table 3-4. 
All the requisite tax increases would pose major challenges for the provincial economy’s 
competitiveness, not to mention public acceptance. Moreover, as mentioned above, rate 
increases of this magnitude would likely evoke behavioural responses that would 
undercut the projected revenue increases. These examples may seem extreme, but as 
will be seen in Part 5, Section 4 (Simulation Results), net budgetary costs of billions of 
dollars result from several of the scenarios, particularly those intended to significantly 
reduce the poverty rate. 
 
20 For simplicity in these two examples, the tax rate for each tax bracket is increased proportionally and the tax 
brackets are not adjusted. 
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Table 3-4: Example 2—additional revenue and resulting rate adjustments 




Top rate increased to 
29.2% 
PST $5 billion New rate 11.4% 
Corporate 
income tax 
$2 billion New general rate 17.1% 
Property tax $1 billion 33% rate increase 
Carbon tax $1 billion New rate $60.50/tonne 
Employer payroll $1 billion New rate 2.95% 
Total $15 billion  
 
3.3 Potential new revenue sources 
B.C. currently makes use of almost all of the types of taxation sources commonly used 
by provincial governments. The only notable exception is the corporation capital tax. 
Because provincial corporation capital taxes are deductible from corporate income tax 
owing, the corporation capital tax ensured that tax would be paid in years with little or no 
corporate income tax owing, essentially constituting a type of minimum corporate 
income tax. B.C. had corporation capital tax from 1973 to 2008, sometimes applying to 
all corporations with capital greater than a threshold level and more often applying only 
to the major banks. Reinstituting a corporation capital tax would likely yield limited 
additional revenues 
If B.C. were to consider new taxation sources, the usual prescription suggested by 
economists is to tax economic rents or negative externalities. “Economic rents” refers to 
profits earned in excess of what could be earned in a perfect market. Examples of 
economic rents are excess profits earned by monopolies and excess profits earned 
from the harvest or extraction of natural resources. Especially relevant in the case of 
Vancouver, restrictions on the availability and use of land can generate excess profits 
for landowners, including homeowners, as has been the case for at least 45 years.  
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Another source of economic rents, one directly related to arguments in support of basic 
income, is rents generated by technological innovations. Technologies that disrupt 
markets can create market power for the firms that create monopolistic rents, which is 
the case for some of the current tech giants. More directly related to basic income is the 
belief that emerging technologies, especially artificial intelligence, will reduce the 
demand for labour and wages as machines eventually take over much of what human 
workers do. That would have the effect of creating rents for the owners of the 
intellectual property and the capital that replaces workers. There are three questions 
here: is technology changing the nature of work? (discussed in Section 4 (Labour 
Market Trends)); is a basic income the best approach to reallocate these or other rents? 
(discussed in Part 5); and could B.C., as a small jurisdiction, capture such rents? 
The reason why economic rents are often recommended as a target for taxation is that, 
because the rents arise not from the production of goods and services but rather as the 
result of an external characteristic like naturally occurring resources, land, or market 
structure, taxing them does not distort the price signals used by markets. That is, taxing 
rents is economically efficient, capturing the excess value for the benefit of society 
without affecting economic signals.  
Negative externalities occur when economic activities cause general harms, such as 
pollution. Using taxation to put a price on the damage done has the effect of using 
markets effectively, by creating an incentive to do less harm and to innovate to reduce 
costs. Taxing negative externalities can both make society better off and generate 
revenue that can be used for other purposes in the public interest. Examples are the 
carbon tax; sin taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and sugary drinks; and polluter-pay user fees.  
One downside from the perspective of sustainably raising revenue to fund new 
spending of taxes intended to incentivize certain behaviours is that they are designed to 
reduce and eventually eliminate the harmful activity they tax. The prime example is the 
effect of carbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, revenues may decrease 
over time, especially at relatively high tax rates.  
The most relevant target for taxation of economic rent in B.C. is rents associated with 
land values. Examples of rent taxation that could be considered are: 
• a provincial tax on capital gains realized on the sale of principal residences in 
B.C.—this form of economic rent is explicitly exempted from the federal income 
tax, leaving it open to B.C. to capture revenues through an appropriately 
designed levy that combines equity with simplicity (see Kesselman, 2017) 
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• capturing excess profits associated with changes in zoning and major 
redevelopment of land that created added wealth for no reason other than 
owning land in a particular location—major provincial infrastructure projects, such 
as transit infrastructure that results in increased density along new routes, 
especially near stations, is an example  
• a sovereign wealth fund based on extracting economic rents from tech firms to 
accumulate returns from innovation, perhaps by taking an enforced ownership 
share in tech and other firms in lieu of a corporate tax increase, building public 
wealth over the long term – though there is likely limited feasibility of this as a 
revenue source for a small jurisdiction such as B.C. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Any significant enhancement to the income and social supports available in B.C. will 
mean that spending will rise, in the form of budgeted costs or tax expenditures or both. 
As will become clear in Parts 5 and 6 of this report, that is true whether those 
enhancements are in the form of a widely applicable basic income or reforms to the 
current system, the only difference being the scale of those added costs. 
Our review of B.C.’s long term fiscal sustainability suggests that while B.C.’s fiscal 
situation pre-COVID-19 was relatively strong, demographic trends are expected to exert 
significant pressure on the provincial government in coming years. That means that 
under the status quo, there is little or no available capacity to increase expenditure 
without making additional fiscal adjustments, at least in the long run. COVID-19 has 
clearly added significantly to B.C.’s future fiscal pressures, reinforcing that conclusion. 
There is also no easy way to increase net revenues very substantially, either by 
reallocating current spending in other areas or increasing revenues from existing 
sources. Detailed design of new revenue sources for B.C. lies beyond the panel’s 
scope. The government would need to address economic and technical issues as well 
as political and public support if they choose to proceed with any of the new revenue 
options we have identified. Attempts to increase the rates or coverage of existing taxes 
in B.C. would face similar challenges. In short, raising the additional revenues needed 
to finance an ambitious basic income or a significant increase in other income and 
social support programs would require careful consideration and consultation. 
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4. Labour market trends 
This section is an abridged version of Trends in the Labour Market and Their 
Implications for a Basic Income (Green, 2020d), a paper written as part of the panel’s 
research program. It provides context about labour market trends, which is important for 
this report for two reasons.  
First, one of the claims made for basic incomes by some advocates—and sometimes 
the most important objective or rationale put forward—is that basic income is the best 
policy response to technology-driven labour market disruptions. Exploring labour market 
trends gives us important background about the nature and extent of these labour 
market disruptions in Canada and B.C. to date. The first question is whether current 
trends suggest that the end of work, or at least significant disruptions consistent with 
reduced labour demand, is imminent. 
Second, there are more general concerns regarding the labour market and the role the 
labour market plays in a just society. That includes the impact of income and social 
support policies on labour supply, a concern that applies equally to basic income and 
more traditional policy approaches. It also includes questions about whether 
interventions in the labour market are needed to address characteristics that are 
inconsistent with our goal of moving to a more just society. So, the second question is 
whether changes in work trends indicate that there are issues in the job market that 
warrant addressing. 
These questions are addressed below by examining: 
• precarious work, to determine whether it is on the rise in Canada and B.C., 
differentiating between standard and non-standard work, and exploring trends in 
categories of non-standard work  
• how standard jobs are changing 
• the protection against adverse events provided by Employment Insurance  
• whether the labour share of income is changing 
• what economic theory says about the possible outcomes of significant 
technological innovation 
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4.1 Is precarious work on the rise? 
Precarious work has come to be associated with the “gig” economy, where 
technological change is expanding the importance of firms like Uber in the way work is 
found and performed. There are two key elements of gig work: 
• It is alternative work in the sense that it is not a standard full-time, permanent 
relationship with a single employer; it is to some degree temporary in terms of the 
work and the employer connection, like individual gigs performed by musicians 
and actors. 
• It is connected with technology, either directly through online platforms or related 
to other IT innovations—where “gig” is short for “gigabyte.” 
There is also alternative work that exists for reasons that are unrelated to technological 
change. The appropriate policy response will depend in part on the extent to which the 
recent gig work phenomenon represents a fundamental change in the labour market or 
is a continuation of existing trends. Overstating the connection with technological 
change has the potential to be misleading in terms of both appropriate policy responses 
and predictions of future trends. It seems better, therefore, to examine levels and trends 
in alternative (non-standard) work arrangements separately from estimates of the 
number of workers who connect with work through online platforms. 
We use Labour Force Survey data to analyze trends, using definitions provided by 
Vosko et al. (2003). We first examine movements in the opposite of alternative work 
arrangements, standard work. Since different modes of alternative work sometimes 
overlap, looking at standard work provides a way of identifying overall trends without 
double-counting subcomponents of non-standard work. After that, we analyze several 
alternative work arrangements, including: 
• Own-account self-employment 
• part-time work 
• temporary and contract work 
For each we consider its level and trend, and its connection with technological change 
and with basic income arguments.  
We also consider how the characteristics of standard work have changed and types of 
work that might not be captured in the Labour Force Survey measures, such as 
Part 3: Background 
December 28, 2020             Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  115 
supplementary work and outsourcing, before moving on to a discussion of work that is 
done in direct relation to online platforms. 
Changes in standard work 
Figure 3-22 includes two panels on the trends in standard jobs in Canada and B.C. It 
gives rise to four main conclusions. 
Figure 3-22: Proportion of workers in standard jobs  
 
First, there has been a long-term decline in permanent, full-time stable employment, but 
it occurred in the early 1990s and the rate has been essentially flat for the past 20 
years. Second, proportionally more males than females are found in standard jobs, 
consistent with well-known conclusions that women experience more precarious work 
patterns. Third, the levels of standard jobs for both sexes in Canada are relatively high, 
at over 60%. Finally, the B.C. trends are similar, although noticeably lower.  
Based on these graphs, one would not conclude that precarious work is taking over the 
Canadian labour market. “Standard” jobs that are full time and permanent remain the 
norm. At the same time, a considerable proportion work in arrangements that are not 
standard and have some feature that could reflect instability. That suggests non-
standard work is an important element of the labour market and we should be 
concerned about whether our public policies related to the labour market are so focused 
on standard jobs that they do not serve this sizable segment well. Certainly, the 
question of why women experience less stable work should be of central policy concern. 
But these issues are important not because there is clear evidence that precarity is 
taking over but because the persistent levels are concerning. 
Trends in categories of non-standard work 
While the overall preponderance of unstable work has not changed dramatically for 
Canada or B.C. in the last two decades, it is possible that this reflects offsetting 
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movements in different types of precarious work. Figure 3-23 includes four panels that 
set out the proportions of employed females and males in Canada and B.C., 
respectively, in four types of unstable, non-standard jobs: self-employed, contract, part 
time, and short term (less than one year). There is substantial overlap across these 
categories, so they sum to more than the proportion of employees not in standard jobs, 
as shown in the previous figure. 
Figure 3-23: Measures of unstable employment, 1997–2019 
 
It is notable that none of the four series in each graph show any significant increase, 
reinforcing the earlier conclusions. It is unsurprising that the proportion of females in 
part-time work is significantly higher than for males, and that the proportion of males in 
contract employment is higher than for females. The proportions in unstable work are 
higher in B.C. than in Canada for all measures for both sexes, but the trends are very 
similar to those at the national level. The only exception is a small upward trend in the 
proportion of contract work for females in B.C. that is not present for the country as a 
whole. 
Own-account self-employment 
Own-account self-employment is at the centre of much of the discussion of the gig 
economy. In the absence of more direct measures of whether people are working gig 
jobs (i.e., project-based and potentially with an online component), some authors have 
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pointed to own-account self-employment as a possible marker for trends toward those 
jobs.  
The proportion of workers who are own-account self-employed has declined slightly in 
the last two decades for both sexes and for Canada as a whole, as well as for B.C.  
In the United States, there is some discrepancy in measures of own-account self-
employment, depending on whether authors use the Current Population Survey, roughly 
equivalent to the Canadian Labour Force Survey, or tax data, with the Current 
Population Survey showing a decline and tax data showing an increase. The 
discrepancy points to technical issues that make the U.S. numbers difficult to interpret 
and use effectively for answering questions about the changing nature of work in 
general and increase of the gig economy in particular. The same issues do not apply to 
the Canadian data. 
In an attempt to narrow the focus on gig workers, Jeon et al. (2019) restrict attention to 
the unincorporated self-employed without a Canada Revenue Agency Business Number 
(their definition of a gig worker), which shows an increase from 5.5% of workers in 2005 
to 8.1% in 2016. That increase comes in two steps: one at the time of the 2008/09 
recession and a second between 2012 and 2014. The second of these might be 
associated with the arrival of gig firms like Uber in Canada, but it is worth noting that the 
trend follows a flattening, not a steepening, line after 2012. It is also worth noting that 
the own-account self-employed no-Business Number share was already at 5.5% in 
2005, well before any of the gig platforms were affecting work in Canada. Thus, the 
level of this measure faces the same issues as other measures of non-standard work: 
considerable non-standard work has existed in Canada for a long time, and labelling it 
as gig work could be misleading, giving the impression of more technologically induced 
change in work than has actually occurred. 
Overall, there is some very limited evidence of an increase in self-employment that 
might be related to the impact of technology on the workforce. In general, the rate of 
self-employment has been in a gradual decline in the last 20 years, especially for 
workers younger than retirement age. (For males in B.C. aged 25–54, the self-
employment rate fell by over 3 percentage points, or about 25%, between the late 
1990s and 2019.) There is thus no evidence that the gig economy is taking over. 
The self-employment rate relates to arguments in favour of a basic income in two ways. 
First, it is a major marker of precarity linked with claims that precarity is increasing due 
to expansion of the gig economy. The figures here do not, on the whole, fit with those 
claims. Second, one argument in favour of a basic income is that it would support 
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entrepreneurship, providing a base from which to pursue new business ideas. Own-
account self-employment, which involves firms that rarely have employees and are 
often very low-earning, does not fit with this idea of entrepreneurship. It typically looks 
more like an employment state of last resort than a launch pad for innovation.  
Part time 
The four panels in Figure 3-24 present the proportion of employees who work part time 
(i.e., less than 30 hours per week), broken down by age group for females and males 
and for Canada and B.C. separately.  
Figure 3-24: Proportion of part-time workers by sex and age group, Canada and B.C., 
1976–2018 
 
The patterns are substantially different for females and males. For female employees in 
Canada, the line for everyone aged 15 and over shows an increase between 1976 and 
1996, but this is fully offset by a gradual decline in the rate over the following 20 years. 
Part of this pattern reflects composition shifts as the baby boom moves through the age 
structure. As one can see by comparing the line for those aged 55 and over to the line 
for those aged 25–54, the proportion working part time is approximately 10 percentage 
points higher among the older group. This likely reflects a role for part-time work during 
the retirement process and afterwards. The baby boom moves into the 55+ age group in 
the later years of our sample, pulling the overall trend line upward.  
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Holding age constant by looking at the 25–54 age group on its own indicates that the 
part-time rate for Canadian females in their main working years has shown a steady 
decline in the last 30 years. In contrast, there is a very substantial rise in the part-time 
rate for 15–24-year-olds between 1976 and about 1996, shown in the top line in the 
graph. But when we separate out 15–24-year-olds who are not students (data available 
only after 1996), the proportion in part-time employment is very similar to the average 
for all age groups aged 15 and over. That suggests part-time employment is important 
for those in high school and post-secondary education and increases in post-secondary 
enrolment explain some of the sharp increase in part-time work for the 15–24 age group 
from 1976 to 1996. However, the timing is not quite coincident, as the rise in enrolment 
started after the rate began to rise and continues to the present, suggesting there are 
other reasons as well. 
In contrast to females, the increase in the first two decades of the period was not offset 
by later declines and, in fact, increases at about the time of the 2008 recession were not 
reversed. As a result, the proportion of male employees who were working part time 
increased from approximately 6% in 1976 to 12% in 2018. This is the only series in the 
list of non-standard work categories that showed a material increase for either sex. 
The fact that the lion’s share of the increase happened before the mid-1990s does not 
fit with the increase being technology-driven. Rather it fits with a pattern that we will see 
re-emerge when we examine employment rates, inequality, and the labour share of 
GDP later—a pattern in which there were substantial changes for the worse in these 
measures prior to 2000 (and especially in the weak labour markets of the 1990s) that 
have not been reversed by successive labour market policies and strong labour markets 
in the 2000s. In that sense, the concerns in the labour market appear to be more deeply 
structural and long-lasting rather than reflections of very recent technological changes. 
The patterns for females are similar to those for Canada as a whole, although the 
Canadian overall initial increase and then gradual decrease pattern is not evident. The 
overall rate remains flat for B.C. males and the pattern is also similar to the one 
observed at the national level.  
For part-time paid work, the basic income claim is that people would be able to afford to 
cut back on regular paid employment hours in order to spend more time in caregiving 
and community building. However, just like own-account self-employment, part-time 
employment is a precarious work state for many people that we hope would be reduced. 
This relates to whether the part-time work status is voluntary—a personal choice that 
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could be enhanced by a basic income—or involuntary, because workers can’t find the 
full-time jobs they want.  
Figure 3-25: Proportion of workers in involuntary part-time work, Canada and B.C., 
1997–2018 
Figure 3-25 shows the 
proportion of involuntary part-
time workers. Males generally 
tend to have higher involuntary 
rates than females, which could 
reflect issues with gender roles 
in taking on family 
responsibilities. In terms of time 
patterns, the series show a 
substantial increase in 
involuntary part-time work at the time of the last recession for both sexes and for 
Canada as a whole and B.C. in particular. But all of the series also show declining 
trends both before and after the recession. Thus, here too, there is no indication of a 
move toward more precarious work imposed on workers by changes in firm demand in 
the last two decades. 
Temporary and contract work 
Temporary and contract job work, like self-employment, is often described as being 
directly related to the gig economy. Indeed, short-term work is the definition of a “gig” 
job, with a claim that new technologies that make it easier to post and find jobs online 
will allow firms to break work down into tasks that are distributed to workers on a 
contract basis. As with the other categories we have discussed, temporary and contract 
jobs have elements that are potentially both positive and negative. Temporary jobs 
might be seen either as stepping-stones to better permanent jobs—opportunities to 
make connections and build experience—or as screening devices allowing more 
efficient matches between workers and jobs. On the other side, these jobs could be 
stigmatizing work of last resort and/or reflect lower-quality or lower-paid work 
arrangements for workers who end up in them. 
Fuller and Stecy-Hildebrandt (2015) follow labour market trajectories for workers who 
start in a temporary job in seven main groups. Moving into permanent, full-time 
employment is the trajectory for 39% of temporary workers, but the rest follow patterns 
with some amount of instability, part-time, or self-employment status. Temporary jobs 
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are not stepping-stones for the majority of workers, although young workers do better 
from this perspective. Starting in a temporary job is also associated with an ongoing 
earnings penalty. Thus, on balance, temporary jobs can have some features of being a 
stepping-stone to permanent jobs for younger workers, but for many workers they are 
accurately characterized as a precarious labour market state. 
Figure 3-26: Proportion of non-student workers in temporary and contract jobs, B.C., 
1997–2019 
 
The two panels in Figure 3-26 show the proportion of B.C. workers who are in 
temporary or contract jobs for various age groups for females and males, respectively.21 
While the overall trend is flat for females and slightly down for males, there is an upward 
trend for the 15–24 age group.  
Fuller and Stecy-Hildebrandt (2015) point out that Canada has contract and temporary 
job rates that are near the OECD average and approximately double those in the United 
Kingdom and triple those in the United States. They argue that this could arise because 
stronger dismissal-related regulations and stronger unions in Canada imply higher costs 
of turnover from permanent contracts, which may push employers toward using more 
temporary contracts in Canada (and Europe) than the United States. Canada also has 
the weakest regulations related to temporary contracts, with no explicit requirements 
that temporary employees be treated similarly to permanent employees and no limits on 
the number of successive temporary contracts that can be given to a particular 
employee, for example. While Canada is a strong candidate to become a jurisdiction in 
which new technologies induce a move toward this job form, there is little evidence this 
has happened as yet in B.C. or the rest of Canada. 
 
21 Seasonal work is also sometimes included in this category. This has purposely been left out in order to focus on 
jobs that are more likely to be associated with new technologies. 
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Summary 
There is limited evidence of a shift toward more precarious work patterns in the last two 
decades in Canada or B.C., although there is some evidence of an increase in 
temporary and contract work since about 2010 for 15–24-year-old non-student workers. 
While worth watching, this is far from evidence of a substantial shift toward precarity in 
the labour market. 
However, a longer-term perspective suggests a different take. Both the proportion of 
workers in full-time, permanent jobs and the proportion in part-time jobs show 
substantial shifts in the 1980s and first part of the 1990s toward more precarity in work, 
which has persisted. It has not continued to worsen but neither has it reversed. If there 
is a case for a basic income to be found in labour market data, it is not based on recent 
trends toward more precarious work but rather on structural shifts that occurred over 
two decades ago.  
4.2 Standard job characteristics 
A standard job is commonly conceived as one that is permanent (i.e., its end date is not 
specified at the outset of the job) and full-time. It is also often viewed as being a good 
job with benefits and methods to enforce worker rights. Precarious work is considered to 
have less stability, less control over the work, lower pay, and few or no benefits. Even 
though there is no evidence of recent increases in precarity, it is possible that the quality 
of those permanent full-time jobs has been deteriorating. This section explores that 
issue. 
The best evidence on job stability in Canada is found in Brochu (2013), which focuses 
on the one-year retention rate—the probability that a job in a particular month will still 
exist one year later. This retention rate rose in both the early 1980s and the early 1990s 
recessions but has been flat at a historically high rate from the mid-1990s through the 
end of Brochu’s data sample in 2010. Far from moving toward being more unstable, 
jobs became more stable in the 1990s in Canada and stayed that way at least through 
2010. Figure 3-27 extends that work using a five-year retention rate. 
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Figure 3-27: Retention rates for permanent jobs, ages 25–34, Canada, 1997–2018 
The five-year retention rates 
refers to jobs lasting for at least 
five years from time of hiring; 
since the series end in 2013, 
they reflect data to 2018. About 
a third of jobs described as 
permanent last at least five 
years, the rates are similar for 
men and women, and the 
trends for both sexes are quite 
flat. Extending Brochu’s series 
shows that the lack of movement in job stability continues to hold. 
The downside of using five-year retention rates is that we cannot easily see the most 
recent movements in job stability. One way to address this is to look at jobs that have 
lasted for one year or less. If there has been a rise in job instability, then that proportion 
should rise, although it is an imperfect measure since it will also move with changes in 
job creation by firms. The lines for short-tenure jobs for males and females are also flat 
over the last 20 years, which fits with the lack of change in job stability.  
Despite the lack of change in job stability, workers may feel that the economy has 
become less stable and so feel growing stress about the stability of their jobs. Brochu 
and Zhou (2009) use Gallop polling survey data to examine this issue. In particular, they 
make use of the same question asked repeatedly between 1977 and 2000: “Do you 
think your present job is safe, or do you think there is a chance you may become 
unemployed?” They show that the responses to this question closely match movements 
in the one-year retention rates, indicating that workers’ perceptions about movements in 
instability are quite accurate. Put together with the evidence in retention rates, our 
conclusion is that job instability is not on the rise in perception or actuality.  
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Figure 3-28: Ratio of workers with unpaid to workers with paid overtime, Canada,  
1997–2018 
Another important dimension of 
job quality is the ability of 
workers to predict and control 
their hours of work. A lack of 
such control is often seen as a 
marker of a “bad” job, and 
evidence from psychology 
indicates that lower control over 
work conditions is associated 
with worse mental health and 
even lower longevity. Worker control of hours is measured using the ratio of the 
proportion of workers who report working unpaid overtime hours to those who work paid 
overtime hours. The idea is that reductions in control over hours would show up as 
relatively more workers being forced to work overtime without compensation.  
Similar to other measures of precarious work, Figure 3-28 shows more precarity for 
females. Males have about the same rates of paid and unpaid overtime work, but 
females are twice as likely to work unpaid as paid overtime. For both groups, though, 
the figures display downward trends. If anything, unpaid overtime—and the potential 
lack of control over the work environment it represents—has become less prevalent 
over time.  
Another element of many definitions of precarious work is low wages.  
Figure 3-29: Measures of wage inequality, Canada and B.C., 1997–2018 
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In Figure 3-29, the first panel shows the 10th percentile of the real hourly wage 
distribution (in 2002 dollars) for Canada and B.C., broken down by sex for the last 22 
years. All four series show gradual increases between 1997 and 2016, with the Canada-
wide series showing stronger growth. In the last three years, all of the series have 
shown very strong growth—over 10% in real terms. This almost certainly stems from 
increases in the minimum wage in B.C. and other provinces. Since a wage of $15 is 
needed to put a single individual working full time at the poverty line in B.C., these 
wages still imply that at least 10% of workers do not make this line (since the B.C. 
minimum wage is still below $15), but the numbers are getting closer to adequacy for 
those at the bottom of the distribution. 
Workers at the low end of the distribution might also be concerned about the level of 
inequality—that is, the extent to which they fall behind high wage earners. The second 
panel plots the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile wage for the same four 
groups of workers. Here we see relatively flat trends in the two decades leading up to 
2016 and then a strong decline in the ratio—that is, a strong decrease in wage 
inequality. Again, this is likely mainly due to minimum wage increases and reflects the 
ability of policy to affect outcomes in markets where precarious jobs dominate.  
Figure 3-30: Unionization rates, all workers and private sector by sex, B.C., 1997–2019 
Worker control over working 
conditions is both an important 
feature of a good workplace in 
its own right and a measure of 
the extent to which other 
features, such as work 
scheduling, are likely to be 
problematic. In Canada, as in 
other advanced economies, the 
proportion of workers 
represented by a union has declined substantially over time. 
Figure 3-30 plots union membership rates for B.C. since 1997 for men and women 
separately, showing both the rates overall and separating out private-sector employees. 
The overall unionization rate for women has declined slightly from 35% of workers in 
1997 to 30% in 2019, while the rate for men has declined much more (from 38% to 
26%). The composition of union membership has also shifted substantially toward the 
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public sector, where women have a larger presence. In the private sector, only 12% of 
female workers are union members. 
Here, as in other markers of precarious work, there is little evidence of a sharp change 
in unionization trends. Instead, de-unionization among male private-sector workers has 
been going on for over 20 years, and the very low rate of union membership among 
female private-sector workers is a seemingly permanent element of the B.C. labour 
market. Thus, the declining and low level of worker representation is a long-standing 
concern rather than a new trend.  
Another sense in which what appear to be stable jobs are actually precarious is the 
extent of domestic outsourcing, or working for intermediate firms or as independent 
contractors. Abraham et al. (2019) implemented a survey in the United States which 
asked respondents standard Current Population Survey (CPS) questions about 
employment but followed up with questions that probed more deeply into the nature of 
work arrangements. Their results imply that approximately 10% of workers who are 
reported in the CPS as employees are, in fact, independent contractors of some type. 
They argue that this may fit with the observation that CPS-reported rates of self-
employment are lower than (and have a different trend from) tax-based rates of self-
employment. This mismeasurement issue likely applies to Canada as well, but there is 
no reason to believe that it is greatly altering the observed flat trend. 
Whether a worker is an employee of the firm on whose premises they work or is, 
alternatively, either an independent contractor or an employee of some type of 
intermediary firm is important for considerations of the precarity of work. Tucker et al. 
(2016) examine the legal limitations on outsourcing of work to subcontractors in 
Canada. They argue that there are few restrictions and that for most elements of work, 
“the sub-contracting company has no legal responsibility for the subcontractor’s 
employees, including pension plans and pension funds” (p. 152). Further:  
Sub-contractors are not under any legal obligation to offer their workers 
the same conditions of employment enjoyed by workers at the user 
company. A sub-contractor is free to negotiate entirely new conditions of 
employment with its employees even if this results in significantly less 
compensation for the performance of the same work. (p. 152)  
This is the key concern with outsourcing or contracting out work to other firms. It can be 
a route to lower pay and lesser workplace protections for workers. 
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Measuring outsourced work is very difficult. As we have already seen, in standard 
surveys the workers themselves may not report whether they are in such a work 
arrangement. Weil (2019) introduces the term “fissured workplace” to group together the 
various work arrangements that include a gap between the worker and the ultimate 
source of direction of the work. Fissured workplaces were created as part of firms 
choosing to focus on their “core” competencies, leaving other tasks (such as food 
preparation or janitorial services) to subcontractors, which several authors have found 
reduces wages for low-paid workers. These include temporary help services, call 
centres, security guards, and janitorial services. Based on what we have learned in the 
current COVID-19 pandemic, the care home industry has been added to the list. Figure 
3-31 shows the proportion of workers in these fissured industries in Canada as a whole 
and B.C. specifically. 
Figure 3-31: Proportion of employment in fissured industries, Canada and B.C.,  
2001–2019 
The figure displays a now 
familiar pattern: the proportion 
of employment in these 
industries is substantial (on the 
order of 17% of all workers in 
B.C.) but has not displayed an 
upward trend in the last 10 
years. It increased in the 2000s 
in Canada and B.C., but the 
B.C. increase was somewhat 
more pronounced. Labour market regulation was weakened during this period and 
shifted to workers self-reporting violations, suggesting a renewed role for policy in 
affecting these trends. 
Caution should be used in interpreting Figure 3-31. On one side, the proportion of 
workers represented as being in fissured work arrangements is clearly overstated in the 
figure because all workers in these industries are counted as fissured. On the other 
side, there are likely workers in other industries who also have these worker 
arrangements. In addition, the pay of at least some workers in the listed set of industries 
who are not themselves in fissured work arrangements will be affected by the existence 
of fissured work in their industry. Similarly, it is hard to know whether there is actually a 
trend upward in fissured work because of these work arrangements making inroads into 
other industries. 
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Figure 3-32: Estimated wage premium paid by large firms in, B.C. 1997–2019 
Looking at this from a different 
perspective, we used 
regression analysis22 to 
determine whether the wage 
premium paid by large firms has 
changed. Figure 3-32 shows the 
results, which can be 
interpreted as indicating that the 
premium has trended downward 
from about 24% in 1997 to about 17% in 2019. This could reflect an ongoing pattern of 
outsourcing lower-wage workers. 
Combining the evidence in the previous two figures and the reports about work 
arrangement in care homes that has emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic seems to 
indicate a need for concern about the extent and nature of these work arrangements. 
The recent focus on gig workers, who seem like a very small portion of the labour force, 
has the potential to misdirect attention away from the potentially much more substantial 
problem of workers affected by a fissured workforce. 
If fissured work arrangements are a cause for concern, is a basic income the right policy 
response to them? Having a basic income might allow workers to turn down these work 
arrangements, generating a bottom-up rearrangement of the labour market that 
increases low wages, as some advocates claim. But the opposite might happen—with a 
secure income base, workers might accept precarious work arrangements with less 
concern. Essentially, a basic income could form the basis of offloading income security 
from firms to workers. That, in turn, could lead to a workplace with even greater power 
imbalances. The much more direct policy response is through enhanced regulation, 
holding the firm in whose workplace the work is done responsible for the workers in that 
workplace, regardless of their contractual arrangements. Indeed, Weil (2019), in his list 
of policy responses to the problems he describes, focuses on regulation, training, and 
social norm responses.  
 
22 Coefficients on firms of 500 workers and over in a log wage regression for B.C. including dummies for five-year age 
groups, six education groups, and a female dummy. The base group is firms of under 20 workers. 
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4.3 Employment polarization and inequality 
If the end of work is on the horizon, one might expect to see a trend downward in total 
employment in recent years. But the employment-to-population ratios for B.C. (males 
and females combined, over age 15) in recent years through 2018 are at levels close to 
their value in 2008, which was a historically high value since the beginning of consistent 
Labour Force Survey data in 1976. Indeed, the employment rate has increased relative 
to the late 1970s, with the labour market absorbing the increased participation of 
women. 
Figure 3-33: Employment polarization measures, B.C. 
 
But underlying this overall trend are declines for men and women with less education. In 
Figure 3-33, the first panel plots employment and participation rates for male and 
female high school graduates, aged 25–54. There is a problem with the level of the 
participation and employment rates for less educated males, but that problem largely 
emerged in the weak labour markets of the 1990s. For females, there is some evidence 
of worsening labour market outcomes in the most recent years, but overall one would 
not conclude from this figure that recent technological change is driving a new 
movement out of work. 
It is worth noting that figures for high school dropouts show more negative long-term 
trends for both men and women, but that group is becoming a smaller and smaller 
proportion of the workforce. Notably, this is true not only because newer generations 
are more educated but also because earlier generations have upgraded their education. 
The overall implication is that education upgrading is happening and helping to mitigate 
negative trends in the lower end of the labour market. 
The education shift matches a shift in the composition of work, with the percentage of 
jobs for all workers aged 15 and over in B.C. that are in “routine” occupations 
(occupations involving repetitive tasks that are seen as being easily replaced with IT-
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related capital) falling from 25% in 2001 to 19% in 2019, as shown in Panel B of Figure 
3-33.23 This is exactly offset by an increase in the percentage working in “cognitive” 
occupations (where more flexibility and non-rote decision-making is required). The 
nature of work is changing, but this has not implied a reduction in work even for less 
educated people in recent years. And the earlier numbers suggest that this shift is not 
matched by an increase in the precarity of work. Moreover, the cognitive jobs that are 
rising in importance in B.C. are the ones that are typically seen as complementary with 
new IT capital—that is, the ones that will benefit from technological change. It is 
possible that the advent of artificial intelligence will change this claim but, at least in the 
near future, B.C. is shifting toward more technology-resilient jobs.  
How are these changes affecting inequality? Figure 3-34 plots the Gini coefficient for 
market income and disposable income for B.C. from 1976 to 2018. Market income 
corresponds to income from all sources other than government transfers, and 
disposable income corresponds to income after adding in transfers and subtracting 
taxes. 
Figure 3-34: Measure of income inequality (Gini coefficient for market and disposable 
income), B.C., 1976–2018 
The values shown in Figure 3-
34 put B.C. in a middle range 
relative to other provinces in 
Canada and relative to other 
developed economies in the 
world. We can break the 42 
years covered by this figure into 
three broad periods. The first 
reaches from the late 1970s to 
approximately 1996 and is 
characterized by substantial 
increases in market income inequality that are almost perfectly offset by taxes and 
transfers, so that inequality in disposable income remains constant. The second period 
runs from 1996 through 2002 and is characterized by a continuation of the trend 
increase in market income inequality. This, though, is the period of major reforms in the 
 
23 Cognitive occupations are defined as professional, management, and technical occupations. Routine occupations 
are clerical, manufacturing, labouring, and trades occupations outside of construction. Manual occupations are 
service, retail, caregiving, and construction trades occupations. 
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income assistance system and the elimination of top-end surtaxes on incomes and, as a 
result, disposable income inequality rises slightly faster than market income inequality. 
In the period since 2002, B.C. has experienced a gradual decline in market income 
inequality, with disposable income inequality moving in a parallel fashion. Thus, since 
the policy changes of the mid-1990s, the system has largely stayed static, neither 
increasing nor decreasing inequality trends. 
4.4 Employment Insurance 
One argument in favour of a basic income is that the existing Employment Insurance 
(EI) system leaves many workers uncovered. This issue has been highlighted in the 
COVID-19 pandemic, as EI seemed unable to meet the needs and temporary 
supplementary programs (most notably the CERB) had to be rolled out. Empirically, the 
argument is often made by pointing to the ratio of EI recipients to the number 
unemployed, which takes values near 0.4. It is not at all straightforward to map from that 
number to arguments about who is covered by EI when they become unemployed, 
because EI includes programs for people who do not meet a standard definition of 
unemployment (e.g., maternity benefits are paid as part of EI) and because there are 
issues about who should be eligible depending on previous premium payments. Gray 
and Busby (2016), working with administrative and survey data, show that close to 40% 
of unemployed workers in 2013 had not paid into the EI system and therefore were not 
eligible for benefits. Of these, approximately 89% did not have a job in the previous 12 
months, with the remainder being mainly the self-employed. Among those who had paid 
premiums, a quarter did not receive benefits because they had quit their job. Of the 
remainder (i.e., those who had paid premiums and were not disqualified because of 
their reason for job separation), about 14% did not get benefits because they had not 
worked enough hours. The latter group make up about 7% of the total stock of 
unemployed individuals. Importantly, these patterns were established in the 1990s. The 
share of unemployed persons who are EI beneficiaries dropped from 84% in 1990 to 
44% in 1997 and has stayed near the latter level ever since. 
It is notable that the drop in the ratio of EI recipients to the unemployed happened in the 
1990s at a time when the extent of both long-term unemployment and self-employment 
increased. The lack of a program to cover these two groups is certainly an issue. But it 
is not a new issue and it is not the case, as is sometimes represented, that EI coverage 
has declined because of recent increases in Canadian precarious work. Like many of 
the series we have examined, the timing simply doesn’t fit such a claim. 
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4.5 Labour share of GDP 
A related concern is over changes in the share of total income that goes to workers (the 
labour share of GDP). The labour share has declined substantially in the United States 
in recent years, falling from 63.3% to 56.7% in the period 2000–2016 (Manyika et al., 
2019). One argument made for a basic income is that this decline stems from changes 
in technology that can be expected to continue in the future (perhaps related to the rise 
of artificial intelligence), which would imply that distribution related to work (either 
directly or through work-conditional government transfers) will ultimately fail. A fair 
distribution of the proceeds of production would then require an alternative approach 
that is not conditional on work—a basic income. 
While considerable attention has been paid to the decline in the labour share in the 
United States, it is important to recognize that this trend is far from ubiquitous across 
developed economies. The United Kingdom has actually experienced an increase in the 
labour share in the last two decades, while the labour shares in France and Germany 
declined, though largely in the 1980s and 1990s, with some increases in recent years 
(Manyika et al., 2019).  
In Figure 3-35, the first panel shows the labour share for Canada for the period 1961 Q1 
to 2020 Q1.24 The long-term pattern can be roughly broken into four periods: a gradual 
increase from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, rising from about 50% to about 54%; a 
flat period with considerable variation related to business cycles from the early 1970s to 
the early 1990s; a period of strong decline from 1992 to 1997; and a period with a 
gradual decline from 1997 to 2005 followed by gradual increase for the remainder of the 
period. 
 
24 The Canadian data is from Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0103-01 Gross domestic product, income-based, 
quarterly. The labour share is the ratio of Total Compensation of Employees divided by GDP at market prices. Note 
that the labour compensation series is only for employees. It is common to make adjustments to include self-
employed workers, but we are unable to do that for the whole period. In years when that adjustment can be made, 
the labour share level is higher but the trend is substantially the same.  
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Figure 3-35: Labour share of GDP 
 
Unlike the United States, Canada has not been experiencing a long-term decline in the 
labour share, with its current labour share at approximately the same level as in the late 
1960s. As with other indicators, the labour share does not support arguments that 
technology-related changes to work are affecting the Canadian economy. 
More specifically, the labour share has been on a mildly increasing trend for the last 15 
years, roughly coinciding with the resource boom that would carry Canada for the next 
decade. Green et al. (2019) argue that the effects of the resource boom affected wage 
setting across Canada through bargaining spillover effects, with B.C. a key beneficiary 
of the resulting wage gains.  
The period of rapid decline in the labour share between 1992 and 1997 matches the 
timing of other large changes we have discussed—increases in inequality and in part-
time work that we have linked to labour market policy changes in Unemployment 
Insurance/Employment Insurance and provincial social assistance changes. 
The second panel of Figure 3-35 examines the impact of industrial composition shifts on 
these trends by plotting both the actual series and counterfactual series in which the 
proportion of GDP accounted for each industry remains at its 1997 level for Canada and 
B.C. Without holding industrial composition constant there is a slight downward trend for 
both Canada and B.C. for the period, more pronounced for B.C. Holding industrial 
composition constant substantially flattens those downward trends making it almost 
completely flat for Canada and much flatter for B.C. That means that any reduction in 
the labour share since 1997 results from shifts between industries with different labour 
shares rather than movements in labour shares within industries. In contrast, several 
studies have observed that the downward trend in the labour share in the United States 
occurs mainly within industry, which is generally interpreted as being the impact of 
technological change affecting all industries at the same time. 
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What is the shift in industrial composition underlying the reduction in the labour share? 
The decline in B.C. after the 2008/2009 recession is largely accounted for by growing 
economic rents in the real estate sector. As prices rose, there was both a reduction in 
the labour share in the sector and an increase in its share of total GDP. Since real 
estate was already a very low labour share sector at the outset of the period, the shift in 
GDP share in its direction also served to reduce the overall labour share for B.C. 
The labour share of GDP once again reflects what are now familiar patterns—the poor 
labour market conditions of the 1990s, policy changes in social insurance and social 
assistance programs and a lack of evidence of recent changes to work resulting from 
technology-driven changes. Canada differs from the United States, where declining 
labour market share is one of the key observations supporting calls for basic income in 
response to technological change, but the evidence for Canada does not support the 
same interpretation. 
4.6 COVID-19 pandemic and short-term change 
All of our data to this point is for the period leading up to the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic. The labour market has been severely affected by the pandemic in ways that 
might alter earlier conclusions.  
Fig 3-36: Employment rate, B.C., January 1997–April 2020 
Figure 3-36 shows B.C. 
employment rates through April 
2020. Two points are 
immediately obvious. The first is 
that claims about the death of 
work before the pandemic were 
greatly exaggerated. The male 
employment rate dropped in the 
2008/09 recession and did not 
fully recover, but the female rate was at historic highs just before the pandemic. The 
second is that the pandemic has generated an unprecedented drop in employment—
much larger than in previous recessions. 
Much of the drop occurred in the retail, food, and accommodation sectors, all of which 
are low-wage and low–job security industries (Lemieux et al., 2020). As a result, the 
percentage of employment that is full time and permanent (standard jobs) has risen 
from 62% in 2019 to 69% in April 2020 for males, and from 55% to 62% for females. 
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Although measures of stability have risen among those who kept their jobs, this also 
demonstrates the precarity of part-time, contract, and self-employed workers most likely 
to lose their jobs in a crisis. 
For those who continued to work, adjustments to COVID-19-related challenges have 
been in the direction of working from home and in ways that make considerable use of 
technologies such as Zoom. Statistics Canada included questions related to these 
adjustments in the April Labour Force Survey and found that 12 million Canadians were 
employed and working at least half their normal hours per week in the April survey 
week. Of those, 5.0 million worked most of their hours at home, which included 3.3 
million who did not normally work at home. The ability to work from home varied widely 
across sectors, with the low-paid accommodation services industry having only 8.4% of 
workers working from home, while the high-paid professional, scientific, and technical 
services sector had 75.5% of its workers working from home (Statistics Canada, 
2020a). This differential ability to work from home is reflected in the employment loss 
numbers by sector. 
Whether and to what extent the shift to working from home will persist and what its 
effect on the labour market will be remains to be seen. This could mark an inflection 
point at which the long-predicted end of work begins to materialize, it could mark some 
fundamental changes but not the end of work, or it could be a short-term effect that will 
largely be reversed in the coming years.  
4.7 Application of economic theory 
There is a distinct lack of evidence, to this point, that we are on a trajectory to less 
employment, stable work, wages, and labour share, so we cannot use projections of 
current trends to predict what would happen if technology did begin to have these 
effects. Instead, we need to turn to theoretical models of technological change and the 
labour market for some insight.  
As many of us have learned from mathematical models of the progression of COVID-19, 
these are not about obtaining accurate predictions of the future. Rather, they are about 
employing logic to understand the limits of what might happen. The limits indicated by 
the models depend, of course, on the assumptions underlying the models, and the 
same points apply equally to economic modeling.  
The question we want to ask, then, is whether, under reasonable assumptions about 
new technologies, production, and the labour market, it is likely that we will witness a 
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future with little or no work and a low labour share of GDP. Or, put in the opposite way, 
how extreme would our assumptions need to be in order to fit with such a dire future?  
The review of the theoretical literature on new technologies and the labour market 
undertaken by Green (2020d) points to a set of useful conclusions.  
First, our future is not technologically determined. Markets are important in steering 
innovation. Inventors themselves respond to incentives and so will tend to focus on 
creating new technologies in response to market forces. New technologies do not fall 
from the sky and our economic future is not technologically determined. Second, while 
there are issues of concentration of firms’ market power that do need to be addressed, it 
is reasonable to predict that labour as a whole will actually do better in terms of wages 
and employment in the future because of innovation. Third, there are good reasons to 
believe that innovation will contribute to increased inequality, though a new, increasing 
trend in inequality has not, so far, emerged. Fourth, questions of concentration of 
market power are important and, left unchecked, could imply worse futures for workers.  
In B.C.’s case, the importance of economic rents in the form of returns on land in the 
Lower Mainland is a key point of breakdown in the competitive allocation of the output of 
the economy that has arisen at several points in our discussion. Since these are true 
rents, taxing them is an economically efficient policy, as by their nature their allocation is 
separate from the efficient functioning of production in the economy. This is quite a 
different conclusion from one based on finding funding sources in the context of an 
economy in which work and production are being mainly determined by artificial 
intelligence and other technologies that are arriving exogenously. 
4.8 Conclusion 
We started with two questions: 
• Do current trends suggest that the end of work, or at least significant disruptions 
consistent with reduced labour demand, is imminent? 
• Do changes in work trends indicate that there are issues in the job market that 
warrant addressing? 
In looking at the labour market from several different perspectives, we see consistent 
patterns emerging that answer both questions.  
First, current trends do not point to the end of work or significant imminent disruptions. 
We are in a period of stability in terms of the indicators we have examined, with no 
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material deterioration in the key aspects of employment as indicated by measures 
related to:  
• the level and characteristics of permanent, full-time employment (standard jobs)  
• the various types of precarious employment, such as part-time, fissured, self-
employment, contract, or temporary employment  
• income inequality  
• polarization in the labour market  
• the labour share of GDP 
They all display a consistent pattern for both Canada and B.C. and for both sexes.  
Most of the disruptions occurred in the 1990s, with a few continuing until 2008 at most. 
The move toward precarious work as characterized by self-employment and part-time 
work happened before the tax and transfer policy changes of the late 1990s, a period 
with relatively generous and increasing transfers. Trends over the 15 years or so have 
predominantly been flat or positive, with minor exceptions.  
In addition, Employment Insurance is not, as some suggest, on a failing path because 
more and more workers face irregular work patterns. Instead both the extent of 
precarious work and the lack of Employment Insurance coverage for a significant 
portion of the unemployed are long-standing problems that emerged from program 
changes implemented in the 1990s and have not changed substantially since.  
The conclusion is that current labour market trends do not support the argument that 
basic income is needed, either because of increased precarity, whether technologically 
driven or not, or a drop in the labour share of GDP. 
Does that mean the trends will not change in the future? No, and in fact changes arising 
from the current pandemic could potentially be an inflection point at which trends 
change. There is no doubt that technological change will have real effects on work and 
pay, as it has throughout history. However, applying theoretical economic models to the 
question of how technological change will affect the labour market suggests that while 
the end of work is possible, other less disruptive outcomes involving rising wages and a 
sharing of the benefits of technology through work are possible and even likely. In 
addition, there is a role for policies related to redistribution of income and wealth and 
dealing with the concentration of market power in certain firms that can mitigate 
concerns. A basic income is a potential policy tool in that case, but our conclusion is 
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that consideration of basic income as a response to a technologically driven future of 
lower wages and precarious or no work is at best premature. 
Second, the analysis reveals that although trends do not point to a deteriorating labour 
market, they do suggest that improved labour market and labour relations policy could 
serve to improve the lot of the substantial proportion of workers who are in precarious 
employment or are vulnerable to disruptions such as the current pandemic. Could a 
basic income play a role in addressing these concerns? Yes, but nothing in the analysis 
helps answer the question of whether basic income should be the preferred policy 
choice. That question is addressed later in the report. Whether basic income is 
considered or not, there are concerns about precarious employment and issues like 
domestic outsourcing that require regulatory measures. 
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5. Income testing and effective tax rate implications 
In a report that discusses income and support programs and a basic income, a recurring 
topic for discussion is whether and how income testing applies to the program in 
question. There are two aspects to income testing: income as an eligibility criterion, and 
whether and how the support provided by the program phases out as the recipient’s 
income increases.  
In this section we provide background information on these various issues by setting out 
a general approach that can be used to describe income testing, particularly the 
phasing out of support as income rises. The same approach applies equally to most 
basic income program designs, the full range of non-basic-income cash-transfer 
programs, and income-tested basic services and in-kind benefit programs. Notably, the 
approach can even be applied to describe a UBI with benefits that do not phase out with 
the recipient’s income. The way income testing is applied in the design of a specific 
program reflects trade-offs that inevitably must be made among the characteristics of 
adequacy, cost, and the incentives related to work and other behaviours. 
Phasing out support as income rises creates work-related incentives by effectively 
placing a tax on income; similar to a tax, this phasing out of benefits with increased 
earnings reduces the return to that work effort. In this section we also discuss how 
benefit phase-out provisions combine with existing income and other taxes and income-
tested supports—as well as the additional taxes needed to finance any new cash-
transfer scheme—to affect take-home pay and the resulting economic implications, 
which are referenced throughout the report. 
5.1 Income testing 
Simple income-testing approach 
Our approach to thinking about income testing starts by defining the three main 
parameters related to income testing: 
• the maximum amount of the support, benefit, or, in the case of a basic income, 
the income guarantee provided by the program (G) 
• the rate at which the benefit is decreased as income rises, referred to as the 
benefit reduction rate (BRR) 
• the income at which the benefit is reduced to zero, referred to as the break-even 
point (BE) 
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The three parameters—G, BRR, and BE—are each closely related to characteristics 
identified in our analytical framework. G is related to the adequacy of the benefit and, for 
obvious reasons, higher is better in terms of poverty goals. BRR is related to the 
economic incentive part of our public trust characteristic because it is effectively a tax 
rate on other income, and taxing income creates a variety of disincentive effects, so 
lower is better. BE determines the number of people who will receive a benefit, since 
those with incomes above BE are excluded from the program. The more people 
covered by the benefit, the higher the cost—another part of our public trust 
characteristic. In terms of cost, the lower the BE the better. Note that the other two 
parameters also affect cost—a higher G will increase cost and a higher BRR will reduce 
cost. However, a lower BE also may mean that fewer people in need of the resources 
will receive them, affecting adequacy.  
This discussion makes it clear that the choice of these three parameters will represent 
trade-offs among the characteristics related to the parameters. The following sets out in 
more detail exactly how those trade-offs work, based on the mathematical relationship 
that links them: 
BE = G / BRR, 
where BRR is expressed as a number, such as 0.50 for 50%.25  
This formula means that all three parameters cannot be set independently. Once any 
two parameters have been set, the third one can be calculated using this formula. It 
follows that low cost, high guarantee, and low disincentive effects cannot all be 
achieved at the same time.  
The trade-off can be illustrated by holding constant any one of the three basic income 
parameters, varying a second parameter, and observing impacts on the third parameter, 
as shown in Figures 3-37, 3-38, and 3-39. In each of these graphs, income from 
sources other than government transfers is measured along the horizontal axis, and 
transfers from the program are measured by the height of the blue and orange lines. In 
each case, the guaranteed amount, G, is shown on the vertical axis. Note that since this 
is paid out to households with zero income from other sources, G is also the total 
income for the household at this point. As the household adds other income, the amount 
 
25 As noted above, this is a simplification for illustrative purposes. It assumes income is taxed back from the first 
dollar of additional income and that BRR remains constant across incomes, neither of which is necessary but is 
useful to make the trade-offs clear. More complex designs will exhibit the same trade-offs. 
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of the benefit is reduced according to the BRR until it reaches zero at the BE level of 
income. 
Figure 3-37: Varying BRR, constant G 
Figure 3-37 holds G 
constant and varies the 
BRR to see the effect 
on BE. Applying the 
formula, where the 
benefit is G (say 
$10,000) and the BRR 
is 33.3%, then BE is 
3G (or $30,000 in this 
example, illustrated by the blue line). However, if the incentive effects of this BRR raise 
concerns, we could consider a reduction in the BRR to 25%, as shown by the orange 
line. This change raises the BE from 3 times G to 4 times G (or from $30,000 to $40,000 
in the example). Since that now includes people with higher levels of income, it means 
that more people will receive some amount of benefit. Because the orange line is above 
the blue line, it means that at every positive level of income the benefit paid will be 
higher. As a result, both because more people will receive benefits and the amount of 
benefit is higher at every income level, the cost will be higher under the lower 25% 
BRR. The trade-off here is that the disincentive effect is reduced but cost is increased. 
Figure 3-38: Varying G, constant BRR 
Next, we consider 
holding BRR 
constant at a level 
that might be 
deemed acceptable 
for incentive reasons 
(in our example, 
33.3%) and varying 
G, the guarantee 
level, to observe the effect on BE. In Figure 3-38, we assume that the initial value for G 
($10,000, to continue the example) was regarded as inadequate and we increase it to 
G’ (say $12,000). This causes a parallel upward shift in the line by the amount the 
guarantee increases, DG ($2,000 in this example). As a result, by applying the formula 
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we see that the BE increases by three times DG (i.e., increases by $6,000 to $36,000). 
The amount paid to every original beneficiary is increased by DG, and some people 
who were not previously receiving benefits because their income was greater than BE 
now receive some benefits on account of the increased BE. In this case the trade-off is 
that adequacy is increased but cost is also increased. In our example, every original 
recipient gets $2,000 more, and people whose income is between $30,000 and $40,000 
become eligible to receive some benefits. 
Figure 3-39: Varying G, constant cost 
What if we want to 
increase the 
adequacy of the 
benefit by increasing 
G to G’, as we did in 
the previous 
example, but we are 
restricted to holding 
constant the cost of 
the program?  
Figure 3-39 shows how that could be done by reducing or eliminating benefits for some 
initial recipients. Under our simplified approach, it could only be done by increasing the 
BRR at the same time as increasing G. For this example, we increased BRR from 
33.3% to 60% for illustration purposes, but to calculate the actual BRR that would hold 
the cost constant requires knowing the income distribution of those eligible for the 
benefit, as well as any induced behavioural responses that affect incomes.  
As illustrated by Figure 3-39, increasing the BRR enough to hold the cost constant 
results in the lines crossing. Those with lower incomes receive higher benefits due to 
the increase in G, while those with higher incomes receive lower benefits and some lose 
all of their benefits due to the higher BRR. Those with incomes at the level where the 
lines intersect receive the same benefit under both scenarios.  
Using the same example, the blue line represents a G of $10,000 and a BE of $30,000. 
We assume that a program with the same total cost can be represented by the orange 
line with G’ = $12,000 and a BE of $20,000, applying the formula. In this example, the 
lines would cross at an income of $7,500, with those earning incomes lower than that 
gaining benefits, and those with income above $7,500 losing benefits. 
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For a given program budget, increasing benefit adequacy for those at lower incomes 
must come at the expense of increased disincentives concentrated on a smaller group 
at the lower end of the income scale. As shown in Kesselman (2020a) and confirmed 
quantitatively in our simulations of basic income scenarios in Part 5, Section 4 
(Simulation Results), with a range of parameters, the cost of programs can rise sharply 
with increased G or reduced BRR on account of the impacts on BE and the associated 
numbers receiving benefits.  
Extensions of the approach 
The three examples described above show situations where the amount of the benefit 
paid decreases with income, starting with the first dollar of income received until the 
benefit paid is reduced to zero at a constant rate. This general approach is most 
commonly associated with income-tested basic incomes, which are discussed in detail 
in Part 5. However, the approach can be extended in several ways to apply to different 
benefit designs.  
Figure 3-40 illustrates the four types of extension to the approach described below, 
together with the simple approach discussed earlier. The figure uses a common set of 
parameters to allow comparison. All examples use G = $5,000. Unless needed to 
demonstrate the effect of a different BRR, it is set at 50%. Wherever used, the income 
exemption level is set at $6,000. The lines are offset slightly to help with readability. 
Figure 3-40: Extensions of the simple income-testing approach 
The line labelled 
“Simple example” 
shows that maximum 
benefit is paid when 
income is zero and is 
reduced by applying 
the BRR (50% in the 
example) to income 
earned up to the BE 
level, where the 
benefit becomes zero ($10,000 in the example). 
Next we consider a universal basic income, where everyone receives the full amount of 
the income guarantee regardless of their income. In that case, BRR is zero and there is 
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no BE point. Graphically, the result is a purple horizontal line at G labelled “UBI” on the 
figure. 
Several cash-transfer and in-kind benefit programs found in the current system, 
discussed in Part 4, have an additional feature: an income exemption. In those cases, 
the benefit is not reduced until income exceeds a threshold level—that is, BBR = 0% up 
to the income exemption level. As a result, the graph of such designs has a horizontal 
section up to the income exemption level and then the line slopes downward to the BE 
point, labelled “Income exemption” on the figure. This design is commonly used in 
refundable tax credits and in-kind benefits. It is also a feature of Income Assistance 
cash transfers.  
Income Assistance has another feature in addition to the income exemption: a 100% 
BRR above the income exemption threshold. That means the benefit is reduced dollar 
for dollar by additional income earned. As a result, the amount available to the 
recipient—the benefit paid plus income earned—does not increase for the income range 
from the income exemption threshold to the BE point, imposing a severe disincentive 
effect. The figure includes a line labelled “Income Assistance,” but it is just an example 
using common parameters for illustrative purposes and does not represent current 
Income Assistance rates or income exemptions. In this example, for income in the 
range of $6,000 to $11,000, the income recipient would have disposable income of 
$11,000 regardless of how much income they earn. Above that level of income, they 
would have disposable income equal to their after-tax earned income since they would 
no longer be subject to the program or its BRR. 
One final feature that is sometimes added to income-tested benefits is a variable BRR. 
In principle, this could take many forms. The Canada Child Benefit has different BRRs 
for different ranges of income. Two B.C. programs—the Affordable Child Care Benefit 
and the B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit—both have benefits with a BRR that applies up 
to a certain level of income, is set to zero up to another income level, and then the 
original BRR applies again up to the BE point. In other words, over a specified range of 
incomes the benefit remains constant. This is illustrated by the line labelled “Variable 
BRR” on the figure, which is also just an example and the parameters are not consistent 
with any existing program. 
These simple examples can be extended in many ways with further variations. An 
example is the Canada Workers Benefit, which is an earnings supplement having a 
unique benefit structure not shown in the figure. This type of benefit offers nothing for 
persons with zero income or earnings (G = 0), but earnings above a certain level are 
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subsidized at a given rate (a negative BRR) up to a maximum level, with additional 
earnings subject to a positive BRR until the BE level of earnings is attained.  
5.2 Combined incentive effects on labour supply 
We mentioned earlier that BRR is related to the economic incentive characteristic in our 
analytical framework because it is effectively a tax rate. In this section we explore the 
impact of BRR on labour supply through the incentive to work. We are discussing that 
here because the same principles and general analysis apply for any income-tested 
program that reduces the amount of support as income increases, whether a basic 
income, a basic service, or a traditional income support program like Income 
Assistance.  
Before starting, we should emphasize two points. The first is that taxes have incentive 
effects that go beyond their effect on the choice about whether to work or how much to 
work. These include many life decisions that depend on current financial circumstances 
and future expectations, including decisions about where to locate, education and 
training, marital status, and having children. For some people, taxes and BRRs also 
affect choices about whether to work in the legitimate economy or for unreported cash, 
as well as whether to engage in other forms of non-compliance. 
The second point is that many other elements of program design can also have 
significant labour supply implications, something that is discussed in detail in the context 
of Income Assistance in Part 4. Every program is the result of many design choices, 
each of which influences the overall implications of the program, including its labour 
supply implications. In Part 5 we delve deeply into the design choices available for 
designing a basic income program, demonstrating clearly that designing and 
implementing a basic income is not quite as simple as many advocates would have us 
believe.  
In other words, work-related impacts of taxes are not the only implications of taxes, and 
the choice of BRR in designing an income-tested benefit is not the only design element 
that can affect labour supply. However, the implications of BRR are an important part of 
the analysis, and something that applies equally to basic incomes and all other income-
tested benefit programs. 
Labour supply issues 
To understand the effects of tax rates on labour supply, we follow Green (2020b) in 
setting out the basic economic model. Figure 3-41 shows the classic depiction of the 
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trade-off between the net or spendable income earned by working and the value of time 
used for other pursuits. 
The classic model depicts this trade-off by first noting the limited amount of time 
available in a given period, say a month, which a person can use for paid work or for 
other pursuits, traditionally referred to in the labour supply literature as “leisure.” On the 
horizontal axis, the point A represents the total number of non-sleeping hours available. 
Points along the line AF represent the amounts of income that can be earned by 
choosing to devote some of these hours to work rather than other things. If none of the 
hours is spent working, all A hours are devoted to doing other things, but no income is 
earned. If all of the hours available are devoted to work, that leaves no time for other 
things, but generates an amount of income F. Thus, an individual choosing to spend 
more hours in paid work is depicted by movement to the left along line AF in the figure. 
Now consider what happens when a benefit in the form of our simple example from 
above is introduced. The maximum benefit, G, is represented by the line AC, which is 
received if no hours are used for work. As more hours are worked, the amount of the 
benefit is reduced by the BRR until it is eliminated at the BE point. On the figure, if the 
BRR were 100%, as it is with B.C.’s Income Assistance (above the earnings exemption 
level—a complication not included in this figure), the situation would be represented by 
the line CD, where the total of the income earned and benefit do not change as more 
hours are devoted to work and the person moves to the left from point A. In that case all 
of their earnings are taxed away by the 100% BRR. Alternatively, a BRR of less than 
100% is represented by the line CD’, where total income rises as more hours are 
worked, but at a lower rate than if there were no benefit and tax-back arrangement. 
Figure 3-41: Work and income with income-tested benefits 
What are the effects 
of changing the BRR 
on hours worked? 
We consider that by 
imagining moving 
from a benefit with a 
100% BRR to one 
with a lower BRR—
that is, changing 
from the CD to the 
1 
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CD’ line. The arrows on the figure illustrate three distinct effects, hinging on the 
individual’s original position.  
The first effect is that of the original 100% BRR, with a person choosing not to work at 
all and locating at point C. The higher the BRR, the less incentive to work and the flatter 
the line. The steeper the line, the more a person gets to keep of their earnings by 
devoting time to work. Arrow 1 points out that reducing the BRR from 100% increases 
the incentive to work for those not initially engaged in work. Thus, Arrow 1 depicts an 
initially non-working person being drawn into the labour force and working. 
Arrow 2 shows a different effect for those who are already working, earning income 
above the BE point for the initial benefit, more than D but less than D’. Those people 
don’t receive a benefit payment when the BRR is 100%, but when it is reduced their 
take-home pay goes up by the benefit payment they receive. This gives rise to an 
“income effect,” since the added income allows these people to do less work and 
maintain the same level of total income and spending. An increase to G without 
changing the BRR also induces this income effect, including decreasing the incentive to 
work for those not already working. 
In addition, these people are now facing a higher effective tax rate than they were 
originally. Even though it’s not the 100% BRR originally associated with the benefit, it is 
more than they faced before, because their income is above the original BE. This 
“substitution effect” gives them an added disincentive on top of the income effect to 
continue working at their original hours.  
Arrow 3 shows a third type of effect that can arise for people whose original income 
exceeds the new BE, D’. Those people have an incentive to work less in order to qualify 
for the benefit; however, they may not respond since they may value increased time for 
non-work pursuits less than the associated reduction in net income. 
Combining the effects of reducing the BRR, some people who don’t initially work will be 
incented to increase their participation in the workforce because they gain more for 
every hour of work (Arrow 1), and some people will be incented to work less (Arrows 2 
and 3). With these effects operating in different directions in terms of the effect on the 
labour force, the net effect depends on which of these effects is larger. The size of the 
effects depends on the number of people affected by each situation and by the strength 
of the incentives associated with the change, known as the “elasticity.” The stronger the 
effect of a given change, the higher the elasticity. Quantitative evidence about labour 
supply elasticities is discussed below, but first we put the effects of benefit design into 
the context of the tax system and other effective tax rates. 
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Effective tax rates 
The BRR of the depicted benefit program is only one mechanism that effectively taxes 
income, and it combines with the effects of the other mechanisms. Most obvious is the 
income tax system, which directly taxes income. In addition, the income tax system 
serves as an important benefit delivery platform for several refundable and non-
refundable tax credits that are phased out with income, each applying a BRR.  
Other programs effectively tax income by applying premiums to earnings, most notably 
Canada Pension Plan contributions and Employment Insurance. They act like income 
taxes because they impose levies at a BRR equal to their respective contribution rates, 
with the amount of the levy dependent on income.  
There are also income-tested cash-transfer and in-kind benefits that are delivered 
through other programs, described in detail in Part 4. In many cases a person may 
qualify for several of these programs, each with an associated G, BRR, and BE point.  
Each of these taxes, levies, and income-tested benefits has the same type of effects, 
has an associated BRR, and has the same kind of effects as described above. Those 
effects combine to exert an overall effect on incentives for the individual. The combined 
implications of all these mechanisms can be analyzed by calculating “effective tax 
rates,” which measure their overall impact on take-home pay and thus the amount of 
taxes that are effectively paid. 
Milligan (2020) describes two types of effective tax rates that align with the discussion of 
incentives based on the labour supply model discussed above. One is the marginal 
effective tax rate (METR), which measures the impact of earning an extra dollar of 
income, including the impact of all relevant taxes and other levies and benefits that vary 
with income, whether delivered by the tax system or not. The METR is the percentage 
of that extra dollar lost through these impacts. The second type is called the 
participation tax rate (PTR), which measures the total impact of additional taxes and 
reduced benefits for a person moving from no work to work at a given level of income; 
the PTR is the percentage of this income lost through these impacts. 
METR is a measure of the extent to which effective taxation reduces the benefit 
associated with increased work. Economists refer to this as the “intensive margin,” 
which means the effect of taxes on the number of hours of worked (i.e., the intensity of 
work). In terms of the earlier discussion, METR affects the decisions associated with 
Arrows 2 and 3, decisions made by those already working. A METR of 100% means 
that an additional dollar earned will effectively be fully taxed back, with no increase in 
funds available to the individual to spend. It is possible for METR to be greater than 
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100%, meaning that earning more reduces available funds. The lower the METR, the 
more of any additional earned income remains with the taxpayer. Changes in METR 
can accompany increased income due, for example, to BE points being reached and 
moving into higher tax brackets in our progressive income tax system. As noted before, 
the METR can be negative on a range for an earnings supplement program. 
PTR measures the impact of a decision to take a job that earns a given amount as 
compared to not working—that is, choosing to participate in the labour market. 
Economists refer to this as the “extensive margin,” which relates to the decisions 
associated with Arrow 1—the decision as to whether or not to work. While METR 
measures the tax rate at a particular level of income, PTR measures the net tax effect 
associated with an income range from zero to a level of income associated with a 
particular job. 
Milligan (2020) has used the Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator26 to simulate the 
combined effects of all of the elements of the tax system plus Canada Pension Plan 
contributions and Employment Insurance premiums, and added to that base Temporary 
Assistance benefits and Disability Assistance benefits for a variety of family 
compositions. Because of the interactions between partners in couples, for illustrative 
purposes we provide results only for single adults without children.  
We have extended that analysis by simulating the effects of a basic income with 
parameters similar to Temporary Assistance. The maximum annual benefit from 
Temporary Assistance is $9,120, and we use that amount for G in our basic income 
simulation. We also use the BE point of $14,120 from the Temporary Assistance 
program, which arises because of its earnings exemption. For the hypothetical basic 
income (which does not include an earnings exemption), applying the formula set out 
earlier gives a BRR of 64.6%. Such a basic income would have a gross cost of about $2 
billion and would reduce the poverty rate from 8.6% to about 7.7%, according to 
simulations conducted for the panel. 
 
26 http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/kmilligan/ctacs/  
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Figure 3-42: B.C. METR and PTR with no benefits, Temporary Assistance, and a basic 
income 
 
Figure 3-42 shows the resulting patterns of METR and PTR for single childless adults 
for three simulations corresponding to no transfer program, Temporary Assistance, and 
the hypothetical basic income. METR is shown in the left panel of the figure and PTR in 
the right panel. The panels show how the respective tax rates, displayed on the vertical 
axis, change as earned income, displayed on the horizontal axis, increases. The graphs 
illustrate several notable points: 
• In the case with no benefits, METR is low, even negative in the range of earnings 
supplement, up to the point where tax becomes payable, at about $14,000 of 
earned income, and then varies in a narrow range around an average of 31%. 
• The Temporary Assistance METR starkly identifies the welfare wall associated 
with the fact that Income Assistance has a 100% BRR, then reverts to the same 
level as the no benefits METR above the BE point. Note that because of the 
$5,000 income exemption, METR is zero below that level before hitting the wall. 
• The B.C. basic income METR, which equals the METR for no benefits plus the 
basic income BRR, is also relatively high. As income tax is applied, at about 
$11,000, the METR increases to almost the same level as the Temporary 
Assistance METR before falling back to the “no benefits” level at the BE point. 
• The PTR without benefits is equal to the average effective tax rate, increasing 
smoothly from a negative amount at low incomes where refundable tax credits, 
including the Canada Workers Benefit, are received and no income tax is 
payable, to just over 20%, at $50,000 of income. 
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• The basic income PTR exceeds the Temporary Assistance PTR at low income 
levels because Temporary Assistance has a $5,000 income exemption but 
increases rapidly to almost 70% at about $10,000 earned income. Above 
$10,000 of income, both PTRs are strikingly similar, creating a significant 
disincentive to participate, compared to the no benefits case. 
Next we discuss the evidence related to the various elasticities, which determine the 
extent to which the disincentive effects associated with METR and PTR translate into 
labour supply impacts. 
Labour supply elasticity 
There are four elasticities to consider when determining the size of the incentives 
associated with introducing or changing a benefit: 
• the elasticity of hours worked with respect to income, measured as the 
percentage change in hours worked due to a 1% increase in income, which 
corresponds to the income effect associated with Arrow 2 in Figure 3-41 
• the elasticity of hours worked with respect to wage, which allows us to determine 
how much a change in METR affects decisions about how much to work, 
represented by Arrows 2 and 3 
• the elasticity of participation with respect to income, which allows us to determine 
how much impact a change in G will have on decisions about whether to work 
• the elasticity of participation with respect to wages, which allows us to determine 
how much a change in the BRR (and thus income after tax and benefits per hour 
of work) affects decisions about whether to work, represented by Arrow 1. 
In each case, we are referring to income and wages after tax and benefits, because it is 
the amount that the person takes home and has available to spend that affects their 
behaviour. 
Green (2020b) has reviewed literature related to estimating various labour supply 
elasticities within several different contexts, including basic income pilots, natural 
experiments resulting from changes in benefit programs, and estimates pertaining to 
specific demographic groups. Based on this literature, Green’s conclusions about the 
best available estimates for elasticities for various groups include the following: 
• Each of the four types of elasticities is essentially the same for men and women 
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• For higher-income earners who work more than the median number of hours 
worked, all of the relevant labour supply elasticities are essentially zero, a finding 
that applies primarily to the impact of increasing tax rates to fund increased 
benefits. 
• For those who are unable to work, which accounts for many Disability Assistance 
recipients and a significant proportion of Temporary Assistance recipients who 
are excused from work requirements, there would be no labour supply response 
to changing either G or BRR because of their personal circumstances. 
• The elasticity of participation with respect to income is between –0.03 and –0.13, 
which means that a 1% increase in G would reduce the number of recipients who 
work by between 0.03% and 0.13%. 
• The elasticity of participation with respect to wages is between zero and 0.01, 
meaning that if wages go up 1% because the BRR is reduced, the number of 
people who choose to work would increase by at most 0.01%, but may not 
increase at all. 
• The elasticity of hours worked with respect to income is between –0.01 and –0.1 
for those below the median hours, which relates to the income effect on those 
who are working and can arise from either increasing G or reducing BRR. 
• The elasticity of hours worked with respect to wages is between zero and 0.1 for 
those below median hours. 
Overall, these elasticities mean that the expected behavioural response from a change 
in the benefit structure is likely to be small, although the total impact on labour supply 
depends on how many people are affected and how big the changes are in G and BRR. 
Thus, depending on the details of a program’s implementation, it is possible for the 
overall labour supply effects to be small while the impacts on specific groups are more 
significant. As Green points out, there is also considerable uncertainty associated with 
these elasticity estimates. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In addition to providing a useful approach to thinking about income testing and 
economic implications, this discussion leads to three conclusions that help frame our 
work. 
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First, income-tested benefit programs and basic incomes share the same basic benefits 
structure approach and the same broad options for designing the benefit structure for a 
specific program. 
Second, there are many factors beyond the benefit structure and its economic 
implications that ultimately affect the overall labour supply response. As mentioned 
earlier and discussed in detail in subsequent parts of the report, many policy design 
elements of programs in addition to the benefit structure can affect the behavioural 
response, including non-cash benefits associated with programs and eligibility 
requirements. Also, different groups of people will react differently because of 
differences in their circumstances and the set of benefits for which they qualify. While 
the insights that can be gained by applying effective tax rates and elasticity estimates 
are useful, they only address part of the issue. 
Third, it is nevertheless interesting to observe that a basic income and a traditional 
income support program with similar maximum benefits and break-even points exert 
very similar incentives on recipients through their effective tax rate implications. 
Whether the labour supply effects are similar will depend on eligibility and other design 
features, but in an apples-to-apples comparison based only on effective tax rates, the 
effects are about the same. 
The benefit structures and the effective tax analysis approach described in this section 
will be applied in Parts 4 and 5 of the report as we analyze the current system and 
potential basic income designs to determine how best to move B.C. toward a more just 
society. 
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6. Panel engagement 
6.1 Public and community engagement 
Consulting with British Columbians 
We consulted broadly with British Columbians in two important ways. First, we used the 
extensive database of comments and suggestions gathered by the Ministry of Social 
Development and Poverty Reduction during the consultative process undertaken in 
support of the first B.C. poverty reduction plan. That process concluded shortly before 
we began our work in 2018 and provided a wealth of information. 
Second, we held a separate web-based public engagement process, with several 
specific questions posed, that took place between November 15, 2018 and March 15, 
2019. Over the course of the consultation, we received 138 submissions through the 
engagement site, 309 email submissions, 72 petition signatures, and seven reports from 
community organizations. Fifty-eight of the individuals making submissions self-
identified as having lived experience of poverty.  
Nearly 70% of submissions were generally in favour of a basic income as an approach 
to reducing poverty. Top arguments in favour of a basic income were that it would 
reduce poverty and improve well-being, while the most frequently cited argument 
against the policy was that it would be expensive and therefore infeasible or 
unsustainable. In addition, several themes emerged across submissions, including the 
inadequacy of existing supports, the special challenges faced by people with disabilities 
and those providing care to someone living with illness or disability, and the role of 
marital status in eligibility determination.  
Engaging key stakeholders 
To obtain further stakeholder input, we also held in-person consultations with 10 
organizations in May 2019. Invited groups included business groups, basic income 
advocates, public health authorities, women’s and seniors’ organizations, and poverty 
reduction groups. During each session, the group was given the chance to present key 
points from their written submissions. Following the presentations, we asked each 
organization a round of specific questions, from “Should there be a pilot?” to “What are 
the trade-offs between basic income and basic services models?” and “How should a 
basic income be financed?” Coupled with the information received through written 
submissions, these sessions provided us with vital perspective and context, and helped 
to fill gaps in our research program.  
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Gathering researchers, experts, and policy analysts to discuss preliminary 
findings  
In December 2019—halfway through our mandate—we convened researchers and 
policy analysts to discuss a range of topics related to our tasks, and, in particular, to 
consider preliminary findings from commissioned research. Workshop attendees 
included the academics commissioned to produce independent research to support our 
work, experts on income supports and basic income design, policy-makers, and 
emerging scholars with an interest in basic income. The objective of the workshop was 
to draw on the expertise of attendees through guided discussion, and to highlight gaps, 
inconsistencies, and places where the panel might shift focus. The workshop was 
organized into eight sessions:  
1. Goals and Definitions of a Basic Income 
2. The Positives and Negatives of the Current System 
3. Societal Transformation, Transitions, and the Changing Labour Market 
4. Basic Income and/or Basic Services  
5. Addressing the Needs of Particular Groups 
6. Practicalities for B.C.—Cost, Structure, and Other Considerations 
7. Investigating the Main Alternative—Reforming the Current System 
8. Evaluation and Pilots of a Basic Income
The following themes emerged over the course of the workshop and are reflected 
throughout this report, particularly in our recommendations: 
• A “radical incrementalist” approach should be considered—Instead of 
getting caught on either end of the spectrum (i.e., “basic income or bust” or a 
principal focus on small, achievable “tweaks”), the panel should focus on “big” or 
“radical” reforms to move the system into line with (or toward) basic income.  
• Money is not everything—Not all programs can be replaced with a simple cash 
transfer, as some in-kind benefits and additional programs and supports are vital, 
particularly in targeting specific needs.  
• Different people have different needs—People with disabilities require extra 
supports to engage in basic daily activities, while those in transition (e.g., youth 
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aging out of care, workers in declining sectors, women fleeing violence) would 
benefit from supports and services tailored to their particular contexts.  
• The system is complex, and delivery and access must be simplified—
Failure to improve access and delivery will limit the impact of future reforms. 
Further, local agencies, non-governmental organizations, and service providers 
play an integral role in supporting system access. This should be recognized—
and these groups better supported.  
• Indigenous people and communities need specific consideration—A legacy 
of institutional discrimination, colonialism, and violence cannot be discounted in 
addressing barriers to access, particularly for Indigenous populations. 
6.2 Commissioned research 
The first step in our work involved developing a comprehensive program of research 
and analysis. We commissioned a series of over 40 independent academic studies that 
would advance understandings in each of the four areas: 
Grounding the analysis: Understanding poverty and basic income    
1. Understanding the nature and extent of poverty in B.C.: What are poverty 
rates, depths, and trends in B.C.? How do labour force dynamics, homelessness, 
and systemic issues influence poverty/risk of poverty? How can “financial 
capability” and “financial exclusion” help to explain poverty/poverty risk? 
2. Grasping the state of basic income knowledge: What do existing 
conceptualizations, political commitments, and past analyses and pilots tell us 
about the basic income concept?  
Studying the current system of income and social supports  
3. Mapping and analyzing the system of income and social supports: What 
income and social support programs are available to people in B.C.? What does 
this look like when considered as a “system?” How is the system designed and 
administered, and according to which logics of benefit delivery?  
4. Who does the system serve (or not)?: What are patterns of use? How do 
programs and services overlap and interact? Are there unintended effects? What 
are user experiences? How do various groups (e.g., women, people with 
disabilities, racialized people) experience it? Where and for whom does it fall 
short? 
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Evaluating potential impacts of a basic income 
5. Assessing an existing Canadian cash-transfer program: What has been the 
impact of the Canada Child Benefit, including on household consumption and 
child outcomes?  
6. Analyzing the potential of a basic income: What do various simulations look 
like? How might a basic income impact poverty, homelessness, and inequality, 
including for diverse groups? Could a basic income influence labour supply and 
self-employment, and provide support given a shifting labour market? How does 
a basic income compare to basic services? 
Looking to the future: Considering reform options  
7. Contextualizing future reforms: What is reasonably possible, given the fiscal 
picture? 
8. Considering reforms along basic income lines: How can programs and 
systems—from income support to rental assistance—be reformed using basic 
income principles? 
9. Assessing design and delivery considerations: What can insights from 
financial inclusion, tax filing, and financial capability research contribute to design 
and delivery? What other design elements are important in developing and 
administering basic income and reformed income support programs?  
The following is a list of reports, all of which are available on our website: 
http://www.bcbasicincomepanel.ca  
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Table 3-5: Research papers 
Grounding the analysis: Understanding poverty and basic income 
1. Understanding the nature and extent of poverty in B.C. 
Poverty in British Columbia: Income Thresholds, Trends, Rates, and Depths of 
Poverty 
Petit and Tedds 
Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) and Intersectionality: Overview, an Enhanced 
Framework and a B.C. Case Study 
Cameron and Tedds 
Homelessness and Poverty in British Columbia Kneebone  
Defining and Describing Energy Poverty in British Columbia: The Distribution of 
Households’ Energy Expenditure 
Shaffer and Winter 
Financial Inclusion in British Columbia: Evaluating the Role of Fintech Clements 
Basic Income, Financial Literacy, and Financial Capability: How Do We Get Better 
Alignment? 
Robson and Shaban 
Income Assistance Trends, Dynamics, and Policy Implications 
Green, Hicks, Warburton, and 
Warburton  
Basic Income: Characteristics Related to Presence in and Absence from the Tax 
System 
Green, Gutierrez, Milligan, and 
Snowberg  
2. Grasping the state of basic income knowledge  
Basic Income in Canada: Principles and Design Features  Tedds, Crisan, and Petit  
Recent Political Manifesto Commitments to Basic Income in Canada Tedds and Crisan  
Basic Income Experimentation Yesterday and Today: Challenges, Achievements, 
and Lessons 
Simpson 
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Evaluating the Existing Basic Income Simulation Literature  Tedds and Crisan  
Studying the current system of income and social supports  
3. Mapping and analyzing the system of income and social supports 
Overview of the System of Income and Social Support Programs in British 
Columbia 
Petit and Tedds 
Programs-Based Overview of Income and Social Support Programs for Working-
Age Persons in British Columbia 
Petit and Tedds  
In-Kind versus Cash Benefits in Social Programs: Choices, Structures, and Delivery  Kesselman and Mendelson 
How and When to Pay? Income Assistance (or Basic Income) as a System of 
Financial Transactions and Services 
Robson and Shaban 
Self-Employment and British Columbia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Lester 
Participation Tax Rates in British Columbia Milligan  
Government Sponsored Training and Employment Programs Sweetman 
4. Who does the system serve (or not)? 
Income Assistance Trends, Dynamics, and Policy Implications 
Green, Hicks, Warburton and 
Warburton  
Interactions between Income and Social Support Programs in British Columbia Petit and Tedds 
User Experience of the System: A Qualitative Analysis of the Access Issues 
Encountered by Clients of the British Columbia Social Assistance System 
Hertz, Gray, and Leslie  
Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) of the Current System of Income and Social 
Supports in British Columbia 
Petit and Tedds 
A Note on SingleAdult Poverty in B.C. Green 
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Evaluating the (potential) impacts of a basic income   
5. Assessing an existing Canadian cash-transfer program 
Evaluating the Canada Child Benefit Baker, Kroft, and Stabile 
How Did the Canada Child Benefit Affect Household Spending? Najjarrezaparast and Pendakur 
Cash Transfers and Child Outcomes Jones and Stabile 
6. Analyzing the potential of a basic income 
Evaluating the Existing Basic Income Simulation Literature  Tedds and Crisan  
Basic Income Simulations for the Province of British Columbia 
Green, Kesselman, Tedds, 
Crisan, and Petit 
Homelessness and Poverty in British Columbia. Kneebone and Wilkins 
Trends in the Labour Market and Their Implications for a Basic Income Green 
Labour Supply Issues Related to a Basic Income and Income Assistance  Green  
Claims Made for or about a Basic Income Green 
Self-Employment and British Columbia's Poverty Reduction Strategy Lester 
Does a Universal Basic Income Reduce Labour Supply for All Groups?: Evidence 
from Canada’s Negative Income Tax Experiment  
Riddell and Riddell 
Gender-Based Analysis Plus of Two Policy Alternatives: Basic Income and Basic 
Services 
Cameron and Tedds  
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Looking to the future: Considering reform options 
7. Contextualizing future reforms 
Financing the Future: Options for Long-Run Debt and Spending Sustainability in 
British Columbia 
Tombe 
8. Considering reforms along basic income lines 
Systems-Level Reforms to British Columbia’s Income and Social Support Programs 
Along Basic Income Lines  
Petit and Tedds 
Income Assistance in British Columbia: Reforms along Basic Income Lines Petit and Tedds 
Income Support and the Affordability of Housing in British Columbia Kneebone and Wilkins 
Applying a Basic Income Lens to British Columbia’s Demand-Side Housing 
Programs 
Mendelson and Kesselman 
Earnings Supplementation for British Columbia: Pros, Cons, and Structure Petit and Kesselman 
Reforms to Earnings Supplement Programs in British Columbia: Making Work Pay 
for Low-Income Workers 
Petit and Kesselman 
Reform of Child Benefits for British Columbians Kesselman 
9. Assessing design and delivery considerations 
How and When to Pay? Income Assistance (or Basic Income) as a System of 
Financial Transactions and Services 
Robson and Shaban  
Basic Income, Financial Literacy, and Financial Capability: How Do We Get Better 
Alignment? 
Robson and Shaban  
Financial Inclusion in British Columbia: Evaluating the Role of Fintech Clements 
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Characteristics Related to Presence in and Absence from the Tax System 
Green, Gutierrez, Milligan, and 
Snowberg  
Design Choice for Income-Transfer Programs: Structural, Economic, and 
Operational Aspects  
Kesselman 
Designing a Basic Income: Lessons from the Optimal Income Tax Literature Boadway and Cuff 
In-Kind versus Cash Benefits in Social Programs: Choices, Structure and Delivery Kesselman and Mendelson 
User Experiences of the System: A Qualitative Analysis of the Access Issues 
Encountered by Clients 
Hertz, Gray, and Leslie  
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6.3 Public survey 
Our social justice framework requires a policy regime that will engender public trust, two 
key aspects of which are policy stability and reciprocity. The former attribute means that 
policies will not be fundamentally altered with changes in government because they 
have strong public acceptance. The latter attribute means that the policy regime will 
create a society of mutual respect, including respect for the public who are financially 
supporting programs through their taxes. A reformed social and income support system 
without those attributes and the desired characteristics for beneficiaries will not move us 
closer to a just society. 
In order to assess whether a prospective basic income would engender public trust in 
British Columbians, a survey and research study were undertaken for the panel in mid-
2020 (Johnston et al., 2020). The online survey was conducted in two stages, with each 
using a separate sample of approximately 2,000 respondents. The first survey was 
designed to elicit opinions on variants of a basic income, comparing a universal basic 
income (UBI) with an income-conditioned benefit, varying the amount of the income 
guarantee, and also varying the benefit reduction rate (and with it the break-even point). 
This survey further asked whether the basic income should officially target people with 
disabilities, be labelled as a housing supplement, or alternatively target renters.  
The first survey made no mention of program cost or potential tax increases. The 
researchers found support for a basic income to be “quite high.” Respondents were 
asked to rank their opinion on a scale from 0 to 100; the mean rating was over 60 for a 
UBI and over 70 for an income-tested basic income. Somewhat surprisingly, that 
support varied little with other dimensions—even when varying the guarantee amount 
from $5,000 to $20,000 per year for a single person or limiting benefits to people with 
disabilities. When the benefits were described as targeting renters, support declined 
somewhat.  
A national survey by the Angus Reid Institute (2020) on Canadian attitudes toward a 
basic income with a guarantee ranging between $10,000 and $30,000 similarly found 
that support was twice as high as opposition when there was no mention of the tax 
increases needed to finance the program.27 However, the Angus Reid survey reported 
that nearly two-thirds of respondents in their national poll would not support a basic 
 
27 The Angus Reid Institute survey’s sample size drawn from B.C. residents was much smaller than the sample for 
our survey, so we report on its nationwide results. 
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income if they had to pay higher taxes to finance the scheme, with no indication of 
which taxes would increase. 
In the second survey, the most popular versions of a basic income identified in the first 
survey—an income-tested basic income with guarantees ranging from $5,000 to 
$10,000—were presented to a separate sample of British Columbians. Cost information, 
varying from citing total program costs to presenting estimates of the increase in B.C. 
income taxes the respondent would face based on their income, was also provided to 
some respondents. Simply citing the cost for an income-tested basic income to the 
government reduced respondents’ average support slightly compared to those for whom 
costs were not mentioned within the second survey. However, when the cost was 
expressed as an estimated tax increase for the individual respondent, average support 
for a basic income declined to the point where those in support and those opposed were 
about equal. For those with incomes above $65,000, opposition outnumbered support 
significantly.28  
Overall, the B.C. survey results show strong support for an income-tested basic income 
when the costs of the program are not made concrete at the level of individual tax hikes, 
and conditioning program eligibility on renter status or disability does not significantly 
affect the support levels. However, when respondents are confronted with the higher 
income taxes needed to finance such a program, their average support for a basic 
income declines to about neutral and is negative for those with higher incomes. In short, 
these results indicate a need to take seriously the concerns of higher-income 




28 In the Angus Reid national survey, support for “some kind of guaranteed income” dropped even more sharply—to 
36%—when respondents were asked whether they “would be willing to pay more in taxes” to finance it. For the same 
question in that survey, B.C. respondents had the highest remaining support rates of all regions, at 42%. 
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Part 3 has provided some useful context that is applicable to the analysis of both the 
current income and social support system and the potential implementation of a basic 
income for all. That includes background information on poverty that helps us to focus 
on the groups most in need of support in order to reduce poverty, background on 
potential sources of funding for new or reformed programs, background on the labour 
market, including wages and precarity especially for low-wage jobs, and an approach 
for describing and understanding the economic incentive implications of income-tested 
programs. In addition, we outlined our public engagement and research programs, 
including the results of a survey conducted on our behalf to gauge factors associated 
with public trust related to a basic income. 
Despite the contextual nature of this material, it does provide us with some useful 
insights. Single working-age adults are the group with the highest poverty rates, 
including those both with and without children. B.C. is facing fiscal sustainability 
pressures that will need to be dealt with over the coming decades, and careful 
consideration and consultation is needed to evaluate the potential new sources of 
funding that would be needed to fund any major policy reform – basic income or other. 
There is no evidence of the technologically driven end of work that some basic income 
advocates believe a basic income would address. However, for the past two-and-a-half 
decades, precarious work has been at a high stable level, suggesting that regulatory 
changes aimed at improving wages and working conditions for low-wage and low-skill 
employees could significantly benefit workers in or near poverty. Income testing, 
whether of Income Assistance, a targeted service delivery program, or a potential basic 
income, all have the same types of work disincentive effects. Estimates of the 
responsiveness of labour supply to such disincentives do not imply large reductions in 
work overall, but impacts for some sub-groups warrant attention.  
All of these insights ripple throughout the remainder of the report. 
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1. Introduction 
In Part 4, we define and describe British Columbia’s current income and social support 
system; we then assess the system based on the analytical framework we developed in 
Part 2. These steps are important because they provide information necessary for both 
of the tasks set for us: to consider the viability of a basic income in B.C. and to consider 
how elements and principles of a basic income could be used to reform the current 
system. A good understanding of how the current system is structured and operates, as 
well as its strengths and weaknesses, is needed to be able to advise government as to 
whether a basic income would be a viable and effective reform to the system, as a 
replacement either for the system or for some elements of the system. This 
understanding is also obviously required to determine how the current system could be 
reformed to move B.C. toward a more just society, the objective we articulated in Part 2. 
We proceed by first defining what we mean by the current system, the set of programs 
that provide income and social support in B.C. We then describe the system in detail. 
Next, we explore the trade-offs among our analytical framework characteristics that are 
inherent in the current system. We do that both at the system level and for important 
groups of programs to determine the strong points of the system and areas that could 
be improved to better align the system with our stated objective. Finally, we set out our 
conclusions about the current system. 
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2. Defining the B.C. income and social support system 
We began by asking ourselves: What exactly is the B.C. income and social support 
system? While it is obvious that a number of programs provide income and social 
support, there is no sense within government or the user community that these 
programs work together as a system. Nor could we find anywhere a statement that 
indicates which programs are included in the system. We therefore needed to establish 
criteria to determine which programs are to be deemed part of the system and which 
programs are not. 
The definition we used to determine which programs make up the system is as follows: 
“The income and social support system” is the set of cash-transfer 
programs (income support programs) and in-kind benefit programs 
intended to benefit those in need because of limited resources (social 
supports). 
Cash transfers provide people with additional financial resources to meet their needs 
without restrictions or conditions on how it is spent. In-kind benefits provide people with 
goods and services to meet specific needs, either directly or through subsidies or by 
cash that is conditional in how it is used.29 The B.C. system, similar to the income and 
social support systems in every other Canadian province, is a combination of programs 
that provide both types of benefits. 
In this report, we discuss basic services in several places, so it is important to be clear 
about how basic services relate to in-kind benefits under the income and social support 
system. Basic services are a set of publicly provided in-kind benefits that ensure that 
people have access to important basic needs of living. They generally include those 
associated with health, housing, education, security of people and property, 
transportation, and other needs. 
Canada has, through its system of fiscal federalism, evolved a set of basic service 
programs mostly delivered by provinces but based on common national values. This 
approach reflects, in principle, the goals of self- and social respect at the heart of our 
justice objective and analytical framework. Universal medicare is perhaps the prime 
example of a basic service provided universally across Canada within a common set of 
standards and with national funding. It is delivered by the provinces, using their 
 
29 Kesselman and Mendelson (2020) elaborate on the distinctions between cash and in-kind benefit formats and 
review the rationales that have been advanced for each format; see especially Box 1 of that study. 
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discretion within the national standards to respond to local needs and priorities, and to 
determine the overall level of provincial resources to allocate. The same principle 
applies across a broad range of provincial social programs. 
Not all basic service programs are part of the income and social support system as we 
define it. In fact, in terms of budgetary expenditure, the majority of basic service 
programs are not included under our definition of the income and social support system 
because they are not focused on those with limited resources and they provide services 
universally; medicare, K–12 and post-secondary education, criminal and civil justice 
systems, child protection and family services, and the transportation system are 
examples. 
Even in the case of universal basic service programs, there are sometimes user costs 
associated with the service. In those cases, there are often programs focused on those 
with limited resources who require support to ensure that they have the full capacity to 
access the universal basic service. These are basic service programs that fall within our 
definition of the income and social support system. Examples are Medical Services Plan 
(MSP) supplementary benefits, housing subsidies, child care subsidies, and income-
tested benefits under the Fair PharmaCare program. The common element is that 
eligibility depends on direct income testing30 or on an indicator associated with limited 
resources, such as receiving Income Assistance. 
In addition to these low income–focused basic services, the system includes cash-
transfer programs with different delivery mechanisms and approaches. One of these, 
Income Assistance, combines cash transfers with in-kind benefits in the form of 
supplements that fund specific costs. Overall, the income and social support system in 
B.C. is a wide-ranging combination of cash transfer and basic service programs. 
  
 
30 See Kesselman (2020a) for a general discussion and analysis of the use of income testing for the targeting of 
benefits of both the cash and in-kind varieties. 
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3. System description 
This section is an abridged version of a paper commissioned as part of the panel’s 
research program (Petit & Tedds, 2020d), together with some additional content. To 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the system, we examine it from a variety of 
perspectives, highlighting how the various levels of government target different groups 
and issues, and use different types of program approaches. This exercise includes 
detailing the agencies that administer the programs, whether the programs provide cash 
transfers or in-kind benefits, how much is spent, how benefits are accessed, how 
programs are delivered, what groups are targeted, whether and how programs are 
income-tested, and benefit levels. 
In fact, even a cursory examination shows that this is a system only in the sense that all 
of the programs are consistent with our definition of the income and social support 
system. It was not designed as a system, and changes are more often than not made in 
the narrow context of a single program without considering impacts on the rest of the 
system. Nevertheless, because the programs often interact in their effects on users, 
analyzing the existing programs and potential changes within a system context is 
crucial, if challenging. 
3.1 Program administration 
For the purposes of this work, we have focused on programs meeting our criterion that 
are provided by the provincial and federal governments. Programs offered by the non-
profit sector without senior government funding are excluded because of complexity and 
resource limitations. Nevertheless, the non-profit sector can and does play an important 
role in helping vulnerable populations learn about, apply for, and access government-
provided programs and benefits, in part because they are often more trusted than 
government agencies. 
Our list of federal and provincial programs was obtained by consulting several sources, 
including a range of public documents,31 and working closely with ministries and 
agencies to create a comprehensive understanding of how the programs work in 
 
31 The Government of British Columbia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (Government of British Columbia, 2019c); the 
Government of Canada’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (Government of Canada, 2018); B.C.’s Budget 2019 
(Government of British Columbia, 2019a); the 2019 federal budget (Government of Canada, 2019b); and the 
Government of Canada’s Benefit Finder (Government of Canada, 2019a). 
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practice and their costs. This work identified a total of 194 programs that were offered or 
planned to be offered to B.C. residents as of April 1, 2019. 
Figure 4-1: Income and social support programs in B.C., by administering body 
 
 
The full set of programs is shown in Figure 4-1, which is the first of several sunburst 
diagrams used to visualize the system from various perspectives. Each of these figures 
is linked to interactive versions that allow users to view them at higher resolution, see 
more details for each segment, and focus on the different groupings represented by 
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segments of the different rings. We encourage readers to use the interactive versions of 
the sunburst visualizations on the panel website32 to explore further. 
The rings in Figure 4-1 represent the governmental reporting hierarchy of program 
administration, which is one of the reasons why the system is so complex. The 
innermost ring shows the level of government (Canada, B.C., or municipal). The next 
ring shows ministerial-level responsibility, while the third ring from the centre shows the 
agency or type of agency that is administratively responsible: the ministry, department, 
agency, Crown corporation, non-governmental organization, or private sector entity that 
the applicant interacts with to access the program. Finally, the outermost ring presents 
the program or group of programs.33 
Figure 4-1 shows the size and complexity of the system. B.C. offers 120 programs 
across 12 ministries through 23 different points of access. Additionally, the federal 
government provides 72 programs through eight different departments or agencies and 
12 different points of access. At the municipal level, there is one program offered by 
nearly all municipalities in B.C.34 
3.2 Programs by expenditure 
In order to identify the largest income and social support programs, and who 
administers them, we next look at programs by expenditure. Figure 4-2 provides a 
visualization of the size of those programs for which we have expenditure data .35 Like 
in Figure 4-1, the second ring from the centre in Figure 4-2 is the responsible 
agency/ministry/department, and the third ring from the centre is the administering 
agency. 
The Government of British Columbia allocates just over $11 billion to its 120 programs. 
The largest program by expenditure offered by the B.C. government is Income 
Assistance (IA)—including both Disability Assistance (DA) and Temporary Assistance 
(TA)—administered by the Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction. The 
B.C. government spent about $2.5 billion in 2019/20 on IA, including $1.5 billion for 
 
32 Visualizations can be found at http://www.bcbasicincomepanel.ca/ 
33 Program groups at the federal level: Employment Insurance, Canadian Pension Plan, apprenticeship grants, 
Allowances, Canada Education Savings Grants, and Canada Disability Savings Grants. Program groups at the 
provincial level: Medical Services Plan, general supplements, health supplements, Labour Market Development 
Agreements, Workforce Development Agreements, Student Aid, the home owner grant, and Fair PharmaCare.  
34 This is not to say that this is the only municipal program that is offered to support people in poverty, but rather that 
this is the only program that is offered consistently by every municipality in B.C. 
35 For some provincial programs and many federal programs we do not have program-specific spending figures.  
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entitlements for DA, $424.6 million for entitlements for TA, and an additional $170 
million for administration, operating, and appeals. These IA figures include both cash 
benefits and supplemental in-kind benefits. Other large programs offered by the B.C. 
government include Community Living BC, on which $1.1 billion was spent in 2019/20, 
the home owner grant at $817 million (2018/19), and Fair PharmaCare at a cost of $765 
million in 2019/20. The B.C. government has also budgeted $1.2 billion for housing 
programs in 2019/20. 
Figure 4-2: Income and social support programs in B.C., by expenditure 
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Among those federal programs for which we have expenditure data, the largest federal 
programs are all administered by either Service Canada or the Canada Revenue 
Agency. Of these, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) retirement pension (as distinct from 
CPP disability benefits) is the largest program by expenditure, at a cost of about $6.4 
billion for B.C. residents. The second largest program is Old Age Security, at a cost of 
$5.6 billion, followed by the Canada Child Benefit, at $2.7 billon, and the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement for seniors, at $1.7 billion. In addition, the federal government 
spends about $2 billion on Employment Insurance (regular and special benefits 
combined). All of these figures relate to expenditures for B.C. residents alone. 
The federal government’s largest expenditure programs in B.C. target seniors. In fact, 
the expenditure on federal seniors’ programs is larger than total B.C. government 
income and social support program spending. The spending on children through the 
Canada Child Benefit is also considerable. As a result, poverty rates and depths of 
poverty are lower for seniors and children than for working-age adults, as discussed in 
Part 3. 
Table 4-1 provides a slightly different perspective on the cost of the income and social 
support system, focusing on the largest federal and provincial program areas by 
expenditure on B.C. residents.36 While these are a subset of program areas that omit 
many individual programs, in aggregate they represent over $30 billion in spending in 
B.C. by the two levels of government, with over two-thirds of the total spending by the 
federal government. 




B.C. government programs 
 
 Income Assistance 2,459  
 PharmaCare 1,405  
 WorkSafeBC benefits 1,119  
 Community Living BC 1,065  
 
36 Expenditures are for 2019/20 except for the B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit, which is the estimated amount for the 
first full year—2021/22. 
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 Employment and skill training programs 1,014  
 Low-income housing programs  976  
 Child-care programs  450  
 B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit  400  
Federal government programs 
 
 
Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income 
Supplement 
7,376  
 Canada Pension Plan  7,326  
 Canada Child Benefit 2,689  
 Employment Insurance 1,860  
 Canada Education Saving Grant 1,679  
 Canada Pension Plan disability benefits  758  
 GST/HST credit  573  
 Canada Workers Benefit 300 
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While the federal programs are all delivered by two agencies and focus largely on 
seniors and children, there is much more diversity in the major provincial program 
areas: 
• IA is the largest program and is a complex hybrid 
of cash transfers and in-kind benefits delivered to 
those eligible for either TA or DA, with cash 
transfers and eligibility for in-kind supplements 
reduced sharply as other income is earned. 
• PharmaCare provides income-tested support (in-
kind benefits) for the cost of prescription drugs, 
ranging from full coverage for those with low 
income to coverage reduced by deductibles that 
rise with income to a maximum of $10,000 
annually, providing universal coverage above 
that maximum cost. 
• WorkSafeBC provides compensation to injured 
workers, including coverage for occupational 
diseases, as well as regulating workplace health 
and safety, as part of a historic bargain between 
workers and employers to avoid resolving such 
matters through the courts, fully funded by 
premiums levied on employers. 
• Community Living BC provides community-based 
long-term support (in-kind benefits) for those with 
developmental disabilities. 
• Employment and skill-training programs provide 
a range of services (in-kind benefits) intended to 
enhance labour market attachment and facilitate 
transitions. Programs generally depend on 
employment status. 
• Low-income housing programs are a diverse set 
of demand- and supply-side housing programs (in-kind benefits) with a variety of 
mechanisms and approaches to income testing. 
Box 4-1: Method of delivery  
Cash transfers 
Pure cash transfer: cash benefits 
not linked to any actual expenses 
incurred or to be incurred 
Refundable tax credit: cash 
benefits delivered through the tax 
system, paid regardless of whether 
income tax is owing  
Non-refundable tax credit: 
reductions to taxes owing, but once 
taxes are reduced to zero, the 
remainder is not paid to the tax filer  
In-kind benefits 
Cash geared to cost: cash benefits 
tied to an actual expense to be 
incurred (e.g., rent).  
Bill repayment: cash benefits tied to 
an expense paid in the past (e.g., 
home renovations)  
Pure in-kind: goods or services 
directly provided by the program, 
with or without a contribution from 
the beneficiary (e.g., health, 
education)  
Services: funding to a third party, 
such as an employer or partnership, 
for an activity that benefits society 
but is not included in the list above 
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• Child-care programs include programs (in-kind benefits) designed to increase the 
supply of child care spaces in B.C. and to subsidize the cost of child care for low-
income parents. 
• The B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit is a refundable tax credit (cash transfer) 
providing support to parents that phases out as income increases. Two other 
refundable tax credits with relatively low benefits are labelled as related to sales 
tax and climate action but are cash benefits. 
Several of these program areas are compared with our analytical framework in Section 
4.  
3.3 Programs by method of delivery 
For this section we have expanded on the basic cash-transfer versus in-kind benefit 
dichotomy to create a finer breakdown of the method of delivery, shown in Box 4-1. 
(See Kesselman & Mendelson (2020) for more on in-kind benefit delivery options.) 
Figure 4-3 provides a visual representation of the programs by method of delivery, and 
Figure 4-4 shows only the provincial programs by program target and method of 
delivery. An important insight made obvious by Figure 4-3 is that the most common 
method of delivery for provincial programs is pure in-kind, while for federal programs it 
is pure cash transfers. 
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Figure 4-3: Income and social support programs in B.C., by method of delivery 
 
Figure 4-4 shows that B.C. delivers benefits to its most common targets—
medical/health and housing programs—as in-kind benefits (pure in-kind, cash geared to 
cost, or bill refunds). There are good reasons to have such a preference. In a research 
paper commissioned by the panel, Kesselman and Mendelson (2020) suggest that 
positive social benefits stem from this method of delivery: housing and health care are 
“merit” goods that have strong taxpayer support for their funding and consumption. 
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Figure 4-4: Government of B.C. programs, by method of delivery and program target 
 
 
In-kind benefits also allow for better targeting with generally applicable cash transfers to 
meet special needs that would not be affordable for individuals to cover. For 
medical/health programs, this is particularly true where protection is required against 
low-likelihood, but high-cost events. In addition, the state can use bulk procurement to 
reduce the cost of many goods and services, in contrast to what individuals would have 
to pay if these were purchased by them. Finally, for low-income persons, housing costs 
and medical/health costs can be a large proportion of their household budget. Simply 
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providing cash with no strings attached, such as a basic income, could result in 
insufficient funds when they are most needed, requiring low-income households to 
resort to solutions such as borrowing from predatory lenders. Ensuring that supports are 
available to cover basic needs with relatively high costs, such as housing and 
medical/health costs, can help break the cycle of poverty. 
As noted above, Income Assistance is a hybrid program. It provides pure cash transfers 
in the form of the support allowance that people can use as they choose, although that 
choice is limited by their overall lack of resources. It also provides access to a suite of 
in-kind supplements. These benefits include the shelter allowance that requires 
evidence of housing costs and other benefits that can be accessed to address adverse 
events and specific types of additional costs that would be devastating if not covered 
when they occur. Even the autonomy associated with cash-transfer portion of IA is, in 
some cases, limited by providing individuals who are unable to manage their funds with 
assistance, such as weekly or daily allocations of funds from their monthly payments, or 
direct payment of the shelter allowance to a landlord. As discussed later, the linkage of 
in-kind supplements to IA eligibility provides a strong incentive to maintain IA eligibility 
by limiting earned income, contributing to the “welfare wall.” 
3.4 Benefit levels 
We now consider the adequacy of overall benefits provided by cash-transfer programs. 
Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 compare annual cash-transfer amounts available in B.C. for 
various family types who qualify for Temporary Assistance and Disability Assistance, 
respectively, compared with the Market Basket Measure (MBM) poverty line for each 
family type for Vancouver in 2017. In both figures, the number in orange is the amount 
of benefit as a percentage of the MBM available to a B.C. resident who has no other 
income. The number in purple is the value of benefits available to a B.C. resident as a 
percentage of the MBM at the point where benefits are at their maximum. 
The transfers included are: 
• IA payments 
• Canada Workers Benefit 
• Canada Child Benefit 
• GST/HST credit 
• B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit 
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• B.C. climate action tax credit 
• B.C. sales tax credit 
• Transportation Supplement provided to all DA recipients (those with the Persons 
with Disabilities designation).37 
 
For the sake of analysis, we assume that recipients of these benefit programs receive 
the full benefit amounts despite the fact that barriers to access mean that many do not 
receive all applicable benefits, and, for simplicity, we assume that the full shelter 
amount is included in the IA benefit. Amounts and other details are program provisions 
for working-age adults in 2019, except the B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit (COB) which 
took effect in October 2020. 
Working-age adults without children 
Figure 4-5 shows that single adults have the lowest levels of benefits. They receive 
$9,640/year in benefits if they have no other income,38 approximately 48% of what it 
would cost to secure a basic standard of living in Vancouver as measured by the MBM. 
If they were to accept a part-time job (20 hours/week) at minimum wage at the time 
($13.85/hour), their benefits would drop to $1,785/year, and the combination of benefits 
and income would represent about 81% of the cost of a basic standard of living in 
Vancouver in 2017. They would have to work at least 26 hours a week at minimum 
wage to secure the MBM standard of living.39 The situation for couples without children 
is very similar in terms of cash-transfer amounts relative to the MBM poverty line. 
 
37 This analysis excludes in-kind benefits, non-refundable tax credits, and most IA general and health supplements, 
as these are difficult to quantify and the amount received varies widely among recipients, as well as social insurance 
programs, such as Employment Insurance, workers’ compensation, and CPP, which depend on individual-specific 
circumstances. 
38 Note that maximum level of benefits is reached at about $5,000 of income due to the Canada Workers Benefit (a 
wage subsidy) for a maximum of $10,065 noted on Figure 4-5 Panel A. Throughout this section we quote the benefit 
amounts associated with earning no other income rather than the maximum benefit amounts. 
39 This does not take into account potential taxes on these earnings, so more than 26 hours of work would be needed 
when taxes are included. 
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Figure 4-5: Cash transfers for those not eligible for Disability Assistance, 2019 
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Figure 4-6: Cash transfers for those eligible for Disability Assistance, 2019 
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For single adults, these benefit levels are worrisome. As discussed in Part 3, Section 2 
(Poverty in British Columbia), single adults in B.C. have the highest poverty rates and 
are the deepest in poverty. The benefits currently available to single adults are very low 
compared with the poverty threshold. Even after securing a part-time job, it is a 
challenge for single adults to move above the poverty line. 
Despite similar relative cash-transfer levels, the situation for childless couples is less 
worrisome because couples have the lowest incidence and depths of poverty. However, 
for those who are living in poverty, cash-transfer levels are low compared with the 
poverty line. 
Working-age parents 
Parents receive a significantly higher level of benefits than adults without children, 
largely due to the Canada Child Benefit and the B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit. 
Canada’s system of child benefits has been credited with contributing more to the 
decline of single-parent poverty than labour market income (Hoynes & Stabile, 2019). 
Benefit levels for single parents and couples with children are higher and closer to the 
MBM than for single adults and couples without children. Single parents with one child 
and no other income are offered up to $22,503/year in benefits, about 79% of the 
applicable MBM threshold. Couples with one child are offered up to $24,609/year, about 
71% of their MBM threshold. 
People with disabilities  
Those with disabilities who are eligible for higher benefits are brought closer to the MBM 
threshold than people who are not eligible for Disability Assistance. Couples with no 
children, no other sources of income, and one person with a Persons With Disability 
designation receive up to $15,453/year, about 77% of their MBM threshold, and couples 
where both people have a disability receive $20,834/year, about 73% of their threshold. 
For families with children and no other sources of income, single parents receive 
$28,208/year, about 99% of their MBM threshold, and couples with one child receive 
$31,479/year, about 90% of their threshold. However, those with a disability face both 
higher costs that are not measured by the MBM framework and significant employment 
barriers, including higher employment-related costs. As a result, the adequacy of benefit 
levels for those with disabilities cannot be fully assessed by simply comparing maximum 
cash-transfer levels with the MBM poverty line. 
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3.5 Institutional framework 
It is notable that the federal and provincial governments use 
different institutional frameworks for the administration of 
programs. The largest federal programs noted above (i.e., 
Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement, the 
Canada Child Benefit, Employment Insurance, and the 
Canada Pension Plan) are delivered by either the Canada 
Revenue Agency (CRA) or Service Canada. 
The CRA delivers programs such as the Canada Child 
Benefit and the Canada Workers Benefit in the form of 
refundable tax credits delivered through the personal 
income tax system. Delivering programs this way offers two 
advantages: low levels of stigma as compared with 
provincially delivered income support programs (Tedds, 
2017); and stable, predictable levels of support, since 
benefit levels are assessed only once a year (i.e., at tax-
filing time). 
However, CRA delivery of benefits also has drawbacks, as 
noted by Tedds (2017) and as explored in more detail in 
Part 5, Section 5 (Claims Made For or About a Basic 
Income). The most significant is that these benefits may be 
difficult for vulnerable populations to access because they 
require tax filing. Since the CRA requires only those who 
owe taxes to file a return, persons who are owed benefits 
are not sought out by the CRA. In addition, tax filing in 
general is complex, and some people are reluctant to file 
because of unresolved taxation problems from previous 
periods, such as taxes and penalties owing. In addition, 
applying for credits often requires providing supporting 
documentation that can be challenging to obtain and 
maintain for those in precarious circumstances. Green, Gutierrez et al. (2020) use 
linked tax, Census and death record data to show that between 3 and 6.6% of the 
Canadian population are not known to the tax system at all. Added to the people who do 
not file taxes in a year, between 11% and 15% of the population are either not in the tax 
system at all or do not file taxes in a year. These findings complement those in Robson 
and Schultz (2020) who find that approximately 12% of respondents to a Statistics 
 
Box 4-2: Methods of access 
Self-initiated—form: online or 
paper form completed by applicant 
Self-initiated—third-party 
provider: application through 
contact with a third-party provider 
Self-initiated—administrator: 
application though contact with 
administering agency 
Caseworker: application submitted 
through a program official, such as 
an IA EAW 
Tax filing—application: specific 
application within filed tax return 
Tax filing—automatic: eligibility 
automatically assessed on tax filing 
Automatic with other self-initiated 
application: eligibility automatically 
assessed if person is in a parent 
program 
Automatic: no action required to 
apply 
Third-party: funding of the costs of 
third parties that deliver benefits or 
services  
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Canada survey did not file taxes in the survey year. In addition, the stability of payments 
noted above is a double-edged sword, as it means that CRA-administered programs are 
unresponsive to fluctuations in income during the year. 
Service Canada is a one-stop shop for federal social insurance cash-transfer 
programs,40 such as Employment Insurance, Canada Pension Plan, and Old Age 
Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement (OAS/GIS). These program benefits can be 
applied for online or in person and some, such as OAS/GIS, have automatic enrolment 
for tax filers when they turn 65, with the option to defer the start of benefits. Employment 
Insurance is designed to respond quickly to changes in circumstances. Additionally, 
since Service Canada provides integrated service delivery for federal programs, it 
informs potential recipients of other federal programs they may be eligible for and is 
more client-oriented than the CRA. Service Canada programs have lower levels of 
stigma than traditional income support programs because they are entitlement 
programs, some of which require employee contributions for eligibility. 
Provincial income and social support programs are, in contrast, delivered through a 
larger mix of institutions, including both provincial and federal agencies, with no 
common interface or point of contact. Program delivery is much more decentralized 
than it is for the federal government programs: B.C. does not have a one-stop shop like 
Service Canada for income and social support programs.41 Some programs are 
grouped. All of Income Assistance, including supplements, are administered by the 
Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction except on-reserve; all provincial 
labour market–related programs are administered by WorkBC; and the CRA administers 
personal income tax credits, whether refundable or non-refundable, on behalf of B.C. 
The rest of the programs are delivered by a bewildering array of agencies. 
This leads to complexity and barriers to access resulting from differences in the 
definition of income used for income testing, eligibility criteria used to gain access to 
programs that target the same group, such as those with disabilities, and a limited ability 
 
40 Public insurance programs that protect against economic risks, including unemployment, disability and other 
medical conditions, and old age. Some of these programs (such as Employment Insurance and CPP) require 
mandatory contributions from employees in order to be eligible for benefits when needed. 
41 Although there is a provincial agency called Service BC, it has a very different mandate from Service Canada. 
Service BC provides services such as registrations (i.e., corporate, court, transplant, etc.), licensing (i.e., liquor, etc.), 
property-related services, and vital statistics services, with specific services differing by location. Service BC provides 
some specific services related to social programs including IA, but services are limited in scope (such as providing 
computer access) and limited to specific smaller, rural, or remote communities. See 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/organizational-structure/ministries-organizations/ministries/citizens-
services/servicebc for more information. 
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of people in the system to inform users and applicants about other programs for which 
they may qualify. The lack of coordination and multiple access points forces those in 
need to navigate through a complex array of access points for the supports they need. 
Not only do potential recipients have to collect their own information on programs for 
which they may be eligible, but if they move or experience a life transition, they must 
inform all of the administrative agencies they deal with of the change. If they fail to do 
this, they could potentially lose or be required to repay benefits. 
3.6 Method of access 
As noted above, navigating the system is difficult due to its complexity. This is 
especially evident when viewed from the perspective of how different programs are 
accessed. Nine different methods of application for benefits have been identified (see 
Box 4-2), ranging from self-initiated to automatic. Figure 4-7 shows federal and B.C. 
income and social support programs sorted by their method of access. 
The majority of programs are self-initiated—by filling out a form or contacting the 
administrator or a third-party provider. A person must act to find out about the programs 
and initiate the application on their own. For vulnerable populations, there are many 
barriers to taking action, from lack of internet access to specific personal circumstances. 
All parts of the Income Assistance system, the most significant B.C. program, are 
accessible only through employment and assistance workers (EAWs), including both IA 
cash transfers and the set of supplementary benefits that are generally available only to 
IA recipients.  
Cash transfers start with online applications that generally require interaction with EAWs 
to proceed. Supplements can typically be accessed only once cash benefits have been 
applied for and are accessible only directly through EAWs.  
The supplements provide the range of in-kind and emergency support responsiveness 
needed to make it possible for IA recipients to survive on limited IA benefits. Information 
on general and health supplements is publicly available online in the BC Employment 
and Assistance Policy and Procedures Manual,42 which can be used by recipients to 
determine if they may be eligible for supplements. 
 
42 See https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/policies-for-government/bcea-policy-and-procedure-manual. 
While the information is available, it may be difficult for at least some recipients to use in practice to determine 
whether they are likely to be eligible, leaving it to EAWs to advise a beneficiary about their eligibility for particular 
supplements. 
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Figure 4-7: Income and social support programs in B.C., by method of access 
 
However, access to most supplements is fully dependent on the recipient contacting the 
ministry to submit a request through an EAW. For some supplements, specific 
supporting documentation may be required. 
For example, crisis supplements are assessed by the EAW directly, as are requests for 
moving, transportation, and security deposits. For health-related supplementary 
assistance, most requests are received through the EAW and then adjudicated for 
eligibility by a specialized team. Generally, some initial eligibility review is performed by 
the EAW in order in ensure the person is likely eligible. Note that eligibility for some 
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supplements differs between TA and DA recipients. Some health supplements can be 
requested directly by the person’s health professional. 
As noted above, several benefits are tax credits that are accessible only by filing an 
income tax return. There are many barriers to access related to tax filing, especially for 
vulnerable populations, as discussed above. Eligibility for some tax credits, such as the 
disability tax credit, are also gateway requirements for other programs that target the 
same population. In addition, some programs that are accessed by other means, such 
as direct application, indirectly require tax filing, since CRA data is used for income-
testing purposes. While this is a consistent, verified way to access income, it imports all 
the barriers associated with tax filing for these programs. 
A final access method is through automatic access with other self-initiated applications. 
This access method is rare but is a potential way to reduce barriers to access. 
Automatic access to a program based on eligibility for another program is difficult in the 
current system because of barriers resulting from differing eligibility criteria and income-
testing parameters. Legal impediments may also arise to sharing of information across 
agencies targeting the same populations. 
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Figure 4-8: Programs by program target and eligibility 
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3.7 Program targeting and eligibility 
Two dimensions of the system provide insight when 
examined together—the targeted policy area and the 
eligible demographic groups. Boxes 4-3 and 4-4 describe 
the categories used for each. At first glance, it is natural to 
expect that these are just two ways of expressing the same 
concept, but it turns out that there are some interesting 
exceptions. 
Figure 4-8 provides a visual representation of B.C. income 
and social support programs by program target and 
eligibility. The complexity of the diagram simply reflects, 
once again, the complexity of the system. It is important to 
keep a few points in mind while examining the figure. 
Programs are represented by colour-coded circles—
generally, black circles are B.C. programs and yellow 
circles are federal programs. However, IA supplements 
cover such a wide range of policy areas that they are 
identified by their own colour, white. Programs that have 
more than one eligibility criterion are placed on the line 
between the two criteria but doing so created difficulty in 
representing all of the programs, necessitating the 
appearance of “low income” eligibility criteria in two different 
rows. The width of some rows varies across the figure, to 
accommodate the number of programs in certain cells. 
(Circle size is only to accommodate names.) 
Figure 4-9 provides a visual representation of only those 
programs for which we have expenditure data, by program 
target and expenditures: the size of the program slice 
indicates the relative size of expenditures. 
Together these figures put the B.C. and federal programs 
into sharp contrast. Federal programs are weighted heavily 
toward seniors and children, plus work-related Employment 
Insurance, non-work-related GST/HST tax credits, and 
Canada Education Savings Grants. In contrast, B.C. has a 
large number of programs, with considerably more diversity 
Box 4-3: Program targets 
Work-related: programs that provide 
support during times of disruption in 
employment 
Non-work-related: programs that 
provide support to those with 
inadequate income  
Children and families: programs 
that support children 
Housing: programs that support 
adequate housing 
Education, training, and 
employment: programs that support 
post-secondary education, job 
training, and employment 
Medical/health: programs that 
support medical and health needs 
Box 4-4: Broad eligibility 
categories  
Low income: eligibility limited to 
those with income of $50,000 or less  
Senior: eligibility limited to those 65 
or older  
Disability: eligibility limited to those 
having a disability; definitions of 
disability differ across programs 
Veteran or Canadian Armed 
Forces: eligibility limited to veterans 
and current or former Canadian 
Armed Forces members 
Immigrant/refugee: eligibility limited 
to refugees, and current and recent 
immigrants 
Other: other eligibility requirements 
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in terms of their policy area targets. The areas with the highest spending are non-work-
related, medical/health programs, housing programs, and education, training, and 
employment programs. 
The federal government offers many programs for veterans and immigrants as well as 
supports for seniors that are not work-related. In contrast, the provincial government 
has more programs for low-income persons and families with dependent children. 
Two specific aspects of eligibility should be addressed separately: disability eligibility 
and income testing. 
Figure 4-9: Programs by program target and expenditure 
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Disability eligibility 
Programs for persons with disabilities are more evenly split between the levels of 
government. In terms of the number of programs for persons with disabilities, the 
federal government offers mostly work-related, tax-administered programs and savings-
matching programs. The provincial government offers more housing and 
education/employment programs. However, this does not mean that every person with a 
disability can access all of these programs. There are nearly as many definitions of 
disability as there are programs for persons with disabilities. 
Table 4-2 provides a summary of the definitions of disability for several of the larger 
programs that target persons with disabilities. It shows that very few programs offer 
support for persons with episodic disabilities, with the focus being on providing support 
for those with long-term, continuous disabilities. The most restrictive B.C. disability 
definitions apply to Community Living BC and Home Adaptations for Independence, 
which target persons with very specific disabilities (i.e., developmental disabilities or an 
ability-related disability, respectively) to serve a very particular need (i.e., social 
inclusion and access within own home, respectively). The more general Disability 
Assistance PWD definition, on the other hand, is consistent with a program that covers 
a broader swath of the population, providing both income support and in-kind services 
for people with needs that vary considerably. 
At the federal level, the two largest programs for persons with disabilities, Canada 
Pension Plan disability benefits (CPP-D) and the disability tax credit (DTC), both have 
very restrictive eligibility requirements compared to DA, and the DTC is not a refundable 
tax credit so has little or no direct value to those with low income but it is used by the 
federal government to determine eligibility for other programs, such as a Registered 
Disability Savings Plan. Both are available only to persons with continuous, longer-term 
disabilities. Many people with disabilities and unmet needs who do not qualify for the 
federal programs either receive nothing or must rely on IA or DA. IA has a much higher 
level of stigma than either the CPP-D or the DTC. 
Income testing 
Income testing is a common feature of income and social support programs. A program 
is income-tested if a person’s income must be below a threshold amount to be eligible 
or if benefits are reduced as income increases. For all income-tested programs, exactly 
what is and is not included in income is very important, and it varies widely, as shown in 
Table 4-3. Most programs use an income definition that is a combination of amounts 
found in the annual personal income tax return, including all of those delivered through 
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the tax system and several others as well. That makes sense because tax reporting is 
consistent and verifiable. However, many permutations are used by other programs, 
and some use altogether different calculations. 
IA is the biggest outlier, directly collecting data on all income sources—including 
sources of income that are not reported for provincial income tax purposes such as 
gifts, prescribed prizes, and lottery winnings. This makes IA applications not only more 
intrusive but also more complex to navigate. Furthermore, the legislation includes a 
detailed list of forms of compensation considered as income, which must be updated on 
an ongoing basis to avoid unfair inadvertent exclusion of new categories of 
compensation. 
The way IA payments are treated for the purposes of income-testing other benefit 
programs and phasing-out the benefit as income rises, is also inconsistent, as indicated 
in Table 4-3. On the T1 income tax return, social assistance payments, including IA, are 
included in the calculation of “total income” (line 15000) and remain part of “net income” 
(line 23600). They are then deducted in determining “taxable income” (line 26000) so 
that they are not subject to income tax.  
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Table 4-2: Definitions of disability for certain programs 
 Federal programs Provincial programs 
 







Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Include mental 
disability? 







No—must have disability at 






If eligible for one 
program, then 
also eligible for 
this program? 
No No 
Yes, CPP-D, CLBC, 
MCFD’s At Home 




Yes—if eligible for 
the disability tax 
credit (no other proof 
necessary) 
Length of time 
disability 
expected to last 
“long duration and of 
indefinite duration or is 
likely to result in death” 
At least 12 months At least 2 years 
Permanent, started 
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Impact on daily 
living? 
 Restricted in two or more of 
the basic activities or in 
vision plus one activity. Basic 
activities include speaking, 
eating, walking, eliminating, 
feeding, dressing, and mental 
functions for everyday life. 
“directly and 
significantly” 
 Permanent disability 
or loss of ability that 
affects safe and 
independent living in 
own home 
Table 4-3: Definitions of income for certain income-tested programs 
Program Government Program target Income definition 
Canada Child Benefit Canada 
Children and 
families 
Net income (line 23600) of applicant and spouse 
– UCCB income 
– RDSP income 
+ UCCB amount repaid 
+ RDSP amount repaid 
= Household Adjusted Family Net Income 





Canada Workers Benefit Canada Work-related 
B.C. climate action tax 
credit 
B.C. Non-work-related 
B.C. sales tax credit B.C. Non-work-related 





Total income (line 15000) of applicant and spouse 
– provincial social assistance (line 14500) 
– (2000*[number of family members – 2]) 
– (3000*[number of children with special needs]) 
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Program Government Program target Income definition 
Income Assistance 
(including Temporary 
Assistance and Disability 
Assistance) 
B.C. Non-work-related 
[Earned Income – Deductions from Earned Income (e.g., EI + CPP contributions, 
income tax) – Exempt Earnings] + [Unearned Income (e.g., EI, CPP) – Deductions 
from Unearned Income – Exempt Unearned Income]43 





Net income (line 23600) 
– OAS income (line 11300) 
– provincial social assistance (line 14500) 
– GIS income (line 14600) 
B.C. Senior’s Supplement B.C. 




Rental Assistance Program  
B.C. Housing 
Total income (line 15000) of applicant and spouse 
+ ongoing funds from non-taxable sources (e.g., spousal support payments, 
alimony, on-reserve income) 
Shelter Aid for Elderly 
Renters  
B.C. Housing Total income (line 15000) of applicant and spouse – BC Bus Pass for seniors 
 
43 Note that this is the income definition used for the calculation of benefits. Each part of this income definition is defined at length in the BC Employment and 
Assistance Regulation (B.C. Reg. 259/2020) and may or may not correspond to a specific line on tax forms. For example, “earned income” is defined in s. (1) of 
the Regulation and includes “any money or value received in exchange for work or the provision of a service, pension plan contributions that are refunded…, 
money or value received from providing room and board at a person’s place of residence, money or value received from renting rooms that are common to and 
part of a person’s place of residence.” Although this definition of earned income includes earned income reported in line 10100 (employment income) and 12600 
(rental income), among other lines, it also includes earned income not reported, such as income earned “under the table.” 
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Four of the five programs that target seniors with low incomes (Guaranteed Income 
Supplement, B.C. Senior’s Supplement, Allowance for the Survivor, and Shelter Aid for 
Elderly Renters44) deduct social assistance in their income definitions ensuring that 
benefits are not reduced as a result of having received IA benefits. But the Canada 
Workers Benefit, the B.C. sales tax credit, and the B.C. climate action tax credit, which 
all target low-income persons, do not deduct social assistance benefits in their 
measures used for income-testing, with the result that those receiving IA benefits have 
their refundable tax credit payments reduced. It is not clear what public policy objective 
is achieved by doing so. 
In summary, there is no consistent definition of income across programs for the 
purposes of income testing. Some programs appear to use a definition of income that is 
consistent with the eligibility group they target (i.e., low-income), but not all do. Most 
programs use a definition of income that can be obtained from provincial income tax 
data, but not all do. This situation contributes to the confusion among applicants when 
applying (or considering whether to apply) for these programs. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This section has provided a sketch of an extensive set of programs covering a range of 
cash-transfer and in-kind benefits. These programs address many of the basic needs of 
people with limited resources, at least in part—their adequacy is discussed in the next 
section. But the set of programs is not recognized by users or administrators as a 
system. As a result, there are evident gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies in program 
design with no obvious purpose. Programs interact with each other in ways that are 
often not recognized or addressed through program design. The complexity and sheer 
number of siloed administrative delivery agencies itself creates barriers to access that 
could be reduced through coordination, co-operation, and better information sharing, not 
to mention the accessibility benefits of simplifying the programs themselves. 
Accessibility is also discussed in the next section. 
  
 
44 Note that IA recipients are not eligible for SAFER, but applicants may have received IA previously, so that IA 
payments are deducted in applying the SAFER income test 
Part 4: The Current System 
December 28, 2020                Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  203
4. Analysis of the income and social support system 
Given this complex and inconsistent set of programs, comparison of the system with our 
analytical framework presents something of a challenge. Before addressing the details 
of this comparison, we first discuss how this analysis fits with the tasks assigned to the 
panel. 
Our first task as set out in the terms of reference is to “consider the viability of a basic 
income in BC and support the simulation of various basic income models in BC to 
identify impacts and financial implications.” That obviously requires a comprehensive 
examination of basic income, which we undertake in Part 5 of the report. Part 5 includes 
a comparison of basic income with our analytical framework, just as we are comparing 
the current system with the framework here. 
However, this task cannot be done on the basis of an analysis of basic income in 
isolation from the current system. In our view, whether a basic income is a “viable” 
policy choice for B.C. depends on several factors beyond the principles, design 
elements, and implications of the basic income itself. The existing environment in which 
a basic income would potentially be implemented must also be understood. In addition, 
the strengths and weaknesses of both the current system and a basic income must be 
understood in order to determine whether implementing a basic income would be an 
improvement overall. We use our framework as a tool for comparing the alternatives on 
a consistent basis. 
Our second task is to “look at BC’s existing income and social support system and how 
elements and principles of a basic income could be used to transform and enhance it.” 
This task establishes the alternative we are expected to consider. Thus, the ultimate 
question for us is this: Would it be better to implement a basic income or to reform the 
current system? However, that question is vague, since it leaves unsaid what is meant 
by “implementing a basic income.” 
As will become clear in Part 5, basic income does not refer to a single program design, 
but a wide range of programs that share two common traits—all are cash-transfer 
programs and all are based on four basic income principles: respect, simplicity, 
economic security, and social inclusion. There are many design elements that must be 
specified to develop a specific basic income program. These can be divided into two 
broad groups: generally applicable basic incomes meant to provide everyone with cash 
transfers (either unconditionally or conditional only on income), and targeted basic 
incomes designed to provide cash transfers to people with specific characteristics, such 
as those with disabilities.  
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In the context of our tasks, then, the essential choice is whether it would be better to 
implement a generally applicable basic income as the primary element of the provincial 
income and social support system, or to reform the system. In our view, this choice is 
best considered by applying our framework to ask which choice would result in the most 
improvement to the current system and progress toward our stated objective of creating 
a more just society. 
The first step in completing these tasks is to provide a baseline analysis of where we 
are now, against which the potential improvement associated with the two choices can 
be compared. That is why, despite the fact that our first task is focused on basic 
income, we start by analyzing the current system. 
In Part 2 we described the concrete characteristics that make up our analytical 
framework: 
• Adequacy—programs that provide resources that are adequate to provide 
personal autonomy, directly related to poverty reduction 
• Accessibility—programs that are simple and understandable, treat users with 
respect, and have low barriers to access 
• Security—programs that provide stable, reliable support and enable future 
opportunity 
• Responsiveness to personal change—programs that respond quickly when 
needed due to changes in personal circumstances 
• Personal efficacy—programs that provide people with the ability to exercise their 
personal autonomy by making more opportunities available to them, enhancing 
social inclusion, and promoting socially beneficial activities 
• Transition support—programs that create resiliency to economic disruption 
• Public trust—programs that give users and funders a shared trust of their value 
to society, in terms of the fiscal cost, administrative efficiency, economic 
implications, and incentive effects of the program and the responsibility of 
beneficiaries to play an active contributory role in society 
Obviously, these characteristics are often in conflict with each other, requiring trade-offs 
to achieve a balance among them. No program or system can perfectly address all of 
these characteristics, but they are useful in considering how systems and programs can 
be improved. 
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In the following sections, we first analyze the current system as a whole, starting with 
three specific characteristics—adequacy, accessibility, and transition support. We feel 
that these are three characteristics that the system as a whole, as distinct from its 
individual programs, should facilitate. This point relates to both gaps in the system and 
cross-cutting system infrastructure that is or could be used by multiple programs to 
enhance the operation of the system. 
Next, we examine selected programs and groups of programs that are part of the 
system. A comprehensive analysis of every program against a common set of 
characteristics would be unnecessarily extensive and repetitive. Instead, we have 
selected certain program areas to analyze, and for each we focus on the trade-offs 
among characteristics that suggest areas offering room for improvement. 
4.1 System adequacy 
The following sections will address accessibility across the system and assess 
individual programs against our analytical framework to determine how well the current 
system meets our stated objective of making B.C. a more just society. Our question 
here is more fundamental: are there basic needs that the system doesn’t cover? 
As noted, across Canada we have a system of basic services intended to address many 
important needs. Some of these needs are addressed through services that are 
universally accessible and some through services that are conditional on demonstrating 
unmet need. Usually that means using income testing, sometimes coupled with other 
eligibility requirements. We also have cash transfers, almost all of which depend on 
income. 
Our system description in Section 3 provides a picture of what basic needs the current 
system is designed to address. It includes cash-transfer programs directed at seniors 
(Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement and B.C. Senior’s Supplement) and 
children (Canada Child Benefit and B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit) that have been 
successful in significantly reducing poverty rates and depths of poverty. It includes basic 
services that provide protection for those with lower incomes in a number of areas, 
including prescription drug costs, health care, housing, child care, children and families, 
education, training, and employment. 
There is also a mix of cash transfers and basic services targeting two important groups: 
working-age adults and those with disabilities. Our overview of poverty in B.C. in Part 3 
indicates that both of these broad groups include some of the highest and most 
persistent rates of poverty in the province. Income Assistance is the primary, but not the 
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only, provincial program directed at these two groups. It provides both cash transfers 
and in-kind benefits to address a range of basic needs for those who are eligible. 
What is missing? Despite all of the existing programs, it appears that the segments of 
the population that get the least attention are childless single members of the working-
age population and single parents, where poverty remains relatively endemic and 
difficult to eliminate. We think there are two main areas with program gaps whose 
remedy could help make a difference, especially when combined with improvements to 
the existing programs. 
The first area relates to intergenerational persistent poverty, which has proven to be a 
cycle that is difficult to break. Child poverty is also closely associated with persistent 
and cyclical poverty, since children are affected by their parents’ income shortfall. While 
the Ministry of Children and Family Development offers programs that target one of the 
groups most directly associated with this phenomenon, youth aging out of care, the 
programs are relatively narrowly focused in duration on the first few years of transition 
and leave out other vulnerable young adults. We believe that the lack of an integrated 
program of life-skills training and other related social supports combined with targeted 
cash transfers is an important gap in the system. 
The second area relates to the dignity and accessibility of work. Paid work is not the 
only way for people to participate in and make valuable contributions to society, but it is 
highly valued by our society. It is an important source of dignity, personal autonomy, 
economic security, and adequate resources, as well as the satisfaction associated with 
making a contribution to society—in short, both self- and social respect. There are 
several programs focused on employment, primarily from the perspective of education, 
skills training, and job search/application skills. However, the gap we perceive is related 
to job precarity, barriers to work other than training and education, and the availability of 
jobs for those who are unsuited, temporarily or permanently, to standard employment 
but would nonetheless benefit from and want to work. 
4.2 System accessibility 
Our earlier description of the system answers the question of how accessible the 
system is, as a system. It is obvious that accessibility is key because, regardless of how 
well designed a program is in terms of achieving stated objectives, like poverty 
reduction, if those targeted by the programs cannot access them, the programs cannot 
be effective. Thus, before examining the programs themselves, we first consider the 
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current system in terms of characteristics associated with accessibility: simplicity, 
respectfulness, and low barriers to access. 
Simplicity 
We started our work with the impression that provincial income and social support 
systems in Canada are complex. However, that was shown to be a gross 
understatement by the sunburst diagrams in Section 3, which allow us to visualize the 
system. The sheer number of programs and diversity of delivery agencies and methods 
and types of benefits tell the whole story about lack of simplicity at the system level. 
It is our belief that, to have a system consistent with our justice goal, we must provide 
both cash transfers to those in need and basic services that address diverse needs. In 
short, we owe each other more than just cash to spend. That directly implies the 
necessity for a variety of programs to provide a range of benefits, both cash and in-kind. 
Unless the entire system is replaced with one simple, central program like basic income, 
this means that at the system level, simplicity is likely to be traded off to some extent 
against other characteristics, such as adequacy, through the breadth of programs that 
make up the system. In Part 5 we discuss why we believe that even if a basic income 
were to be adopted as the core of the system, basic service programs would continue to 
be required. 
Even in a system where the variety of programs creates a certain level of complexity, it 
is possible to have features of the system that can help reduce that complexity. Perhaps 
the most important is consistency in key program design features where possible and 
appropriate. 
Cash-transfer and in-kind benefit programs often have two common features: eligibility 
criteria and benefits that are reduced as income increases. Eligibility is determined in 
most cases with reference to income and, depending on the program, criteria related to 
the group the program is intended to benefit. 
Income is a parameter that is used in virtually every income and social support program, 
often for both eligibility and benefit amount purposes. Use of a common income 
definition where possible would help make the system as a whole simpler. However, as 
discussed earlier (see Table 4-3), a surprising number of income definitions are used by 
various programs, often with no obvious design reason for the differences. Even though 
most programs use amounts calculated as part of the T1 personal income tax form 
(Income Assistance is a notable outlier), there is little consistency in exactly what T1-
calculated income amounts are used and how they are adjusted by adding or 
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subtracting other amounts reported for income tax purposes. Not only does the 
complexity associated with many different income definitions make the system more 
confusing and difficult to navigate for users, but it can have real implications for the 
benefits received by recipients in different circumstances, creating unintended 
interactions among programs. 
Non-income criteria associated with programs that target the same group but use 
different standards to determine eligibility are another source of complexity. There may 
be public policy reasons for having different criteria to determine whether someone 
qualifies as a member of a targeted group, but sometimes the differences do not seem 
to serve a clear public policy purpose. The example discussed in detail above is related 
to those with disabilities. This is a case where multiple federal and provincial programs 
use a wide range of definitions of disability (see Table 4-2). The result is not only 
difficulty in navigating the system but also the frustration of perceived unfairness as 
different definitions are applied by different agencies. 
The unnecessary inconsistency in definitions across programs in the system affects 
accessibility by introducing complexity, but it also affects accessibility by reducing 
respectfulness and creating barriers to access. 
Respectfulness 
Lack of respectfulness, or stigma, is a powerful behavioural impediment to accessibility 
that is most easily considered at the individual program level. Stigma is generated, 
among other ways, by relatively vague or subjective eligibility criteria, especially when 
there is considerable interaction with adjudicators and/or considerable discretion. That 
is, programs that delve deeply into applicants’ and recipients’ circumstances, where the 
outcome is not easily predicted, do not treat applicants respectfully. Another element of 
respectfulness, though, is making people aware of the benefits for which they are likely 
to qualify, which is a feature that would help make the overall system more respectful 
and accessible. 
There is little or no information about how other income and social support system 
programs work and how their eligibility requirements are applied. Also, no mechanism 
exists for helping recipients of one program understand what other programs they may 
be eligible for and how to apply. From a system perspective, this is an important gap. 
One approach to remedying this shortfall would be to have one central portal for 
program access. But that concept has several important drawbacks. The diversity of the 
basic service programs that make up the system means that there are important 
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legitimate differences in eligibility requirements, making one access portal unlikely to be 
effective or efficient. More worrying is the potential for applicants to be frozen out of the 
system as a whole at the first stage of application. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
several programs were merged under a single of point of access, resulting in the 
disentitlement of many who were previously eligible for individual programs. Information 
and privacy considerations in Canada also make information sharing among programs 
challenging. 
However, other approaches could be taken to enhance respectfulness to applicants and 
recipients without compromising their privacy or harming their potential eligibility for 
other programs. These involve equipping each program with the tools to provide people 
with relevant information about other programs based on the information the user has 
provided to the program, without sharing that information with anyone but the user. That 
could include simply informing people about other programs for which they may be 
eligible, or more actively providing people with fully or partially pre-populated 
applications that make it easier for users to apply for other relevant benefits. 
Barriers to access and responsiveness to personal change 
Again, the question of barriers to access is best addressed on a program-by-program 
basis, given the impact that the details of program design can have on creating barriers 
to access. However, many programs share a feature that can both reduce barriers of 
access for many and inadvertently create major barriers for the most vulnerable - the 
use of income tax data by income and social support programs. The use of income tax 
data for benefits administration purposes also affects how responsive programs can be 
to changes in personal circumstances, a key characteristic associated with our justice 
objective, as well as accessibility and adequacy. 
Over the past few decades, the personal income tax system has increasingly become a 
crucial element of the administrative infrastructure that enables income and social 
support programs across Canada to operate. As described earlier, with the exception of 
Income Assistance, cash-transfer programs use income tax data, and many are 
delivered directly through refundable tax credits. Most targeted basic service programs 
also use income tax data for eligibility and benefit-setting purposes. 
Use of the income tax system for these purposes offers many advantages, the most 
obvious being that it provides a consistent, verified, and detailed set of data on the 
characteristics of personal income for every tax filer. It is also as close as Canada 
comes to having a registry of contact information for Canadians, which is required to 
deliver benefits to people. Of course, people seeking benefits can provide the 
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information, but having access to verified information is an important means to enhance 
accessibility. For example, a key implicit assumption underlying the simple accessibility 
claims associated with universal basic incomes is that there is access to a verified 
registry of identification and contact information for everyone. The alternative of having 
to apply and verify identity and contact information, the program becomes considerably 
more complex than an automatic alternative.  
As discussed above and in Part 5, Section 5 (Claims Made For or About a Basic 
Income), the income tax system also has two major drawbacks that are passed on to 
each benefit program that utilizes this infrastructure. There are two primary concerns. 
First, many of the vulnerable and those with the least income do not file tax returns, 
even though it would be in their best interest to do so for a variety of reasons, which 
either excludes them from or makes it more difficult to access most of the current 
programs. Second, the income tax system provides only annual income information and 
does not provide it for at least six months after the calendar year end, the point at which 
annual personal income is measured. Programs relying on that data to determine 
eligibility or the level of benefits can take up to 18 months to react to changes. In 
contrast, the IA programs requires recipients to report income frequently and can accept 
applications at any time, not just when taxes are filed, allowing it to be more responsive 
to personal changes than is possible under the current tax system.  
The tax systems in several European jurisdictions demonstrate that a more responsive 
tax system is possible. Drawbacks of Canada’s current tax system can and should be 
addressed through tax system reforms that reduce barriers to filing and increase 
responsiveness, for both tax administration and benefits administration reasons. 
Updating Canada’s tax infrastructure alone would lead to a considerable improvement 
across the income and social support system, but the requisite reforms would fall almost 
entirely within federal jurisdiction on account of the tax collection agreement between 
B.C. and the federal government.  
The tax collection agreement allows B.C. to delegate the administrative and operational 
arrangements for income tax almost completely to the Canada Revenue Agency. The 
downsides of the agreement are that B.C. must adhere to national definitions of taxable 
income and suffers the slow responsiveness of income reporting as well as high rates of 
non-filing by vulnerable populations. However, overcoming those deficiencies in a 
provincially operated tax administration would be extremely challenging for B.C. Also, 
the fact that major provincial and federal income and social support programs operate 
closely on an integrated federal-provincial tax system supports continuing with the 
agreement.  
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Nevertheless, the B.C. government is free to raise these issues with the federal and 
other provincial governments to influence changes that would facilitate the 
implementation of income-conditioned social benefits. The September 2020 throne 
speech (Governor General, 2020) indicated that “the Government will also work to 
introduce free, automatic tax filing for simple returns to ensure citizens receive the 
benefits they need”; this signals that the federal government is already pursuing one 
reform of a kind that would assist vulnerable person who now have low filing rates. 
4.3 System transition support 
The final characteristic that we apply to the overall system is transition support, the 
extent to which the system provides support specifically to those whose circumstances 
change due to economic disruptions that apply systematically to broad groups. 
Examples include disruptions of industries due to technological change and disruptions 
associated with other factors, such as children in care aging out. 
One of the claims associated with basic income by advocates is that giving everyone 
money ensures that when people suffer a significant loss of income due an economic 
disruption, the loss will be cushioned by the cash transfer. The disruptions often 
mentioned by those arguing for basic income are unpredictable events like the current 
pandemic crisis and predicted reductions in the demand for workers due to artificial 
intelligence, increased automation, and the changing nature of work. Economic 
disruptions that put people into difficult circumstances, including dropping them into 
poverty, are regular occurrences, although few have ever rivalled the current global 
pandemic. Climate change has already affected several economic sectors and will 
continue to do so, especially those related to the extraction and use of fossil fuels. 
The current system has only two programs designed specifically with transition support 
as one of its specific goals: Employment Insurance and some employment programs 
related to retraining. Employment Insurance will be discussed in more detail below, but 
its relatively narrow eligibility is notable, as pointed out in the discussion of labour 
market trends in Part 3. The fact that one federal response to the pandemic was the 
Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB), a cash-transfer program with much 
wider eligibility than Employment Insurance and with a philosophy of “trust then verify,” 
suggests that without reform, Employment Insurance is not currently an effective 
transition program. The federal government has indicated that reforms to the program 
are forthcoming. 
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While people who experience significant losses of income due to economic disruption 
may qualify for other cash-transfer and basic service programs, two factors distinguish 
these situations. First, a substantial group of people find themselves in similar 
situations. Second, these people need cash to avoid falling into homelessness or 
otherwise losing the ability to make a transition in their lives, together with services that 
would help with that transition, which may include but are often not limited to training 
and housing supports. 
It is notable that Income Assistance is not designed to be a transition program, given 
the income and assets tests that limit eligibility to those for whom the program is a last 
resort. Transition support, in contrast, is support for making a successful transition from 
one situation to another situation where a family or individual can be self-sustaining and 
have autonomy. 
Another type of transition that represents a gap in the existing system is that faced by 
young adults who are in care or in low-income families as they move into adulthood. 
Recent years have seen an increasing recognition of the difficult transition that former 
children in care face with the sudden loss of support at age 19. Programs such as 
Agreements with Young Adults and free tuition at post-secondary institutions provide 
some transition support. However, no generally available program provides a 
combination of cash transfers and wraparound services designed to fully support 
transition for a group that usage statistics show has a high likelihood of becoming long-
term and frequent IA recipients. 
Another type of transition relates to women fleeing violence. There is funding for not-for-
profit agencies that offer help and transition houses that provide immediate housing, but 
there is a gap in the funding and services available. In a pattern that is emerging from 
this analysis of the overall system, the current programs address only part of the issue, 
making it difficult for people to successfully transition through a difficult time to a result 
that provides them with dignity, security, and opportunity. For women fleeing violence, 
basic needs extend well beyond housing. These women often suffer traumatic brain 
injuries and other medical conditions that require treatment, time, and support to heal. 
They often have limited or no accessible resources but face barriers in accessing 
programs, including IA. They need both cash transfers and wraparound support 
services, similar to those described for young adults transitioning to full adulthood and 
those facing multiple barriers to work. 
In summary, the current system has significant gaps related to the way it addresses 
transitions. Few programs are specifically intended to provide transition support, and 
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several important groups have little or no access to specific transition support. Where 
there is support, too often it is focused on cash transfers. Also needed additionally for 
successful transitions are wraparound basic services to enable people to move with 
dignity to a new self-sufficiency. 
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5. Analysis of specific program groups 
This section examines several programs or groups of income and social support 
programs in comparison with the analytical framework: Income Assistance, health-care 
services, housing programs, the home owner grant, child care programs, and the 
provincial Child Opportunity Benefit, together with other federal and provincial 
refundable tax credits. These programs collectively cover a large proportion of provincial 
and federal income and social support spending in B.C., and represent a range of cash-
transfer and in-kind benefit program types. In particular the current system includes 
cash transfers that are targeted basic incomes and others that are not, as well as 
different types of basic service designs. 
5.1 Income Assistance 
Income Assistance is B.C.’s core social assistance program and is consistent in 
principle with provincial social assistance programs that have been in place across 
Canada for decades. These programs, including IA, are funders of last resort for people 
in need that are designed to limit access to those who have virtually no other income or 
wealth. As we shall see, that basic principle leads to policies that conflict with some of 
the key characteristics within our analytical framework such as adequacy and 
accessibility.  
Prior to discussing the details, it is important to note two important pieces of context, the 
importance of changes to IA policy and how they affect respect and stigma.  
IA policy changes 
The program we describe is the IA program as it now stands, but it is not static. Small 
policy changes often have big impacts. Thus, we also discuss some of the major policy 
changes that have affected program delivery since the mid-1990s, first tightening 
eligibility and budgetary resources considerably up to 2017, at which point a renewed 
focus on poverty reduction led to changes designed to increase adequacy and 
accessibility.  
Since 2017, the Province has passed historic poverty reduction legislation, including 
targets and timelines, and introduced B.C.’s first poverty reduction strategy 
(Government of British Columbia, 2019c). The strategy included a range of investments 
and initiatives from across government, including the introduction of the Child 
Opportunity Benefit; significant action on child care, housing and homelessness; 
increases to the minimum wage; and improvements to access and affordability of 
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education and skills training. The strategy also contained important updates to the 
income and disability assistance program implemented since 2017, including increases 
of up to $150 per month in monthly benefits plus increases in the earnings exemption of 
$200 per month (TA) and $2,400 per year (PWD) (which are due to increase again in 
January 2021). Additionally, in July 2019 and January 2020, a series of policy and 
regulation changes were made to the income and disability assistance program to 
remove barriers and better support clients, described later in this section. 
The ministry has also made significant operational changes since 2017. These include 
implementing an accommodation alert for clients with disability or language barriers to 
help ensure appropriate service is provided; installing free, public Wi-Fi for clients in 
ministry and Service BC locations; expanding the services available online at My Self 
Serve; improving phone service, such as reducing the average phone wait times and 
adding the option to enter a callback number; and introducing an Advocate Client 
Enquiries process for advocates and the Public Guardian and Trustee to discuss 
multiple client cases.  
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, federal Employment Insurance benefits, 
including the $2,000 Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) and Canada 
Recovery Benefits (CRB) have been exempted from IA income testing provisions and 
do not affect benefit amounts. IA clients who are not eligible for the federal emergency 
support programs, including the CERB and CRB, have been provided an automatic 
$300 monthly COVID-19 crisis supplement for the period April to December 2020, 
reduced to $150 per month for January to March 2021. This supplement has also been 
provided to low-income seniors who receive the B.C. Senior’s Supplement. Relief 
payments provided by First Nations bands and Indigenous organizations have also 
been exempted from income testing. Work-search and employment plan requirements 
have been temporarily waived. Operational changes have also been made to protect 
applicants, recipients and staff, and to align with provincial health officer guidelines.  
The effect of policy on stigma and respect 
The second piece of context relates to the characteristic of respectfulness and the 
stigma that arises when people do not feel respected. As we discuss, that often arises 
because of relatively intrusive eligibility requirements and their adjudication. We want to 
be clear from the outset that our discussion of respect is a discussion of the policy 
framework and the operational processes that are necessary to implement those 
policies. It is easy to read these discussions as directed at the way public servants do 
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their jobs, but that is not what we intend—our focus is on the policies, not the people 
who are tasked with implementing them. 
Summary of program features45 
Income Assistance provides both cash transfers and in-kind benefits. We consider in-
kind benefits to be goods and services provided directly or indirectly and cash payments 
that are conditional on being spent in a particular way, whereas “cash transfers” are 
periodic payments that are conditional only on eligibility for the program and not 
restricted in any way on how they can be spent.  
Within this categorization of benefits, IA provides a cash transfer to cover support (food, 
clothing, and other necessities) to eligible people; this support allowance is not intended 
to cover rent, which is covered by a separate shelter allowance. The support allowance 
is disbursed in the form of monthly payments for those who are eligible, with the 
payment amount determined by the amount of income received in the month, up to a 
break-even point beyond which eligibility is affected. The shelter allowance is an 
amount paid only for the actual shelter cost incurred by a recipient up to a maximum 
level. It thus assumes the character of an in-kind benefit, except that most IA 
beneficiaries spend more on rent than the shelter allowance maximum, so that for them 
it is like an unconditional cash benefit. 46 
IA also provides in-kind benefits in the form of supplements to cover the cost of specific 
types of immediate or ongoing needs. There are two kinds of supplements, general 
supplements and health supplements, with access limited to people currently or recently 
receiving cash benefits. General supplements cover a variety of special circumstances 
including: crisis grants for running out of food or loss of property; school start-up costs; 
guide dog costs; and security deposits. Some general supplements are one-time while 
others are continuing payments where the need is ongoing. Health supplements are 
extended health benefits that include health-care services and goods such as dental 
and eye care, such as medical supplies and equipment, and natal and nutritional 
supplements; some of which are accessed directly by health professionals through a 
third-party administrator. Income Assistance eligibility also automatically provides 
 
45 Further information about Income Assistance can be found at 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/policies-for-government/bcea-policy-and-procedure-manual  
46 While disbursed as part of the cash payment under IA, shelter allowance can be regarded as in-kind benefit 
because it is conditional on having shelter costs, with the payment limited to actual rent incurred up to the maximum 
allowance. IA beneficiaries without shelter costs, such as homeless individuals, do not receive the shelter allowance 
portion of benefits.  
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eligibility for other income and social support program benefits, such as 100% coverage 
under Fair PharmaCare and Medical Services Plan (MSP) supplementary benefits. 
Some of the main features are summarized below. 
Income Assistance components 
The IA program has several components, primarily the following: 
• Temporary Assistance—provides assistance to those who are in need and have 
no other financial resources. Other eligibility criteria apply including looking for 
and using all other sources of income and assets before applying for assistance. 
TA is further subdivided into three groups: 
o Expected to Work (ETW)—people who are found to have no impediment 
that prevents them from working, and who must undertake a mandatory 
work-search period prior to qualifying for benefits 
o Temporarily excused from work for a qualifying reason, including being the 
single parent with a young child 
o Temporarily excused (medical)—people who have a temporary medical 
condition that prevents them from working 
• Persons with Persistent Multiple Barriers (PPMB) to employment—provides 
assistance to those who have a persistent medical condition as well as at least 
one other barrier to employment that seriously impedes their ability to work and 
who meet other eligibility criteria 
• Disability Assistance—provides assistance to those who have been designated 
as a Person with Disabilities (PWD) as defined by the program and who meet 
other eligibility criteria 
Of these groups, only the ETW group has a requirement to actively seek work, with a 
job-search period and a requirement to develop and comply with an employment plan. 
The job search period is currently three weeks, down from the previous five-week 
requirement, and can be completed prior to applying. There are several exemptions 
from the job search requirement, and hardship assistance can be provided to meet 
immediate needs before the job search is completed.  
The other groups are all excused from the job search and employment plan 
requirements for varying periods of time. PWD and PPMB recipients are effectively 
excused indefinitely because in practice there are few reviews of their status. Despite 
that, recipients in these groups have indicated that they are concerned about having 
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their status reviewed, because periodic reviews were a past feature of the system and 
are still possible. 
Application process 
IA has a complex application process that can be challenging to navigate. However, it is 
worth noting that since 2017, the Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction 
has implemented numerous operational and policy changes to reduce barriers and 
make it easier for applicants and clients to access assistance. 
The ministry has three ways in which individuals can apply for income assistance:   
• Online—self-directed from anywhere  
• Online—staff-supported in an office, overriding the email address requirement  
• Staff Assisted—staff complete the application with the applicant in an office or 
over the phone  
All Ministry offices and Service BC locations have free, public Wi-Fi and computers 
available for applicants and clients to access My Self Serve during office hours. The 
ministry accommodates applicants who require language and American Sign Language 
interpreters.  
The ministry has specialized intake processes to assist in streamlining Income 
Assistance applications for youth transitioning from care and underage Persons with 
Disability applicants, as well as applicants leaving correctional facilities, alcohol and 
drug facilities, and hospitals.  
Applicants who are fleeing abuse or have an immediate need for food, shelter, or urgent 
medical attention are contacted within one business day. The ministry standard is that 
once an applicant submits a completed application, the ministry aims to contact the 
individual within five business days.  
The process begins with an application for TA as an ETW, from which point eligibility for 
other components of the program may be pursued. Applications for PPMB and PWD 
require applications to be completed in part by health professionals.  
While the number of ministry-specific offices has been reduced since the early 2000s, 
ministry staff continue to provide in person support through various ways, to support 
clients who are not able to access virtual or online ministry services. Partnership with 
Service BC has provided in-person ministry services in small rural communities that 
may not have had ministry services available in the past. In addition, the ministry 
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expanded their in-person outreach services in 2019 by creating community integration 
specialist (CIS) positions. These new CIS positions were designed to bridge the gap 
between some of B.C.’s most vulnerable people and supports and services. CIS 
workers go into communities to connect people with their local agencies and 
organizations. These additional in-person resources have been successful in increasing 
take-up of the program by eligible vulnerable populations. 
Eligibility criteria 
The eligibility criteria for IA include the specific criteria associated with each of the five 
different groups described above, as well as two significant eligibility tests—an income 
test and an asset test. Applicants must have income below the benefit level to apply and 
must have assets below the asset limit. 
As mentioned earlier, IA is the only significant income and social support program that 
does not use income tax T1 definitions as the basis for measuring income. Rather, IA 
legislation has a unique set of definitions for the components of income, with the effect 
that many sources of funding that are not considered income for tax purposes are 
included in the IA income construct. That includes lottery wins, gifts, and benefits 
received from many other programs. The result is that applicants for and recipients of IA 
must carefully manage the amounts they receive from other sources in order to achieve 
and maintain eligibility. 
Once a person is receiving benefits, they must report income monthly; if they are 
receiving DA, they need only report a change in their monthly income. Each group has a 
level of earned income that they may receive without affecting benefits. For all but DA 
recipients, this exemption level is a monthly amount; for DA it is an annual amount. 
All recipients are required to pursue all potential sources of funding, whether earned 
income unless excused from seeking work, other benefits, or non-earned income 
sources. Income amounts in excess of the exemption level reduce monthly benefits 
dollar for dollar (i.e., a 100% benefit reduction rate). When the benefit is reduced to zero 
in a month, the recipient no longer is eligible for IA, although there is a period during 
which they can reapply using a streamlined process to effectively reinstate their IA 
status, if their income falls below the benefit level. 
There is a difference between the income at which one becomes eligible for IA and the 
income at which eligibility is lost. To become eligible, income must be less than the 
maximum benefit level. Eligibility is lost if earnings exceeds the exemption level plus the 
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maximum benefit. Once eligibility is lost, income must fall below the benefit level to 
regain eligibility. 
The asset test also varies between those on DA and others, with a much stricter test for 
those not on DA in terms both the asset exemption level ($5,000 and $10,000 for TA; 
$100,000 and $200,000 for DA, depending on family structure) and the assets that are 
exempted from the asset test.47 Because it often takes considerable time for DA 
applicants to have their PWD application completed by a medical practitioner and 
adjudicated, the asset test is not applied until the eligibility decision has been finalized. 
Together, these eligibility tests combine to comprise a significant part of what is known 
as the welfare wall. The purpose of these and other aspects of the program is to ensure 
that IA is available only to those who have no other resources to meet their basic 
needs—no other source of funding that can be accessed or wealth that can be 
consumed. In other words, these apply the principle that IA is “the funder of last resort.” 
They create a wall to keep those with other options out, in order to minimize both the 
cost of the program and its impact on labour supply. 
However, as discussed in detail below, these features, together with other elements of 
the program, also create a wall that is a barrier to leaving the program. Just earning 
enough to eliminate eligibility likely still does not fully cover basic needs but does 
subject the person to the risk that their income will again fall, and their lack of assets to 
fall back on means that they may be even worse off in the future, especially given the 
three-week job search requirement before regaining eligibility for benefits. On top of 
that, the loss of access to health and general supplements that IA eligibility gives 
recipients puts them at further risk of adverse events. That means that the welfare wall 
created to make sure only those who need benefits as a last resort are able to qualify, 
together with the loss of valuable in-kind protections, creates an even higher barrier to 
leaving for those already on benefits. Recipients who leave DA for employment can 
maintain access to most in-kind health supplements under Medical Services Only 
coverage. Similarly, parents who leave IA for employment are provided with 12 months 
of Transitional Health Services coverage. 
Another requirement for gaining and maintaining eligibility for those required to seek 
employment is that they, together with an EAW, develop an employment plan and that 
they adhere to the plan. The plan outlines the steps the recipient plans to take to find 
 
47 For details see https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/policies-for-government/bcea-policy-and-
procedure-manual/bc-employment-and-assistance-rate-tables/asset-limits-table  
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employment. If a recipient refuses to make an employment plan or fails to comply with 
the plan, they can face reduced benefits or have their eligibility for benefits terminated. 
The monthly reporting requirement includes both reporting of income and reporting of 
employment-seeking activities, which can be compared with the employment plan. 
In a gender-based analysis plus of the current system, Petit and Tedds (2020a) have 
identified employment plans for parents and people who work in certain occupations as 
problematic. Those who have responsibility for children under the age of three are 
excused from employment obligations under TA, but for those with children over that 
age, lack of child care is not an acceptable excuse for the inability to fulfill the 
requirements of an employment plan. For those whose employment opportunities tend 
not to be during regular weekday daytime hours, access to child care is often 
challenging, despite an increase in licensed daycare capacity, which is predominantly 
available during daytime weekday hours. The Single Parent Employment Initiative is 
intended to alleviate the issue through child care and training support, including post-
secondary education for one year. But that is available only to a small percentage of the 
caseload and specifically does not include couples applying for IA where both have 
employment obligations. 
One concern about these obligations is related to sex work, which despite being 
generally legal in Canada is often not accepted as part of an employment plan. This 
clearly discriminates against those who have that as an occupation. 
The effect of eligibility policy on caseloads 
All of these eligibility criteria have been subject to change frequently, including changes 
to several features during the course of our work, and some of those changes have had 
significant impacts on caseloads.  
Figure 4-10, excerpted from Petit and Tedds (2020g), shows that the size and makeup 
of the IA caseload has changed dramatically since 1995. The most significant trends are 
as follows: 
• The ETW caseload fell sharply beginning between 1996 and 2007. 
• The DA caseload has climbed steadily and at a surprisingly constant rate since 
1995. 
• Following a spike in 1997 that corresponded to a sharp decrease in the ETW 
caseload at the same time, the excused from work subcategory of TA has 
decreased as DA has increased. 
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Green, Hicks et al. (2020) show that these trends are closely associated with specific 
eligibility policy changes implemented in 1996 and 2002, both intended to tighten 
eligibility criteria and increase the linkage to employment. In 1996 the major changes 
were to require non-disabled recipients to seek work, institute periodic reviews of 
disability status, and change the exemption from employment requirements for mothers 
from having children under age 12 to having children under age seven. The rules were 
further tightened in 2002 by lowering the child’s age for the mother’s exemption to under 
three years, instituting a duration limit of two years out of five on single employable 
recipients and a two-year independence test, adding a five-week work search for new 
applicants before benefits are paid, and reducing face-to-face contact in favour of phone 
and online contact. The impact of these changes was felt primarily by the ETW 
category, where cases fell by about 150,000 over 10 years. 
It is noted that these eligibility changes were introduced because over the first half of 
the 1990s decade, the caseload almost doubled from under 120,000 annually to about 
220,000. Even as the economy improved significantly, the caseload increased rapidly 
resulting in significant public pressure to reduce the number of recipients. Data were not 
available to show this period in the following charts. 
In addition to these eligibility changes, as will be seen below, benefit levels were frozen 
between 2007 and 2017, except for a $25 increase to DA rates in 2016. Beginning in 
2017 however, benefits have been increased several times and many of these eligibility 
restrictions have begun to be loosened in important ways. They include reducing the 
required job search period to three weeks, ending the requirement for recipients to 
pursue Canada Pension Plan retirement benefits before the age of 65, expanding 
access to security deposits and introducing a pet damage deposit supplement, 
increasing asset limits and  removal of the $10,000 asset limit on primary vehicle for IA 
recipients, increasing crisis supplements for shelter, expanding access to additional 
supplements for recipients of hardship assistance, amending the definition of spouse to 
be more inclusive, eliminating the rule that limited eligibility to those who had two years 
of financial independence, adding the community integration specialists, and providing 
an additional $300 per month COVID-19 temporary rate top-up. Eligibility for PPMB has 
been expanded to include addiction and substance abuse under the heading of medical 
conditions. A streamlined reapplication process was also introduced for individuals who 
return to IA within six months of exiting. 
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Figure 4-10: Income Assistance caseload by category 
 
Figure 4-11 breaks down the IA caseload patterns by family type in order to assess the 
impacts of past B.C. policy changes in more detail. The figure shows that the biggest 
drops in ETW caseload were first in single males without children, second in single 
parents, and third in single females without children. In contrast, the increase in DA 
recipients is primarily among single males and females without children, with a much 
smaller increase among single parents. The increases in employment requirements 
played a significant role in reducing the number of single male and female recipients, 
and the less generous exemptions for mothers, dropping from children under 12 to 
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children under three years, affected single parents, together with the B.C. Family Bonus 
benefit and employment programs for young adults, both introduced during the same 
period. 
Figure 4-11: Income Assistance caseload by family type 
 
Also notable were other factors that contributed to caseload changes in addition to 
changes in eligibility criteria. One of the most significant was that the former 
Unemployment Insurance program was reformed and became Employment Insurance 
(EI) over the same period. Green, Hicks et al. (2020) show that changes related to EI in 
the 1990s reduced the number of short-term IA recipients who were waiting for EI 
approval, which accounted for almost 10% of ETW recipients, a situation that was 
Part 4: The Current System 
December 28, 2020                Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  225
based on the nature of the EI system at the time and cannot be recreated under the 
current structure. 
That leads to the question as to why DA has grown so steadily over such an extended 
period. According to the Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction, 
eligibility changes have played an important part, as it has become somewhat easier 
over time to qualify for DA especially with the inclusion of mental health conditions 
within the PWD designation eligibility rules in 2002. In addition, the PWD designation is 
limited to those with severe long-term conditions, leading to long durations of benefit 
receipt which means caseload accumulates over time. Other important factors include 
the aging population, since a high and growing proportion of DA recipients are over age 
50, and the fact that, unlike TA, DA recipients tend to have very long durations of 
coverage. Once a person qualifies for DA, they tend to stay on the caseload. While the 
duration of TA cases has been growing over time, it remains considerably shorter than 
for DA recipients (Green, Hicks et al., 2020). 
These findings point to two important groups that we believe should be targeted in our 
analysis of policy reforms. The first is single adults, who have been most affected by 
eligibility changes and also have the highest rates of poverty, as shown in Part 3. The 
second is people with disabilities, who make up about 70% of the IA caseload. 
Background patterns 
Census data from 2016 provides a valuable perspective on single working-age adults 
(Green, 2020c), defined as people ages 18–64 who are not married or in a common-law 
relationship, do not have children present, and were not students in the school year 
between September and May of 2015.48 It shows that 98.8% of single adults living 
below the poverty line received at least some income from government transfers. It 
seems likely that IA forms a dominant part of those transfers, but we are not able to 
confirm that.49 However, EI income is specifically identified, showing that only 5% of 
 
48 In the data reported in Part 3, B.C. had an anomalously high poverty rate in 2015, with the 40% single-adult poverty rate in 
2015, which was over 10 percentage points higher than in 2018. This means that some of the people denoted as living in 
households below the poverty line in the census may have moved above the poverty line now—though, almost surely, not by 
enough that they are no longer a concern. As discussed in Part 3, the census uses the economic family to calculate poverty, so 
adults dependent on family support are not classified as single adults. 
49 The categories of government transfer income in the census are imperfect. In particular, IA income is in a catch-all 
category of Other Government Transfers that also includes workers’ compensation, Working Income Tax Benefit, and 
most refundable tax credits. 
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single adults had EI income in 2015, which made up only 3% of total income received 
by this group. 
This means that even radical reforms to the EI system that may be coming after COVID 
are unlikely to have sizable impacts on poverty for this group as a whole (although it 
may affect some sub-groups more), but the adequacy of Income Assistance benefits is 
likely to continue to be very important. 
Green (2020d) profiles single adults living below the poverty line in three main groups, 
those whose income is limited to government transfers, those with earned income over 
$16,000 in 2015 and those who earned income but worked less than half of the weeks 
in the year. 
The first group accounts for 33% to 40% single working-age adults in poverty and 
Income Assistance accounts for 84% of their income, suggesting long duration benefits 
consistent with Disability Assistance. Many also report CPP income, which for those 
under 60 means CPP disability benefits. The group profile is predominantly older males 
living outside the Lower Mainland/Victoria, with lower education, three-quarters of whom 
do not work in the year but 8.8% worked 48 to 52 weeks in the year (i.e., on the census 
they said they worked but their tax records do not report earned income). It is not clear 
whether this corresponds to working under the table while receiving benefits. This group 
is mostly made up of people with disabilities who are a group of central policy concern. 
The second group makes up about 20% of single working-age adults in poverty. 
Because their earned income is within 20% of the Market Basket Measure (MBM) 
poverty line, they have relatively low depth of poverty. The group profile is 
predominantly female with few high school dropouts, most of whom work full-time hours 
for 40 weeks or more, with a plurality in sales and service occupations. Estimated 
median wages were $10 to $11.42 per hour (2015 minimum wage was $10.45), with 
few exceeding $13 per hour and many below minimum wage by 25% to 50%, due to 
exemptions for servers and commission sales (Green, 2020d). This group is the one 
most negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The work of the Fair Wages 
Commission, established in 2017, which has already prompted increases in minimum 
wages ultimately to $15.20 in June 2021 and which continues with a report on 
addressing the difference between minimum wage and a living wage expected in 2021 
will benefit this group. Policies such as earnings supplements that increase their 
earnings by, say, 30% (a not uncommon earnings subsidy rate in other jurisdictions) 
would move most or all of them above the poverty line, as could changes to Temporary 
Assistance. 
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The third group covers about 14% of single working-age adults in poverty. The group 
profile is middle of the road in terms of education, sex, and age, with some 
concentration among young adults (under 24) with a relatively high 11% receiving EI 
benefits and a relatively high proportion of self-employment. This is the group that could 
benefit most from EI reforms, including incorporating the self-employed into the system. 
As pointed out in the discussion on labour market trends in Part 3, Section 4.4 
(Employment Insurance), a substantial portion of unemployed people do not receive EI 
benefits, with coverage at only 40% in recent years. Large proportions of the 
unemployed are ineligible largely as a result of changes in accessibility to the then-
Unemployment Insurance program in the early to mid-1990s. As a result, the proportion 
of the B.C. population receiving IA benefits skyrocketed, reaching approximately 12% in 
a month in 1995 (Green, Hicks et al., 2020). At that time IA was very seasonal, with a 
high proportion of short-term spells and a high proportion of “single employable” 
recipients, a program primarily assisting those with sudden, short-term loss of income. 
Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance), detailed how the IA reforms in 1996 and 
2002/3 responded to loss of public confidence in a program that had become too costly, 
by essentially denying access to individuals who needed to replace scaled-back 
Unemployment Insurance benefits. The result was sharp declines in the total caseload 
and the seasonality of the caseload, and increases in the share of longer-term and 
disability cases in the caseload (Green, Hicks et al., 2020).  
This points to a different way to frame the question of who uses the ETW part of the 
system and how to assist them. The question of how to reform IA needs to be 
addressed in the broader context, asking about the nature of gaps in the combination of 
IA and EI currently and how the transfer system as a whole needs to be reformed. The 
relevant questions, therefore, are, who is being underserved by the overall transfer 
system, and is IA the right tool for responding to their issues? Considering those who 
are not currently eligible for EI: 
• People returning to school from work are not a clear target group for IA—that 
should be covered through scholarship and student loan programs.  
• People who quit their last job and the self-employed are likely best addressed 
through adjustments to the EI system. They are not entitled to EI benefits 
because of moral hazard considerations, and it would seem better to address 
those considerations directly in the EI system than to take them on in a residual 
fashion in the IA system.  
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That leaves the long-term unemployed.50 Some of these people may have disabilities 
that mean that their situation is best addressed through reforms to the DA part of the 
system. Approximately a quarter of the long-term unemployed attended school in the 
previous school year. Again, they are better addressed through other systems related to 
education. We discuss transitions for young people in Section 8 (Reforms Targeting 
Young Adults) of Part 6 on recommendations. The remaining group, the non-student 
long-term unemployed, have a 42% poverty rate, and those in poverty are 
disproportionately in the 45–64 age group and have low levels of education.  
Are the long-term unemployed who are not receiving EI benefits mainly people who 
have exhausted their EI benefits? Green’s (2020c) analysis of a federal government 
evaluation of the EI system suggests that a quarter to a third of the long-term 
unemployed are EI benefit exhausters.51 From the point of view of IA policy, these long-
term unemployed have demonstrated considerable difficulty in finding a job, implying 
that they will need help to become job ready. As in our earlier comment, it would be 
good for the provincial government to engage in discussions with their federal 
counterpart about the best set of policies for EI exhausters. Having them move into IA 
receipt, as at present, seems more like a residual outcome than conscious policy.  
There is also a strong pattern of repeated, shorter-spell use of IA by single working 
adults—in December 2016, about 70% of recipients had been on IA for over 12 months 
in the last five years, including 25% who were receiving benefits for 48 months or more 
out of the previous 60 months. Combined with the fact that 77% of ETW spells end in 
under one year, it is clear that many users of the system cycle in and out of the system 
with multiple, short-term periods of work and receiving Temporary Assistance (TA) 
benefits, which we refer to as “long-term repeated TA use.” 
Of those in the “48 months in the previous five years” group, about half were over age 
50, compared to a quarter of those in the “under 12 months of use in the previous five 
years” (Green, Hicks et al., 2020). This reveals an important correlation between long-
term repeated TA use and older age. These older and less-educated workers may be 
 
50 We define long-term unemployed using the combination of people who are unemployed in the census survey week 
and who have not worked in 2016 or 2015, so it actually corresponds to people searching for work at a point in time 
who have not worked for over a year, as opposed to people who have been searching for work for over a year. 
51 In steady state, if 40% of the unemployed are receiving EI benefits and a third of those end up exhausting benefits, 
then approximately 13% of all unemployed are benefit exhausters. If most of these are long-term unemployed and the 
long-term unemployed make up a third of the unemployed, then the benefit exhausters make up a bit over a third of 
the long-term unemployed. Taking out those who exhaust benefits because they are following a seasonal pattern 
results in our rough estimate. 
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unlikely to establish long-duration employment, but as a group they do engage in 
multiple, short employment spells, which do not coalesce into employment-based 
independence from transfer support. Especially for older workers, it would seem better 
to acknowledge this reality and create a system that provides better support for 
(sporadic) work efforts. Doing so would match our goals of self-respect and reciprocity 
but would also imply a system that does a better job of providing security for people in 
this situation. 
Benefit levels 
Cash benefits in the IA program vary significantly among the DA and TA components, 
and they are further differentiated by the number and age of family members. The 
ministry provides current rate tables for TA recipients (including PPMB)52 and DA 
recipients.53 Note that, on top of the rates shown on these tables, as a COVID-19 relief 
measure, all IA rates (TA and DA) and the Senior Supplement rate have been 
effectively increased through an automatic $300 monthly supplementary payment for 
the period April 2020 to December 2020, which will be reduced to $150 per month for 
January 2021 to March 2021. In addition, DA recipients who qualify for the disability tax 
credit received an additional automatic one-time federal supplement payment of $600. 
IA recipients qualify for the one-time B.C. Recovery Benefit of $500 for singles and 
$1,000 for families available beginning December 2020. 
For both TA and DA, the benefit is made up of a support amount and a shelter amount. 
The support amount is received by all qualifying recipients and is thus a cash transfer in 
our categorization discussed above. The shelter amount paid is equal to the actual 
shelter costs incurred, up to a maximum and is therefore an in-kind benefit.54 In 
practice, there are few places in B.C. where market rents are less than the shelter 
amount, so 90% of recipients who pay for shelter qualify for the maximum shelter 
allowance (Mendelson & Kesselman, 2020). 
Figure 4-12 shows monthly combined support and shelter amounts for single ETW and 






54 The combined support and shelter amounts are phased out as income increases above the earnings exemption. 
55 In September 2020, Statistics Canada introduced a revised MBM 2018 base, under which threshold amounts have 
increased significantly. See Part 3 for further information. 
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Rates in B.C. were held constant for 10 years, from 2007 to 2017. TA rates were 
increased in 2017 and 2019, while DA rates were raised in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. 
Figure 4-12 also shows the temporary COVID-19 response supplement of $300 per 
month in 2020. As a result of the 10-year rate freeze, the benefit as a percent of the 
MBM threshold fell from 41% to 36% for single ETW recipients and from 62% to 56% for 
single PWD recipients by 2017. By 2019 the rates had been increased to 44% and 69% 
of the MBM thresholds, respectively. The 2017 increases raised both rates above the 
2007 levels after adjusting for inflation as measured by the consumer price index for 
B.C.56 IA rates for 2019 were up 4% for TA and 9% for DA from 2007 levels in real 
terms. 
Figure 4-12: Single adult TA and DA monthly rates compared with MBM thresholds57 
 
Applying the analytical framework 
The following sections discuss IA in terms of the characteristics associated with 
achieving our goal of moving toward a more just society. For some of these 
characteristics, we distinguish between DA and TA, while for others we consider both 
components of the program together. 
 
56 Statistics Canada, Table 18-10-0005-01. 
57Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction; Table 11-10-0066-01 Market Basket Measure (MBM) 
thresholds for the reference family by Market Basket Measure region, component, and base year. MBM thresholds 
are for Vancouver, using the 2008 base, with the trend estimated using OLS regression. 
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Adequacy 
Adequacy is basically a question of the extent to which benefits, including both cash 
transfers and in-kind supplements, enable recipients to meet their basic needs 
sufficiently to be able to have personal autonomy. Figure 4-12 sheds light on that 
question, indicating that the cash transfers fall considerably short of the MBM threshold, 
which is designed to be a measure of the disposable income needed to cover basic 
needs in a particular location, in this case Vancouver. It is noteworthy that in general, 
people living with disabilities face higher costs of basic needs than those without a 
disability. Supplements are a type of insurance or protection against adverse events, 
which are also more likely for those with disabilities, especially extended health-care 
costs, including medical equipment in many cases. Therefore, we do not factor in the 
supplements in meeting the MBM level. 
Cash-transfer rates that cover only a portion of basic needs make going on Income 
Assistance less attractive, encouraging those who have alternative means of support 
that cover more of their basic needs, especially through work, not to use IA. Using our 
framework, that means trading off adequacy for public trust, in terms of both the fiscal 
implications (higher rates would increase costs) and the imposition of reciprocity 
through work incentives. This issue is discussed further below. 
Accessibility 
A just income and social support program should treat users with respect, be simple 
and understandable, and have low barriers to access for those the program is targeting. 
These are all needed to make the program accessible to those it is intended to support. 
IA is not simple. It has many rules and requirements that can be challenging for users to 
understand and, as suggested above, the rules and procedures change frequently. 
While the changes are intended to address legitimate policy issues, they make it difficult 
for users to understand fully how the program works. For example, the uniquely 
comprehensive definition of income used by the program is itself a source of complexity. 
The program also carries a high degree of stigma, which combines with intentional and 
unintentional barriers to access to disenfranchise people who would otherwise qualify in 
at least some cases. We have been unable to quantify that negative effect—eligible 
people who are either mistakenly rejected on application or don’t even bother to apply. 
In part, the stigma associated with IA arises because of eligibility criteria that impose 
intrusive requirements on users to provide personal information without explaining 
exactly how that information will be used in adjudicating a claim. This contributes to a 
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perception among many who start by distrusting government that they are being subject 
to discretionary and arbitrary decision-making. 
This issue is especially salient for DA. As found by a previous expert panel that 
reviewed the DA program (Dunn et al., 2016), the current eligibility criteria are difficult to 
apply because, among other concerns, physicians are expected to complete application 
forms, but the criteria are not consistent with established medical practice. The work of 
that panel is discussed further in Part 6 in support of specific recommendations to 
reform disability eligibility criteria and adjudication processes. 
Access to supplementary benefits is another example. Almost all supplements, whether 
general or health-related, are available only to current IA recipients and those who have 
recently stopped receiving cash benefits due to increased income. Some supplements 
are accessed directly by the recipient through a health-care provider, such as dental 
treatment and optical coverage. However, few supplements are automatic in nature 
because they are situation-specific; most can only be accessed through an EAW or, for 
some health supplements, a medical professional. That creates a sense of 
powerlessness among users and leads to perceptions of inconsistent treatment—
significant barriers to access that are, to some extent, unavoidable for benefits that are 
conditional on demonstrating specific needs. 
More generally, the welfare wall itself is an intentional barrier to access and a source of 
stigma, because only those with nowhere else to turn can access the program. As with 
adequacy, accessibility has been traded off against public trust. 
Security 
DA is in fact quite a secure stream of benefits for those who qualify, but unfortunately 
that is not evident to all users. The program was originally intended to provide the least 
assistance possible, so there were provisions for periodic reassessment of disabilities 
against eligibility criteria. Those provisions continue to exist, but as a matter of policy 
are not exercised. Nevertheless, many recipients fear that they will lose their disability 
status on reassessment. In addition, while only 14% of PWD recipients earn 
employment income, the average income earned is at the earnings exemption level. 
Despite the ability to earn in excess of the exemption, although benefits are reduced 
dollar-for-dollar of excess earnings, some do so at the perceived risk of losing their DA 
eligibility by earning too much. Similar concerns apply to those designated as PPMB. 
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TA is designed not to provide long-term security. As noted above, the loss of valuable 
supplements, combined with cash transfers, while difficult to live on, create a welfare 
wall disincentive to leaving the program. 
Responsiveness to individual changes in circumstance 
IA has a mixed score in terms of this characteristic. The existence of the mandatory job-
search waiting period for ETWs and the difficulty in successfully navigating the DA 
application and adjudication process mean that IA is not very responsive to changes in 
potential applicants’ personal situations. However, the monthly income reporting 
requirements ensure that the program is quite responsive to changes in personal 
circumstances for recipients. Access to supplements depends on the evidence and 
information that EAWs require before approving the supplements and can vary 
significantly. 
Opportunity 
For those considered to be employable, WorkBC provides access to training and 
employment readiness programs, providing opportunities consistent with the objective 
of moving ETW recipients off benefits in favour of paid employment as quickly as 
possible. On the other hand, PWD recipients are not expected to work because many 
have limited ability to work. Often PWD recipients face costs and other barriers to 
working that would need to be overcome to make work financially feasible, but those 
matters are not recognized by the program. WorkBC provides assistance and supports 
to both TA and DA clients, including working to reduce barriers to employment through 
assistive technology and ongoing case management support. However, feedback from 
disability groups is that they would like to see enhanced services to more fully meet 
their needs. IA also does not recognize in any way other socially productive activities, 
such as caregiving or volunteering. 
Public trust 
As suggested earlier, the funder-of-last-resort concept underlying IA is intended to 
enhance public trust by preventing those who are able to be self-sufficient through work 
from accessing the program, withdrawing valued labour services from the economy 
while at the same time drawing benefits supported by taxpayers at a fiscal cost. The 
strictest requirements apply to TA, and particularly to ETW recipients, since they are 
presumed to be employable and the incentives not to apply for IA therefore need to be 
significant. On the other hand, PWD recipients are presumed to be mostly less 
employable, reducing the need to erect a high barrier to keep those with genuinely 
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severe disabilities out, but strict eligibility adjudication is key in this construct. The 
current system reflects this description of how the desire to maintain public trust has 
contributed to the design and evolution of the program. As noted above, the result is to 
trade off some characteristics that are key to self-respect in favour of these 
characteristics that are crucial in terms of public trust. 
This analysis helps us understand the purpose of the funder-of-last-resort concept and 
how, by placing the emphasis on public trust over characteristics associated with self-
respect, including adequacy and accessibility, it has created a program that does not 
treat its users in a way that is fully consistent with our justice objective. In a similar way, 
the analysis of basic income in Part 5 shows that by putting its emphasis on personal 
freedom of choice and autonomy of action, broadly applicable basic income programs 
are not fully consistent with the public trust requirements, particularly the fiscal cost and 
economic implications for labour supply. 
However, to fully analyze the economic implications of the IA program it is important to 
consider the welfare wall in terms of both discouraging people from accessing the 
program and discouraging recipients from exiting the program through employment and 
earned income. The two sets of barriers contribute to the effects of the program on 
people’s decisions about whether and how much to work. 
It’s important to note that the labour supply incentives discussed here apply only to 
those who are able to work. Barriers to entry and exit have no effect on decisions about 
work for those unable to participate in work, a group that constitutes a majority of the 
current IA caseload. However, it is difficult to determine who is and who is not able to 
work. It is also useful to remember that making a contribution to society, including 
through work, is key to self- and social respect. 
Table 4-4 lists several features of Income Assistance programs and indicates which of 
those features result in barriers to entry and barriers to exit. Importantly, the barriers 
created are not the same height from both directions, so perhaps the “welfare wall” is 
not the most appropriate metaphor. These features include the eligibility criteria 
established as barriers to access as part of the funder-of-last-resort principle. The 
purpose of these features is to limit the number of people who qualify and thus the 
reduction of labour supply associated with people who could be self-sufficient through 
work but who rely on benefits instead. 
The real question, though, is about the effectiveness of these barriers to entry: do they 
effectively discriminate between those who are legitimately unable to work, those who 
are able to work but need support to get by and to regain workforce attachment, and 
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those who don’t need support and are choosing benefits over work? As discussed 
under Accessibility, above, there are opportunities for improvement, especially in terms 
of objectively and accurately determining who has a long-term severe disability. In 
addition, there is a legitimate question about how many people who should qualify for 
TA or DA do not because of barriers to access that leave them unable to meet basic 
needs. 
Table 4-4: Income Assistance program features that create barriers to entry and exit 
IA program feature Barrier to entry Barrier to exit 
Income test  Yes Yes (by limiting re-entry) 
Asset test Yes Yes (by limiting savings, 
primarily affects TA) 
Cash-transfer rate Yes Yes 
Work search period Yes Yes (by limiting re-entry) 
Disability eligibility criteria Yes Yes (by limiting re-entry) 
Benefit reduction rate and 
the associated break-even 
point 
No Yes 
Supplemental benefits No Yes (primarily affects TA)58 
 
Barriers to entry can also create barriers to exit because eligibility criteria make it 
difficult to re-enter the program if needed after exiting. Despite low benefit levels, when 
the protection afforded by being able to re-enter the program is limited by the way 
eligibility criteria are applied, some people will choose not to work, with the associated 
risk of losing benefits for a significant period. That is in part what happened with the 
1996 and 2002 eligibility changes, which have been, in part, reversed over the past 
three years. 
The ability to return to the system is a type of “job insurance” that is especially important 
if the job is precarious employment and does not create Employment Insurance 
eligibility. Most TA recipients have lower levels of education. They often face other 
 
58 Former DA recipients are eligible for Medical Services Only coverage indefinitely, and TA recipients receive partial 
coverage for one year. 
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barriers to employment that make full-time standard employment less likely than 
insecure employment in the form of casual, part-time, or gig jobs that currently do not 
lead to Employment Insurance eligibility. 
The linkage between access to general and health supplements and continued eligibility 
for IA cash benefits poses another barrier to exit. Supplements are protection against 
adverse events that those in poverty cannot easily overcome, and the risk of losing 
them makes the decision to exit cash benefits for work more difficult. Once a beneficiary 
earns enough to lose their last dollar of cash benefits, they subsequently lose their 
entitlement to supplemental benefits, although some are maintained during a 12-month 
transition period for TA families. PWD recipients receive Medical Service Only benefits 
indefinitely. As their earnings approach the break-even level, they risk losing not just the 
benefit reduction rate (BRR) times their incremental income but eventually the total 
value of the supplements, albeit sometimes after a transition period. This phenomenon 
creates a “notch” in their benefits, where earning an extra dollar produces a far larger, 
discrete loss of benefits. This notch is a significant component of the welfare wall. 
Policies to moderate or eliminate the notch for IA recipients could proceed by any of 
three methods (Kesselman & Mendelson, 2020). All methods entail detaching eligibility 
for the supplemental benefits from the IA program, so that they become accessible to all 
low-income persons regardless of their IA status. The first method would make the 
supplemental in-kind benefits contingent on income below a specified threshold, which 
would widen the eligible population but simply move the notch to a different level. The 
second method would be to make the benefits contingent on but phased out smoothly 
with income; for example, using a variable co-payment or varying the number of free 
health practitioner visits with income. Third, and most costly, would be to universalize 
the in-kind benefit so that it would become a covered part of the medicare program 
available to the entire population. 
The cash-transfer structure of the program is also a barrier to exit in the same way that 
the BRR associated with any income-tested benefit that is phased out creates a 
disincentive to work, as discussed in Part 3. The structure of cash benefits that phase 
out with income, whether in a basic income, tax credit, or IA program, poses 
disincentives to enter work or, for those already working, work more hours. Similarly, 
higher taxation of income poses work disincentives that may cumulate with those of IA if 
the two programs overlap. That is, the BRR associated with any earnings creates a 
negative work incentive. The question is the magnitude of that disincentive. 
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To estimate the impact of these disincentives, Green (2020d) uses estimates of the 
responsiveness of workers, referred to by economists as elasticities, found in the 
literature. He compares the labour supply effect of a basic income with the current IA 
program as a result of this specific effect—the effective tax rate impact of phasing out 
benefits as income rises. In summary, he shows that: 
• for higher income workers (who are not affected by IA or most basic income 
designs) the impact is essentially zero, in terms of both the decision as to 
whether to work and how much to work 
• for IA recipients who are unable to work, effective tax rates are obviously not a 
consideration 
• for those who earn low incomes or would do so if they chose to work, the impact 
of tax rates is more significant, but the impact on the participation decision is 
generally greater than the impact on how much to work, and that depends on 
how these incentives apply to the specific program design 
Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing and Effective Tax Rates) describes the different 
incentive effects that arise when income testing parameters are changed as discussed 
by Green (2020c). We point out the conflicting incentives that will affect some people by 
discouraging additional work effort, some by encouraging additional work effort and 
some by encouraging people who are not working to begin to participate. 
In the case of DA, the earned income exemption is relatively high, at $12,000 (due to 
increase in January 2021) and is annual rather than monthly. The 14% of DA recipients 
who do work represent those who are able to work and have chosen to do so. Many 
have earnings that are closely clustered around the annual earnings exemption, while 
many also exceed the maximum and others earn substantially less. Ministry staff have 
suggested that some recipients limit their work effort to ensure income is near the 
income exemption to avoid inadvertently exceeding the much higher break-even level of 
income, at which point their eligibility for IA would be affected. That is reasonable given 
that above the exemption, all of the additional income is taxed back by the 100% BRR. 
These people have chosen to participate in the workforce but have chosen how much to 
work based on the program design, specifically the income exemption/BRR 
combination.  
That suggests that a reduction in the BRR will encourage some DA recipients who work 
to increase their hours of work. That idea is supported by Campolieti and Riddell (2012) 
who found that a reduction in the BRR increased employment of disability insurance 
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recipients but did not change inflows or outflows to the program. This suggests that 
reducing the BRR in the DA program would encourage work among recipients but have 
little negative effects in the form of increasing the caseload. Since currently only about 
13,500 people out of about 107,000 DA cases report earned income (Petit & Tedds, 
2020d), increase in work would not have a material impact on B.C.’s economy but 
would be beneficial to those individuals’ well-being both financially and in terms of self-
respect and autonomy.  
That impact on the choice of how much to work is specific to the current IA design and 
the observation about the level of earnings. Separate from the benefit structure, other 
barriers to exit identified above are disincentives to participation and, for those who 
choose to work, limiting factors on hours of work. It is important to note as well that for 
those with disabilities who are able to work, higher costs of employment associated with 
disabilities act as another disincentive to participate; this too could be addressed by 
policy changes. 
The TA program also applies to some who are able to work and others who are not. We 
will focus on the main component of TA, the ETW group accounting for about 30,000 
individuals who are presumed by the system to be able to work (Petit & Tedds, 2020d). 
About 7% of the ETW group (roughly 2,100 individuals) currently report earned income. 
They face a monthly rather than an annual earnings exemption that is also substantially 
lower than that for the PWD recipients, at $400 per month for single adults and $600 for 
single parents. Single adults in the ETW category receive a benefit of $760 per month 
and a BRR of 100% that applies from $400 to $1,160 in monthly earnings, where the 
latter number is the break-even point. As noted in Part 3, Green (2020c) found that 
replacing IA with a basic income that did not include an earnings exemption but had a 
70% BRR would not reduce the disincentive to work caused by IA’s 100% BRR by 
much, because of the offsetting effects of the lack of an earnings exemption and the 
lower BRR. It is likely that most of the disincentive effect for ETWs is in the form of a 
disincentive to work at all rather than a disincentive to increase hours worked. It may not 
be significant, but it combines with the disincentive to workforce participation resulting 
from barriers to re-entry and loss of supplements to create a significant barrier to exit. 
Overall, then, the labour supply implications of the current system are that the barriers 
to entry for the IA system are intended to prevent those who are not in real need from 
accessing the system, thus preventing people who can work from choosing not to in 
order to access benefits. That protection of the labour supply is at least partially offset 
by the barriers to exit erected by those same eligibility tests, together with other features 
of the program, especially for those with disabilities who are able to work. There are 
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important considerations beyond the labour supply economic impacts, such as the self-
respect and autonomy benefits associated with the dignity of work and the fact that 
some who qualify are excluded by the accessibility barrier. In that context, the public 
policy question becomes, what is the right balance of eligibility tests and program 
design parameters that are affordable, reasonably cover most basic needs, and don’t 
unnecessarily create barriers to participation in the workforce? 
Lowering barriers to entry and exit would affect PWD and ETW recipients somewhat 
differently. For PWD recipients it would primarily increase both participation and work 
effort, and in at least some cases encourage longer-term, more stable employment, 
where there is the capacity to do so. For ETW recipients who are more likely to move 
from benefits to relatively precarious employment, making entry and re-entry easier and 
lowering other barriers to exit are likely to increase repeated short-term durations on 
benefits. How prevalent that is will depend in part on the extent to which the federal 
government’s expected Employment Insurance reforms increase Employment 
Insurance eligibility for these workers.59 
5.2 Health-care services 
Summary of program features60 
As with the whole of Canada, B.C. has universal medicare, known as the Medical 
Services Plan. Since it is universal, we don’t consider MSP as part of the income and 
social support system. But we do deem three health-care programs to be part of the 
system: the MSP supplementary benefits, Healthy Kids, and PharmaCare programs. 
MSP supplementary benefits and PharmaCare are administered by the Ministry of 
Health, and the Healthy Kids Program is delivered by Pacific Blue Cross under contract 
to the Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction. 
The MSP supplementary benefits program is a basic service, providing payments to 
improve low-income individuals’ access to health-care professionals not universally 
 
59 In Part 3, Section 4 (Labour Market Trends), we discusses the gaps in coverage under current Employment 
Insurance policy, which the federal government has indicated will be addressed in upcoming reforms, as the program 
is adjusted to replace the protections afforded by CERB.  
60 Further information about MSP supplementary benefits can be found at 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/health/health-drug-coverage/msp/bc-residents/benefits/services-covered-by-
msp/supplementary-benefits, and more information about PharmaCare can be found at 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/health/health-drug-coverage/pharmacare-for-bc-residents 
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covered by MSP. The program provides up to $23 per visit for up to 10 visits per year to 
eligible individuals. Professional services covered are: 
• acupuncture 
• chiropractic 
• massage therapy 
• naturopathy 
• physical therapy 
• non-surgical podiatry 
People who are automatically eligible for the program are: 
• IA recipients 
• Convention refugees 
• inmates of B.C. correctional facilities 
• individuals enrolled with MSP through the At Home Program 
• residents of long-term care facilities receiving the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement 
• individuals enrolled with MSP as mental health clients 
• First Nations individuals with coverage through the First Nations Health Authority 
In addition, people with “adjusted net family income” of less than $42,000 who are 
eligible for MSP coverage and have filed their taxes for the most recent year are eligible 
for the supplementary benefit. Applicants apply only once online, providing authorization 
to the program to verify their income with the Canada Revenue Agency based on the 
previous year’s tax assessment. Once enrolled, the benefit is available in all years when 
the income test is met. This is one of several basic service programs that require a one-
time application for the purpose of establishing permission to access tax data. 
Healthy Kids provides basic dental treatment, optical care, and hearing assistance to 
children of families that are eligible for MSP supplementary benefits. While using the 
same eligibility criteria, it is delivered separately by Pacific Blue Cross. It effectively 
extends access to health supplements available for dependent children under IA to low-
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income families not receiving IA; however, the coverage for children under Healthy Kids 
is less extensive than for children under IA. 
PharmaCare is also a basic service program intended to protect families from the cost 
of prescription drugs and other treatments not covered by MSP. The program provides 
coverage for: 
• eligible prescription drugs, subject to rules about coverage for specific drugs 
• some medical devices and supplies, including prostheses, orthoses, ostomy 
supplies, and diabetic supplies 
• eligible dispensing fees and pharmacy services 
As with the MSP supplementary benefits approach, some people are eligible for specific 
coverage and there is general coverage that is income-tested. The specific groups 
covered are: 
• permanent residents of licensed residential care facilities 
• IA recipients 
• people with cystic fibrosis 
• individuals enrolled with MSP through the At Home Program 
• people on certain psychiatric medications 
• people in palliative care 
• First Nations individuals with coverage through the First Nations Health Authority 
The largest group of families is covered through Fair PharmaCare, which is the part of 
PharmaCare that is income-tested, at least in part. Everyone covered by MSP has 
automatic eligibility for 100% coverage for costs for covered items in excess of $10,000 
per year. In addition, with a one-time application that provides explicit permission for the 
program to access tax information from the CRA, income-tested provisions apply that 
reduce the annual amount paid by families for prescription drugs covered by 
PharmaCare, depending on income level. 
The plan works by setting a deductible amount and a family maximum amount based on 
family net income. Nothing is paid until the costs have exceeded the deductible, at 
which point 70% or 75% of incremental costs begin to be paid. Once the family 
maximum is exceeded, 100% of any additional costs are paid. The deductible and 
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maximum amounts both increase slowly with income from zero for incomes under 
$15,000. The Fair PharmaCare family deductible (the level at which partial coverage 
starts) does not reach $10,000 until income exceeds $316,000 and the family maximum 
at which point 100% of incremental costs are covered does not reach $10,000 until 
income exceeds $250,000. In other words, the coverage is reduced very slowly as 
income rises, and never fully phases out, even for those earning very high levels of 
income. 
In effect, this is a program providing universal coverage for B.C. residents that also has 
enhanced income-tested benefits. It is delivered directly through pharmacies, which are 
all linked to the program electronically, so the costs of prescriptions and other eligible 
items are reduced at the point of sale by the Fair PharmaCare payment. 
Applying the analytical framework 
Adequacy 
Fair PharmaCare provides strong protection against catastrophic costs associated with 
prescription drug costs. With income-tested support that provides 100% coverage to 
most of the lowest-income families and that continues to provide additional coverage up 
to relatively high-income families, it has a high degree of adequacy. Inevitably difficult 
decisions must be made about exactly what drugs and items are covered, especially 
very expensive ones, which periodically results in criticism, but it clearly provides 
important and valuable coverage. 
The MSP supplementary benefits program covers professional health-care services not 
covered by MSP, with a maximum benefit of $230 per person that is cut off at $42,000 
adjusted net family income. This program provides a relatively low level of protection 
because of the limited services covered (i.e., not including dentistry), the limited number 
of covered visits, and the low amount rebated for each visit. However, this program is 
important because it establishes eligibility for the Healthy Kids Program, which is 
administered separately by a different ministry, but delivers a more adequate extended 
health benefit for low-income children. 
It is striking that IA provides its clients with broader extended health coverage in the 
form of health supplements than are available to other low-income persons under MSP 
supplementary benefits and PharmaCare. Both of these programs provide automatic 
coverage for IA recipients, but health supplements go considerably further in terms of 
their coverage, to include additional health-care services, such as dentistry, consumable 
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medical supplies, and medical equipment, similar to the way that the Healthy Kids 
Program extends IA supplements to other low-income families. 
Accessibility 
Fair PharmaCare as a universal benefit is simple and automatic with MSP eligibility and 
is delivered without anything being required by the user at the point of sale, making it 
highly accessible in almost all circumstances. Behind the scenes there is complexity 
associated with exactly what drugs are covered in certain circumstances, but that does 
not create a barrier to access generally. As a result, there is virtually no stigma 
associated with the program. 
Income-testing does add some complexity and barriers to access for some users, 
because of the requirement to apply and to annually file tax returns. For many people, a 
single application and a requirement to file taxes is not a problem, except to the extent 
that the level of coverage and the requirement to apply once may not be fully 
understood by the general public. However, as discussed earlier, there are significant 
barriers to tax filing that affect the most vulnerable because they are not required to file 
and often don’t have the information and capacity to file, especially those with 
developmental and cognitive impairments, and mental health and addiction problems. 
Automatic full coverage for IA recipients61 and others listed above, many of whom are 
vulnerable people, mitigates this accessibility barrier. These considerations apply 
equally to income-tested PharmaCare benefits, and the MSP supplementary benefits 
and Healthy Kids programs. 
Responsiveness to personal change 
These three programs, along with all other benefits that rely on use of income tax 
information for income-testing purposes, are not immediately responsive to changes in 
income, because of only annual assessment and up to an 18-month lag for a change in 
income to be reflected in CRA data. Again, the categories that provide automatic non–
income-tested coverage, such as being an IA recipient, mitigate that concern in some 
cases. In other cases such as Fair Pharmacare, it is possible to request a family income 
review that gives the program the ability to respond to changes in circumstances more 
rapidly, but one must know that manual application option exists for a benefit that most 
people regard as automated once eligibility is established. 
 
61 IA recipients must meet the residency requirements for PharmaCare to receive coverage. 
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Public trust 
These programs are effective in terms of public trust. The cost of PharmaCare is 
accepted as a part of the B.C. health-care budget and is well recognized as providing a 
valuable basic service, MSP supplementary benefits are not sufficiently material to 
attract attention, and the Healthy Kids Program is well regarded as beneficial for 
children. Neither has any material economic implications or labour supply effects; even 
the benefit notches arising at incomes of $42,000 for the Healthy Kids and MSP 
supplementary benefits programs are not likely to be visible enough to affect work 
incentives. The administrative approach to PharmaCare, where payment is applied 
automatically at point of sale, is a light-touch approach, particularly from the perspective 
of users. 
Conclusion 
These programs are examples of basic services that align relatively well with our 
analytical framework. The primary issue with MSP supplementary benefits is their 
narrowness compared with both the extended health benefits available to IA recipients 
and the Healthy Kids Program. Extended health basic needs can be devastating to any 
low-income family. Cash transfers are poorly suited to covering costs that may be 
catastrophic for some and non-existent for others.  
PharmaCare provides much more complete coverage for prescription drugs as well as 
certain consumables and medical equipment, but the range of covered goods is also 
more limited in these areas than what is provided to IA recipients. PharmaCare provides 
a potential model for delivery of some basic services, but in part it benefits from 
covering items that are available only from licensed sources, primarily pharmacies, all of 
which are required to participate in a government information technology system. 
However, the deductible and family maximum approach that varies with income may be 
applicable in other areas as well, even if point-of-sale payment could be more 
challenging. Accessibility to these basic services would be further improved if the 
income tax system were more responsive, approaches such as automatic pre-
population of tax returns for low-income individuals were used, and there were an ability 
to consent to sharing of tax data with benefits programs on tax returns to avoid the need 
to apply separately for the programs. 
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5.3 Housing programs 
Program feature summary62 
Housing programs supported by the B.C. government are provided through a Crown 
corporation, the British Columbia Housing Management Commission (BC Housing), 
which operates the programs, and its associated agency, the Provincial Rental Housing 
Corporation, which holds property for low-income and social housing in B.C. 
Housing programs that are part of the income and social support system can be divided 
roughly into two streams: supply-side programs to increase the stock of housing 
available, and demand-side programs to assist those in need in accessing housing, 
through various forms of rent subsidies. In addition, BC Housing provides licensing and 
consumer services directed at residential construction and home ownership, including 
licensing builders and providing new home warranties, which are neither income nor 
social support programs. 
On the supply side, BC Housing operates both by directly buying and building 
residential properties, and by funding not-for-profit agencies to provide residential 
accommodation. These activities are focused on homelessness (11,024 housing units in 
2018/19), supported housing for those with special needs (17,334 housing units in 
2018/19, including 875 spaces for women and children fleeing violence), and social 
housing for low-income households (40,100 housing units in 2018/19). 
BC Housing demand-side programs include rent supplements provided through the 
Rental Assistance Program (RAP) and Shelter Aid for Elderly Renters (SAFER). BC 
Housing also owns or contributes to the financing of Rent Geared to Income (RGI) 
housing units. In addition, BC Housing supports the housing costs of residents in 
properties dedicated to reducing homelessness and supported housing, but these are in 
part supply-side programs. 63 
In RGI housing units, eligible families pay no more than an established proportion of 
their household income in rent and direct housing costs, usually 30%. Eligibility criteria 
include residency status and household income, which varies by location within the 
province from $23,500 to $96,000. Typically, RGI housing is also subject to an asset 
test (BC Housing uses a $100,000 maximum, excluding personal effects, registered 
 
62 More information about B.C. housing programs can be found at https://www.bchousing.org/housing-assistance  
63 For more detailed description and assessment of B.C. demand-side housing programs, see Mendelson and 
Kesselman (2020). 
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savings plans, and certain other assets). Access to these programs is limited by the 
stock of available units, resulting in wait-lists, and priority is given to certain groups for 
certain buildings. Eligibility is determined by BC Housing, and the difference between 
RGI rent and market rent is provided to not-for-profit operators to cover any shortfall in 
operating costs versus rent revenues. The funding is provided through contractual 
arrangements between BC Housing and the operator. 
RAP provides rental subsidies to eligible families who do not live in RGI housing. 
Eligibility requirements include a residency requirement (i.e., must be a citizen, 
permanent resident, or government sponsored refugee), being under 60 years of age, 
having at least one dependent child, spending more than 30% of income on rent, an 
income test (less than $40,000 gross household income) of which some must come 
from earnings or EI, an asset test (maximum $100,000), and not receiving IA. 
SAFER provides rental subsidies to eligible seniors (60 years and above) who do not 
live in RGI housing. Eligibility requirements include a similar residency requirement, an 
income test that varies with location and whether single or couple, spending more than 
30% of income on rent, and not receiving IA. The gross income thresholds for eligibility 
are monthly income of less than $2,550 for a single person and $2,750 for a couple in 
Metro Vancouver, and $2,446 for a single person and $2,666 for a couple in the rest of 
the province.64  
As discussed earlier, IA beneficiaries are provided with a shelter allowance along with 
an unrestricted cash benefit for general support purposes. The shelter allowance is a 
fixed dollar maximum amount per month dependent on household size, and it is paid 
only up to the actual rent outlay of the household. Because of the high rents in most of 
B.C. and the modest level of the shelter allowance, most IA beneficiaries spend the full 
amount on rent or incur rent costs exceeding the allowance. Thus, while IA shelter 
allowance has the formal structure of an in-kind benefit, for most beneficiaries it is very 
much like an unconstrained cash benefit since at the margin they bear the full cost of 
any additional rent.65 IA beneficiaries are also eligible for many of the other B.C. 
housing programs with the exception of RAP and SAFER.  
 
64 For comparison, $2,446 monthly corresponds to $29,352 annually, and $2,750 monthly corresponds to $33,000 
annually. 
65 This situation is described as an in-kind benefit that is “infra-marginal” to the recipient’s actual spending on the 
targeted item, which is predicted to influence their spending choices no differently than an equivalent amount of 
unconstrained cash transfer; see Kesselman & Mendelson (2020) and Mendelson & Kesselman (2020).  
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It is notable that the major urban areas of B.C. have experienced rapidly increasing 
housing prices and rental costs for two decades, arising from an imbalance in demand 
and supply. Many factors on both the demand and supply sides of the market have 
contributed to this situation, increasing the number of people unable to meet their basic 
needs. The proportion of a family’s income needed to meet basic housing needs has 
increased. That has resulted in people both being unable to afford an appropriate level 
of housing consistent with their family composition, and compromising other basic 
needs because of the proportion spent on rent. The government has responded in a 
variety of ways, including significant increases in capital spending to add to the stock of 
social housing, and tax measures to reduce demand for residential properties 
purchased for investment rather than accommodation purposes. The programs focused 
on homelessness have become increasingly integrated with other services related to 
homelessness, mental health, addictions, and the opioid crisis, policies that are 
important to advance further. 
Applying the analytical framework 
As a group, the demand-side and supply-side housing programs comprise a set of 
programs intended to provide a housing basic service through both cash subsidies and 
in-kind benefits. 
Adequacy 
The B.C. Housing programs raise two adequacy concerns. First, the relatively low and 
inconsistent level of support provided through the rental assistance programs is 
insufficient to address the housing needs of those who qualify. Second, program 
coverage is limited because of the linkage of subsidies to the availability of social 
housing and, for market housing, the RAP program is limited to families with dependent 
children where some of their income comes from employment or EI benefits. As a 
result, some in need as defined by program eligibility criteria are left without services, 
and the benefits provided by RAP are insufficient to fully address needs. These 
shortcomings clearly represent a trade-off with the cost of the programs, which would be 
very high if they were to provide sufficient supplements and sufficient subsidized social 
housing to meet all needs. However, for those who are successful in getting subsidized 
social housing, having accommodation that is appropriate for the family composition at 
a cost of no more than 30% of income is a fully adequate benefit. 
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Accessibility 
The approach is not simple in the sense that several programs apply different criteria, 
application processes, and benefit levels that are not well understood by the public. 
Eligibility criteria require applicants to provide considerable information and require 
recipients to report changes, which is inherently intrusive and creates a certain amount 
of stigma or loss of dignity. Significant barriers to access exist as well, especially the 
inadequate availability of subsidized social housing to meet the needs of all those who 
are eligible.  
Finally, the lack of integration between IA and the RAP program creates a barrier to 
access, since those who exit IA because of income earned then must try to get rental 
support from this programs. If they are lucky enough to get subsidized accommodation 
but their income falls and they must go back on IA, they lose the benefit again. This 
situation adds to the barriers to exit from Income Assistance discussed above. 
Security and responsiveness to personal change 
For those who successfully get subsidized accommodation, the benefit is stable and 
responsive to changes in income, setting a cap at 30% of income. For some 
beneficiaries of other housing programs, such as RAP and SAFER, the funding formula 
brings recipients to about 32% of income if they are able to locate a rental unit where 
the rent is below the rent ceiling for the program. However for those whose rent 
exceeds the ceiling, the shelter consumes a higher proportion of their income. Unless 
the SAFER or RAP programs received funding to increase the rent ceilings regularly, 
even at the level of rent increases allowed by the Residential Tenancy Regulation, this 
means that those paying rent above the maximum rent ceiling must absorb the entirety 
of future rent increases 
Public trust 
The important element of public trust for these programs is the fiscal cost associated 
with program capital and operating costs. Administration through a Crown corporation 
together with a significant number of not-for-profit partners who operate the buildings is 
relatively efficient. Given that the available social housing is limited and the rent subsidy 
programs are uneven, the lottery element to this policy challenges our notions of 
fairness and, through that, could affect public support for the housing programs in 
general. 
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Conclusion 
The current set of programs is a targeted approach to increasing the supply of low-
income housing and housing for certain groups with specific housing needs, but the 
amount of additional supply that can be built is finite and limited by fiscal considerations. 
With the access to RGI housing units limited because there is more demand than 
available units, some who would otherwise be eligible are excluded. That suggests that 
consistency with our framework could be improved with a rental assistance benefit that 
is easier to access and that applies more generally to all those who meet income-based 
eligibility tests and whose benefit phases out as income increases. However, any such 
benefit should not detract from efforts to increase low-income housing supply and, in 
particular, efforts to reduce homelessness through provision of housing together with 
additional required services and cash transfers. 
5.4 Home owner grant 
Summary of program features66 
The home owner grant (HOG) is a measure that reduces property tax for most 
homeowners. It essentially provides a fixed reduction in property taxes of $570 per year 
for the principal residence of B.C. residents, with higher amounts provided to seniors, 
those with disabilities, and low-income veterans. There is an assessed value threshold 
above which the grant is phased out, with the threshold adjusted annually to maintain 
the proportion of the housing stock that is eligible for the grant. Low-income owners who 
qualify for the higher grant can apply to have any benefit that was phased out returned 
to them. The specifics of the program have little relevance for the purposes of this 
analysis. 
This is a program that, in some ways, is the opposite of an income and social support: it 
benefits home owners, who on average have higher incomes and wealth than renters, 
and it does not impose an income test. We have included it in our description of the 
existing systems because it is a large transfer that is related to the ones we are 
discussing, but it does not target those with limited resources. The HOG is a housing-
related program, and shelter is clearly a basic need, but the HOG does not directly act 
to improve access to shelter. 
 
66 More information about the home owner grant can be found at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/taxes/property-
taxes/annual-property-tax/home-owner-grant 
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Applying the analytical framework 
Rather than analyzing each of the characteristics separately, a summary level of 
analysis seems most appropriate. The HOG lacks adequacy because it does not help 
people meet basic needs, since it is provided directly to homeowners but not to the 
renter population that is facing much more severe problems of housing affordability. 
However, the HOG is easily accessible as part of the annual property tax payment 
process, without significant barriers to access and with no stigma attached. The cost of 
the program is significant, at $817 million in 2019. Our conclusion is that this is a costly 
program that does not target any group clearly in need or achieve any evident public 
policy objective. The funds used to cover the program’s high cost could be much more 
effectively used for addressing basic needs. 
5.5 Child care programs 
Summary of program features67 
Support for child care in B.C. is a basic service program area provided through a set of 
programs directed toward both increasing the supply and affordability of licensed child 
care spaces in the province (supply side) and providing financial support to parents 
requiring child care services (demand side). While public programs for child care have 
been available in B.C. for decades, they were substantially overhauled in 2018 to 
enhance both supply- and demand-side supports. 
Supply-side programs include both support for licensed child care operators to increase 
the capacity of facilities, to reduce fees charged to parents, and to support the 
increased operating costs of additional spaces, as well as support to recruit, train, and 
retain early childhood educators. These programs include Child Care Operating 
Funding and the Child Care Fee Reduction Initiative. Both programs provide funding to 
licensed child care facilities that accept subsidized families to cover operating costs for 
facilities and, to reduce and stabilize parents’ monthly child care fees respectively. In 
addition, the associated Early Childhood Educator Wage Enhancement program and 
New Spaces Fund subsidize eligible worker wages by $2 per hour and provide capital 
cost funding, respectively. Together these programs are intended to increase the supply 
of spaces and the workforce needed to expand capacity. 
 
67 More information about child-care programs can be found at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/family-social-
supports/caring-for-young-children 
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The primary demand-side program is the Affordable Child Care Benefit, which is an 
income-tested subsidy available to parents accessing either licensed child care facilities 
or other unlicensed child care arrangements. It pays benefits directly to licensed and 
registered child care facilities on behalf of the parent or directly to the parent where the 
care is in the child’s own home. Features of the benefit structure include the following: 
• The benefit structure generally has a maximum subsidy amount and an income 
exemption above which the subsidy is phased out as income increases up to a 
break-even point where the benefit is reduced to zero, consistent with the benefit 
structures discussed in Part 3. 
• The maximum subsidy amount, income exemption, and break-even point vary 
with the type of child care arrangement: licensed group child care facilities have 
the highest maximum subsidy amounts, income exemptions, and break-even 
points, followed by licensed family providers, registered and unregistered licence-
not-required facilities, and then child care in the child’s own home (see Figure 4-
13). 
• For each type of child care, the maximum subsidy amount also varies with the 
age of the child and the amount of child care provided, but the other parameters 
(income exemption and break-even point) are unaffected. 
• For the purpose of determining the subsidy amount, income is calculated using 
family income tax data for the previous year, equal to total income (i.e., gross 
income) less social assistance payments and per-child deductions if there is 
more than one child in the household. Additional adjustments reflect single- 
versus two-parent families and children with special needs.  
• Applicants are required to give permission to use CRA data for subsidy 
administration purposes, but if CRA data is not available users can provide 
income information directly using an Income Declaration Form and, if their 
income is reduced during the year, can ask for a review of the subsidy 
determination based on directly provided income information.  
Figure 4-13 shows how the monthly subsidy amount varies by the type of child care and 
family income level for a child under 19 months, to illustrate how the benefit structure 
works. As can be seen, the structure is somewhat unusual for subsidies related to 
licensed facilities. The subsidy amount begins to be phased out at the exemption level 
of $45,000 of income, but the benefit reduction rate reverts to zero between incomes of 
$60,000 and $80,000 before resuming up to the $111,000 break-even point. (The B.C. 
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Child Opportunity Benefit has a similar feature, also containing a flat section for a range 
of incomes up to $80,000.) 
Figure 4-13: Child care subsidy for child under 19 months 
 
Applying the analytical framework 
The demand-side and supply-side child care programs combine to provide a child care 
basic service that is intended to increase the capacity of the system to make child care 
more accessible and to reduce the cost of child care for low- and middle-income British 
Columbians, through a combination of facility operating subsidies and subsidies for 
parents. 
Adequacy 
Significant resources have been added over the past few years, which have acted to 
increase capacity and affordability. The stated aspirational objective is to achieve 
universal child care in the sense of having affordable child care available to every family 
that wants or needs it. Access to child care is a barrier to working and other forms of 
participating in society that many low-income parents face, whether in single-parent or 
two-parent families. This is especially true for mothers.  
The current suite of programs is a step toward increased adequacy and is especially 
helpful for low-income families who can both find jobs with hours consistent with 
licensed child care facilities hours and find a facility with available capacity. The 
combination of the Affordable Child Care Benefit and the Child Care Fee Reduction 
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Initiative may fully cover the fees of families with income up to about $45,000, and make 
a significant contribution to child care costs for families with income up to at least 
$80,000. However, for those with non-standard work hours and little choice but to have 
child care in the home or in a licence-not-required facility, the available subsidy is 
considerably less adequate, as Figure 4-13 shows. 
Accessibility 
The Affordable Child Care Benefit is somewhat complex, since it has several factors 
that affect the amount of subsidy making the amount a family is eligible for difficult to 
predict. This concern is mitigated by having a benefits calculator available,68 the Child 
Care Service Centre available to provide phone advice, and a system of not-for-profit 
organizations (Child Care Resource and Referral Centres) established to help both child 
care operators and parents seeking child care to navigate the system. Licensed and 
registered child care providers are also typically aware of the subsidy program and can 
assist users. 
There is little stigma attached to getting the Affordable Child Care Benefit. In most 
cases, all that is required is completion of an online application form and a physical form 
with the child care provider, and eligibility criteria are objective, clear, and not 
unnecessarily intrusive. 
Provided that child care itself can be accessed, the barriers to accessing the subsidy 
are relatively low. As discussed above, there is a general concern about programs that 
rely on income tax information to establish eligibility and benefit levels for two reasons. 
First, if tax filing is a requirement, barriers to tax filing, especially among vulnerable 
populations, can create barriers to accessing the benefits, although this is unlikely to 
affect many families where child care is needed because the parent or parents are 
working and likely to file taxes. While the subsidy program uses tax information, it 
provides an alternative where taxes have not been filed, which enhances accessibility. 
Second, use of the previous year’s tax information to set subsidy amounts is not very 
responsive to changes in personal circumstances. However, this is mitigated by the 
ability to seek a review of the subsidy amount if income has been reduced. As a result, 
recipients who lose a job or have their hours or income reduced can continue to access 
child care while they seek a new job and, crucially, are less likely to have to give up a 
child care space that might be difficult to regain when they go back to work. 
 
68 https://myfamilyservices.gov.bc.ca/s/estimator—The estimation provided in this service is not a guarantee of 
payments and does not take into account all circumstances, but it is a useful guide. 
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The fact that the recipient’s subsidy level is adjusted just once each year unless a 
review is requested or a change in circumstances that affects eligibility, provides a 
secure and stable level of subsidy. 
Public trust 
Child-care accessibility and affordability have been significant and growing issues for 
families with children. Those barriers have reduced the rate of parents participating in 
the workforce and held back families that would be better off if the parents were able to 
work. The result is that increases in the cost of government contributions toward child 
care programs have been generally well accepted. The economic incentive effects of 
child care programs are positive because child care services are crucial to increasing 
labour supply. The provisions that provide enhanced accessibility and responsiveness 
require more administrative resources than a program that automatically establishes 
eligibility and subsidy levels based on income tax data. However, this trade-off among 
accessibility, responsiveness, and administrative effort seems to be well accepted as 
necessary for a fair and effective program. 
5.6 Provincial refundable tax credits 
Summary of program features69 
B.C. currently offers three generally applicable types of refundable tax credits—that is, 
tax credits that are conditional only on income and family composition. Refundable tax 
credits are a form of targeted basic income. The three refundable tax credits are the 
climate action tax credit, the sales tax credit, and the Child Opportunity Benefit. Table 4-
5 shows the expenditure in B.C. related to each of the credits for 2019/20, except for the 
Child Opportunity Benefit, for which the estimated cost for the first full year, 2021/22, is 
provided. 
These refundable tax credits are in fact cash transfers that are delivered periodically 
through the year; they use the tax system as a delivery platform but have no direct 
connection to income taxes other than to use tax information to calculate the level of 
payments. They are computed and paid independently of whether the recipient is a 
taxpayer or has outstanding taxes owing. That is particularly important for low-income 
individuals who pay little or no income tax because of their low-income status and who 
 
69 For more information about B.C. tax credits, see https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/taxes/income-
taxes/personal/credits  
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benefit from the cash transfers generated through refundable tax credits. The federal 
government also provides refundable tax credits, including the Canada Child Benefit, 
the goods and services tax/harmonized sales tax (GST/HST) credit, and the Canada 
Workers Benefit. 





Climate action tax credit 255 
Sales tax credit 45 
Child Opportunity Benefit 400 
Total 700 
 
The climate action tax credit uses the approach discussed in Part 3 of a maximum 
benefit that is received up to an exempt level of income, after which the benefit is 
reduced at a benefit reduction rate of 2% of income until the benefit is reduced to zero 
at the break-even point. The benefit can be claimed by one tax filer in each family and 
includes an amount for each adult and child ($174 and $51 annual amounts, 
respectively, in 2020/21, plus a one-time additional payment in July 2020 due to the 
pandemic). Benefits are paid quarterly starting in July each year, based on the previous 
year’s income, and are added to the federal GST/HST tax credit payment. The income 
exemption is currently $35,748 for a single-person family and $41,706 for a family with 
more than one person. Income for the purposes of calculating the benefit is adjusted 
family net income.70 The break-even point varies with the amount of benefit for the 
family, from $44,448 for a single-person family to $66,756 for a family of five.71 
The climate action tax credit was established as a consequential change associated 
with the carbon tax when it was introduced. The tax credit was one of several tax 
measures that, combined, ensured that the carbon tax was revenue-neutral. It also 
acted to reduce the regressivity of the tax, ensuring that any carbon tax paid by people 
earning less than the exemption level was at least offset by the tax credit. 
 
70 Adjusted family net income adjusts the combined net income amounts for family members for Universal Child Care 
Benefit and Registered Disability Savings Plan payments and repayments. 
71 The one-time July 2020 additional payment generates higher break-even points related to that payment. 
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The sales tax credit takes the same form, with a maximum benefit of $75 per adult in 
the family, a BRR of 2% of income, and an income exemption level of $15,000 for a 
family with one adult or $18,000 for a family with two adults. The sales tax credit also 
uses adjusted family net income to calculate the benefit amount. The sales tax credit 
was introduced when B.C. replaced the HST with the provincial sales tax in 2013. The 
provincial sales tax was reintroduced in a form that that was almost identical to the one 
in place prior to adopting the HST in 2010, and it has remained unchanged since then. 
The B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit (COB) was announced in the 2019 budget and took 
effect in October 2020, replacing the former B.C. Early Childhood Tax Benefit. Relative 
to the predecessor provision, the COB extended coverage for children from age six 
through age 17, increased the basic benefit level, and increased the degree of income 
targeting.72 The COB also follows the usual approach of reducing benefits with family 
income, with an added feature of having a range of incomes over which the BRR is set 
to zero, similar to the approach taken by the Affordable Child Care Benefit. 
The benefit is available to income tax filers with children under the age of 18 and is paid 
monthly in combination with the Canada Child Benefit. The maximum benefits are: 
• $1,600 annually for the first child 
• $1,000 for the second child 
• $800 for each subsequent child 
There is an income exemption of $25,000, at which point the BRR of 4% of income 
takes effect. There is a range of income between about $65,000 and $80,000 for which 
the BRR briefly drops to zero, shown as the flat sections shown on Figure 4-13. That is 
created by specifying that for income less than $80,000 the benefit will not fall below: 
• $700 for the first child 
• $680 for the second child 
• $660 for each subsequent child 
As a result, the income range over which the BRR is zero depends on the number of 
children. For income greater than $80,000, the BRR is once again 4%. 
 
72 For further detail on the COB, assessment, and reform proposals, see Kesselman (2020b). 
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The COB uses adjusted family net income for the purposes of calculating the benefit, 
which is consistent with the sales tax credit and the climate action tax credit. While both 
of those tax credits were at least initially related to other tax policy measures, the COB 
is specifically intended to provide income-tested support to families with children, 
supplementing the much larger refundable tax credit support provided by the Canada 
Child Benefit. 
Figure 4-14: B.C. refundable tax credit amounts compared with adjusted family net 
income 
 
Figure 14-14 illustrates how these different benefit structures, income exemptions, and 
BRRs for B.C. refundable tax credits combine to create a pattern of net benefits relative 
to income. The figure is simplified to show only families with two adults plus children. 
The “notches” and varying slopes of the lines result from the different parameters 
associated with the three refundable tax credits. The total benefit from these tax credits 
can be seen as dominated by the presence and number of children in a family; a 
childless couple receives very little regardless of income, and a childless single person 
(not shown) even less. Note that all three tax credits have an income exemption, which 
ensures that those who do not pay income taxes are also not subjected to “effective” tax 
rates.  
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Applying the analytical framework 
Adequacy 
The three refundable B.C. tax credits have different levels of adequacy. 
The climate action tax credit has been increased whenever B.C.’s carbon tax rate has 
increased, including in 2018 and 2019, and the income exemption thresholds have been 
indexed to inflation and increase each year. It has continued to fulfill its original intention 
of offsetting carbon tax impacts on low-income taxpayers. Without assessing whether 
the specific amount is fully adequate to offset carbon tax costs for most British 
Columbians, it is clear that changes are made as necessary to keep the tax credit 
consistent with B.C.’s carbon tax rates. 
The sales tax credit, at a maximum benefit of $75 annually without change for over a 
decade, neither effectively mitigates the regressivity of the provincial sales tax nor 
provides a material benefit to low-income individuals. 
The COB represents a clear improvement in the adequacy of B.C. tax credits aimed at 
families with children. The former tax credit applied only to children under age six and 
provided a considerably lower maximum benefit amount. Two questions come to mind, 
though: 
• Given the fact that the Canada Child Benefit provides much larger benefits up to 
relatively high income levels, is it necessary to have a provincial credit for 
children that also has a relatively high break-even point? 
• Is there a practical benefit to having variable BRRs across the income range so 
that there is a zero BRR for a range of incomes up to $80,000? 
The COB provides a material benefit that combines with the Canada Child Benefit to 
provide support to families with children. However, the analysis in Part 3 indicates that 
while poverty rates and depths for children have been improved considerably by the 
Canada Child Benefit, there is still room for improvement, especially since the federal 
programs targeting seniors and children have taken the focus away from the provinces 
in the area of child poverty. An alternative would be to adjust the COB to increase the 
maximum benefit levels and the BRR to phase out the benefit more quickly (Kesselman, 
2020b). The result could be designed to be fiscally neutral while focusing public 
resources more directly on low-income families. 
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Accessibility and responsiveness to personal change 
The accessibility issues associated with benefits delivered through the tax system or 
that use income tax information have been discussed in some detail earlier in Part 4 
and in Petit and Tedds (2020f). Briefly, the income tax system places high barriers to 
access on those with low incomes, especially those who do not otherwise need to file 
tax returns, and the tax system is inherently unresponsive to changes in personal 
circumstances, with its annual filing cycle taking up to 18 months to respond to a 
change. Despite these concerns, delivery of benefits through the income tax system has 
a relatively low level of stigma associated with it, provided the tax filer regularly files 
returns. Trouble with missing or disputed tax filings can reduce access to benefits and 
can affect personal dignity. Changes to improve the income tax system’s role as 
providing benefit delivery infrastructure would directly improve accessibility to 
refundable tax credits. 
Public trust 
The use of the tax system to deliver benefits is administratively efficient. These tax 
credits have few material economic impacts. Neither the sales tax credit nor the climate 
action tax credit is large enough to have any impact on the incentive to work, especially 
with the income exemptions and low BRRs associated with the credits, in addition to low 
maximum benefits. The COB has the potential to contribute to increased participation 
rates and hours worked for parents who face significant costs that are barriers to 
working, especially together with the Affordable Child Care Benefit. That positive impact 
could be enhanced by focusing more of its resources on lower-income families. 
5.7 Youth aging out of care 
Background: Outcomes for former youth in care 
There has been considerable debate over the impact on children who have been taken 
into government care. In the 1990s, the Gove Inquiry into Child Protection in British 
Columbia concluded that too many children at risk were being left with their families and 
the system pivoted toward taking more children into care. More recently, there has been 
some amount of consensus that it is better to focus on keeping children with their 
families as much as possible. In the academic literature, as well, there are varying 
estimates of the causal impact on future outcomes of taking a child into care. But 
regardless of that causal impact, it is clear that being a child in care is associated with 
poor outcomes later and, for that reason alone, is a good place to focus resources. 
Moreover, close to 70% of youth aging out of care are indigenous, implying that reforms 
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in this area have clear connections to reconciliation issues. This is one reason that we 
emphasize the involvement of community organizations in our recommendations in this 
area in Part 6. 
According to one study following a small sample of youth aging out of care in B.C. in the 
mid-2000s, only 32% of these youth had graduated from high school by age 19 
compared to 84% for the general population (Shaffer et al., 2016). The graduation rate 
for former youth in care eventually reached the 50–70% range, pointing to two 
conclusions:  
• the disruptions faced by these children and youth before age 19 have significant 
negative effects on their education  
• they need longer times (and likely more supports) to reach any given level of 
education  
Former youth in care also make heavy use of the Income Assistance (IA) system. 
Approximately a quarter of the children/youth lived in a household receiving IA just 
before being taken into care. Then, at age 19 their own IA use rates surpass 35% 
before settling down to around 29% in their late 20s. But these are rates in each year 
and understate the extent to which youth aging out of care use the IA system over time.  
When we follow the cohort of youth aging out of care between 1998 and 2002 using 
administrative data, 74% of them used IA in at least one month in the following 15 
years.73 The rate of using IA in the population as a whole for the same period is under 
5%. Looking at IA use from another perspective, in 2017, 26,000 months of IA benefits 
were paid to people who were 21 years old at the time and 19% of that total usage was 
by former children/youth in care even though they represent a miniscule portion of the 
total population of 21 year-olds.  
Former youth in care also have much greater contact with the criminal justice system 
than other youth. About 41% of children and youth in care had been involved with the 
 
73 In the results based on administrative data in the remainder of this section we used the following data: education 
data (British Columbia Ministry of Education (2019 a, b, c, d)); justice system data (British Columbia Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General (2019 a, b, c)); Income Assistance data (British Columbia Ministry of Social 
Development and Poverty Reduction (2019)); MSP billing data (British Columbia Ministry of Health (2019a, c)); health 
outcome data (British Columbia Ministry of Health (2019 b, d)); and death records (British Columbia Ministry of 
Health(2019 e). All data was accessed through the BC Data Innovation Program. All inferences, opinions, and 
conclusions drawn in this paper are those of the authors, and do not reflect the opinions or policies of the Data 
Innovation Program or the Province of British Columbia.  
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criminal justice system by age 21 compared to 6.6% for the general population of youth 
(Kendall & Turpel-Lafond, 2009). Returning to the small-scale longitudinal study, 48% of 
the cohort followed in that panel had been homeless at some point by the time of their 
first interview (some of them while on a Youth Agreement). Strikingly, 61% of their 
sample were pregnant or parenting by age 21 and 19% were expecting their second 
child (Shaffer et al., 2016). Thus, providing help for this set of people is really helping 
two generations at once. This result also points to the fact that issues do not begin at 
age 19. A truly effective response must support continuous improvement in the 
operational and policy aspects of the child welfare system. 
Youth aging out of care have much lower rates of high school graduation (38% versus 
84% for other youth of the same birth cohort), are much more likely to be involved with 
the criminal just system (28% have such an involvement between ages 23 and 38 
compared to 4% of youth from the same birth cohort), are more likely to use IA (they 
use 52 months of IA by age 40 compared to 4 months for the comparison group; and 
children in care plus children who were contacted by MCFD but not taken into care 
make up 49% of IA payments ever made to a cohort of children born in the same year). 
In addition, 31% of the children of people who were formerly in care are taken into care 
themselves, compared to 1.5% of the rest of the population. We used these numbers 
and costed foregone taxes from high school drop outs, costs associated with the 
criminal justice system and increase IA usage, and other related costs to come up with 
an estimate of incremental fiscal cost associated with people formerly in government 
care compared to others in the same birth cohort. In net present value terms at age 19, 
these costs amount to $320,000 per person. 
Perhaps most troubling, the mortality rates of youth aging out of care are much higher 
than the rest of the population. According to administrative data, 15% of the people age 
19 to 33 who died in 2015 were former children in care. It is hard not to see this as an 
issue of first order importance. British Columbia has been wrestling with how to help this 
group of young people for decades without finding a fully effective approach. Several 
significant moves have been made in the last few years such as free tuition but more is 
required. Striving to become a just society means making youth aging out of care a top 
priority, committing the necessary resources in a complete revision of policy that is 
created in close co-operation with these young adults and the communities that support 
them. 
Numerous researchers and investigators argue that these poor outcomes arise from a 
background of instability. Anyone taken out of their family home has, by definition, 
experienced a traumatic event and for many, it is simply one of many traumatic events. 
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Many children in foster care shift foster homes frequently so that by the time they reach 
19 they do not have a stable relationship with any adult to whom they can turn for 
support. That is compounded by heavily overloaded case workers who have time only 
to assess crisis cases and determine whether children should be removed from a 
home—not time to provide real support to the family and a stable adult relationship for 
the child.  
Summary of program features74 
Despite the outcomes reported here, traditionally, few services have been available to 
this group once they reach 19 and become adults under the law. At this point those 
receiving services under the child welfare system age out of care. 
As indicated in Part 3, Section 2 (Poverty in British Columbia) single adults are the 
demographic group with the highest rates and depths of poverty, and single adults in 
the 18–25 age group fare the worst within that group, with almost double the poverty 
rates. Of course, young adults formerly in care under the child welfare system make up 
only part of that group, but they are an identifiable sub-group, for which specific 
programs are clearly needed. 
Three primary programs focus on youth aging out of care. 
Agreements with Young Adults program 
Launched in 2008, the Agreements with Young Adults (AYA) program is offered to 
young adults who, up to their 19th birthday, were receiving services under a Continuing 
Custody Order, Youth Agreement, or were in the guardianship of the Director of 
Adoption or a director under s.51 of the Infants Act.  
Between the ages of 19 and 26 (inclusive), these young adults can access up to $1,250 
per month (based on assessed need) to cover living expenses while enrolled in a post-
secondary educational program, vocational training program, or attending a 
rehabilitation program or a life-skills program. Life-skills programs are provided by not-
for-profit agencies. 
Cultural programs are also now included under the AYA life-skills program policy to help 
Indigenous young adults connect with their culture and traditions.  
 
74 For more information, see https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/family-social-supports/youth-and-family-
services/teens-in-foster-care/aging-out-of-care and https://studentaidbc.ca/explore/grants-scholarships/provincial-
tuition-waiver-program 
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AYA support is available over scheduled program breaks, such as summer months, but 
the duration of coverage by AYA cannot be more than four years in total or extend 
beyond the recipient’s 27th birthday. 
Provincial Tuition Waiver Program  
Introduced in 2017, the Provincial Tuition Waiver Program is managed in partnership 
with the Ministry of Advanced Education, Skills and Training and waives tuition, 
mandatory fees and deposits for former youth in care attending any of 25 public post-
secondary institutions or 10 union trades training centres.  
To be eligible, the person must have been in care75 for at least 24 months at any time 
and either: be 17 or 18, no longer in care, and have graduated from high school; or be 
between ages 19 and 26. The program covers a wide range of programs, including 
courses leading to a post-secondary credential, apprenticeship training, and courses 
related to lifelong learning and labour market competencies, but does not include 
graduate programs or Adult Basic Education. 
Youth Educational Assistance Fund  
Introduced in 2002, Youth Educational Assistance Fund provides eligible young adults 
from care with funding for post-secondary education and vocational training. MCFD 
funds this program, the B.C. student financial aid program receives applications from 
students, and Victoria Foundation administers grant funding. It provides up to $5,500 
per year to qualifying full-time students for up to four years.  
To be eligible, a person must be between 19 and 24 years of age; aged out of care on 
their 19th birthday from a Continuing Custody Order or subject to a Continuing Custody 
Order for at least five years before being adopted or having custody transferred to a 
person other than a parent; and taking post-secondary courses at a recognized post-
secondary institution in an eligible program, at least 12 weeks long and leading to a 
certificate, diploma, or degree. This includes academic, vocational, and trade programs. 
Recipients of Youth Educational Assistance Fund funding can also access the 
Provincial Tuition Waiver Program and Agreements with Young Adults. 
 
75 Care is defined as a Continuing Custody Order, Temporary Custody Order, Special Needs Agreement, Voluntary 
Care Agreement, Youth Agreement, Adoption, Extended Family Program, Permanent Transfer of Custody Order, 
Temporary Transfer of Custody, Interim Custody Order or Child in Home of Relative. 
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Applying the analytical framework 
Adequacy 
For some individuals, these programs may all apply at the same time. Monthly AYA 
payments are about equal to monthly Disability Assistance payments for a single adult, 
prior to the $300 per month COVID-19 top-up; combined with the tuition waiver and 
education assistance grants, this provides significant support for those able to attend 
post-secondary education and training. However, for those who are unable or unwilling 
to engage in post-secondary programs, the benefits are considerably less adequate. 
People are eligible for the AYA program only while attending post-secondary education 
or training, or while they are attending rehabilitation or mental health programs, 
receiving post-program care, or engaging in life-skills training. Once they are no longer 
eligible, support is immediately cut off. Four years of eligibility is probably not sufficient 
for some, especially those who struggle with the trauma of having ‘lived experience’ in 
the child protection system compared to their non-care peers and those who have to 
address educational gaps prior to engaging in post-secondary education. 
While the support available to the few who qualify for all three programs is significant, 
the support for most people in this population is not. Many require social supports in 
order to get the point where they can reasonably consider post-secondary education; 
life-skills programs only partially provide these supports, and many people require more 
wraparound support to prepare themselves. In addition, failure to succeed in any of the 
education or program streams under AYA results in loss of support as a breach of their 
agreement under AYA, and no support is provided to help them try again or try 
something else. Adequacy could be improved by providing stable, ongoing support in 
terms of cash transfers and basic services sufficient to meet basic needs for a 
reasonable period to enable people to transition into independent adulthood. 
Another element of adequacy is the extent to which the programs provide the type of 
support that is needed. Youth Agreements for youth aged 16 to 18 and AYAs are 
contracts requiring the youth to meet specific requirements. There appears to be limited 
room for these children and young adults to fail, as many of us do at that age. 
Essentially, young people who have grown up with the least stable background in our 
society are being asked to hold up their side of a contract—something that even youth 
from homes with considerable support will find hard to do. In the AYA program, too, the 
youth now aged out of care are being asked to meet standards requiring considerable 
maturity without even the safety net of the child welfare system. When a child from a 
higher socio-economic background home fails out of university or loses a job, they can 
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move home, regroup, and try again. Youth aging out of care don’t have that kind of 
support, whether they are under an AYA or not, an indication of program inadequacy.  
Accessibility 
While there were lower uptake rates for the AYA program in 2015 (12% in 2015, 
according to Shaffer et al., 2016), suggesting that there are barriers to accessing this 
most widely available of the three programs, more recent numbers indicate this uptake 
is on the rise. 35% - 37% of those 19 years of age transition directly to AYA. The overall 
cohort of 19 to 27 had a 16% uptake in 2019. This more recent success validates the 
benefit of having a current or recent connection/relationship with someone in the 
ministry or a Delegated Aboriginal Agency.  
The inconsistency in the eligibility requirements for the three programs and limits in both 
the time during which support is available and the age range it available for may also be 
confusing. Work is underway to streamline funding opportunities.  
There is also concern about the requirement to continue to deal with the ministry that 
controlled their lives as children and youth in care and that many may not trust after 
years in care. Treating these young people with dignity and support despite setbacks is 
key. Access would be improved by providing former youth in care with automatic access 
to a set of services and sufficient financial support with less strict agreement-based 
enforcement mechanisms. 
Responsiveness to personal change 
The current programs are responsive to change but in a way that defeats the objective 
of helping former youth in care transition into independence, self-sufficiency, and 
engagement in society. Rather, they need a service safety-net that ensures that basic 
needs are met as they transition to adulthood from a much less than ideal childhood in 
most cases. 
Public trust 
Given the poor outcomes associated with former youth in care, and the extension of the 
moral responsibility of society to children and youth in need of protection to ensure that 
they have a reasonable opportunity in life, it is hard to imagine that there would not be 
general support for providing an increased level of support. The notion of reciprocity 
inherent in the AYA program is understandable as way to encourage people who apply 
for the program to be accountable for making effective use of the support. However, the 
result more likely is to defeat the purpose of supporting people who in many cases need 
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additional support and several tries to be successful. A set of financial and basic service 
supports that is effective in ensuring that more people transition more successfully 
would more than likely have beneficial economic and fiscal impacts as more of this 
group have more success throughout their adult lives. 
Conclusion 
The move over the past few years to provide additional supports to former youth in care 
has resulted in significant improvement. However, there remains room for more 
improvement in terms of providing former youth in care with more accessible and 
adequate support, both financial and social, to enable a successful transition to 
adulthood, a transition that can be challenging even for those with much less difficult 
childhoods. While we have only reviewed programs for former youth in care here, others 
who are vulnerable as they transition to adulthood due to childhood family poverty could 
also benefit from similar wraparound supports. 
5.8. Labour market regulation 
Why is labour regulation important? 
To this point, we have focused on the current income and social support system, which 
is in essence a set of policies related to income redistribution (through taxes and 
transfers) or service provision (such as housing). However, there is a third broad 
category of policies that can affect the justness of societies: regulation. Government 
engages in a very broad range of regulatory activity with diverse public policy 
objectives, including for some specific goals that are related to the income and social 
support system, such as the licensing of child care facilities, for example. We generally 
consider a review of regulatory activities to be out of scope for our purposes. But there 
is one regulatory area that we believe needs to be considered as a potential area for 
reform closely aligned with our justice-based objective—the regulation of work. 
We believe labour market regulation is important for our purposes because, as the 
philosopher Elizabeth Anderson (2017) points out, people spend a considerable part of 
their lives in paid work and the conditions of justice within employers—conditions 
related to feelings of control and respect—are, therefore, of central concern for the 
justice of society as a whole. More specifically in terms of our tasks, working conditions 
and wages interact vitally with the need for income and social services.  
From the perspective of employable people, there are “good jobs” (i.e., having working 
conditions that embody respect, work arrangements that allow the worker some control 
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over their hours, etc., and pay good wages) and “bad jobs” (i.e., having a disrespectful 
environment, low control, and low wages). Changing the balance by increasing the 
proportion of good jobs would make it easier to exit Income Assistance. It would also 
reduce the need for redistribution to, for example, meet poverty goals. In essence, 
policies that shape working conditions and wages have direct implications for the 
income redistribution and service provision policy arena of the income and social 
support system.  
Evidence in Part 3, Section 4 (Labour Market Trends) shows that over a third of 
employees in B.C. are in precarious work arrangements (temporary, contract, own-
account self-employment, and part-time work). There has also been a gradual rise in 
fissured work arrangements where workers at a workplace are actually employees of a 
third party. All of these work arrangements have the potential to provide flexibility to 
both workers and employers but also to be sub-standard with low levels of control over 
work, wages and respect for workers. The example of fissured workers in long-term 
care homes, where issues with scheduling and low pay contributed to COVID-19 related 
problems, points to an imbalance in worker and employer interests.  
Recent discussions have raised concerns that these work arrangements are on the rise 
because of an expanding role of artificial intelligence in particular and disruptive digital 
technology business model in general. There is little evidence of such a trend for B.C. 
but the level of use of these work arrangements has been high since the 1990s and 
remains an ongoing concern (Green,2020d). 
What is the best approach to addressing concerns about precarious and fissured work 
arrangements? One possibility is that providing adequate incomes and services can 
have indirect effects on these arrangements by allowing people to walk away from bad 
jobs. This is an argument that has been raised in favour of a basic income. It is 
possible, however, that a basic income might have the opposite effect—acting as a 
backstop for workers that reduces their interest in resisting transitory work 
arrangements. Moreover, this is quite an indirect approach. Regulation provides a more 
direct way to improve the quality of work and, through it, this dimension of the justness 
of society.  
Regulatory policy considerations 
Policy decisions in the area of regulation are complex as they involve many dimensions 
and a balancing of interests. As Anderson (2017) points out, employers have a 
legitimate need for control over what workers do while at work in order to function 
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effectively. At the same time, that control necessarily raises issues related to worker 
feelings of self-respect, which is rooted in their need for autonomy.  
Justice in all of society’s institutions is about finding balance and it is no different in this 
realm. Our assessment is that the conditions of work and the nature of control over work 
arrangements are not in balance in B.C. at this time, and our recommendations in Part 6 
are intended to move toward a more balanced equilibrium. Our treatment of this issue, 
though, proceeds while keeping clearly in mind concerns about becoming unbalanced in 
the other direction, harming employers, the work opportunities they provide, and the 
economy more generally. 
We can think of the question of finding greater balance in three main parts.  
The first two relate to the content and applicability of the regulations. Especially after 
changes made in the last two years, the existing set of employment standards provides 
employees with a set of protections that seem to be generally recognized as striking a 
reasonable balance. But there remain questions about the extent of their applicability 
and enforcement. If the standards are fair and reflect a reasonable balance they should 
be enforced generally; if not true either generally or for specific industries or 
circumstances, the standards should be re-evaluated and then the resulting standards 
enforced. Thus, the first two questions are: 
• Should there be changes in regulations to further reduce precarious and fissured 
work and how would changes affect the balance between employer and 
employee interests? For example, should we discourage the use of unstable 
work arrangements through rules about hours setting?  
• Should there be changes in the extent that the standards apply across the sector 
and how they are enforced, to ensure that they are effective in achieving the 
desired balance? 
The third are issues related to unionization and worker collective rights—essentially, 
setting up arrangements that support workers and employers themselves finding the 
right balance.  
The set of issues and suggestions we discuss here is not intended to be an exhaustive 
discussion of labour regulation issues. Starting from the description of the B.C. labour 
market in Green (2020d), our focus is mainly on issues related to fissured work and the 
incomplete regulatory coverage of workers.  
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Analysis of current B.C. labour regulation 
Labour regulation is a split jurisdiction under Canada’s constitutional set of federal and 
provincial authorities. Most employers and employees fall under provincial jurisdiction.  
Federal labour regulation falls under Part III of the Canada Labour Code and applies to 
employers and employees in the federally regulated private sector, which includes 
banking, telecommunications, international and inter-provincial air, rail, road and 
maritime transportation, and federal Crown corporations. Workers in these industries 
make up approximately 5% of the Canadian labour force (Johal et al., 2019). 
Approximately 90% of workers fall under provincial jurisdiction, with the remaining 5% 
being federal public sector employees. There are important issues related to “cracks” 
between the two systems where workers are either not covered or incompletely 
covered. We will return to those cracks at the end, but we will start with the provincial 
system.  
The relevant regulatory provisions in B.C. fall under two acts: the Employment 
Standards Act (ESA; Government of British Columbia, 2020) and the Labour Relations 
Code.  
The first two stated goals of the ESA are to: 
• ensure that employees in British Columbia receive at least basic standards of 
compensation and conditions of employment  
• promote the fair treatment of employees and employers  
To do this the ESA sets out minimum standards as well as procedures for ensuring 
those standards are met. Thus, the ESA relates primarily to the first two of the earlier 
questions. 
The Labour Relations Code governs unionization and collective bargaining, and is the 
subject of the third question posed above. 
Issues falling under the Employment Standards Act 
The ESA sets employment standards that apply to several aspects of the relationship 
between employers and employees including: 
• hiring employees, requiring that employment agreements meet minimum ESA 
standards, employees are informed of their rights, jobs are not misrepresented 
and special rules for certain occupations and foreign workers are followed 
• taking time off from work for vacation and various life situations 
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• statutory holidays, including pay for working on those days 
• ending employment, including the right to quit, and the requirements for firing or 
laying-off an employee 
• scheduling, including standard hours of work, overtime, minimum daily hours, 
breaks, minimum rest and travel time provisions 
• licensing of employment agencies, talent agencies and farm labour contractors 
• getting paid, including minimum wage, deductions, tips and gratuities and paid 
time off 
• specific rules for employees in defined groups, including young people, 
commission sales, taxi and truck drivers and certain specific occupations such as 
high technology, oil and gas, domestic workers, farm workers, loggers, 
silviculture workers and aquaculture workers 
One issue of particular significance in terms of poverty and justice is the minimum 
wage. In October 2017 the B.C. government established the independent Fair Wages 
Commission “to advise government on how to raise minimum wages with increases that 
are regular, measured and predictable.”76 The Commission has three tasks—to 
recommend a path to a $15 per hour minimum wage, to recommend ESA changes 
related to alternate wage arrangements, and to advise government on addressing the 
discrepancy between the minimum wage and a living wage. Reports covering the first 
two tasks have been completed and changes corresponding to those tasks have been 
implemented or are in process. As a result, we do not specifically address minimum 
wages in this section. 
As noted above, there is general acceptance that the set of standards in the ESA after 
recent changes strikes an appreciate balance. In 2019, the government enacted a major 
package of ESA regulatory reform measures that affected both policies about 
administration of ESA regulatory provisions and the standards themselves. The 
changes included: 
• Self-Help Kit elimination—Previously workers seeking enforcement of 
employment standards at work were required to a mandated Self-Help Kit to 
initiate a discussion with their employer before any enforcement action could be 
 
76 See https://engage.gov.bc.ca/fairwagescommission/  
Part 4: The Current System 
December 28, 2020                Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  271
taken by the regulator, the Employment Standards Branch (ESB). This step was 
eliminated, an important move toward more balance in regulatory enforcement.  
• ESB requirement to investigate all complaints accepted for resolution—
Previously, investigations were not necessarily carried out (a position rationalised 
as being in the interest of the speedy resolution of cases). This change sets the 
stage for a more proactive investigative approach to potential violations of 
regulations.  
• Requirement for employers to inform workers of their rights—This change could 
help reduce situations where employers misrepresent the nature of the work 
relationship and whether the particular arrangement is subject to employment 
standards.  
• Licensing for temporary help agencies—This is a step in addressing the fissured 
workplace issues we discuss below.  
• Changes to employment standards about the situations that give rise to job-
protected leaves and to improve wage-recovery provisions.  
Our first point of interest is how broadly employment standards apply across the entire 
economy and range of worker arrangements, and how effective the administration and 
enforcement of the standards is in ensuring compliance. That is important because 
whether or not the standards are achieved in practice by employers affects the living 
standards of the affected workers.  
It is also important because it affects fair competition in the marketplace. Meeting 
regulatory standards of any kind imposes a cost on those being regulated. In the case 
of labour standards, that creates an incentive for employers to avoid those costs, 
whether by not complying or by finding ways to avoid the standards applying to them 
such as by avoiding their workers being considered as employees covered by the act. 
The vast majority of employers, nonetheless, do comply with the standards and accept 
the attendant costs. But that means that employers that do not “play by the rules” gain 
an unfair advantage. Effective enforcement and definition of coverage is needed to 
insure competitive fairness.  
Definition of employee 
The ESA standards apply to “employees,” so the first key question is who is an 
employee, especially in terms of specific exemptions in the act. A key element of this is 
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deciding how to distinguish employees from independent contractors, and who bears 
the onus of proving whether a worker is or is not an employee. 
The Guide to the Employment Standards Act and Regulation (Government of British 
Columbia, 2020), states: 
The definition of “employee” as discussed above, as well as the definitions 
of “employer” and “work” are intended to cover as many work relationships 
as possible. The Act is benefits-conferring legislation. It must be construed 
in a broad, generous and purposive manner. Any doubt arising from how 
the definitions fit a particular fact situation is to be resolved in favor of the 
worker. 
Section 4 of the Act prohibits employers and employees from contracting 
out of the Act. For this reason, a worker is not an independent contractor 
simply because they signed a written agreement to that effect. 
Further, in distinguishing whether a worker is construed as an employee entitled to the 
benefits and protections required to be provided by employers under employment 
standards, or a contractor not entitled to such benefits and protections, the guide states: 
The longer a person works for another, the more closely the worker’s 
duties are connected to the purpose of the business and the more the 
person who pays the worker controls the material, directs the activities 
and earns the profit or suffers the loss, the more likely it is that the 
relationship is one of employer/employee.  
The effectiveness of legislation, of course, is determined not only by its language but 
also by the interpretation given to that language by the courts. In that regard, it is 
important that the British Columbia Law Institute (BCLI; 2018) states that “Numerous 
court and tribunal decisions have held that the terms “employer” and “employee” in the 
ESA must be applied broadly, in light of the purposes of the Act, so as to extend to a 
wide range of circumstances.”  
The broad interpretation and the focus on whether a worker is doing work “connected to 
the purpose of the business” is important in light of recent events in other jurisdictions. 
Most notably, California has taken steps to define “gig” workers such as those working 
for ride-sharing companies as employees rather than independent contractors (as some 
ride-sharing companies define them). It has set out an “ABC” test that says that the 
hiring employer must establish three points for a worker to be defined as a contractor: 
that their work is not directly controlled by the hiring employer; that they typically do 
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work of the type they are contracting for (e.g., they have a trade); and “that the worker 
performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.” (Johal et 
al., 2019).77 This test, and especially the last point, seems quite similar to the 
description of the ESA definition of an employee set out earlier. At this point, the 
determination of how the ESA applies to specific cases such as ride-sharing companies 
operating in B.C. is yet to be determined by either the ESB or the courts, and the results 
may vary depending on the specific facts of the case. 
With that said, there exists a potential middle ground that is termed a “dependent 
contractor” in some jurisdictions. The defining feature of a dependent contractor 
arrangement is that the contractor has an exclusive working arrangement with a given 
employer (i.e., the employer is not one of many clients). In a few jurisdictions (Quebec 
and the Yukon) dependent contractors are defined explicitly as employees under the 
relevant act (Johal et al., 2019). Some commentators have called for the creation of a 
separate “dependent contractor” designation that is subject to some but not all 
employment standards (Harris & Krueger, 2015). The BCLI argues that a new category 
is not needed, but that there should be a clearer definition and more effective 
enforcement of who is an employee.  
The B.C. government has not taken any steps toward constructing such a category or 
revising the employee definition. In our view, that implies uncertainty for workers and 
employers. It also means that workers in non-traditional work arrangements may not 
receive the benefits and protections inherent in ESA standards while this uncertainty 
remains unaddressed. This, potentially, is an example of an unfair advantage given to 
employers using these alternative work arrangements. It would be preferable for the 
government to act proactively in defining these workers as clearly being covered by the 
ESA provisions—potentially by clearly defining them as employees.  
Co-ordination of the Definition of an Employee 
Further to the discussion above about the ESA employee definition, workers are 
affected by a variety of other provincial and federal policies including worker’s 
compensation, federal disability benefits, and tax provisions through CRA, that also 
depend on whether the person is deemed to be an. As the expert panel on federal 
labour standards pointed out, the definition of an employee or worker varies across the 
 
77 Note that in the November 2020 U.S. election, California Proposition 22 passed, overturning the ABC test. 
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different policies, raising possibilities of workers falling through policy cracks (Johal et 
al., 2019).  
In the B.C. context, the ESA defines an employee as someone “receiving or entitled to 
wages for work performed for another” or “a person an employer allows, directly or 
indirectly, to perform work normally performed by an employee” along with other 
elements related to being a trainee, and so on, and is subject to the interpretation 
issues discussed above. The Workers Compensation Act instead has a definition based 
on being “under a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether the contract is written 
or oral, express or implied, and whether by way of manual labour or otherwise.” In both 
cases, how dependent and independent contractors are treated is not stated explicitly. 
In contrast, the Worker’s Compensation Act contains a provision giving the Board the 
power to direct that provisions apply to an “independent operator” as if they are an 
employee, but the details of how that power could be used is left to regulation. When 
one then turns to how the CRA defines whether a person is an employee for income tax 
purposes, there is a different set of criteria that includes issues such as the intent of the 
contract, who bears financial risk, and so on. At the very least, all of these differences 
are confusing and could result in workers being unsure about the nature and extent of 
their coverage under work-related policies.  
We believe there should be an examination of all the definitions of employee in B.C. 
statutes, regulations and administrative policies with an aim to developing a single, 
provincial definition. That definition should directly address the question of who is an 
independent (and dependent) contractor, taking— as in the ESA—as broad a stance as 
is reasonable in defining who is an employee, but with clear, objective criteria. We 
believe a coordinated definition could be helpful for workers, but it could also allow for a 
more coordinated approach to supporting workers’ rights and entitlements. 
Exclusions from ESA coverage 
In addition to the definition of employee, coverage of the Act is also determined by a list 
of specific occupations that are exempt from the Act, with most being professionals 
(doctors, lawyers, and accountants, among others). These workers are presumably 
deemed to have their work conditions concerns represented by their professional 
organizations and, for the most part, have contractor-type work arrangements.  
The BCLI (2018) calls existing exclusions under the ESA “bewildering in their number 
and complexity,” stating: 
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no readily discernible principle explains why some occupations and job 
situations are excluded from the Act entirely (e.g., some professions, 
sitters, students employed by their schools, registered investment 
dealers), others from specific parts of the Act (e.g., managers, resident 
caretakers), others from parts of the Act except certain provisions (e.g., 
fishers, farm workers, election workers), others from specific sections 
(e.g., taxi drivers, livestock brand inspectors, loggers). (p. 44) 
There are, as well, partial exclusions in which some occupations are not subject to a 
subset of employment standards such as minimum wage provisions and overtime 
provisions. The BCLI notes that the “partial exclusions of farm workers and fishers are 
notable for their breadth.” The partial exclusions for farm workers are troubling in this 
regard since many are low-wage and racialized. The BCLI recommends a thorough 
review of exclusions under the ESA with a view to establishing clear principles for 
exclusions.  
Onus of proof 
The ESA does not specify who bears the burden of proof in determination of whether 
workers are employees or contractors. Rather, the ESB undertakes investigations 
based on complaints filed by workers. This fits with a general concern that the system in 
place prior to the most recent changes to the ESA was complaint-based rather than 
proactive. Recent changes have shifted that toward a more proactive system, including 
providing more resources for the ESB. One benefit to such a move would be relieving 
workers from the burden of filing complaints in order to be classified as employees 
when they are mis-classified. Further improvements to give the ESB more ability to act 
without a complaint are possible. 
Fissured work 
Fissured work refers to work arrangements where workers are direct employees of one 
employer (such as a temporary help agency) but do their actual work at another 
employer. Johal et al. (2019, p. 77) state that, “fissuring often materializes in 
subcontracting chains and tripartite employment relationships, where the characteristics 
of an employer may be shared between two separate employer entities.”  
Concerns associated with these work arrangements have been highlighted in recent 
times by the working conditions of caregivers at long term care homes. The caregivers 
are often hired out by intermediary employers that move them around across sites, 
paying low wages and potentially not attending to workers’ rights including the right not 
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to work while sick. Evidence from the economics literature shows that when 
employment arrangements are moved out of the employer where the work is being 
done and into intermediate employers, wages and working conditions decline. There is 
some evidence that fissured work arrangements are created in order to shield the 
employer where the work is ultimately done from responsibility for meeting costly labour 
regulations and tax-like levies. That is, these work arrangements have the potential to 
allow avoidance of labour regulations even though the affected workers are officially 
covered under the ESA (Johal et al., 2019). This is particularly a concern since some of 
the intermediary employers seem to have a temporary, “fly by night” nature (Ivanova, 
2019).  
It is important to emphasize that the affected workers are clearly employees and their 
employer is covered by the ESA, so this situation differs from those related to the 
definition of employee and exemptions from coverage. Rather, the concerns are about 
whether these employees have adequate access to the means to address violations of 
their rights under the act. The lack of such access directly affects their working 
conditions, feeling of control over a substantial part of their lives, and, so, their self-
respect. 
Green (2020d) presents evidence on fissuring in B.C. While available measures are, for 
the most part, indirect, they appear to indicate that substantial fissuring occurred in the 
late 1990s and has been proceeding at a slower pace since the mid-2000s. This fits 
with a broad pattern seen also in indicators such as the proportion of workers who are 
own-account self-employed—there were moves in the direction of precarity in the 1990s 
but these trends have either stalled or reversed in recent years. Thus, the problem we 
face is a relatively high level of precarity (including fissured work, where in all likelihood 
jobs do not include various fringe benefits) but not an increasing trend toward more 
precarity. This suggests that problem is not a reflection of an intractable growth in gig 
work due to technological change but, rather, a longer-standing issue that might be 
addressed through policy changes.  
The legislative changes to require licensing of temporary work agencies is a good step 
in the direction of addressing fissured work but we believe more is needed. In Part 6, we 
present a set of recommendations aimed at addressing fissured work. 
Enforcement 
Labour regulation is obviously only as good as the enforcement behind it. The changes 
to the ESA listed earlier—the removal of the self-help kit and the requirement for the 
ESB to investigate cases—are substantial steps toward effective enforcement. It would 
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be good to move further in this direction. In particular, stratified random checking (in 
which random checks of workplaces are carried out at higher rates in sectors with 
histories of non-compliance) would provide more complete regulatory protection for 
workers and ensure a level playing field for employers that are complying with 
regulations.  
Potential improvements in employment standards 
While the regulatory requirements that make up employment standards appear to be 
generally well balanced, there are remaining concerns to be addressed. Precarious 
employment—including part-time, part-year, and other temporary workers—raises the 
question of whether these types of work should be addressed directly in the ESA.  
At the moment, workers in these arrangements get the same protections as other 
workers, and those might be enough. But there are potential reasons for concern. For 
example, there is a pay gap between part-time and full-time workers. Working with 
Labour Force Survey data for 2016 through 2019 and controlling for education, age, 
gender, and industry, part-time workers have hourly wages that are 13% less than full-
time workers. This could be justified if part-time workers are, in effect, less productive 
than full time workers (including taking account of fixed costs of employment). The 
controls in the analysis for education, age and industry make this less likely (though not 
impossible). Instead, lower wages may reflect lower bargaining power and just as the 
province effectively goes to the bargaining table for low-wage workers in general 
through establishing a minimum wage, it might consider taking action in this area as 
well.  
A second issue is control over hours setting. Short notice on hours changes, 
requirements to perform over-time work, and a general lack of input on working hours 
have substantial impacts on worker feelings of dignity and control over their lives as well 
as posing substantial difficulties in terms of acquiring daycare coverage. These issues 
need to be balanced against the need for employers to have the flexibility to meet 
sudden changes in demand. The balance might be found, for example, in requiring 
employers to provide notice of hour changes a reasonable (though not overly long) time 
before the changes (e.g., 24 hours). We believe there is a need for a discussion on 
these and related points (such as on questions of minimum shift lengths and the right of 
workers to refuse over-time requests).  
The ultimate goal is to use regulation to frame the work arrangement in such a way that 
employers choose a “good job” model (with some worker control over their working 
conditions, decent pay, and a stable relationship between workers and employers) over 
Part 4: The Current System 
December 28, 2020                Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  278
a “bad job” model (one with little or no worker control over their working conditions, low 
pay, and high turnover). The BCLI report provided an overall evaluation of the ESA and 
labour regulation in B.C., but we believe further evaluation would be useful, working 
from the viewpoint of this goal.  
Issues falling under the Labour Relations Code 
The Labour Relations Code establishes the relationships between labour and 
management—how workers join unions, how employers and unions interact, and how 
collective bargaining disputes are resolved. It was also amended in important ways in 
2019. In particular, the amendments included provisions to encourage union 
certification, including providing the Labour Relations Board broader discretion to 
impose certification when the employer is found to have unduly interfered with the 
certification process, and shortening the time between an application for union 
certification and an employee vote from 10 to 5 days. The changes also affected 
successorship rights and established the framework for industry advisory councils. 
The following addresses two area of labour regulation that fall under the Labour 
Relations Code: continuity of work and industrial advisory councils. 
Continuity of work 
A key point emphasized by the federal expert panel on employment standards (Johal et 
al., 2019) was maintaining continuity of work. In particular, employees covered by 
federal regulations were not protected from having their job tenure clock re-started 
when contracts were rolled over even if they continued to do same work.  
The amendments to the Labour Relations Code in 2019 strengthened successorship 
rights in a set of specified sectors, including in situations of contract re-tendering. The 
list of covered sectors can be expanded by regulation but, much like the exemptions 
under the ESA, there do not appear to be any clear principles underlying the choice of 
which sectors are to be covered. It seems possible, in fact, that the opposite approach 
could be pursued: one in which all sectors are automatically covered and with stated 
principles to determine which sectors can be excluded.  
Industry advisory councils  
A key element in the report of the Labour Relations Code Review Panel (Fleming et al., 
2018) was a search for changes that would move labour relations in B.C. to a more co-
operative stance. We believe that this is a particularly important policy direction, fitting 
with our overall goal of a more just society founded in principles of reciprocity. The 
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panel’s recommendations for structures to enhance mediation availability and 
effectiveness seem reasonable to us. Most striking was the recommendation to form 
industry advisory councils. We believe that such councils should be set up on an 
ongoing basis with the goals set out in the panel’s report (Fleming et al., 2018): 
(a)  recommend measures to achieve more efficient collective 
bargaining and procedures for settling disputes, 
(b)  identify industry or sector issues, skills and training needs, health 
and safety related issues, competitive and productivity challenges, 
(c)  develop labour market information and marketing initiatives, and 
(d)  make any recommendations necessary to advance the industry or 
sector.  
Establishing councils with both employer and employee representation could be an 
important first step toward an environment in which workers feel that they are partners 
in enhancing the viability of industry. We view this as likely to be of practical usefulness 
in spurring increased productivity but also to be a real step in enhancing workers’ sense 
of dignity and participation in a key part of their lives.  
The 2019 Amendments to the Labour Code (Bill 30) included the provision: 
On application by an employer, a trade union or the board, or on the 
minister's own motion, the minister may direct the board to assist the 
parties to establish an industry council.  
The description of the goals of such councils are exactly the same as in the Panel’s 
recommendations. Now that there is a provision enabling the establishment of such 
councils, we believe the government should take a proactive role in creating and 
providing them with resources to meet the stated goals. 
5.9 Earnings supplements  
Earnings supplements are effectively wage subsidies that increase the financial 
incentive to work, whether to entering or returning to the workforce or increasing hours 
of work and earnings. The federal Canada Workers Benefit (CWB) program is national 
earning supplement that applies in B.C. The program allows individual provinces to 
reconfigure the CWB parameters, though any such changes must be cost neutral. 
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Provinces can also create their own earnings supplement program, which they can 
administer directly or delegate to the CRA for operation alongside the CWB. 
The key policy question is whether B.C. should reconfigure the CWB in B.C. and/or 
create a provincially funded earnings supplement. In answering that question, we must 
assess whether changes can be done in a way that is both effective and affordable, as 
well as meeting our other characteristics for making the province a more just society, 
given the rest of the income and social support system. 
Summary of program features78 
The CWB is a benefit that can be described using the approach set out in Part 3, 
Section 5 (Income Testing and Effective Tax Rates) but it has some unusual features. 
Unlike most benefits, CWB does not provide benefits until an eligible person’s earnings 
are above an annual threshold of $3,000. The benefit increases as income rises above 
the threshold at a rate of 26% (i.e., a BRR of –26% denoting benefit increases rather 
than reductions) until the maximum benefit is reached; then over a range of earnings 
the benefit plateaus without changing as income increases (a BRR of 0%); beyond the 
plateau range the benefit is phased out at a 12% BRR based on family income (not 
earnings alone).  
Figure 4-15: Benefit patterns for Income Assistance and Canada Workers Benefit 
 
Figure 4.15 displays this pattern of benefits and the associated BRRs over the 
respective ranges. In 2020 the maximum annual benefit per beneficiary unit (i.e., family) 
is $1,355 for single childless claimants and $2,335 for couples and single parents; for 
 
78 For details of the structure and operation of the CWB, its Canadian predecessor program (the Working Income Tax 
Benefit), the provincial earnings supplement programs, and the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit, as well as a review 
of the extensive body of empirical studies on these programs’ economic and other impacts, see Petit and Kesselman 
(2020a).  
Part 4: The Current System 
December 28, 2020                Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  281
the latter two groups, the benefit is unaffected by the number of children. The figure also 
depicts the benefit pattern for IA in British Columbia, with an exempt level of initial 
earnings (a 0% BRR) followed by a 100% BRR on incremental earnings. 
A provincial reconfiguration agreement for CWB can alter the benefit pattern provided it 
is cost-neutral for that province and satisfies other federal criteria. To date, B.C. has not 
pursued a reconfiguration agreement for the CWB, although it did have such a variation 
under the predecessor federal program. The cost-neutrality requirement and the 
relatively small amount of CWB funds going to B.C. workers limit the potential of 
reconfiguration to have a meaningful poverty impact. 
A study of claimants under the federal predecessor program to the CWB over 2009–
2012 (Canada, 2016) showed that a majority of all claimants were childless single 
workers, with a high share under age 30 because most couples and many single 
parents had income greater than the breakeven point. Most claimants were in the 
benefit phase-out income range of income, with a positive BRR, which reduces the 
incentive to work due to the program. Only 10% of claimants were also receiving 
provincial social assistance benefits. It is expected that similar results would be found 
for the current CWB program. 
Three provinces— Alberta, Quebec, and Saskatchewan—have instituted their 
provincially funded own earnings supplement programs running parallel to the CWB. 
The program designs vary considerably: childless single persons are ineligible in two 
provinces; breakeven points for two provinces are equivalent to full-time minimum wage 
employment, well above the CWB break-even level; for families the maximum benefits 
vary with number of children; and the Alberta and Quebec programs are refundable tax 
credits while Saskatchewan utilizes mandatory quarterly income reporting that achieves 
faster response to earnings changes.  
Application process 
The CWB is administered by the CRA as a refundable tax credit with automatic eligibility 
assessment done for all tax filers so that they do not even need to know about the 
provision. Like other refundable tax credits, the CWB cannot reach those who do not file 
a tax return, which is most common among the most vulnerable low-income persons. 
Many of those eligible for CWB are not required to file a tax return because they owe no 
tax, and some of those don’t bother filing even though it is to their advantage. Others 
don’t file even though they have an obligation to do so for a variety of reasons, including 
outstanding tax disputes, lack of trust and lack of personal capacity. The Alberta and 
Quebec programs also require tax filing as refundable tax credits; the Saskatchewan 
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program requires application by prospective beneficiaries as well as quarterly reporting 
of incomes. 
Applying the analytical framework 
Adequacy 
Unlike most cash transfers, earnings supplements do not provide an income floor 
unconditional on working and earning. Rather they augment low-income market 
earnings and thereby partially close their shortfall from the poverty threshold while 
increasing incentives to work, in contrast to the work disincentives associated with IA 
and income-tested basic income schemes. The CWB program’s small maximum 
benefits and its even lower benefit for childless single persons, however, limit its ability 
to address poverty among the group with the highest incidence of poverty. Similarly, 
existing provincial programs are biased against childless single persons, entirely 
excluded in two of the three provinces. Given the much larger child benefits provided in 
federal and provincial programs, this deficiency is hard to justify in terms of adequacy 
and suggests differentially favourable benefit levels for childless single persons in any 
future earnings supplement program reforms or enhancements. 
Accessibility 
As the only earnings supplement program operating in B.C., the CWB is highly 
accessible to all eligible persons who file a tax return. CRA administration of all the B.C. 
tax credits ensures that all filers with earnings and incomes falling in the covered ranges 
will be granted the CWB. Like all income transfer benefits delivered via the income tax, 
the CWB fails to reach persons who do not file a tax return, which is often the most 
vulnerable persons. The accessibility of a provincial program would depend on its 
design details. 
Responsiveness to individual changes in circumstance 
Like any cash-transfer program implemented as a refundable tax credit, the CWB 
suffers long lags in its benefits responding to changes in individual earnings. Since it is 
not intended to cushion reductions in earnings, lack of responsiveness is not as crucial 
as it is for IA or basic income cash transfers. However, the slow response and lack of 
clarity to a typical beneficiary about how varying work and earnings affect their benefits 
likely compromise the positive work incentives earnings supplements are intended to 
provide. Increased responsiveness would require provincial administration separate 
from the tax system, as Saskatchewan has done.  
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Personal efficacy and opportunity 
Earnings supplements promote opportunity for individuals to advance by increasing 
their earnings and self-sufficiency as well as encouraging work experience and labour-
force attachment. That can increase skill and earnings potential and augment self- and 
social respect, which are key characteristics in our social justice framework. These 
effects are the opposite of the work disincentives that can accompany income-tested 
benefits. Evidence from the much larger US earnings supplement suggest that a 
sufficiently generous program can significantly increase labour force participation and 
reduce poverty. 
Public trust 
As noted above, earnings supplement programs enjoy a high degree of public support 
across the political spectrum. The CWB’s predecessor program was first proposed by a 
Conservative government, but the actual legislation was passed by the succeeding 
Liberal government. Public trust is enhanced by the linkage of benefits to work effort 
and earnings, thus providing a visible association between benefit payments and 
recipients’ efforts to be self-sufficient and their contributions to the economy. Facilitating 
the move of beneficiaries from Temporary Assistance back to the workforce also 
increases public support for the earnings supplement and other employment-type 
programs. The counterpart earnings supplement program in the United States has been 
in existence for 50 years and enjoyed bipartisan support leading to periodic 
enhancements (at times paralleling cutbacks to unconditional cash-transfer programs). 
The original U.S. earnings supplement program was implemented as a counter to the 
Nixon administration’s proposed Family Assistance Plan, a negative income tax 
scheme. Experience with programs of the earnings supplement format in Canada also 
reveals broad cross-party support (Gillezeau & Speer, 2016). 
Conclusion 
Earnings supplements offer an attractive means for making cash transfers to low-
income earners. However, the existing CWB provides only limited assistance in 
reducing the poverty of B.C. workers, particularly the demographic of single childless 
adults who bear the highest rates of poverty. The option for the province to reconfigure 
the CWB’s benefit structure offers little potential for mitigating overall poverty, since it 
would simply shift a fixed total amount of benefits for B.C. workers between gainers and 
losers. Nevertheless, the CWB could be an attractive platform for B.C. to build on to 
expand earnings supplement benefits using provincial funds. It offers automatic 
enrolment of eligible tax filers by the CRA with associated high take-up and low 
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administration and compliance costs, since most low-income earners are likely to be tax 
filers. Alberta’s earnings supplement program already uses that approach, but its 
benefits are restricted to families with children, whereas the main income deficiency in 
B.C. is childless singles. 
Simulations of numerous alternative ways to alter and/or augment the CWB were 
undertaken to explore the potential for B.C. (Petit & Kesselman, 2020b). First a cost-
free reconfiguration of the CWB that emphasized the group with most acute poverty, 
single childless adults, was explored. The earnings threshold was doubled from $3,000 
to $6,000, the latter figure aligning with the annual rate for the $500 monthly earnings 
exemption for TA beneficiaries beginning in 2021. In one variant the CWB maximum 
benefit for single adults was increased closer to that of the other family types. The 
numbers below the poverty threshold declined by 2% for single childless adults but 
increased by 6% for family types with children. This illustrates the limitations of CWB 
reconfiguration with a fixed cost. 
The next simulation exercise considered the addition of a B.C. “participation bonus” to 
the CWB for childless singles and couples. The participation bonus was varied between 
25% and 100% of the default CWB amounts, with associated costs for the province 
ranging between $84 million and $450 million. The total benefit phase-in rates were 
increased by the rate of the participation bonus, but the phase-out rates were held 
constant at the CWB’s 12% rate; thus, the total federal plus B.C. benefit break-even 
incomes were increased beyond poverty thresholds. Reductions in the number of single 
childless adults in poverty ranged from about 1% for the cheapest variant to nearly 5% 
for the costliest. 
The final exercise examined a CWB reconfiguration plus a provincial “top-up” to the 
CWB focused on childless singles and couples with earnings not too far below poverty 
thresholds. Maximum benefits targeted childless workers with annual earnings ranging 
between $16,000 and $20,000. The best combination in terms of poverty reduction 
relative to the province’s top-up cost emerged as the one with an $18,000 earnings 
target. With a B.C. cost of about $400 million, this combination reduced the estimated 
number of low-income single adults by about 18,000 or 9 percent, and it brought an 
even larger percentage reduction in the smaller cohort of low-income childless couples. 
In addition, the earnings supplement lowered the depth of poverty for many more 
recipients whose incomes were lifted but not above the poverty threshold. 
We conclude from these preliminary exercises that the B.C. government should explore 
the development of a provincial earnings supplement program. Other methods of 
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targeting this group, low-earning workers not receiving IA benefits, are very limited 
except for broad-brush extremely costly unconditional cash-transfer programs. Earnings 
supplementation also has the advantages of public support, reciprocity, self-respect, 
and conformity with social norms regarding work and self-sufficiency for those who are 
able. The variant of a provincial top-up to the CWB, structured as a refundable tax credit 
and administered by the CRA, appears to be the most promising approach for B.C. to 
pursue.  
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6. Conclusion 
In Part 4, we have shown that the B.C. income and social support “system” has 
considerable reach but is far from a cohesive system. It is a fairly comprehensive set of 
supports made up of a combination of cash transfers and basic services that together 
address most of the concerns facing people with limited resources, although there are 
adequacy and accessibility concerns. As a result, we are able to conclude that the 
current system is a strong foundation on which to build an increasingly effective system. 
It would be a serious mistake to consider eliminating the current system or major 
elements of it to take a fundamentally different approach in the immediate future. 
However, by comparing the system and its programs at every level to our analytical 
framework, we have found areas that could improve the system’s contribution to making 
B.C. a more just society. One look at the various sunburst diagrams presented earlier 
confirms the complexity of the system. With so many programs, so many policy 
objectives, so many delivery organizations, and so many approaches to providing cash 
transfers and basic services, all of which evolved over time in response to different 
pressures, it is not surprising that this group of programs lacks many of the properties 
that we expect of a “system.” 
One area that we have concluded could significantly improve the system would be to 
add features that create a more systemic approach. We do not advocate creating one 
huge program or even one access portal as a way to make this set of programs more 
system-like, because that could easily reduce access and effectively eliminate needed 
targeted programs, especially basic services. Rather, the system properties that we 
believe need to be improved relate to increasing consistency across programs in terms 
of eligibility conditions and income-testing or benefit calculation. 
The income tax system provides widely used benefit delivery infrastructure, not just for 
tax credits but also for many other cash-transfer and basic service programs. The 
effectiveness of the tax system as a benefit platform could be significantly improved by 
reducing barriers to access for the vulnerable and increasing the responsiveness of the 
tax system to changes in income. Both of these would entail significant federal reforms 
that would be, to say the least, challenging to design and time consuming to implement. 
Nonetheless, we believe it is worthwhile for the province to add its voice to calls for tax 
system reforms. 
At the system level, we have also found some gaps that need to be filled, in terms of 
how well the system targets specific groups whose needs are currently underserved. A 
theme related to those gaps is that both monetary resources and basic services are 
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essential to address needs of the groups. That includes youth transitioning to adulthood, 
especially former youth in care, women fleeing violence, those with disabilities, single 
adults, and others. 
At the program level, we have found a mix of results. Some program areas, especially 
basic service programs such as PharmaCare and child care programs, provide services 
that are quite consistent with our framework but need to be improved by system-level, 
cross-cutting reforms. Other programs require more significant reform to address 
adequacy and accessibility issues in particular, so that they benefit more of the people 
who need the support in a simpler, more respectful way, with lower barriers to access. 
As we will see in Parts 5 and 6, that means applying basic income principles. 
In particular, Income Assistance provides an opportunity for significant improvement in 
terms of both its Temporary Assistance and Disability Assistance components by 
continuing on the path established by recent reforms, implemented since 2017. Income 
Assistance has the key advantage of being quickly responsive to changes in individual 
circumstances, but it also has shortcomings. Not only do concerns about adequacy and 
accessibility need to be further addressed, but the negative economic implications of the 
high barriers to exiting the program, the welfare wall, need to be reduced by building on 
the eligibility improvements made to date. We believe that requires not only changes to 
the cash-transfer aspect of the program but also the addition of some basic services 
that would better support people in transition to achieve true autonomy. The provision of 
important basic services such as extended health benefits needs to be extended across 
the low-income population, independent of their IA status. It is also important to target 
some specific groups, such as former children in care and youth who have faced 
childhood poverty as they transition to adulthood, building on recent improvements 
there as well. 
We therefore conclude that a variety of well-designed basic services together with 
improved cash-transfer programs are needed to create a system that is effective in 
achieving our stated goal of making B.C. a more just society. We also believe that 
improving the effectiveness of labour regulation is another important element that 
should be considered this policy arena. 
This analysis of the existing system provides us with an important foundation for the rest 
of the report. It contributes to our analysis of basic income, which is often discussed in 
comparison with Income Assistance. Our analysis would be less than complete if it were 
not set within the context of the current system and the full range of basic services and 
cash transfers it provides. It also is essential background for the development of 
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recommendations about improving the system. These are the topics addressed by the 
final two parts of our report. 
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1. Introduction 
With the benefit of the discussion and analysis presented in the first four parts of this 
report, we are now in a position to consider in detail the question at the heart of our 
review: whether B.C. should consider implementing a basic income at this time. That is 
a more complex question than it may at first appear to be, because a basic income itself 
is not as straightforward as many have suggested. In addition, we are not starting with a 
blank page, but rather with an already extensive set of cash-transfer and basic service 
programs, as detailed in Part 4. It is not sufficient to simply explore how a basic income 
could be designed and implemented, and what its implications would be. In order to 
complete the tasks we have been assigned, we must ask these questions in the context 
of the current situation, and we must compare the implications of a basic income with 
alternative approaches. 
1.1 Defining basic income 
We start Part 5 by introducing the basic income concept. While there is much 
discussion about a basic income, it is not always clear exactly what is being referred to, 
and in fact the term often seems to have different meanings for different users.  
The term “basic income” has become handy shorthand for an idea that has been around 
for over 200 years: society might be better off if everyone could count on receiving at 
least a minimum amount of cash on a regular basis. A lot of terms have been 
associated with this idea, such as minimum annual income, guaranteed income, state 
bonus, citizen’s income, negative income tax, basic income guarantee, guaranteed 
basic income, refundable tax credit, universal basic income, and many others. For 
some, “basic income” denotes a very specific type of universal, unconditional program 
design, but in popular usage it is most often an umbrella term for a wider range of 
proposed cash-transfer programs.  
In this report, we use “basic income” in this broad sense. We define it as follows: “Basic 
income” means a policy that guarantees all members of a society a minimum amount of 
income in a period.  
A basic income is attractive because of its apparent simplicity of concept. As we will 
show, though, underneath this simple idea lies a tangled web of principle, policy, and 
practice implications that is difficult to unravel. Having defined a basic income in very 
general terms, we will make the idea a little more concrete by outlining a few 
fundamental types of basic income, before getting into the details. 
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1.2 Types of basic income 
If you have only heard of one type of basic income, it is probably a universal basic 
income (UBI). The key feature of the UBI is that it is universal: in principle, everyone 
gets the cash transfer in every period. We discuss some of the practical exceptions to 
universality that are sometimes included in UBI proposals to address practical issues 
but, those aside, this is the simplest type of UBI. A UBI imposes no conditions and no 
eligibility requirements except being a resident, and, as a result, everyone is guaranteed 
a minimum amount of income. 
UBI is an example of what we refer to in the report as a “generally applicable basic 
income.” That is a basic income covering the entire population. This is the type of basic 
income that most people mean when they call for a basic income to reduce poverty or to 
respond to the pandemic. 
The alternative to a generally available basic income is a “targeted basic income.” By 
that we mean a basic income that is conditional on the recipient being a member of a 
defined group. In fact, targeted basic income programs are already in place in Canada 
and B.C., such as Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement, and federal and 
provincial refundable tax credits.  
Two other basic income design types are also commonly discussed, both of which are 
basic incomes that are conditional on income: the refundable tax credit (RTC) and the 
negative income tax (NIT). These two approaches have some similar elements and 
some differences. 
Both can be used for either generally applicable or targeted basic incomes. Both 
provide benefit payments in amounts that depend on the recipient’s income. In general 
terms, both use the type of approach outlined in Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing and 
Effective Tax Rate Implications). Income testing targets those most in need for the cash 
transfers, reducing the cost of the program as compared to a UBI or a targeted basic 
income that is not income-tested; many basic income proposals are therefore income-
tested. 
The difference between the RTC and the NIT lies in their responsiveness to changes in 
recipients’ income. RTCs, as their name suggests, directly use the income tax system to 
deliver the benefits and use the data collected by that system to apply income testing to 
determine the payment amount. NITs, despite their name, are less reliant on the 
existing income tax system. Rather, NITs are characterized by collecting income data 
on an ongoing basis, in real time or monthly or for some other convenient period, and 
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basing the payment amount on this up-to-date reporting, thus responding rapidly to 
changes in income. The implications associated with these alternative designs, as well 
as all of the other design parameters that need to be taken into account, are discussed 
later. However, even this brief introduction suggests some of the complications inherent 
in practical basic income designs that may make them less simple than they seem at 
first glance. 
1.3 Examining basic income and basic income claims 
Many of those advocating a basic income believe that it is a policy panacea that can 
help address many of the issues facing society. Those claims include: 
• reducing stress for many people, which contributes to several of the subsequent 
claims 
• improving adult health outcomes 
• improving health and educational outcomes for children  
• providing a stable basis for investing in human capital and finding a better job  
• raising low-end wages (and thereby reducing wage inequality) by allowing 
workers to reject bad jobs  
• providing a stable basis for pursuing an entrepreneurial idea and thus 
encouraging innovation 
• building community by allowing people to participate in unpaid work beneficial to 
society, such as caregiving and volunteering 
• eliminating or at least reducing poverty and the intergenerational cycle of poverty 
• transforming society and the economy in response to disruptions such as artificial 
intelligence, climate change, and, now, pandemics 
The challenge for us is to delve deeply into the principles and practicalities of designing 
and implementing basic incomes, bringing evidence to bear in assessing claims about 
what effects a basic income would have, and comparing that with alternative 
approaches to address the same issues. To do so, we: 
• examine the philosophy and principles underlying basic income proposals in the 
context of the panel’s analytical framework, described in Part 2  
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• build on that review of the conceptual underpinning of basic income, to consider 
the nuts and bolts of designing a basic income and all the choices that would 
entail  
• present evidence, existing and newly developed as part of the panel’s research 
program, which casts light on the claims made about what basic income can and 
will do  
• estimate the costs, distribution of benefits, and impacts on poverty in B.C. of 
various basic income designs through a series of simulations of various basic 
income designs  
• address the question of how a basic income implemented in B.C. could be 
funded, including how the tax system would interact with a basic income and the 
implied impacts on incentives of both beneficiaries and taxpayers (Note: A key 
point in the discussion of feasibility is whether enough savings can be achieved 
from eliminating other programs in the current B.C. policy universe and, if not, 
how the fiscal gap could be filled.) 
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2. Basic income philosophy and principles 
2.1 Basic income philosophy 
As we define it, basic income involves cash transfers to some or all people. But how can 
we distinguish between basic income cash-transfer programs and other programs that 
also distribute money to individuals? As we demonstrated in Part 4, the B.C. income 
and social support system comprises a set of both federal and provincial programs, and 
both cash-transfer and basic service programs. The distinction between a cash transfer 
and a basic service is clear, with the latter focused on directly providing services (e.g., 
medicare—the Medical Services Plan in B.C.) or providing in-kind benefits, such as 
reimbursement of specific costs. Within the cash-transfer domain, the question remains 
as to how to draw the line between basic income as a category and other cash 
transfers, particularly Income Assistance, the major cash-transfer element in the current 
system. 
We suggest that whether a program is truly a basic income depends on its purpose. 
There is an extensive literature around basic income, including many proposed basic 
income designs and evaluations of basic income pilots. Our reading of the literature is 
that to be a basic income, a program must not only be intended to make society better 
off, in some sense, by creating a minimum guaranteed income through an ongoing cash 
transfer; it also must align with certain objectives, values, and principles, which we 
collectively refer to as the basic income philosophy.  
The foundational principles of the basic income concept have been inferred by Tedds et 
al. (2020) based on an in-depth review of program designs and proposals. We believe 
their four identified principles are the defining characteristics of a basic income: 
• simplicity 
• respect 
• economic security 
• social inclusion 
Two aspects of these four principles are important to us.  
The first is to understand these principles in the basic income context, because it is 
possible to design a cash-transfer program that might look like a basic income at one 
level but that includes design choices that violate one or more of the principles. (Later 
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we examine a number of design choices inherent in fully specifying a basic income 
proposal and consider how some choices can take the proposal out from under the 
basic income umbrella.)  
The second aspect is how these principles align with our analytical framework, which 
allows us to compare basic income models with other programs. All four principles 
contribute to autonomy, a key part of our framework. Autonomy requires people to have 
adequate resources and the freedom of choice to make decisions about how to use 
those resources. But our framework goes well beyond autonomy. 
Simplicity 
Simplicity refers primarily to ease of access and usability by beneficiaries of the 
program, considerations that are important both as a basic income principle and as a 
characteristic of our framework. Simplicity is perhaps what makes the basic income 
concept most attractive, standing in stark contrast to the complexity that is so evident in 
the current system. Simplicity is more than just an observed characteristic of basic 
incomes. The literature emphasizes simplicity as a required feature of the basic income 
concept. It is not enough to call a proposed program a basic income and claim that it is 
therefore simple. If the features of the program introduce a lot of complexity, then it 
should not be considered a basic income. Exactly where to draw that line, though, is a 
difficult question. 
Simplicity is partly associated with eligibility. The more onerous and intrusive eligibility 
requirements are, the more difficult it is for an applicant to know if they are eligible, and 
the more information they need to provide to show that they meet the requirements. 
Alternatively, the fewer conditions associated with a program, the simpler it is to 
determine eligibility, by both applicants and administrators. Unconditional programs or 
programs that use already available information to assess eligibility can often be 
automatic, requiring no action from the recipient and thus achieving the ultimate level of 
eligibility simplicity. Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance) describes the Income 
Assistance program’s eligibility criteria, which are relatively complex. Traditional social 
assistance programs like Income Assistance are often compared with universal basic 
income programs under which eligibility criteria are minimal (e.g., residency requirement 
only), although not all basic incomes are that simple, as we will show. 
Must a basic income be universal to meet the test of simplicity? No. A cash-transfer 
program that focuses on a specific target group and is therefore conditional on meeting 
an eligibility test can also be consistent with the basic income principle of simplicity. 
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However, eligibility criteria can easily introduce significant complexity, so consistency 
with the principle depends on the design details.  
Simplicity also means being easily understood, and another aspect of how a program 
works that can introduce complexity is the benefit structure. As we described in Part 3, 
income testing can be designed for different purposes. Again, UBIs have simple benefit 
structures: usually the same cash transfer is paid to all eligible recipients. However, 
many basic income proposals include income testing and, depending on how it is 
applied and administered, that can be another source of complexity. 
Respect 
In this context, respect is the opposite of stigma. The basic income philosophy places a 
high value on avoiding program features that treat beneficiaries with a lack of respect 
and that are demeaning to beneficiaries or induce feelings of shame for finding 
themselves in need. Systematic lack of respect is itself a barrier to access and is 
detrimental to those in need, whether they access the program or not. Like simplicity, 
respect is also both a basic income principle and an important characteristic in our 
framework. 
Similar to simplicity, eligibility considerations are an important part of determining 
whether a proposal is consistent with the principle of respect. Strict eligibility 
requirements, several steps in the eligibility adjudication process, subjective criteria that 
are applied by program administrators, and ongoing requirements that can result in 
penalties or loss of benefits can all contribute to stigma. On the other hand, programs 
such as benefits delivered through the tax system avoid stigma by automatically 
providing benefits based on information routinely collected for other purposes. In part, 
stigma can arise from having to declare that one is in need in order to qualify. Part 4 
shows that some current programs, such as Income Assistance (IA), do poorly in 
relation to respect, while other programs do better. The same would apply to basic 
income proposals, depending on specific design and operational details. 
Economic security 
As a basic income principle, economic security refers to providing people with the sense 
that, no matter what, they will be able to get by, enhancing their freedom of choice. The 
idea is that with economic security, people have the autonomy to make their own 
decisions, a luxury not afforded to those with inadequate resources. Economic security 
is measured, in part, by the rate and depth of poverty. This principle is closely related to 
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the question of how adequate benefits are (our adequacy characteristic) within our 
framework.  
Economic security includes the idea of financial stability and continuity, not only 
responding to current circumstances but doing so in a way that contributes to future and 
ongoing financial security and stability. While that suggests ongoing support, it also 
suggests encouragement of self-sufficiency through paid work, although that is more 
commonly a feature of traditional income and social support programs than of basic 
income proposals. Economic security also includes protection from adverse events. A 
minimum income guarantee provides a level of protection against some such events, 
like job loss. But other circumstances, for example the need for expensive medical 
equipment, may be more amenable to basic service approaches. 
As discussed in Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance), the IA program as currently 
designed has room for improvement in terms of adequacy and other characteristics 
associated with the basic income principle of economic security. However, not all 
programs that fall under the basic income umbrella necessarily rate highly in terms of 
economic security either. It all depends on the design details of a specific program and, 
to some extent, the nature of the system within which the basic income would operate. 
For example, a basic income provided as a refundable tax credit has slow 
responsiveness to sudden income losses and thus may fall short on its adequacy to 
meet immediate needs. 
Social inclusion 
Social inclusion means improving people’s ability to participate in society. Lacking the 
resources to cover basic needs is a fundamental barrier to social inclusion, as are 
limited freedom of choice, dignity, and self-respect. As with the other three principles, 
social inclusion is closely aligned with our goal of creating a more just society. Paid 
work is perhaps the most important social inclusion activity. Participating by working is 
highly valued by society and beneficial to workers in terms of both economic security 
and social inclusion.  
In addition, there are unpaid activities that benefit society, such as emotional labour, 
child care, elder care, domestic work, and volunteering, as well as engaging in 
education, training, and social entrepreneurship. Basic income is often promoted as a 
way to provide people with the resources to enable them to undertake these other 
socially inclusive activities, rather than focusing solely on paid work.  
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While some people may use basic income payments to support non-work social 
inclusion, it is not clear how effective a basic income would be unless it included 
features that specifically address this principle. Some proposals for a basic income, 
called a “participation income,” have explicit requirements for a beneficiary to be 
engaged in any of a specified set of activities. Similar considerations apply to alternative 
cash-transfer and basic service programs that are or could be included in the income 
and social support system. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, all four of the basic income principles align with aspects of autonomy, 
although our autonomy construct is less about unconstrained personal freedom than the 
basic income principles seem to be to many advocates. A guaranteed minimum income 
directly addresses the issue of raising people above destitution to enable them to act 
with autonomy. How effective a specific basic income design is in providing adequate 
resources depends on the design details. In principle, however, basic income is a tool 
that directly addresses most aspects of poverty reduction: the rate and depth of poverty 
and reducing income disparity among groups. The basic income principles of simplicity 
and respect are both features of accessible support that has low barriers to take-up by 
those in need. A complex system, in contrast, means those in need face barriers 
associated with difficulty navigating the system as well as stigmatizing elements. These 
factors then lead to discouraging people from gaining access. Economic security also 
supports autonomy, enabling people to make choices about the future with the 
protection afforded by economic security. Social inclusion is then a consequence of that 
autonomy, in the sense that providing people with more autonomy through a basic 
income will induce some to choose prosocial activities. 
But these principles are not necessarily satisfied by simply providing a minimum income 
guarantee. The real-world requirement to make trade-offs in designing public policy 
discussed in the following section can quickly lead to design choices where simplicity, 
respect, and economic stability must be sacrificed to, for example, budget constraints or 
unacceptable economic implications. That is why a basic income proposal’s consistency 
with these four principles ultimately depends on the design details. 
2.2 Comparing basic income principles with the analytical framework 
Having discussed the alignment of the basic income principles with some of the 
characteristics in our framework, we now turn to examining the characteristics of that 
are not fundamental basic income principles. Extending the analysis beyond the basic 
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income principles and their relationship to autonomy, Table 5-1 shows the extent to 
which basic income principles align with our analytical framework. 
Table 5-1: Analytical framework characteristics and corresponding basic income 
principles 
Analytical framework Basic income 
principles 
Autonomy  
Adequate resources are provided, with a focus on poverty 
reduction, including: 
• reducing the poverty rate 
• reducing the depth of poverty 
• preventing poverty  
• breaking the poverty cycle 
• reducing disparities across defined groups 
Economic security 
Accessible programs: 
• are simple and understandable 




• provide stable, reliable support 
• offer future opportunity 
Economic security 





Opportunity-creating programs enable people to exercise 
autonomy and competence 
 
Economic security 
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Analytical framework Basic income 
principles 
Social connection  
Socially inclusive programs act to build community  
 
Social inclusion 
Transition support  
Response to transitions through: 
• creating resiliency to personal and societal crises  
• broad equality of self- and social respect 
Economic security 
Public trust  
Policy stability requires consideration of: 
• fiscal implications 
• efficient administration 
• economic incentives and impacts 
 
Reciprocity requires beneficiaries to take responsibility for playing 
the fullest and most active role in society and the economy that 




The first two characteristics that are not fully addressed by basic income principles are 
responsiveness to significant changes in personal circumstances and support for 
transitions. Income security is provided by a basic income paying an ongoing income 
guarantee, which is something people can incorporate into their planning. But autonomy 
requires more than just having a stable ongoing level of income; it requires security in 
the face of unexpected and uncontrollable shocks and life transitions that even stable 
income cannot always accommodate.  
Responsiveness and transition support requires flexible programs that are responsive to 
changes in a person’s circumstances, differences in need among different groups of 
people, and society-wide changes, such as financial crises, climate change, 
earthquakes, and pandemics. Basic incomes can be designed to respond to different 
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circumstances, but their fundamental character and attractiveness as policy tools come 
from their simplicity—providing everyone with the same guaranteed minimum level of 
income. Responsiveness and transition support, simplicity, and accessibility are 
considerations that will often be in conflict, requiring a balance to be struck. Building in 
more responsiveness is likely to increase complexity and may reduce accessibility. On 
the other hand, in the context of the total income and social support system, basic 
service programs together with a basic income could address the need for 
responsiveness, although that may detract from the strict freedom-of-choice ideal of 
some basic income advocates. 
Our analytical framework includes another area that is not central to basic income 
principles and is sometimes overlooked by basic income advocates: public trust, made 
up of policy stability and reciprocity characteristics. The goal of moving toward a more 
just society requires long-term trust and acceptance of the system meant to achieve it 
by both those who are or may be beneficiaries and those whose primary role will be to 
help fund the system. Trust and acceptance turn on the fiscal and economic 
consequences of the policy: how much will it cost taxpayers, how will it be funded, and 
how it will affect behaviours and the economy. Basic income principles have little to say 
about any of these considerations, leaving it up to analysis of specific proposals to 
ensure that they are addressed. But addressing these characteristics inevitably requires 
trade-offs to be made.  
Perhaps the central behavioural question related to basic income is how it would affect 
labour supply, the incentive to engage in paid work, and other aspects of work hours 
and job choices. One of the benefits ascribed to basic income is that it supports many 
valuable activities, such as caregiving and volunteering, in addition to paid work. People 
could also choose not to work or otherwise contribute to society. How would that affect 
the paid labour supply and the level and growth of economic activity? On the other 
hand, would basic income make it possible for more people to join the labour force and 
seek work, thereby increasing the labour force? These questions are addressed in 
Section 3.3 (Types of Basic Income) in terms of the incentive effects inherent in different 
basic income designs, how those interact with the tax system, and what the evidence 
tells us about behavioural implications.  
The fiscal impact of the basic income is important because there is a limit to how much 
taxpayers will be willing to pay before they lose trust in the system, leading again to 
trade-offs. For example, the quintessential basic income design that most closely aligns 
with the basic income principles is the UBI, but it is also the most costly, as will be seen 
when simulations are discussed, and the fiscal implications of a UBI that has any 
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material effect on poverty would create public trust issues. The cost can be reduced 
through income testing and trading off simplicity, accessibility, and likely responsiveness 
for affordability and public trust.  
Another source of trade-off arises because the higher the guarantee level provided by 
the basic income, the greater the impact on poverty—but the greater the cost as well. 
Fiscal impacts are also important because they must eventually be funded and, 
depending on what the funding sources are, that can cause additional economic and 
behavioural impacts due to, for example, raising taxes or cutting program spending.  
Another issue created by the degree of income testing for a basic income (or any 
income-transfer program) is a different type of disincentive effect. Since people below 
the break-even level are being lifted and those above the level are not, there may be a 
perception of unfairness by those who receive a smaller or no benefit. Among those 
working but with earnings below the break-even level and receiving net benefits, the 
compression of net incomes and the reduced returns for working more or harder, on 
account of the income testing, may also pose issues of acceptability. Beyond the purely 
economic aspects of these effects, this effect is associated with the public trust 
characteristic in our analytical framework. 
Reciprocity refers to mutual respect between those who are beneficiaries and those 
who are mainly paying to fund the supports. A key feature of reciprocity is those who 
are mainly funders feeling that society is benefiting from the activities of recipients, by 
their playing an active role in society, commensurate with the cost. Income support 
programs traditionally address that by requiring that those who are able engage in paid 
work. Basic income is touted as way of eliminating harsh work requirements and 
encouraging other valuable forms of activity, but most basic income formulations neither 
specifically address labour market conditions nor specifically promote a choice to 
participate in valuable but unpaid activities over a choice to work less or not at all. 
That is not to suggest that those advocating basic incomes ignore important 
considerations like responsiveness, incentives, and fiscal cost; it is really a question of 
the weights placed on different principles. One way of summarizing the discussion in the 
broader context of our justice-based analytical framework is that the basic income 
principles are most closely aligned with freedom of choice and autonomy over 
government intervention. That is, they are focused on solving problems through 
unconditional cash transfers rather than targeted programs.  
Our analysis suggests that by downplaying the collective interest, important 
considerations related to public trust—cost, economic implications, and reciprocity—are 
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also being downplayed. This imbalance can be addressed in various ways, such as 
through basic income design choices that reduce its cost or enhance its 
responsiveness, or by layering a basic income onto a system that provides basic 
services and in-kind benefits as well.  
All of these possibilities have been suggested by various basic income advocates, who 
have proposed a wide range of approaches, from a fundamentally libertarian concept of 
a basic income as the sole income and social support program to many proposals that 
implicitly or explicitly recognize the necessity of some type of hybrid system. For 
example, leading basic income proponents Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017) state 
the following: 
[A] basic income is not meant to replace all services provided or funded by 
the state. A combination of mild paternalism, awareness of positive and 
negative externalities, and concern for the preconditions of competent 
citizenship can easily override the argument for cash in the case of some 
specific goods such as basic health insurance and education at the 
preschool, primary, and secondary levels. Such provisions in kind can be 
defended in terms of the long-term interests of the individuals concerned, 
and also in terms of societys’ [sic] interests in maintaining the healthy and 
well-educated workforce and citizenry that are crucial to well-functioning 
economies and democracies. … For all these reasons, making a strong 
case for a basic income paid in cash is consistent with supporting public 
provision of various services in kind.  
Our point is that an emphasis on basic income principles fundamentally implies a 
relatively high weighting on individual over collective interests. In contrast, our social 
justice perspective tilts the balance of policies more toward basic services and in-kind 
benefits. As exposited in a research paper commissioned for the panel (Kesselman & 
Mendelson, 2020), this approach derives from widely-held values and concerns, 
including human rights, social externalities, merit goods, and ensuring everyone the 
requisites for a dignified life. 
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3. Basic income design 
In this section we address in detail the general point that we have made several times 
previously: basic income is not one thing but a set of proposed programs sharing a 
common characteristic (i.e., providing cash transfers to ensure a minimum income), and 
the implications of a program crucially depend on the specific design chosen.  
3.1 Design questions and elements 
The complexity of potential basic income design choices and their implications is 
demonstrated in Considerations for a Basic Income as a COVID-19 Response (Green, 
Kesselman & Tedds, 2020), a briefing published by the panel members in their capacity 
as independent academic researchers. A research paper commissioned by the panel 
(Tedds et al., 2020) sets out 13 key elements that provide a structure for assessing 
basic income design. Table 5-2 sets out these 13 elements and the corresponding 
panel questions from the briefing, indicating where these questions and design 
elements are discussed in this part of the report, as the basis for the analysis presented 
in this section. The discussion is about how the design details can affect consistency 
with basic income principles and reflect the trade-offs among competing characteristics 
within our analytical framework. 
Table 5-2: Design elements and panel questions 
Report section/subsection Design elements Panel’s questions 
2.  Basic income 
philosophy and 
principles 
  What overarching principles define a 
basic income policy? 
3.2 Objectives and claims Objective What is the specific objective? 
• poverty reduction 
• reforming society in response to 
disruptions, such as artificial 
intelligence changing the nature 
of work 
• distributing economic rents, or  
• some other objective? 
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Report section/subsection Design elements Panel’s questions 
3.3 Types of basic income Universal versus 
income-tested 
Is the basic income to be a universal 
basic income, a negative income tax, or 
a refundable tax credit? 
Will the basic income be responsive to 




Is eligibility for, or the amount of, the 
payment conditional on individual 
attributes (e.g., age, income, assets) 
and/or behavioural conditions (e.g., work 
search)? 
3.5 Benefits Sufficiency 
(Adequacy) 
What is the amount of the guarantee, 
and are the amounts paid uniform or 
variable? 
Uniformity How would the basic income treat those 
with a disability? 
Interactions with 
other programs 
How does the basic income interact with 
existing income and social support 
programs, especially provincial Income 
Assistance, including Temporary 
Assistance and Disability Assistance? 
Duration How often and when would payments be 
made? 
Frequency 
Beneficiary unit Would benefits be:  
• based on individual or joint family 
incomes  
• paid to individuals or 
family/households, or  
Payment unit 
Payment scale 
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Report section/subsection Design elements Panel’s questions 
• scaled by the number of 
members in the unit or a per 
capita amount? 
3.6 Administration Administration How does the basic income interact with 
existing income and social support 
programs, especially provincial income 
and disability assistance? 
Would recipients require a bank account 
to receive payments and, if not, how 
would payments be delivered to the 
unbanked, the under-banked, and/or 
those dealing with homelessness? 
How will any changes and what they 
mean to people be communicated? 
4. Simulation results  Funding What is the cost of the program and 
what other tax and benefit program 
changes would be made to finance the 
program? 
5. Funding and 
interactions with tax 
rates 
How would the tax system treat the 
payments received? Would there be an 
associated significant income tax 
system reform?  
How would the basic income be 




To understand whether a policy is successful, it is necessary first to know why it’s being 
implemented. Basic income advocates put forward several reasons for implementing a 
basic income, some of which align well with our goal of moving toward a more just 
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society, others not as well. Some of these reasons are objectives in the sense that basic 
income is suggested as the solution to a specific problem. Others are not so much 
specific objectives as claims about what impacts a basic income would have.  
In some cases, the basic income principles described in Section 2 (Basic Income 
Philosophy and Principles) are cited as the reason for implementing a basic income—
that is, a basic income should be implemented because it would be simpler and more 
respectful, provide greater economic security, and promote social inclusion better than 
traditional income and social support programs. In other cases, a basic income is touted 
as a virtual panacea that can solve multiple issues and problems. Those claims include 
improving health outcomes; increasing investment in human capital; improving social 
outcomes for children; encouraging risk-taking, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity; 
raising wages; and supporting community through volunteering and caregiving.  
We recognize that it is difficult to draw a bright line between basic income objectives 
and claims, but we have nevertheless attempted to do so. In this section, we discuss 
the main purposeful objectives—as opposed to consequential benefits—of basic 
income, advanced by different groups of proponents. Section 5 (Claims Made For or 
About a Basic Income) addresses the claims about those consequential benefits in 
detail. 
Poverty reduction 
The most common objective for basic income proposals is to reduce or eliminate 
poverty. This objective fits with the tendency to express basic income principles in 
comparison to traditional cash-transfer programs, such as Income Assistance in B.C. 
Basic income is promoted as a more humanizing and effective way to reduce poverty. 
Basic income principles are what makes it more humanizing, but its effectiveness in 
poverty reduction arises from the fundamental feature of a basic income—a guaranteed 
minimum income for everyone. The idea of a basic income is to make sure all those 
who need cash transfers to lift them part or all of the way out of poverty receive the 
benefit by erring on the side of giving it to a larger group. In general, a basic income will 
be more effective than a more tightly targeted and less accessible transfer program that 
inevitably excludes some who are in need, but the basic income will also inevitably be 
more expensive.  
This observation reinforces points made in Section 2 about basic income principles 
aligning with our characteristics associated with autonomy—in particular adequacy, 
accessibility, and security—but creating trade-offs in terms of public trust, especially the 
fiscal impact. 
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In the context of our framework, poverty reduction objectives should recognize that 
basic needs are not the same for everyone. Dealing with those differences effectively—
for example, with differential provisions to address the higher costs faced by those with 
disabilities—is an important part of reducing poverty and of moving toward a more just 
society. However, it is difficult to deal with these differences in basic needs through the 
design of a basic income without violating basic income principles. It is hard to design 
and implement eligibility criteria for those with additional needs without adding 
complexity and introducing stigma. Of course, it is possible to have a simple basic 
income program while addressing needs differences with other programs, but in that 
case one must look to the whole system, not just the basic income, to assess its 
implications. Either way, it is the details of the program designs that will ultimately 
determine how effectively poverty is reduced and the way the policies balance the 
competing characteristics within our framework. 
Economic disruptions 
The second objective is one that has become of increasing interest in recent times—to 
mitigate the effects of economic disruptions. A basic income has been proposed to 
address two types of disruptions: those associated with ongoing change processes that 
we are aware of and those associated with sudden changes. Examples of the first type 
of disruption include expected labour market changes that may arise from artificial 
intelligence, robotics, and other technological change, and disruptions due to climate 
change and policies to mitigate it. Sudden, less predictable changes include natural 
disasters such as pandemics and economic disruptions such as major recessions, 
which are both sudden and transient.  
Both types of disruption are related to the characteristic under our framework of 
supporting transitions, because whether anticipated and long-term or sudden and 
transient, economic disruptions force people to make transitions in their lives. The 
question is how effective a basic income would be in supporting and facilitating these 
transitions in general compared with alternatives, within the context of our justice 
objective.  
Perhaps the disruption most commonly associated with calls for a basic income is that 
arising from technological change. The associated concerns are that technology is 
changing both the nature of work and the distribution of income. Artificial intelligence 
and robotics are examples of technologies that some fear will displace workers, reduce 
demand for labour, leaving people without as much opportunity to work, and shift 
income from workers to the owners of capital. A basic income funded by taxing the 
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resulting economic rents accruing to technology giants has been suggested as a 
solution to this phenomenon.  
However, as shown in detail in Part 3, Section 4 (Labour Market Trends), there is no 
evidence of the starting premise that the nature of work is being disrupted by technology 
on a large scale, at least not to date. There is evidence of a significant degree of 
precarious work in the labour market, which has significant implications from a justice 
and economic perspective, but those structural issues arose decades ago and do not 
seem to be getting worse. As we will discuss in Part 6, there are good reasons to 
believe that labour regulation can reduce many of the issues that cause job precarity. 
Based on these assessments, we believe that it would be premature at best to 
implement a basic income to address a disruption that has not so far materialized on a 
large scale and the ultimate form of which is uncertain, while the alternative of 
regulatory reform in this area could have a significant beneficial impact. 
Climate change is most likely to disrupt certain industries in a negative way, and others 
in a positive way. Negatively affected industries will include those closely related to 
fossil fuels but also industries affected by climate change in particular locations, such as 
agriculture and forestry. Climate change can also positively affect these and other 
industries in different locations, and the response to climate change—for example, 
benefiting industries associated with alternative energy and construction of 
infrastructure needed to adapt to climate change. Overall, what is needed is support in 
making transitions for those whose lives are negatively affected by climate change itself 
or the response of government and the economy to mitigate and adapt. A basic income 
could provide a base level of protection throughout the economy from disruptions as a 
type of automatic stabilizer. The question for us is: would that be better from a justice 
perspective than a more targeted transition support approach or a combination of a 
basic income and targeted programs? Given the fiscal and economic implications, this 
is a valid question. 
Sudden economic disruptions resulting from market forces such as recessions or 
natural disasters such as the COVID-19 pandemic are much more transitory. These will 
have a significant economic impact that may last for a few years, but the transitions 
requiring support are abrupt and, for many, short-term. On the other hand, recessions 
and natural disasters will undoubtedly arise in future, as has happened throughout 
human history, and being prepared to respond is a valid objective. Once again, the 
question is whether the passive broad protection provided by a basic income is the best 
way to prepare for the disruption of the next disaster. Or would it be preferable in terms 
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of the balance among our justice-focused characteristics to prepare by having the ability 
to respond quickly and effectively when needed? 
Redistribution of economic rent 
The third objective suggested for basic incomes is to be a means to redistribute 
economic rents—to provide a social dividend. An example of this type of basic income 
exists in the form of the Alaska Permanent Dividend Fund, which makes cash transfers 
to residents funded by resource rents, revenues generated from the sale of publicly 
owned natural resources. A basic income has been suggested as part of a revenue-
neutral carbon tax scheme. Basic income could also be used to distribute other windfall-
type revenue streams. Considerations related to taxing economic rents as a source of 
funding are discussed in Part 3, Section 3 (Fiscal Context).  
The taxing of economic rents has long-standing support in economic theory and we 
suggest considering such taxation as a basis for funding program reforms. There is no 
clear reason, however, why the revenues from such a tax would have to be linked to a 
basic income. They could equally well be used to fund basic services or other policy 
reforms.  
3.3 Types of basic income 
Advocates in Canada and elsewhere have proposed many types of basic income 
schemes, which could be classified in a variety of ways. We have divided basic income 
approaches into different types of basic income along two dimensions: whether the 
basic income is income-tested, and whether the basic income is meant to apply widely 
or be targeted. In this section we explore both of these dimensions. 
Universal versus income-tested types of basic income 
One particularly useful way of classifying these schemes is based on whether and how 
the income of beneficiaries is factored into their benefit payments. How income is 
treated has fundamental implications for several characteristics included in our 
analytical framework: adequacy, accessibility, responsiveness, and related areas of 
public trust, fiscal implications, efficient administration, and economic incentives. It also 
gives rise to the three canonical basic income formats: universal basic income (UBI), 
refundable tax credit (RTC), and negative income tax (NIT). Each format has significant 
associated economic and operational distinctions (for more detail, see Kesselman, 
2020). 
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In Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing and Effective Tax Rate Implications), we outlined a 
general approach to describing how income testing is usually designed, which can also 
be applied to describing the income-testing structure of a basic income, a traditional 
income support program, and any number of income-tested basic services and in-kind 
benefits programs. That approach was used extensively in Part 4 with respect to 
programs that make up the current system, and we use it again here. The elements of 
the “simple model” are the maximum amount of the benefit (G), the rate at which the 
benefit paid is reduced as income increases (the benefit reduction rate (BRR)), and the 
break-even level (the level of income at which the benefit paid is reduced to zero (BE)). 
These three parameters are linked through a formula, so that once any two of the three 
is specified, the other is determined.79 
Under a UBI, G, the full payment or “guarantee” amount, is made to all eligible persons 
(i.e., universally) on a regular basis without any direct impact on the transfer arising 
from recipients’ other income. Any conditions that are established to determine eligibility 
are based solely on characteristics (e.g., residency, citizenship, or age) and not on any 
measures of income or wealth. This type of basic income format is sometimes called a 
demogrant, from the Greek “demos,” meaning “people.” In terms of the simple model, 
by definition the BRR of a UBI is zero, and there is no BE because the full guarantee is 
paid regardless of how high an individual’s income. 
The benefit from the demogrant can be treated either as a non-taxable benefit or as 
taxable income, but provisions related to the taxable nature of the guarantee would be 
separate from the UBI itself, typically treated as part of the program’s financing 
provisions. As we discuss in more detail later, though, if a UBI is fully or partially 
financed by applying income tax to the payments or increasing income tax rates, that 
has the effect of making the UBI income-tested, with the income tax rate applied acting 
as a non-zero BRR. For that reason, when considering the economic implications of a 
particular basic income proposal, it is important to analyze the implications of measures 
taken to finance the program, in addition to the direct implications of the basic income 
itself. 
Unlike the UBI, both the RTC and NIT formats have income-testing elements explicitly 
specified as part of their design. They pay out net benefits that are directly based on 
and decline with recipients’ other income according to the BRR. Persons without any 
additional income receive the maximum benefit, G. Those with income from other 
 
79 The formula is BE = G / BRR where BRR is expressed in decimal terms (e.g., 0.3 instead of 30%). 
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sources, such as wages, self-employment, pensions, rents, and investment income, 
receive a portion of the guarantee that is reduced by applying the BRR to the income. 
For those with income above BE, no benefits are paid.  
These three parameters—G, BRR, and BE—all have implications for the degree to 
which poverty is reduced, the potential incentive effects, who the beneficiary population 
is, and the cost of the program, as discussed in Part 3. We also discussed extensions of 
the simple model, including varying the BRR and having an income exemption below 
which the BRR does not apply, which are elements that could be incorporated in the 
design of an income-tested basic income. 
While both RTC and NIT basic incomes directly use income testing, they are 
distinguished by additional features. The RTC type of basic income operates much like 
current refundable tax credits available in the personal income tax system. An RTC 
basic income would deliver periodic payments calculated on the basis of the 
beneficiary’s income as reported on their previous year’s tax return, so that they could 
respond to income variations only with a long lag. The Canada Child Benefit (CCB) is 
an example of an RTC basic income targeting a specific group (children) and 
conditional on the family’s previous year’s income. 
The NIT is also a basic income type that provides periodic payments to recipients based 
on income, but, unlike the RTC, NIT payments respond to beneficiaries’ income 
fluctuations within the year. Benefit payments can thus be highly responsive to changes 
in individual short-term need; however, depending on the design, that can result in 
overpayments that must be recouped over time. To achieve this responsiveness, the 
NIT format requires reporting of individual incomes periodically within the year, so it 
cannot be implemented as a simple adjunct to the income tax system as it currently 
stands.80 There is no existing example of a Canadian NIT, but Manitoba’s Basic Annual 
Income Experiment (Mincome), undertaken in the 1970s, was an NIT requiring monthly 
reporting of income. All of the American basic income pilots have also been NITs. 
Apart from the administrative considerations related to how frequently the income test is 
applied, the choice between an RTC and an NIT approach is effectively a trade-off 
between income stability associated with benefits that are fixed for a year at a time and 
responsiveness to short-term fluctuations. The preferred approach may depend on the 
characteristics of the group being targeted, if it is not widely applicable, and the 
 
80 If the income tax system were reformed to allow for real-time or frequent reporting of an individual’s income, an NIT 
could be delivered through the tax system. Such a system exists in Ireland. 
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objective. For example, providing for costs associated with raising children through the 
CCB may be best suited to a stable RTC, while for a basic income with poverty 
reduction as its primarily goal, responsiveness to short-term income fluctuations may be 
given more weight. 
Income testing and trade-offs 
The degree of income testing of a basic income has special significance for two 
reasons: first, it directly reflects the trade-offs among adequacy, incentives, and cost 
considerations; and second, it interacts with existing incentive effects in the personal 
income tax system and other potential financing methods. Both of these considerations 
are discussed in Part 3, Section 5.3 (Combined Incentive Effects on Labour Supply), 
and these same considerations apply, in general, to all income-tested programs.  
The three parameters associated with income testing—G, BRR, and BE—directly relate 
to the trade-offs among cost, adequacy, and incentive effects. G is related to adequacy, 
and for obvious reasons higher is better in terms of poverty goals. BRR is related to 
work and other incentives because it is effectively a tax rate on other income, and taxing 
income creates a variety of disincentive effects, so lower is better. BE (in conjunction 
with G) is related to the number of people who will receive a benefit, directly reflecting 
the trade-offs among adequacy, economic implications, and cost. Providing benefits to 
more people tends to increase adequacy by not only lifting people out of poverty but 
also protecting against adverse events. But higher BE levels tend to increase the 
economic impact by adding the BRR to progressive tax rates that increase with income, 
increasing the economic implications, and of course the more people who receive 
payments, the more expensive the basic income would be. These trade-offs are 
illustrated graphically in Part 3, and Part 3 also explains how and why taxes have a 
labour-supply effect and what the evidence shows about the magnitude of that effect. 
The trade-off between adequacy, as measured by the rate and depth of poverty, and 
cost can be seen in concrete terms in our later discussion of the basic income 
simulations for B.C. conducted on behalf of the panel. The economic impact associated 
with BRR, together with other tax rates, depends not only on the design of the basic 
income itself but also on how it will be financed, since the effect arises from the 
combined effective tax rates. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5 (Financing a 
Basic Income). 
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Responsiveness to change in personal circumstances 
A key characteristic of our framework that has an effect on the issues of whether and 
how to implement income testing for a basic income is responsiveness to changes in 
personal circumstances. By this we mean timely provision of resources when the ability 
to provide for basic needs changes suddenly, whether on a short-term or permanent 
basis, and whether due to reduced income, increased costs, or both. These adverse 
events could arise from changes at the personal level (such as the onset of a disability) 
or from changes that affect the whole society (such as a pandemic). 
In principle, resources provided in response to changes in circumstances could be cash 
transfers or in-kind benefits, such as services, or both, as is provided by the current 
mixed system. Many approaches can be taken to build responsiveness into the system, 
and it is not crucial that a given program, such as a basic income, address this 
characteristic. However, one of the key distinctions among the three types of basic 
income we are discussing here is the extent to which they respond to changes in 
personal circumstances. 
UBI 
A UBI, being paid out continuously to everyone, is immediately available when an 
income loss or catastrophic event occurs. This ready backstop, though, comes with a 
high price tag, since it is also continuously being paid to all, even those who are not 
experiencing a negative event. In addition, the fact that it is paid continuously raises the 
possibility that people will build the amount into their regular budget—using it to rent a 
better apartment or buy a car on a payment plan. Indeed, one of the arguments in 
favour of a basic income is that it will allow people to make these more permanent 
changes. However, to the extent that families behave this way, the UBI will not respond 
to their additional needs arising when they face sudden shortfalls in income. Thus, a 
UBI provides a certain amount of general protection but does not respond to changes in 
need. The trade-off is that a UBI is not complex or costly to administer, but the 
program’s complexity and operational cost would increase if responsiveness to changes 
in need were desired. 
RTC 
An RTC is the least protective of the three variants in terms of response to adverse 
events. Because an RTC is based on the previous year’s income, it responds to 
changes in income with a considerable lag, with the needed support arriving as much as 
24 months after a significant change in other income. This has several implications. 
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Because of the time lags, an RTC will not always treat people who have the same 
current income the same, violating a basic type of fairness that is a common 
consideration in the design of taxes—equal treatment of equals, or horizontal equity. 
Appendix 5-A provides some illustrations of the relative responsiveness of the RTC and 
NIT basic income types, and the potential impact on horizontal equity. As with a UBI, it 
would be possible to have other programs available to address changes in personal 
circumstances, as the current system already does, to some extent, but as a stand-
alone measure the RTC performs poorly in responsiveness. 
By using the income tax system to calculate and deliver benefits, an RTC basic income 
has the same general advantages and disadvantages as all programs that rely in the 
income tax system. Use of the tax system means an RTC approach is simple to 
implement, has low associated stigma (since others can’t see the calculations on your 
tax form), and relatively low administrative costs. However, as discussed in Part 4, the 
income tax system does have drawbacks as a platform for delivering benefits or as the 
information source for income-testing purposes. In addition to lack of responsiveness to 
changes in personal circumstances, the tax system imposes significant barriers to 
access for certain people, especially the most vulnerable populations. These people 
may not have to file tax returns because of low income and may not be willing to file 
because of distrust of the system and the consequences of filing, previous compliance 
issues, or a lack of the information, documents, and general capacity to complete and 
file a tax return. Filing rates for those who are not required to report but would benefit 
from existing RTCs is very low (Petit & Tedds, 2020g). 
NIT 
An NIT provides the most responsive approach to adverse events affecting income, 
since evaluations of need are carried out within the year—for example, on a monthly 
basis. That provides an ability to respond at the time of an income loss or catastrophic 
event.  
However, the stream of benefit payments under an NIT can be quite volatile in the short 
term, trading off stability for responsiveness. A difficulty that can arise with such a 
responsive approach, though, is related to how income testing is applied in practice. 
When monthly income fluctuates, how should the income-testing approach be applied? 
Should the BRR be applied each month to the income in that month to determine the 
benefit, or should the BRR be applied to some sort of averaged or smoothed income 
amount that reduces volatility in the benefit amounts paid? If benefits are quick to be 
initiated but take time to reassess and withdraw, the NIT has the disadvantage of 
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potentially requiring a recovery of overpayments at tax time or in future months, 
although the extent to which this is a concern depends on design details (see 
Kesselman, 2020). Because of the RTC’s use of the previous year’s income, addressing 
recovery of overpayments is, generally, not a feature of this type of basic income 
approach. 
It should be noted that Income Assistance has benefits calculated monthly based on 
reporting by recipients. Temporary Assistance uses a monthly income exemption, and 
benefits change on a monthly basis, limiting overpayment except in cases of income 
misreporting. However, Disability Assistance applies an annual income exemption, 
which provides more stability to monthly payments but also increases the chance that 
overpayments will be made and will need to be repaid, or that recipients will choose to 
stop working when they approach the annual exemption.  
Given that the Canadian tax system currently does not include a system for making sub-
annual adjustments to payments, one of the main drawbacks of the NIT is that it would 
imply the need to create a new, complex, and costly administrative system or undertake 
a substantial reform to the current tax system. Some countries, like Ireland, have tax 
systems that incorporate sub-annual reporting from employers about employee incomes 
and effectively assess tax monthly. That kind of tax system would offer more freedom to 
design a basic income that better balances stability and protection against adverse 
events, but implementing such a system would require a national-level reform of the tax 
system. It is not something that B.C. could do on its own.  
Widely applicable versus targeted types of basic income  
Our discussion of the types of basic income so far implies a focus on programs that 
would apply to the population generally, whether universal or conditional on income. 
However, a basic income need not be widely applicable. The alternative is a targeted 
basic income, sometimes referred to as a categorical basic income, which is conditional 
on meeting eligibility criteria.  
In traditional forms of income-transfer programs, targeting groups defined by eligibility 
criteria addresses conflicts among adequacy, incentives, and cost. Restricting eligibility 
to particular groups defined by observable characteristics other than income directly 
reduces the potential program cost. Attributes such as age (e.g., children or seniors) or 
disability are common eligibility criteria. Targeting is also useful for dividing beneficiaries 
into two (or more) groups with different levels of basic need and other characteristics 
that can be addressed through some of the design choices discussed later in this 
section. Also, targeting can reduce concerns about labour supply effects, if people 
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reduce their paid work because of the availability of benefits or the way income testing 
is done, in two ways. Since the targeted group is only a fraction of the population, the 
economic implications are smaller. In addition, where the targeted group has a lower 
level of labour force attachment than the general population, labour supply effects are 
also more muted for the group. That would apply, for example, to those with severe 
disabilities and to seniors, but many groups could potentially be targeted where that 
would not apply. 
Any of the three types of basic income—UBI, RTC, or NIT—could be targeted. That is, a 
targeted basic income could be income-tested or not, and could be designed to be 
either stable over time or responsive to short-term changes in income. 
Similar to targeted traditional income and social support programs, the challenge is to 
design eligibility criteria and adjudication/administration processes in a way that does 
not violate basic income principles of simplicity, respect, and social inclusion to make 
the program accessible. The challenge is to accurately and fairly target a group without 
taking dignity from applicants and recipients and without adding undue complexity. With 
traditional programs, the way eligibility is defined and applied by administrators often 
contributes to the features of those programs that are inconsistent with justice—
stigmatizing users, unintentionally excluding certain groups, and creating complexity 
that is a barrier to access.  
One way of mitigating these concerns would be to combine a widely available low-
benefit basic income with targeted programs that provide additional benefits, some 
cash-transfer programs for specific groups and some basic service programs that 
provide protection against specific costs, such as health-care costs. That would at least 
provide some resources to those prevented from applying or qualifying for the higher-
guarantee conditional programs by barriers to access arising from eligibility rules. 
Another mitigation channel is to provide those who need to access the benefits with 
channels to provide input on the programs on an ongoing basis so they can take part in 
designing and maintaining a more respectful system. Grounding their input in a human 
rights basis, as is being done in the federal National Housing Strategy, seems to us to 
be a particularly promising approach. 
This discussion yet again illustrates that design details really matter. Targeted basic 
income programs can be effective elements of a just income and social support system, 
with or without a generally applicable basic income. However, eligibility rules and 
gatekeeping associated with eligibility, together with other design parameters, must be 
Part 5: Basic Income 
December 28, 2020                Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  323
carefully considered to balance complexity, fairness, respect, cost, and incentive 
effects. 
3.4 Benefits 
Several elements of basic income design relate directly to the nature of the benefit 
provided and affect how well the design aligns with basic income principles and the 
panel’s broader framework, as outlined in Table 5-2.  
Adequacy 
Adequacy is about the size of the guarantee, a design element that is a significant factor 
in determining the degree to which a basic income would reduce poverty, especially the 
rate and depth of poverty. But as discussed earlier, the maximum benefit also drives the 
cost of the basic income and the economic implications of the program in terms of its 
incentive effects both directly and through its financing requirements.  
As the analysis of the current system in Part 4 illustrates, adequacy must really be 
assessed at the system level. The level of benefits for a given basic income that would 
be considered adequate from a poverty reduction perspective depends on the other 
supports that are provided. That is true whether considering a widely applicable basic 
income or a targeted basic income, where the cost of basic needs not supplied by other 
programs must be taken into account. 
Definition of income 
In the case of income-tested basic incomes, adequacy depends not only on the size of 
the guarantee but also on the extent to which and how the payments are conditional on 
additional income. This is most directly related to the BRR but also depends on exactly 
what sources of income the BRR applies to—the definition of income for the purposes 
of the basic income.  
Income testing unit: Household versus individual income 
One definitional issue is whether family or individual income is used for the income test, 
which we refer to as the income-testing unit. Family income is often used in the income 
tax system when assessing refundable tax credits and in most benefit programs, on the 
assumption that family income is shared. Making calculations based on family income, 
rather than individual income, will reduce the cost of a given basic income design (i.e., 
the same G and BRR).  
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This is especially true where incomes within couples are unequal. For example, in a 
couple with one high earner and the other with little or no income, if we evaluate based 
on family income, benefits would be taxed back (possibly to zero) for both members of 
the couple, but if the income-testing unit is the individual, the low earner in the couple 
would get large benefits and the high earner zero benefits.  
However, not all families do share income, and use of individual income may help 
people, specifically women, to leave abusive relationships, especially if payment is 
made to each individual. It should be noted, though, that just because the cost of a 
given design is lower if family income is used, it does not necessarily follow that, if you 
fix the cost rather than the design parameters, a basic income using family income will 
be more effective in reducing poverty. We explore this question in Section 4.2 (Finding 
Optimal Basic Income Parameters for Reducing the Poverty Rate), which in fact shows 
that using the individual as the income-testing unit is more effective. 
So far, we have used “family” as shorthand for “household,” largely because “family” is 
the terminology used for Canadian income tax purposes. In that context, a family is a 
nuclear family composed of a single person or a couple (married or common-law), 
together with their dependent children. However, innumerable examples of “economic 
household” exist where people live together within some sort of economic arrangement 
that differs from the nuclear family. Many economic households involve extended 
families, but many involve no familial relationships. Even when all members of the 
household share a familial connection, there is the question of whether dependent adult 
children living in the same residence should be considered part of the household for 
basic income (and tax) purposes or should be considered their own family/household. 
If reduction of poverty is a primary consideration, a basic income administered based on 
economic households would reflect the economic relationships within the household 
and better target those most in need. In fact, as noted in Part 3, Market Basket Measure 
(MBM) poverty statistics use economic households as the basis for determining the 
poverty rate and depth of poverty. However, using the economic household as the 
income-testing unit is not practical under the current tax system, which suggests 
another practical difference between the RTC and NIT forms of basic income. If RTCs 
rely on the tax system, that implies use of the nuclear family, unless that aspect of the 
tax system is reformed. An NIT that is administered separately from the tax system 
could also use a different definition of household as the income-testing unit, but not 
without introducing complexity. 
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Income-testing basis: Definition of income 
Our analysis of the current system shows how many different definitions of income are 
used in the income tax system and in various transfer and benefit programs for different 
purposes, creating complexity across the system. In designing a basic income, it is 
important to keep in mind this source of complexity, with its implications for accessibility, 
as well as any effects, intended or not, that could arise because of the many definitions 
used by different programs. From another perspective, designing a basic income could 
be an opportunity to develop a consistent basis for defining income and other elements 
of income testing across the income and social support system, with avoiding 
unnecessary complexity as a key consideration. 
The types of income included determines the level of benefit a household receives 
under an income-tested basic income. This has real implications in terms of whether 
people in comparable circumstances are treated the same. Income Assistance, with its 
funder-of-last-resort principle, has the broadest definition of all the income-tested 
programs available in B.C., which means that benefits are reduced for Income 
Assistance purposes by sources of funding that do not affect other programs. For 
example, gifts and lottery winnings are both subjected to the 100% BRR associated with 
income assistance and could result in a person losing eligibility. In contrast, many other 
income-tested programs, from RTCs to PharmaCare, use income tax information for 
income testing. While there is inconsistency in the exact calculation of income for the 
purposes of the different benefits, at least all exclude the same set of non-reportable 
income items, most of which are transitory.  
Uniformity of benefits 
Also related to the adequacy question is how the basic income would address 
differences in need associated with different costs of living. MBM poverty thresholds 
specifically address the fact that the location and size of a community affects the costs 
of meeting basic needs. In B.C. the cost of living in the Lower Mainland is higher than in 
other areas, especially the cost of shelter. Should the basic income be uniform 
geographically and, if not, what effect would that have on mobility? 
Some members of society also face higher costs than others, especially those with 
disabilities. A basic income providing a generally available guaranteed minimum income 
achieves simplicity by providing the same income guarantee to everyone. Such a 
guarantee amount, set to achieve a certain poverty reduction goal, for example, would 
have the result of leaving those facing higher costs due to their disability disadvantaged, 
unless those costs are covered in another way.  
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When designing a basic income, therefore, it is important to be specific about how those 
with a disability will be treated, whether through a higher guarantee level provided by a 
targeted basic income, additional cash transfers provided by another program, and/or 
basic services or other in-kind benefits provided by other programs. Those details will 
ultimately determine the consistency with basic income principles like simplicity, 
respect, and social inclusion.  
Interactions with other programs 
This design element concerns whether the basic income would be layered over the 
existing system without change or the existing system would be changed when the 
basic income is introduced. Conceptually, this question is different from the question of 
how the basic income would be financed, but in practice the two ideas are inevitably 
entangled.  
Depending on the basic income design, it may interact with the tax system, requiring 
adjustments to existing tax credits, refundable or not, or tax rates and structure. 
Adjustments might be needed to avoid extreme disincentives caused by the aggregation 
of basic income and tax system features, or to eliminate duplication and overlap.  
In addition, a basic income will obviously interact with Income Assistance. As detailed in 
Part 4, Income Assistance is intended to be the funder of last resort and uses an 
extremely broad definition of income for income-testing purposes, which includes almost 
every source of income, including many ignored by the tax system, like gifts. If current 
Income Assistance principles are applied, any basic income payments would be 
considered income for Income Assistance purposes, eliminating or reducing eligibility 
for Income Assistance or reducing benefits paid for some, depending on the size of the 
basic income benefit and the income-testing parameters chosen.  
However, that would not necessarily mean that Income Assistance would no longer 
operate. For example, if there were an RTC, Temporary Assistance could remain as a 
complementary program that provides the response to short-term changes in income 
that the RTC is unable to provide. Consider a person with income above the BE point in 
the previous year whose income falls to zero: until the RTC amounts are adjusted in the 
following year, the person would receive no basic income payments and would satisfy 
the income eligibility requirement for Income Assistance. Depending on the basic 
income guarantee amount, Disability Assistance could also act as a top-up to the basic 
income for those who qualify.  
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Another interaction arising from a basic income reducing Income Assistance eligibility 
would mean that access to in-kind benefits provided as supplements by the Income 
Assistance system would be eliminated, unless some change were made to Income 
Assistance. Depending on the specific design features of the basic income, interactions 
with other existing programs are possible, and care would have to be taken to ensure 
that unintended consequences that act to inadvertently reduce the effectiveness of the 
overall system are not the result. 
Two points require emphasis here. The first is that it is not enough, when designing a 
basic income, to consider the new program in isolation, because in practice it will 
inevitably interact with the pre-existing system. It is important to specify how the pre-
existing system will be adjusted, if at all, when the basic income is implemented. The 
second is the necessity, when evaluating the proposed basic income in terms of 
alignment with principles, to assess how the system as a whole has changed. The 
simplicity of a UBI may be eroded by consequential income tax changes, for example, 
or the adequacy and responsiveness of the system may be reduced if in-kind benefits 
are eliminated on the introduction of a basic income. 
Duration and frequency 
“Duration” refers to whether a program is permanent or temporary in nature, providing 
benefits over a defined period. “Frequency” refers to how often benefits are paid.  
It is self-evident that permanent programs provide more financial security, but eligibility 
conditions that limit the duration of a program could be part of the program design, 
depending on its specific purpose. For example, a targeted basic income focused on 
children aging out of care may provide temporary benefits if the objective is to facilitate 
transition to self-sufficiency. Financial security will then depend on what happens when 
the temporary guarantee expires. 
Simplicity suggests that the frequency of payments should be standard for everyone. A 
common frequency used for benefit payments is monthly. However, some populations 
might be hurt by receiving a relatively large cash payment once a month. The “welfare 
Wednesday” phenomenon illustrates the social and health consequences of monthly 
Income Assistance payments (Richardson, 2019). This issue is particularly critical 
among the most vulnerable populations, given the opioid crisis, but the solution is not 
obvious. The Income Assistance program has features that allow the frequency to be 
adjusted, often using community not-for-profit service providers to help recipients who 
are unable to manage their resources. However, not only would that add complexity and 
compromise autonomy, but it would be difficult to administer without stigmatizing 
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recipients. This is an example of the trade-off between freedom of choice associated 
with unconditional cash transfers and the adaptation of programs to recipients’ actual 
needs, consideration of which is encouraged by our justice framework but directly 
violates the four basic income principles.  
Another alternative to regular monthly payments arises because some groups may 
require lump-sum payments to get back on their feet after a traumatic adverse event, 
without which an ongoing stream of payments may not be enough to meet basic needs. 
For example, an Alberta program for women escaping domestic violence provides a 
lump-sum payment up-front and an ongoing stream of payments, among other 
supports. Again, this is more consistent with a hybrid set of programs that provide cash 
transfers and basic services designed to work together for a specific purpose within a 
broad justice framework, than a basic income consistent with the four principles. 
Income-testing unit, payment unit, and scale factor 
Three design parameters affect how the benefit paid is determined and to whom it is 
paid: 
• the income-testing unit parameter—whether the income testing is based on 
individual or family income (relevant only for income-tested basic income, not 
UBIs) 
• the payment unit parameter—whether the benefits accrue to and payments are 
made to the family, as represented by one member, or, regardless of how the 
benefit is calculated, the beneficiary and the payee is each individual adult in a 
family (relevant for both income-tested and universal basic incomes) 
• the scale factor parameter—applied to the maximum benefit for a single person 
when there is more than one person receiving benefits to determine the 
maximum benefit (applies to both income-tested and universal basic incomes) 
Income-testing unit and payment unit 
We start by putting these income-testing and payment unit parameters into the context 
of existing examples, one delivered by the tax system and one delivered separately.  
The income tax system, which delivers several RTC benefits, treats taxes and benefit 
delivery in different ways. In general, taxes are assessed and paid at the individual level 
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based on the individual’s income, with a few notable exceptions,81 but tax credits are 
usually determined based on family income for couples and paid to one family member. 
The Canada Child Benefit is such an RTC basic income, with the family as both the 
income-testing unit and payment unit.  
The Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement (OAS/GIS) is another basic 
income program, but it is delivered by Service Canada rather than through the income 
tax system. It is also a combination of a component that is effectively a UBI targeting 
seniors (OAS) and an income-tested component (GIS) that is effectively an RTC, 
despite not being delivered by the tax system. For both components the payment unit is 
the individual, but for GIS income testing applies to family income. OAS benefits are 
also subject to tax recovery on higher-income recipients, which is applied based on 
individual income. 
These two parameters can each have two values—individual (I) or family (F)—so there 
are four permutations possible for income-tested basic incomes. With individuals as the 
income-testing unit and individuals as the payment unit, the result is simply that each 
person receives the amount calculated for them (I-I). Where income testing is done on 
the basis of individuals, payment can still be aggregated and paid on the basis of the 
family (I-F). Likewise, a benefit calculated for a family could be made in one payment 
(F-F) or divided and paid separately to the individual family members (F-I). 
The reason we distinguish between these two parameters is that, regardless of the 
income-testing unit chosen, separate payments to each person in a family is linked to 
autonomy. The individual payment unit choice provides each family member with, at 
least in principle, the freedom of choice to use the benefit as they see fit. Where there is 
a power imbalance in the family, that may not be true in practice, but it is consistent with 
basic income principles, with our justice framework, and with avoiding systemic 
approaches that are likely to contribute to gender inequity. 
Scale factor 
The third parameter we discuss here is the scale factor—how the maximum benefit for a 
single person is scaled up for more than one family member. The question is: should 
the size of G for a household be simply that of G for a single person times the number 
of people in the household (per capita), or should it be adjusted by a lower scale factor? 
 
81 For example, some deductions and credits are transferable between married or common-law partners who have 
low income and for dependent children, as well as some income-splitting provisions. 
Part 5: Basic Income 
December 28, 2020                Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income  330
Using a lower scale factor would reflect the fact that sharing expenses as a member of 
a household costs less than living alone. For example, housing rental costs for two 
people living together will clearly be less than twice the cost facing each person living 
on their own. A common scaling factor is the square root of the number of people in the 
household, which is used in a number of existing cash and in-kind benefit programs. 
Note that this is also the scale factor used to calculate the MBM threshold for a family of 
a given size, starting with the MBM threshold for a representative family of four reported 
by Statistics Canada. 
Applying a scaling factor of the square root of the number of household members to a 
guarantee amount reduces the cost of a basic income compared to per capita 
guarantee levels for households. If, for example, the guarantee per person were 
$10,000, then a couple would receive $20,000 on a per capita basis but $14,100 if the 
square root scaling were used to recognize economies of scale. For a program with 
given cost and BRR, using a per capita scaling would reduce the feasible guarantee for 
a single person to less than that under a square root scaling. 
3.5 Administration 
Any of the three types of basic income discussed earlier could in principle be 
administered and have payments delivered by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) or 
by a new agency established for that purpose. In recent decades the CRA has played 
an increasingly important role in the delivery of benefits, both as the administrator and 
the payment agency for refundable tax credits and as the source of information for 
income-testing generally.  
We discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the CRA as a benefit platform in 
detail in Part 4, Section 4.2 (System Accessibility) but, to summarize, the CRA is a 
national repository for verified income information for a large proportion of the 
population, and integrating benefits administration with tax administration provides an 
automatic and administratively efficient platform that carries little inherent stigma. 
However, especially for vulnerable populations, CRA benefit delivery poses significant 
barriers that lead to low levels of access among those with low incomes. The use of tax 
administration to deliver benefits also imposes limits on the design of benefits, which 
must be consistent with the design of the tax system, such as annual filing and income 
assessment. There is also a natural tension between tax and benefits administration, 
since the CRA’s roots are as a tax administrator, and the CRA is not trusted by many 
(CRA, 2017). 
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A widely applicable RTC fits naturally with CRA administration because it is fully based 
on tax system integration. A targeted RTC could also be delivered by the CRA, provided 
that eligibility can be established either using income tax information or by an external 
agency that shares eligibility information with the CRA. 
A UBI could be delivered by the CRA, but because income testing is not part of the 
design, there are fewer advantages to using the CRA than there would be with an RTC. 
The alternative is creating a provincial UBI-specific agency. 
An NIT requires frequent (such as monthly) reporting of employment income and payroll 
deductions on each employee. In addition, intra-year reporting would also need to be 
extended to many other types of payments, such as pensions, self-employment income, 
RRSP withdrawals, net rental income, interest, dividends, and realized capital gains. 
Currently these payments are reported to the CRA only at year’s end, and for payrolls 
the current monthly reporting by each employer is only on an aggregate basis for all of 
its employees. An NIT could therefore be implemented only with major administrative 
reform—either creating a new agency or substantially overhauling the CRA’s 
mechanisms. In this sense, movement to an NIT would be a significant undertaking for 
the government as well as for payroll deduction payers, financial institutions, and tax 
filers; it could not be done immediately and is likely something that the CRA would not 
contemplate for a single province. However, basic income aside, considering such 
reforms could have many advantages for the administration of the income tax system, 
not the least of which is that automated tax filing for most taxpayers and better 
administration of existing RTCs could result.  
If a separate agency were established to administer a provincial basic income on the 
NIT model, it would require creating and maintaining a general register of provincial 
residents. Such a list does not currently exist, but the record of those eligible for MSP 
services would be a possible starting point. Monthly reporting of income data would be 
required as a condition of receiving a payment, which would be a significant undertaking 
in terms of collection and verification of the information, depending on the number of 
potential recipients, driven by the BE point. This work is already undertaken for Income 
Assistance purposes, but expanding the coverage to not only the entire low-income 
population but others whose incomes might on occasion drop below BE would be a 
gargantuan task. In practice, the system would require that all employees and others 
receiving incomes be included in the system, and the fact that many B.C. residents 
receive incomes from out-of-province sources would be a further issue. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This section has highlighted one of our key conclusions about basic income: it is not 
simple to design or implement a basic income, and a basic income is unlikely in practice 
to be as simple for users as many have claimed.  
Basic income proponents rarely address all of the many considerations that arise. 
These considerations invariably lead to difficult trade-offs, and it is all too easy in 
addressing these trade-offs to create a design that is inconsistent with basic income 
principles. As a result, a fully specified proposed basic income that fully takes our 
analytical framework into account may share as much with existing cash-transfer and 
basic service programs as it does with the basic income ideal. 
The UBI format is simple, accessible, and respectful, but also expensive, a trade-off 
quantified in the next two sections. Although it protects everyone against changes in 
income, it is not responsive to other changes in circumstances, nor does it directly 
address higher costs faced by those with disabilities and others with specific differential 
needs. Addressing these additional needs would require other provisions and programs. 
It is clear to us from comparing the current system with basic income alternatives that 
targeted cash transfers and basic services are unavoidable, regardless of the design of 
a core cash-transfer program. The current system already provides much of that base 
coverage, but it has gaps that must be filled and programs that can be improved. 
Introducing a UBI would almost certainly preclude that from happening because of the 
cost. 
The cost associated with a UBI can be reduced through using an income-tested variant, 
and benefit responsiveness to changes in personal circumstances can be improved with 
an NIT or with responsive complementary programs. However, each of these steps has 
its own complications, consequences, and trade-offs. Cost, poverty reduction effects, 
simplicity, stigmatization associated with eligibility requirements, the guarantee level, 
the benefit reduction rate, the delivery mechanism, and many more design factors must 
all be specified in a complex set of trade-offs. Because of these unavoidable 
compromises, there is clearly no single perfect basic income design.  
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4. Simulation results 
The review of basic income design parameters in Section 3 (Basic Income Design) 
raises the question of how given basic income design choices affect the practical 
outcomes in comparison with alternative choices. In this section, we summarize key 
findings from the results of simulations of 1,640 scenarios of basic income 
commissioned by the panel (Green, Kesselman, Tedds, Crisan et al., 2020). 
The simulations were implemented using the Social Policy Simulation Database and 
Model (SPSD/M) platform provided by Statistics Canada, which includes a 
representative, de-identified database of Canadians with information combined from 
several different sources, together with the ability to model different policies. The 
simulations calculate for each representative person and household in the database 
how a basic income with a specified set of parameters affects them, and aggregates 
those results to determine the overall effects for B.C. The simulations are done on the 
basis of “economic families,” the same basis used by Statistics Canada to measure 
poverty using the Market Basket Measure (MBM) making our results consistent with the 
poverty trends discussed in Part 3, Section 2 (Poverty in British Columbia).  
For each basic income scenario simulated, the estimated impacts include: 
• the number of recipients 
• the amount received by each, allowing the total cost of the basic income and the 
distribution of benefits across income and demographic categories to be 
estimated 
• the impact of the benefit received on disposable income as measured for the 
purpose of applying the Market Basket Measure (MBM), allowing the effect on 
the rate and depth of poverty to be estimated 
We have undertaken all of the simulations only for working-age adults between 18 and 
64 years. Since basic income programs already exist for children under age 18 (Canada 
Child Benefit) and seniors age 65-plus (Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income 
Supplement), we have focused on working-age adults for the purpose of simulating 
basic income implications. For these reasons, we exclude children under age 18 in 
assessing family size for purposes of computing benefit entitlements. 
The simulations assume that basic income benefits will not affect Income Assistance 
benefits. The simulations also do not model the impact of behavioural changes induced 
by a basic income or how it might be financed. These issues are discussed further in 
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Section 6 (Financing a Basic Income). All of the simulations were of widely applicable 
basic incomes, as the data were not available to determine eligibility for targeted 
variants of basic incomes. 
To create the various permutations of basic income simulated here, we varied the type 
of basic income, the maximum benefit amount, the scale factor, and, for RTCs the BRR 
and whether income testing was done at the family or individual level. 
We analyze the simulation results in two ways. First, we provide summary results for a 
set of permutations that illustrate the general effects of changing these parameters on 
the program cost, poverty rate, and depth of poverty. Second, we use the full dataset to 
analyze which specifications provide the greatest reductions in poverty rate for a given 
cost. 
4.1 Summary results 
For the summary results, we have specified the following parameter choices, which are 
combined in various permutations: 
• type—UBI and RTC82 
• G = $5,000, $10,000, and $20,000 for a single adult 
• scale factor—per capita and √2 
• BRR = 15%, 30%, 50%, and 75% for the RTC  
• beneficiary unit for the RTC—individual and family 
The common income-testing parameters G, BRR, and BE are related by the expression 
BE = G / BRR. Table 5-3 shows the BE points for each of these permutations of G and 
BRR. For couples, G and BE also depend on the scale factor applied, per capita or √2, 
with G and BE shown for both options. 
The table makes clear how increasing the BRR reduces BE, and also shows how the 
choice between the per capita and the square root of 2 scaling factors affects the BE 
point. We include, as benchmarks, the 2018 Vancouver MBM threshold, median 
income, and average income. These provide context for the various BE levels 
 
82 Because only annual data are available, it was not possible to simulate a more responsive form of basic income, 
such as an NIT. The NIT is known to have a significant larger cost than the RTC with identical G and BRR (Allen, 
1973; Kesselman, 2020). 
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calculated for different combinations of parameters. The fact that median and average 
incomes for couples are nearly triple those for singles is consistent with our observation 
in Part 3 that singles make up a high proportion of those in poverty. 





 G = $5,000 G = $10,000 G = $7,071 
15% $33,333 $66,667 $47,140 
30% $16,667 $33,333 $23,570 
50% $10,000 $20,000 $14,142 
75% $6,667 $13,333 $9,428 
 G = $10,000 G = $20,000 G = $14,142 
15% $66,667 $133,333 $94,281 
30% $33,333 $66,667 $47,140 
50% $20,000 $40,000 $28,284 
75% $13,333 $26,667 $18,856 
 G = $20,000 G = $40,000 G = $28,284 
15% $133,333 $266,667 $188,562 
30% $66,667 $133,333 $94,281 
50% $40,000 $80,000 $56,568 
75% $26,667 $53,333 $37,712 




  $28,739 
Median income $35,500 $102,300 
Average income $43,900 $119,100 
 
An interactive visualization providing all of these summary results is available at 
http://www.bcbasicincomepanel.ca/ or by clicking on the tables presented here with 
 
83 Also applies for each spouse of a couple if per capita benefits and BRR are applied to income of each separately 
rather than jointly (family income). 
84 Assumes that BRR applies to joint family income. The case of a per capita benefit for couples with individual 
income testing yields the same results as for “Single” in the table; the case of a scaled benefit for couples with 
individual income testing is not considered very plausible but would have the same BE as “Couple √2.” 
85 MBM threshold uses the 2008 base (Statistics Canada Table: 11-10-0066-01) and 2018 incomes for B.C. singles 
and economic families, which includes couples (Statistics Canada Table 11-10-0191-01).  
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partial results. Table 5-4 provides a subset of results focused on how the choices 
related to income testing, G, and BRR affect the cost and implications of the basic 
income. In this exercise, we focus on combinations of parameters that use the family 
income testing unit and couples’ benefits scaled by the square root of two, because 
these are the least expensive options and the most consistent with most proposals for 
basic income programs. 
The outcomes presented in Table 5-4 are the number of recipients, the cost of the basic 
income, the percent change in the poverty rate from B.C.’s 2018 poverty rate (8%), and 
the percent change in the depth of poverty (36.8%), as measured by the average gap 
ratio. (Part 3, Section 2, Poverty in British Columbia, provides detailed background 
information on poverty rates and depths.)  
In addition, we show a measure denoted as poverty efficiency, the number of people 
lifted out of poverty per $1 billion in expenditure. This should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that each permutation could somehow be scaled to raise this number of 
people out of poverty at a cost of $1 billion. Rather, it is simply a way of comparing how 
cost-effective each permutation is in terms of its effect on poverty rates, allowing for the 
different options to be compared on a consistent basis. 
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 Table 5-4: Simulations results—Varying type, G, and BRR, for family income-testing unit and √2 scaling 
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Table 5-4 makes several things clear: 
• UBIs are much more expensive than RTCs at every level of guarantee. A UBI 
guaranteeing that everyone would be at least at the MBM poverty line of about 
$20,000 would cost $51 billion for B.C. residents aged 18–64—or roughly the 
same order of magnitude as the entire B.C. budget. In comparison, an RTC with 
a $20,000 guarantee (effectively guaranteeing that no one would be below the 
poverty line) and a BRR of 30% would cost roughly one-third of that. 
• The trade-off between BRR and cost is obvious: for each guarantee level, the 
cost decreases as the BRR is increased. 
• In general, the higher the guarantee, the greater the reduction in the poverty rate, 
but that is not a proportional relationship. Looking at the poverty efficiency 
measure, UBIs are much less efficient than RTCs in general, and for RTCs cost-
efficiency increases with the BRR, but so does the disincentive effect that results 
from increased effective tax rates. 
• As one would expect, higher guarantee levels reduce the depth of poverty more, 
and for a given guarantee, the higher the cost (i.e., lower BRR), the greater the 
reduction in poverty depth because there are more recipients.  
Table 5-5 focuses on the two parameters not varied in Table 5-4: the income-testing 
unit and the scale factor. To isolate these effects, we report results with a fixed level of 
G = $10,000. We encourage the reader to use the interactive visualization linked to the 
tables to explore the results for other combinations.  
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Table 5-5: Simulation results—Varying type, income-testing unit, scaling factor, and BBR, for G = $10,000 
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The results in Table 5-5 show that, for a given G and BRR, varying the income-testing 
unit affects both the number of recipients and program cost, while varying the scale 
factor affects only the cost but not the number of recipients. The results also show that, 
for every combination of policy parameters where the income-testing unit is the 
individual as opposed to the family, the cost is higher (typically by 40% or more), the 
impact on poverty rate and depth of poverty is larger, and the poverty efficiency is lower. 
In other words, when the income-testing unit is the individual, the average cost of lifting 
a person out of poverty is higher, but more people are lifted past the MBM threshold. 
Changing the scale factor from √2 to per capita acts in the same direction (i.e., higher 
costs and bigger impacts on poverty rates and depths of poverty), but the differences in 
impacts are small.  
4.2 Finding optimal basic income parameters for reducing the poverty rate  
The results from the simulations presented to this point indicate that the guarantee 
level, the BRR, and the income-testing unit all have substantial effects on cost and on 
impacts on poverty rates and depths of poverty. It is not immediately obvious what 
combination of these parameters would be most effective in reducing poverty. Green, 
Kesselman, Tedds, Crisan et al. (2020) present an optimization exercise that uses the 
simulation results to compute the optimal combination of parameters in terms of 
reducing the poverty rate for specified cost levels varying between $100 million and $50 
billion. This is the exercise we would want to carry out if we were designing a basic 
income and viewed reducing the poverty rate as our main goal.86 
The results of the optimization exercise shown in Figure 5-1 point to four main 
observations.  
First, similar to what we observed in Table 5-5, switching between scale factors has 
only small effects on the poverty rate at any given cost level. In some ways, this is 
surprising, since one would expect that the savings resulting from paying couples about 
1.4 times the individual benefit (scale factor = √2) rather than 2 times the individual 
benefit (scale factor = per capita) should allow a given amount of money to be spent on 
 
86 Results for reducing the depth of poverty point to similar conclusions, though using the depth of poverty as an 
outcome measure is not straightforward, since the depth of poverty can move in counterintuitive directions with 
increases in spending. For example, if there was a group near the poverty line and another in much deeper poverty, 
then increased spending that lifted the first group over the poverty line would cause the average depth of poverty to 
increase. 
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much larger reductions in the poverty rate. However, as indicated earlier, singles make 
up a disproportionate share of people living in poverty and, obviously, for them the scale 
factor distinction has no impact. This is important because it highlights the value of the 
simulation exercise: the general principle that paying on a family basis is less costly 
may be true, but it turns out to be more or less irrelevant in practice, given the actual 
joint distributions of income and marital status in B.C.  
Second, the optimization exercise is also consistent with results described in the 
previous section, supporting the observation that a UBI is much costlier (and therefore 
less effective in reducing poverty at any given cost level) than an RTC approach. 
However, the comparison is somewhat complex, reflecting the fact that we are choosing 
optimal parameter combinations at each cost level. Figure 5-1 shows the poverty rate at 
various levels of cost for a UBI and a RTC set at its most efficient option with family 
income testing and a per capita scale factor. It shows that the two approaches are 
actually not very different at low expenditure levels. Even at a $2.5 billion expenditure, 
the RTC approach yields poverty rates that are only about 1 percentage point lower 
than the UBI approach. But by $10 billion (i.e., when G is nearing $20,000 in the RTC 
approach) the poverty rate under an RTC would approach 2% or about 3.5 percentage 
points lower than under a UBI.  
Figure 5-1: Poverty rate at set cost levels for UBI and RTC basic incomes 
 
However, the figure also illustrates our third observation, that efforts to reduce the 
poverty rate below about 2% quickly become increasingly expensive even for the RTC. 
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For the UBI this goal is not achievable even with program expenditure exceeding $35 
billion. 
The fourth key result from the optimization exercise is that, under the RTC, the optimal 
approach in terms of reducing poverty turns out to raise both G and the BRR as the cost 
level increases. This result is far from obvious; a potentially fruitful alternative would be 
to raise G but keep the BRR unchanged. The latter approach would limit the amount of 
G that could be afforded at any cost level, since a lower BRR extends the benefits to a 
wider group of recipients, making the increase in G more costly. The optimal approach 
turns out to be to use a low BRR when G is low, at low cost levels. That combination 
implies a low BE level of income so that benefits are being paid mainly to people below 
or not far above the poverty line. As the expenditure allocated to a basic income 
increases, one can increase G, but to keep it focused on low-income people, the BRR 
must be raised (and, with it, the BE kept low) in order to get the most reduction in 
poverty for the level of spending.  
Taken together, these results point to an important conclusion. If our goal is to reduce 
poverty, then an RTC is the preferred basic income approach—especially as total 
spending on the basic income increases. But within the RTC approach, to reduce 
poverty as much as possible, as expenditures in the system increase, both G and BRR 
increase. As discussed in Part 3, Section 5.3 (Income Testing and Effective Tax Rate 
Implications) and Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance), it is high BRRs that are 
largely responsible for creating a welfare wall of work disincentives. This simulation 
exercise shows that in fact the optimal BRR rises from 10% at $1 billion in expenditures 
to over 80% at $7 billion in expenditures, not far off the B.C. Income Assistance BRR of 
100%.  
This result may not be clear to many basic income proponents, who often decry the 
welfare walls inherent in current conditional transfer systems and argue that a basic 
income would be much better in this regard. If one spends more than a small amount on 
a basic income program with the goal of reducing poverty, then it is not true that the 
basic income is much better than a traditional welfare program in terms of disincentive 
effects. In both cases, consideration must be given to how to reduce poverty while 
minimizing these welfare wall consequences.  
Of course, all of our simulation exercises including the optimization rely on the 
assumption that a basic income of any format would not affect incentives and thus 
reduce earnings or reported incomes. In fact, as we explore in the next section, the 
increased taxes needed to finance a basic income in addition to the implicit disincentive 
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effects of the BRR applied to all with incomes below the BE would reduce incomes. 
Since the costs of a basic income of the RTC or NIT format would increase with 
reduced personal incomes, which would also reduce income tax revenues, the program 
costs of a real world program would be even higher than our estimates. As will be 
explained in the next section, even with its zero BRR, a basic income of the UBI format 
does not escape these second-round impacts on its budgetary costs. 
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5. Claims made for or about a basic income 
Basic income has been promoted as an important policy tool for a long list of reasons, 
ranging from supporting increased entrepreneurial activity to increasing mental health. 
In this section, we assess some of the key claims made about the positive and negative 
impacts of a basic income. This is based on detailed assessment of these claims 
provided in Green (2020b). 
5.1 Using the tax system means a basic income is easy to implement 
One claim advanced for a basic income is that it can be administered through the tax 
system, making it more transparent, easier to access, and less costly to administer than 
other transfer approaches. In the Canadian context, Forget (2018, p. 162) argues that 
“the basic income could be offered at very low administrative cost because it could be 
delivered through the income tax system.” Further, Tedds (2017) notes that delivering 
benefits through the tax system, as opposed to through the existing provincial social 
assistance system, has additional advantages in terms of ease of access and reduced 
stigma from receiving benefits. However, this approach faces two key problems.  
The first is that a substantial proportion of Canadians do not file taxes in a given year, 
and a non-trivial proportion are not found in tax-related administrative data at all, 
suggesting that they have never filed taxes. As noted by Robson and Schwartz (2020), 
approximately 13% of working-age adults in British Columbia did not file a tax return in a 
given year, and the rate is at least 20% for Income Assistance recipients. Green, 
Gutierrez et al., (2020) provide further evidence of non-filing by matching census, tax, 
and death records, showing that 7.4% of people in the census did not file taxes in 2015 
and 3.5% were not in tax records at all. Further, Green, Gutierrez et al. (2020) show that 
those who do not file taxes are disproportionately the least well-off. Since those least 
well-off have a strong incentive to file to qualify for refundable tax credits, such as the 
GST/HST tax credit, the Child Opportunity Benefit, and B.C.’s climate action tax credit, 
raises concerns about whether that tax system as currently structured could adequately 
deliver a basic income to those who need it most.  
The second is that to be more effective as a delivery vehicle for a basic income, the tax 
system needs to be more responsive to real-time fluctuations in income. Currently, the 
tax system operates at annual frequency, meaning there is potentially a large time lag 
between when a person experiences an income shock and when they would be 
assessed for income benefits under the tax system. Depending on timing of the income, 
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there can be considerable lags between when a person’s income falls and when 
benefits intended to help make up for that fall would be delivered. In the extreme, if a 
person lost their job in January of, say, 2020, this would not be reported to the tax 
system until the spring of 2021. While a universal basic income would not suffer from 
issues of timing relative to negative events like job loss because the benefit does not 
vary with time, a basic income delivered as a refundable tax credit would. A delay in 
receiving the benefit then may drive the person deeper into financial insecurity: they 
may not qualify for provincial social assistance (a timelier option), given that they 
worked in the past so they may have income and assets above social assistance 
thresholds, and they have earnings at their new lower-paid job that may be higher than 
social assistance income eligibility thresholds. That is, a provincial social assistance 
system would have to remain intact (Forget, 2018), but people would still fall through the 
cracks.  
To address these cracks, Segal et al. (2020) argue instead for using a delivery 
mechanism like that used for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB), in 
which people apply (either online or with help) at the time of an income drop and are 
paid on a “trust then verify” approach. This approach still requires people to have a valid 
Social Insurance Number, which is not the case for the 3% to 6.6% of people missing 
from the system (Green, Gutierrez et al., 2020). However, given the controversy 
currently unfolding regarding the use of the trust-then-verify system used by the CERB, 
it is not clear whether many Canadians are ready to support a permanent 
implementation of such a system.  
5.2 Claims related to work 
A variety of claims are made about the impact of a basic income on work. Proponents 
argue that it will actually increase tendencies to take paid work through lowering the 
“welfare wall” (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). However, as we show in Part 5, 
Section 4.2 (Finding Optimal Basic Income Parameters for Reducing the Poverty Rate), 
in order for a basic income to have higher benefits for those with the lowest income and 
to focus payments more on that group, its program design will mimic the welfare wall 
present in the Income Assistance system. This means that a means-tested basic 
income must still wrestle with the existence of a welfare wall—it is a trade-off that any 
redistribution system needs to confront. That is not to say that we are unconcerned 
about work disincentives caused by high effective tax rates; we are just saying that a 
basic income has no advantage in this respect. 
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On the other hand, opponents of a basic income argue that it will induce people toward 
less work because they can afford to work less. In Part 3, Section 5.2 (Combined 
Incentive Effects on Labour Supply), we show that lowering the welfare wall will induce 
some unemployed benefit recipients to take a job while at the same time incenting those 
who are subject to higher tax rates to work less. The relevant question is which effect is 
stronger. The literature points to relatively weak effects in general and particularly small 
effects for employed people working above-average hours per week. More specifically, 
Green (2020c) concludes: 
Overall, based on estimates in various related literatures and an exercise 
using those estimates in conjunction with census data for B.C., a shift to a 
generous basic income scheme would likely have limited impacts on total 
hours worked in the economy. It would also likely have small effects in 
drawing IA recipients into work through lowering the welfare wall. At the 
same time, there are some groups—notably those without children—for 
whom predicted hours reductions are somewhat larger. Concerns for 
those groups could be mitigated by implementing a wage or earnings 
subsidy in conjunction with the basic income. But the key conclusion is 
that hours impacts are likely not large enough for them to be the main 
factor in deciding on whether to adopt a basic income. 
A basic income would therefore likely have negative effects on paid work—but not to a 
large enough extent to justify a strong argument against a basic income. 
However, this is a focus on paid work. Just because someone works less in paid work 
does not necessarily mean they work less overall, when non-paid work, such as 
caregiving and volunteering, is factored in. In terms of caregiving, Schirle (2015) found 
that the Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) resulted in lower hours of work and 
participation rates declined for mothers of young children, with particularly large effects 
for mothers with less education. However, Koebel and Schirle (2016) found that the 
reduction arises only for legally married mothers, while divorced mothers increased their 
labour force participation. In a similar vein, Riddell and Riddell (2020) show that in the 
Mincome experiment, married women with children reduced their mean hours of paid 
work by approximately 40%. They did not, however, reduce their probability of 
participation, so it looks as if they cut back on hours of work to spend more time at 
home (likely in child care). These women report an accompanying increase in life 
satisfaction. These results fit with married women shifting their work hours from the 
market to home. However, given that the single mothers increased their paid work, the 
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argument that a basic income supports moves to types of work that are outside the paid 
labour market is not universal.  
Regarding volunteering, Campolieti et al. (2009) found that people who receive benefits 
from Canada Pension Plan disability benefits are more likely to volunteer than people 
with a disability who are not receiving these benefits or people receiving benefits from 
workers’ compensation. However, since CPP disability benefits do have a limit on 
earnings, it may be more the case that program design results in a shift away from paid 
work to volunteering so as not to risk a loss of benefits. Therefore, it may not be the 
basic income that induces additional volunteering. Rather, the program design may 
result in a person wanting social inclusion being constrained to volunteering rather than 
paid work.  
5.3 A basic income would improve child well-being, development, and 
education 
Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017, p. 25) state, “Like other ways of making family 
income more secure, basic income can be expected to have a beneficial effect on 
children’s health and education. … By facilitating chosen part-time work and promoting 
a smoother conciliation of work and family life, it enables parents to devote more 
attention to their children when this is most needed.” Jones and Stabile (2020) review 
existing evidence on the effects of income transfers on child outcomes. They conclude 
that transfer income improves cognitive, social, behavioural, and physical outcomes for 
children and infants. Forget (2011) found that continuation rates from Grade 11 to 
Grade 12 for high school students in Dauphin, Manitoba, increased substantially relative 
to students either in Winnipeg or in the rest of the province other than Winnipeg during 
the Mincome experiment, falling back to prior levels after the experiment ended.  
These various positive effects on social behaviour, cognitive skills, and education from 
transfer income could arise through different channels: increased spending on goods 
related to child health and education; reduced stress in the household; and increases in 
parental time with children as a result of reductions in paid work. Jones et al. (2019) 
found that households receiving child benefits increased spending on education-related 
goods such as computers and on food, and decreased spending on cigarettes and 
alcohol. Najjarrezaparast and Pendakur (2020) examine the effect of the Canada Child 
Benefit on consumption patterns and find that beneficiary households dramatically 
increased their spending on housing.  
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However, Jones and Stabile (2020, p. 10) note, “It isn’t clear that one can conclude that 
one type of benefit income delivery system has a much larger impact on child outcomes 
than another,” pointing out that it may be cash transfers in general rather than a basic 
income in particular that generate the positive effects. Based on Jones and Stabile’s 
conclusions, it appears that existing evidence points to substantial returns in terms of 
child outcomes from providing transfers to low-income households, but there is no clear 
case that such transfers achieve better outcomes if they are delivered in a basic income 
form.  
5.4 A basic income would increase entrepreneurship 
Advocates of a basic income, particularly those in Silicon Valley, argue that a basic 
income provides economic security that would make people more willing to take 
entrepreneurial risks. In any discussion of entrepreneurial activity it is important to 
separate true entrepreneurship, in the sense of pursuing a productive idea that could 
develop into a firm with many employees, from simply starting a business. In particular, 
Lester (2020) distinguishes between “necessity” self-employment, in which individuals 
open a small business (usually employing only themselves) because of a lack of options 
in paid employment, and “opportunity” self-employment, in which individuals open 
businesses to pursue an innovative idea, potentially leading to employment of others. 
Green (2020c) shows that a significant portion of necessity self-employment is more 
related to labour market conditions than entrepreneurship.  
The division into different types of self-employment is important for discussing the role 
of a basic income relative to opening firms. As Lester (2020) points out, the necessity 
self-employed are a group that appear to need help, since they have very low incomes, 
but they are underserved by income support programs. In particular, by Lester’s count, 
only 2.1% of government spending on active labour market programs targets the self-
employed (a much smaller proportion than the proportion of all workers) and they have 
limited access to Employment Insurance. Thus, a basic income could be seen as a way 
of providing support for a group of people who currently have few supports. Of course, if 
a basic income helps make self-employment less risky by providing income in periods of 
business downturns or failure, then entering self-employment will become more 
attractive. It is not clear whether this would be a good outcome, given the arguments 
that this tends to be a low-income, high-variability employment state and only rarely a 
path to true entrepreneurship. Indeed, it could serve to subsidize the type of precarious, 
unstable employment related to ride-sharing and other “disruptive” technology 
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employment—employment that we have argued in Part 4, Section 5.7 (Labour Market 
Regulation) is a source of potential concern. Lester (2020) does note, though, that 
acquiring extended health and work injury coverage is problematic for both the self-
employed and entrepreneurs, reducing the attractiveness of opening a firm. This 
suggests that some types of basic services support may be at least as helpful in 
providing a favourable climate for opening businesses as providing a basic income.  
5.5 A basic income will improve health 
Forget (2018, p. 64) argues that improved health outcomes is a key way in which a 
basic income can pay for itself, arguing that it “will pay off in a need for fewer hospital 
beds and lower demands placed on family doctors, who too often find themselves 
prescribing antidepressants and anti-anxiety medications to people living with the stress 
of chronic poverty and economic insecurity.” The evidence cuts across demographics. 
Low-income mothers have higher rates of premature birth and low birth weight, which 
are themselves associated with worse outcomes of various kinds for those children later 
in life. The Finnish basic income experiment indicates that access to ongoing benefits 
results in an improvement in overall health. Costello et al. (2010) found ongoing income 
benefits resulted in decreases in any psychiatric disorder during adolescence as well as 
in young adulthood (i.e., to age 21) and reductions in alcohol and cannabis use. 
McIntyre et al. (2016) show that seniors receiving a basic income through the OAS/GIS 
programs results in better overall health. Milligan and Stabile (2011) found that child 
benefits lead to a lower emotional disorder-anxiety score, as well as significantly 
reducing maternal depression, albeit with little discernable impact on overall health of 
either the mother or the children. Jones and Stabile (2020) also find that more income 
tends to reduce maternal depression. Thus, there is evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that having a consistent income source reduces stress and increases mental 
health for people in low-income households.  
A second element of the claims about a basic income and health outcomes is that 
improved health leads to reduced use of health-care resources—that is, fewer visits to 
hospitals and doctors’ offices. This is sometimes asserted as one way in which a basic 
income can, in essence, help pay for itself. Forget (2011) argues that hospitalization 
dropped by 8.5% in Dauphin relative to the control group because of the Mincome basic 
income and that this suggests that there could be considerable savings in health 
spending from implementing a basic income. She found that the drop in hospitalizations 
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was driven by drops in accidents and injuries and in mental health diagnoses, both of 
which she attributes to reductions in financial stress because of the basic income.  
Green (2020b), however, challenges this finding. Figure 5-2 shows the difference 
between the treatment (Dauphin) and the control (other jurisdictions in the area). The 
points for 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 correspond to the Mincome experiment years. 
Two key points follow from this figure. First, the convergence in hospitalization rates 
between Dauphin and the controls happens almost entirely after the experiment has 
ended. Second, there was already a trend toward convergence underway before 
Mincome. It is not clear where the downward trend comes from, but Forget (2011, p. 
295) notes the installation of a “fairly new” hospital in Dauphin in the pre-Mincome 
years, such that “it is certainly possible that some of the comparison group may have 
had less convenient access to hospitals than the Dauphin residents, leading them to 
forgo voluntary treatment. It could be the case that the hospital led to an initial set of 
admissions and procedures in Dauphin that took years to clear through.  
Figure 5-2: Difference between Dauphin and controls hospitalizations  
 
Source: Forget (2011), Figure 2 
 
Conversely, Green, Hicks, et al. (2020) examine the impact of benefit denial under 
Income Assistance and find evidence that losing transfer income does not alter medical 
system usage rates as reflected in the person showing up with in MSP billing data. 
However, it may be associated with a small increase in death rates, pointing again to 
the distinction between actual health and health system use. These new assessments 
of the data on health-care system usage point to a conclusion of no effect or even 
possibly increases in hospital usage when transfer income access is provided. A basic 
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income therefore seems to help with health, but not in a way that will provide savings in 
health-care costs.  
5.6 A basic income will reduce crime rates 
Another way that a basic income is claimed to both provide direct benefits and reduce 
other expenditures is through reducing crime. In particular, Calnitsky and Gonalons-
Pons (2018) examine crime impacts using the Mincome experiment and suggest that 
Mincome resulted in lower crime in Dauphin, the saturation site for the experiment. 
However, the decrease in crime in Dauphin began at least a year before the first 
Mincome payment was made, on December 1, 1974. While there was an advance 
information campaign about the impending payment, it seems unlikely that people 
would cut back on property crime because of a promised basic income to come later. 
Moreover, Dauphin continues to have lower property crime rates after the experiment is 
over. That fits more with Dauphin being on a different trend than a pure treatment effect. 
On the other hand, violent crime follows a pattern that fits better with a treatment effect: 
the rates for Dauphin and other similar-sized towns are very similar through 1974, 
diverge during the experiment, and then come back together afterwards. The implication 
is that there is some evidence of beneficial effects on violent crime of a relatively 
substantial size but uncertain evidence on the property crime impacts. Akee et al. 
(2010) used the Eastern Cherokee Band dividend to examine the impact on crime, 
finding a 22% reduction in self-reported criminal activity among youth from families 
receiving the benefits, with much of the reduction in terms of minor crimes and drug 
dealing. Combined with the Mincome evidence, this does point to some reduction in 
crime rates associated with a basic income.  
5.7 A basic income will raise wages 
A basic income has been argued to be a tool for better wages and working conditions, 
especially for low-skill workers (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). There are two 
mechanisms through which this could occur. The first is a simple demand-and-supply 
channel. If a basic income induces some unskilled workers to withdraw from the labour 
market, then supply will be reduced and, as long as the demand for labour is not 
perfectly elastic, wages will rise. Rothstein (2010) used this framework to examine the 
impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States on wage-setting, 
and found evidence that the EITC reduced wages to an extent that substantially 
reduced the benefits of the program, essentially transferring some of the benefit money 
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to employers and consumers. Based on this, he argued that a combination of the EITC 
with a minimum wage could be effective in making sure the benefits actually ended up 
with workers.  
The second route through which a basic income can affect wages is its impacts on 
bargaining—in particular, that a basic income increases the relative bargaining strength 
of workers over firms due to having a credible alternative to negotiation (namely, the 
basic income benefit). There is considerable theoretical evidence in support of this 
claim, but the empirical evidence is less clear. For example, Beaudry et al. (2012) show 
that workers in a given industry (e.g., construction) are paid higher wages in local labour 
markets where there are higher-paying firms, such as steel mills, than in ones where the 
employment structure is dominated by lower-paying firms, such as call centres. This is 
because a worker’s outside option includes the possibility of getting a high-paid steel job 
in the first firm and the worker can use that as a threat in bargaining. On the other hand, 
Jager et al. (2019) examine the wage impacts of a major unemployment insurance 
reform in Austria and find no effect on wages. Further, Green and Townsend (2009) 
estimated impacts on the wage distribution of changes in disability benefits across 
provinces and over time and found no conclusive evidence. 
5.8 A basic income will increase human capital investment 
One key claim made in favour of a basic income is that it will provide a sound 
foundation for investment in human capital. We have already discussed potential 
impacts for children and teenagers in households that would receive basic income or 
other transfers. The claimed being made here is that a basic income would also lead to 
increases in training and education among adults. The argument is similar to the one 
made about increasing entrepreneurship – that people with a secure income base will 
be more likely to make risky investments.  
Sweetman (2020) provides a thorough analysis of the Canadian and international 
evidence on the effectiveness of training programs and assesses the claims made for a 
basic income in this area. He argues that recent evidence points to training programs 
having long term effects that more than justify their costs. However, there is 
considerable heterogeneity both across types of programs and across different 
recipients for a given program. Sweetman (2020) argues that this heterogeneity should 
be tackled directly through development of targeting/referral systems. He sees these as 
paying off even for workers whose income would place them well above break-even 
levels in standard basic income schemes. Thus, his recommendation is for 
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governments to actively search out workers for offers of training (something that both 
the federal and provincial governments have already started). A basic income could 
complement this approach but, given its essentially passive nature, could in no way 
replace it. 
5.8 Summary 
Our overall conclusion is that the various claims made for a basic income receive 
varying amounts of support from empirical investigations completed for our panel as 
well as work by other researchers, but this evidence does not, overall, suggest that a 
generally available basic income is an intrinsically better policy approach than available 
alternatives to address these policy issues.  
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6. Financing a basic income 
A critical issue in assessing both the feasibility and desirability of any basic income 
scheme is how to finance its cost. In Section 3 (Basic Income Design), we discussed 
the policy trade-offs inherent in a basic income and how they are affected by design 
details, particularly related to cost, the size of payments and the number of people who 
receive payments, responsiveness, and the incentives related to whether and how 
much to work and other choices. Decisions about how to finance the basic income 
combine with the basic income itself to further affect all these considerations. The 
combination of the basic income design details and its financing details must form the 
basis for assessing the feasibility and comparative merit of a basic income. 
In this section we explore the financing that would be needed for some of the basic 
income scenarios presented in Section 4 (Simulation Results). While our mandate is not 
to propose specific financing provisions, it is essential to have a sense of the limits 
around B.C.’s fiscal and economic capacity to finance basic income costs, as well as 
the implications of using different potential funding sources. 
We pursue this task in two main stages. First, we discuss in principle why financing and 
the implications of financing have to be considered jointly with the implications of any 
chosen basic income design in examining the trade-offs inherent in our analytical 
framework—especially trade-offs among adequacy, cost, and incentive effects. Second, 
we examine the various sources of financing. Governments always have essentially two 
choices for funding a new policy measure: increase taxes or reduce spending; 
increased debt finance has ultimate limits. Part 3, Section 3 (Fiscal Context) provides 
background on B.C.’s overall fiscal capacity and on the revenue sources and spending 
programs that could be considered to finance any new spending initiative, including a 
basic income. 
On the revenue side, it is apparent that increasing personal income tax (PIT) revenue is 
one of the key options, but the way in which PIT revenue is increased has significant 
implications, especially when the effective tax rate associated with an income-tested 
basic income is combined with existing and increased PIT rates or reduced tax credits. 
This analysis relies on the background provided in Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing 
and Effective Tax Rate Implications). 
Part 5: Basic Income 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 355 
 
Gross and budgetary cost 
Prior to that analysis, it is important to clarify what we mean by the “cost” of a basic 
income. The aggregate value of the payments made to recipients under a basic income 
is the “gross cost” of the program. The “net cost” or “budgetary cost” of a basic income 
is the gross cost less any expenditure reductions that directly result from the 
introduction of the basic income absent any program changes. For simplicity, we 
assume that the basic income is overlaid on the existing income and social support 
system, of which Income Assistance is the largest program in terms of expenditure.  
In accordance with its underlying funder-of-last-resort principle, Income Assistance has 
a 100% benefit reduction rate (BRR) that applies to a very broad definition of income. 
While the Income Assistance definition of income does not currently mention basic 
income benefits, including them would be consistent with that principle. A universal 
basic income (UBI) with a monthly guaranteed income (G) that exceeds the Income 
Assistance break-even (BE) point of $1,160 monthly for an individual87 would eliminate 
Temporary Assistance cash payments in that case and, depending on the level of G, 
would reduce or eliminate Disability Assistance spending. A negative income tax (NIT) 
basic income that responds to monthly changes in income would similarly reduce or 
eliminate Income Assistance benefit payments, depending on G and BRR. For a 
refundable tax credit (RTC) basic income, the Temporary Assistance spending 
reduction would be more complicated because the RTC is fixed a year at a time, while 
Income Assistance responds to monthly changes in income. Individuals currently 
receiving either Temporary Assistance or Disability Assistance would likely have their 
eligibility terminated by an RTC or their benefits reduced, depending on the G and BRR 
of the RTC. On the other hand, those who receive few or no RTC benefits because they 
are near or above the RTC’s BE point, and whose income falls significantly, could begin 
to meet the Income Assistance income eligibility requirements, at least until the RTC 
benefit amount is reassessed in the next year or the year after.  
In the simulations described in Section 4, because of this complexity and a lack of data 
about people currently receiving Income Assistance in the SPSD/M database used for 
simulations, we have estimated only the gross costs of the simulated basic incomes. 
 
87 The Temporary Assistance BE for a single person is equal to the monthly benefit amount plus the income 
exemption, which is currently $385 support plus $375 shelter plus $400 earnings exemption, for a total of $1,160. 
Note that the temporary COVID-19 top-up of $300 per month has not been included, and the earnings exemption is 
slated to increase to $500 in 2021. 
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Clearly the budgetary cost will be less than the estimated gross cost regardless of the 
type of basic income implemented, but the amount of the difference will depend on the 
parameters chosen plus any discretionary program savings undertaken along with the 
basic income. 
6.1 Implications of financing for policy trade-offs 
It is helpful to conceptualize the financing choices for a basic income of any form—
whether a UBI or an income-tested variant—at a broad level. We have already 
discussed why, for any given guarantee level, a basic income’s gross cost decreases as 
BRR increases—as income testing gets stricter.  
One can think of applying a positive BRR as a way of “internally” reducing the cost of 
the program compared with a UBI that is not income-tested at all. Increasing the BRR of 
an income-tested basic income further reduces its budgetary cost. Thus, the need for 
financing from “external” sources falls as the BRR increases, other parameters being 
equal.  
Our simulation results confirm the strength of this relationship, which Table 5-6 shows 
for a basic income with a guarantee of $10,000, income testing done at the individual 
level, and benefits scaled by √2. This is the most efficient combination of parameters in 
terms of poverty reduction, as noted in Section 4.2 (Finding Optimal Basic Income 
Parameters for Reducing the Poverty Rate). 
Table 5-6: Income testing and gross cost of a basic income  
Type UBI RTC 




25.7 11.6 6.6 4.3 3.2 2.7 
Note: G = $10,000, individual income test, and square root scaling 
Source: Simulations performed for the panel 
 
The trade-off between gross cost and the disincentive to earn more associated with the 
BRR is discussed in Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing and Effective Tax Rate 
Implications). In summary, increasing BRR reduces the budgetary cost by both reducing 
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the number of recipients (those below the break-even level) and reducing the payments 
received by recipients with other income. But increasing the BRR increases distortions 
that apply to recipients because the BRR is effectively a tax on additional earnings, a 
disincentive to earn more, and it combines with existing effective income tax rates to 
create an overall disincentive effect. Higher BRRs constrain the autonomy of recipients 
in many respects, such as reducing the returns to accepting a better job, undertaking 
further education, upgrading skills, or moving to a higher-wage locale. 
Overlaid on that trade-off is the effect of financing the budgetary cost. Every method of 
funding the cost of a basic income has its own inherent set of economic distortions that 
apply to whatever group of taxpayers or spending program beneficiaries bear the cost 
burden. It is important that the overall level of distortion be given due consideration, 
because distortions inherent in the basic income combine not only with the distortions 
inherent in the existing fiscal system but also with the additional distortions caused by 
changes to the fiscal system needed to finance the basic income. Together these affect 
labour supply through effective tax rates along with associated economic efficiency 
costs and distributional impacts. 
This way of conceptualizing the costs of a basic income, as a continuum based on the 
degree of income testing, stresses the point that the behavioural distortions—the 
disincentives and associated efficiency costs—cannot be avoided. If the budgetary cost 
is financed by increasing personal income taxes, the total distortions are those due to 
the BRR plus existing income tax rates plus the incremental tax rates associated with 
financing. If the cost is financed by increasing other taxes or reducing expenditure 
programs, different types of distortions will also arise for various types of activities or 
choices.  
Advocates of a UBI claim that because it is not income-tested, the scheme does not 
itself impose disincentives to work while eliminating the extreme disincentives for 
Income Assistance beneficiaries associated with a 100% clawback of earned income. 
This ignores a key fact: a UBI imposes higher fiscal costs than a comparable income-
tested basic income, and funding that cost will inevitably impose distortions on 
taxpayers that increase with the cost. In other words, when distortions imposed by the 
basic income are combined with distortions caused by its financing, all basic income 
designs have significant disincentive and distortionary effects. While the specifics 
depend on the details of both the basic income and its financing, this conclusion is 
unavoidable for programs that redistribute incomes. 
Part 5: Basic Income 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 358 
 
The degree of income testing for a basic income combined with financing also has 
implications for the distribution of income. The financing could, in principle, be designed 
to have any desired impact on income distribution, such as putting more of the burden 
on low-income, middle-income, or high-income taxpayers. For income-tested basic 
incomes, the BRR itself has a distributional effect by determining how quickly net 
benefits decline with increasing income for everyone under the BE income. Again, the 
way the budgetary cost is financed affects the overall distributional effect. But the 
distributional effects of the financing are overlaid on a basic income that itself flattens 
the income distribution.  
Eliminating tax credits to finance a basic income 
An alternative PIT approach to financing basic income costs through income tax rate 
increases is to eliminate the personal credit amount and some or all non-refundable and 
refundable tax credits, effectively depriving taxpayers of the reductions in tax payable 
resulting from tax credits in exchange for the basic income benefits. For those at low 
and moderate incomes, basic income benefits would more than compensate for the loss 
of tax credits. This financing approach has been utilized in whole or in part by almost 
every Canadian basic income proposal (summarized in Appendix 5-B), so it warrants 
scrutiny.  
The non-refundable tax credit with the largest potential to provide savings that would 
offset the budgetary cost of a basic income is the “personal amount.” It effectively 
creates an income tax exemption equal to the personal amount through a non-
refundable tax credit that applies to every tax filer, equal to the personal amount times 
the tax rate for the lowest income bracket. The tax increase for taxpayers that would 
result from eliminating the personal amount varies widely across the jurisdictions, 
depending on the level of the personal amount and the tax rate for the lowest tax 
bracket, as shown in Table 5-7. It would be about $2,300 in Quebec, $2,000 in Alberta, 
$1,000 in Manitoba, and about $550 in British Columbia and Ontario. In addition, every 
taxable filer would lose about $2,000 if the federal basic amount were eliminated to 
finance a national basic income. As indicated in Appendix 5-B, a G of $6,400 that could 
be funded by eliminating the personal amount in Alberta (and several smaller provincial 
tax credits) would be reduced to only about $2,000 in B.C. because of this differential. 
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Federal $13,229 15.00 $1,984 
Quebec $15,532 15.00 $2,330 
Alberta $19,369 10.00 $1,937 
Manitoba $9,838 10.80 $1,063 
British Columbia $10,949 5.06 $554 
Ontario $10,783 5.05 $545 
Source: www.taxtips.ca 
 
Elimination of tax credits as a financing mechanism has deficiencies beyond its limited 
capacity to fund a prospective B.C. basic income program, as elaborated by Kesselman 
(2018). Proponents of the method sometimes assert that the non-refundable personal 
amount is “regressive,” so that eliminating it would improve distributional effects of the 
tax system. However, as a credit with a lump-sum value per taxable filer, the personal 
amount is actually progressive relative to income except for filers with income so low 
that they are non-taxable. Simply making the existing personal amount refundable 
would address the issue for those non-taxable individuals. 
Removing the personal amount from the tax system would in fact be one of the most 
regressive methods of financing a basic income, since it is equivalent to a lump-sum tax 
increase—imposing the smallest proportionate tax increases on those with the highest 
incomes. Some proposals for financing a basic income recognize this point by 
 
88 Revenue increase calculated as product of personal amount and the tax rate for the lowest income bracket. The 
calculated amounts apply to those currently paying PIT because their income exceeds the personal amount. For tax 
filers who currently do not pay tax but would become taxable if the personal amount were eliminated, the tax increase 
is only a portion of the tabulated figures. 
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additionally including major expansions of the income tax base affecting high earners 
and/or hikes in the upper-bracket tax rates. Eliminating the personal amount would also 
be less transparent for taxpayers than a more straightforward increase in income tax 
rates; either approach would increase tax liabilities for a wide swath of taxpayers. 
A final deficiency of this method of financing a basic income is that it removes the zero-
tax bracket for initial earnings, so that some individuals might be deterred from entering 
or returning to the labour force. As suggested in Part 3, Section 5.2 (Combined 
Incentive Effects on Labour Supply), it is likely that the disincentive to participate in work 
at all is stronger than the disincentive for those that are working to work less. If an 
income-tested basic income were implemented and the personal amount removed, 
even the first dollar of earnings would then be subject to both the income tax at the rate 
for the lowest income bracket and the basic income’s BRR, creating a significant 
disincentive to enter the labour force. This impact would be a particular concern for the 
non-working spouse in a couple with income below the BE. The interaction between 
BRR and tax rates is discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
B.C. also offers several additional refundable and non-refundable tax credits that could 
be eliminated as funding mechanisms. Table 5-8 provides the list of credits and the 
revenue cost of each of the credits in 2020.  
Like the personal amount, all of these tax credits have lower costs and thus less 
capacity to fund a basic income through their elimination than in provinces with higher 
tax rates for the lowest tax bracket. The personal amount has the highest cost. The 
spousal and eligible dependant amount plays a very similar role to the personal amount, 
and if the personal amount were eliminated it would make sense to eliminate the other 
amount as well. Many of the other credits serve specific purposes that would make their 
elimination less appropriate—for example, those related to children and seniors, who 
would not likely benefit from a provincial basic income as they are already covered by 
federal targeted basic incomes, and those intended to encourage charitable donations 
and post-secondary education and training. Eliminating provincial tax credits for 
employee contributions to the Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance also 
would not be justified so long as the province continues to tax the benefits received from 
those programs. 
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Non-refundable tax credits  
Personal amount 1,600 
Charitable donations 291 
Canada Pension Plan 
contribution 207 








Tuition and education 62 
Disability 37 
Pension 30 
Refundable tax credits  
B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit 400 
Climate action 302 
Sales tax 50 
Small business venture 
capital 
30 
Source: Government of British Columbia, 2020, Tables A1.1.1 and A1.2.1, except the personal amount, which was 
simulated using SPSD/M. 
 
 
89 The cost of tax credits cannot be added together to calculate an aggregate cost because the credits may interact, 
and in the absence of credits taxpayers may make different choices. The B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit tax credit 
took effect on October 1, 2020; the amount shown is the full year’s estimated cost. 
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6.2 Incentive and efficiency effects of financing provisions 
One of our main points about a basic income is that it is not enough to focus on the 
basic income itself—it must be put into the broader context of how it would combine and 
interact with the existing public administrative structure. We have discussed why policy 
trade-offs associated with basic income benefits must be addressed in this broader 
context to be fully understood. The same applies to the financing of a basic income. 
Here we consider the combined incentive effects and the associated efficiency costs of 
the basic income along with existing tax rates and the increased tax rates that would be 
needed to finance the program. 
Tax rates affect work incentives. Incentives related to work go well beyond just the 
decision to begin working, or the decision to work more or less. They also include when 
to work (shifts), job search, occupation, industry, employer, migration, self-employment, 
off-the-books work, illegal activities, wages versus fringe benefits, on-the-job training, 
and formal education and skills upgrading. Tax rates also affect income tax compliance, 
honest self-reporting of income, and many aspects of tax planning, tax avoidance, and 
evasion behaviour. In addition to work incentives, tax rates can affect other life 
decisions, especially family formation and fragmentation, marriage, and childbearing. 
Tax rates can create incentives on the employer side, too, but we ignore those for our 
current purposes. 
Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing and Effective Tax Rate Implications) addresses two 
effective tax rate measures and how they relate to work incentives: the participation tax 
rate (PTR) and the marginal effective tax rate (METR). The PTR refers to the total loss 
through higher taxes and lower benefits from choosing to work at given levels of income 
compared with not working. In contrast, the METR measures the loss from higher taxes 
and lower benefits when earning one more dollar of income, beginning at some initial 
level of income. People directly observe the PTR when they start to work, but their 
perception of METR also affects work-related decisions: the higher METR, the less 
take-home pay one gets for working more or moving to a higher-paying job. As 
discussed in detail in Part 3, PTR is a measure of the tax effect associated with the 
participation decision, for those not working, as to whether to accept a job at a given 
level of income, known as the extensive margin. METR is a measure of the effect of 
taxes and benefit programs on decisions by those participating in the labour force that 
would change their income, whether by changing the number of hours worked or 
changing jobs, known as the intensive margin. Part 3 also discusses the estimates of 
the size of these effects (elasticities) and how they translate into labour supply changes. 
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The estimated elasticities are small but can make a difference when the changes in 
METRs and PTRs are large. As the Part 3 discussion also points out, design details of a 
program beyond effective tax rates can also have a significant impact on work-related 
incentives. 
Both the METR and PTR faced by an individual are amalgams of the effects of many 
tax and benefit provisions. First is the tax rate structure, where the tax rate applied to 
taxable income depends on the individual’s tax bracket, which increases with higher 
income levels. Second is a variety of premium rates imposed for social insurance 
programs such as Employment Insurance and the Canada Pension Plan. Third are the 
BRRs embedded in many federal and provincial tax credit programs. Some individuals 
are also affected by the BRRs applied in income-tested benefit programs, such as 
housing and child-care subsidies, as discussed in Part 4. Finally, the implementation of 
a basic income would add its BRR to the PTR and METR.  
Figure 5-3 includes three panels that use the approach and data set out by Milligan 
(2020) to show the METR, PTR, and take-home income for three different situations: 
• a single adult with no children where there are no cash-transfer benefits (blue 
line) 
• the same person eligible to receive Temporary Assistance benefits (orange line) 
• the same person receiving an RTC basic income with G = $18,000, BRR = 50%, 
and thus BE = $36,000 (purple line)90 
The basic income example was chosen with reference to the simulation results as a 
relatively efficient example in terms of effect on the poverty rate. This example would 
have a cost of $8.8 billion and would reduce the poverty rate from 8.6% to 2.7%. As 
discussed in Section 4.2 (Finding Optimal Basic Income Parameters for Reducing the 
Poverty Rate), the most efficient combinations require high G and BRR values, but 
taking the poverty rate below 2% becomes increasingly expensive. This combination 
was chosen because it has a relatively low BRR among those that reduce the poverty 
rate to the 2% range. Other combinations have a higher G and BRR. 
Figure 5-3 gives rise to two major observations. The first is the big orange welfare wall, 
the high levels of METR and PTR at and above the $400 per month earned income 
 
90 For a couple with a √2 scale factor, the BE = $53,740. 
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exemption in Temporary Assistance. METRs of 100% or so and PTRs of up to almost 
70% result from the 100% BRR associated with Income Assistance. It also shows up in 
the flat horizontal section of the orange line in Panel 3, where the 100% BRR means 
that increasing earnings in that narrow range does not increase take-home income. The 
second is that a basic income with a 50% BRR generates METR and PTR rates that are 
comparable to those created by Income Assistance. The METR is lower for the basic 
income example than for Temporary Assistance over the zero–$15,000 income range, 
where income tax is not payable because of the basic personal amount and refundable 
tax credits create negative effective tax rates. However, just at the Temporary 
Assistance BE point, where METR falls back to the “no benefits” rate, the basic income 
METR, which is the no-benefit amount plus 50%, jumps up to the 80% level, where it 
remains up to its BE point. The basic income PTR also mirrors the no-benefits PTR, up 
to the BE point, where it begins to drop. In other words, a basic income with a 50% BRR 
has greater disincentives caused by effective tax rates than Temporary Assistance once 
tax becomes payable. Panel 3 shows that, as the slope of the purple line above about 
$15,000 income is a flatter slope than the no-benefits line. 
Figure 5-3: Comparison of METR, PTR, and take-home income 
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All of that does not yet include the disincentives associated with whatever financing 
mechanism is chosen to fund the basic income’s budgetary cost. The example in the 
graph would have a budgetary cost of about $8.8 billion. If the entire cost were financed 
by increasing PIT rates, that would necessitate almost a doubling of the current 
provincial PIT, with large increases in marginal tax rates at most income levels. Unless 
the lowest tax bracket (lowest provincial rate is currently 5.1%) were excluded from the 
tax increase, the METR and PTR shown in the figure would increase. Assuming 
provincial PIT rates were doubled at every income level, that would increase the METR 
and PTR in the taxable income range by about 5 percentage points, a small but material 
increase. As discussed in Part 3, Section 3 (Fiscal Context), almost doubling PIT 
revenues would significantly affect B.C.’s tax competitiveness with the rest of Canada 
and would challenge the public trust and acceptability needed to support such a policy. 
A less ambitious basic income, with a guarantee of $10,000 and a BRR of 25%, would 
have about the same break-even income levels as the example shown in Figure 5-3 
($40,000 for singles, $58,240 for couples) and a reduced budgetary cost of $5.3 billion, 
and the poverty rate would be reduced to 4.8%. But even that version of a basic income 
would mean increasing tax rates by 50% if funded by an across-the-board PIT rate 
increase—also a significant tax increase that would be felt by all taxpayers and would 
add a material amount to the METR and PTR associated with the basic income. Thus, 
regardless of the case, the combined disincentive effects associated with effective tax 
rates, together with public trust and acceptability impacts, would be substantial. 
Significant increases in tax rates would also increase incentives to avoid or evade taxes 
and are unlikely to raise an amount of revenue proportional to the increase in tax rates. 
Similarly, the discussion in Part 3 makes it clear that there are challenges associated 
with raising significant amounts of revenue by increasing the rates and bases of existing 
taxation sources, although it is clearly possible to achieve significant revenue increases 
through a combination of sources if needed. However, while that could be used to fund 
a significant income-tested basic income, it is clear that even a modest UBI would be 
very difficult to accommodate fiscally and would have important economic implications. 
6.3 Financing a basic income with program changes or elimination 
The alternative to using taxation to fund a basic income is to reduce program spending. 
Part 4 of the report, which focuses on the existing system, includes a detailed 
discussion of the whole range of federal and provincial income and social support 
programs. 
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For the purpose of identifying program costs that could be reallocated to fund a basic 
income, our discussion here focuses on B.C. programs, as federal programs are 
beyond the province’s control. In total, B.C. spent about $12 billion on 120 programs in 
2019/20, as reported in Part 4. Table 5-9 summarizes the costs of the major income and 
social support programs. 
Table 5-9: B.C. Income and social support program costs, 2019 
Income and social support program 
Budget 2019  
($ millions) 
Income Assistance cash transfers91 $2,094 
Tax expenditures92 $3,596 
Personal amount $1,600 
Home owner grant $817 
Child Opportunity Benefit $400 




Housing programs $1,060 
Income Assistance supplements $572 
Other $276 
Seniors, children, and families $696 
 
91 “Income Assistance cash transfers” includes Disability Assistance and Temporary Assistance payments. 
92 Tax expenditures cannot, strictly speaking, be aggregated because of interactions among them, but a total is 
provided here for illustrative purposes. The personal amount is not identified as a tax expenditure in budget 
documentation but is discussed in Section 5.1 (Implications of financing for policy trade-offs) as a potential source of 
basic income funding. The Child Opportunity Benefit took effect on October 1, 2020; the amount shown is the 
estimated cost for the full year.  
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Income and social support program 
Budget 2019  
($ millions) 
Various child, youth and family programs $460 
Other $236 
People with disabilities, except Disability 
Assistance 
$1,144 
Community Living BC $1,065 
Other $89 
WorkSafeBC $1,119 
Grant total $11,997 
Source: Government of British Columbia, 2020, Tables A1.1.1 and A1.2.1, except the personal amount, which was 
simulated using SPSD/M. 
 
The full set of income and social support programs identified in Part 4 includes a range 
of cash-transfer programs and basic service and other in-kind benefit programs. Table 
5-9 categorizes the programs in six groups:  
• Income Assistance cash transfers  
• cash transfers provided through the tax system (tax expenditures)  
• basic services focused on those with low incomes  
• basic services for seniors, children, and families  
• basic services for those with disabilities  
• basic services for workers and employers (WorkSafeBC) 
The largest single program area is Income Assistance, which provides cash-transfers in 
the form of Temporary Assistance and Disability Assistance. As discussed earlier, 
Income Assistance cash transfers are likely to be reduced as a consequence of 
introducing a basic income, but the amount of that offset to the gross cost of a basic 
income depends on the type of basic income implemented and its design details, as 
well as how Income Assistance program provisions are adjusted in response to the 
basic income. Currently, Income Assistance cash transfers account for about $2.1 
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billion and, given the complexity of the response together with a lack of data, we were 
unable to estimate the impact of a basic income on that cost. 
Tax expenditures are programs, such as tax credits, that are delivered through the tax 
system and are reported by government as their estimated impact on net revenue. 
Certain tax expenditure programs are discussed in Section 5.2 (Implications of 
Financing for Policy Trade-Offs) as potential funding sources for a basic income, such 
as refundable and non-refundable PIT credits. Tax credit programs account for about 
$3.4 billion in B.C., although this estimate does not take interactions among the credits 
into account. 
In addition to cash transfers, Income Assistance also provides an extensive array of 
supplements that are generally available only to those receiving Income Assistance.93 
These are in-kind benefits, often payments for goods and services required by specific 
recipients, and available only if the recipient meets specific additional eligibility criteria. 
These supplements would still be available to those who qualify for Income Assistance if 
a basic income were implemented. As discussed in Part 4, especially if Income 
Assistance recipients were reduced substantially by a basic income, consideration could 
be given to expanding eligibility for supplements, especially those associated with 
extended health-care coverage, which represent a cost of about $0.6 billion. A wide 
variety of income and social support programs delivered by several ministries are 
directed at low-income people or are income-tested. This category has 24 programs, 
including the Income Assistance supplements, with a total cost of $3.3 billion. 
Several programs target two groups that we specifically excluded from the basic income 
alternatives that were included in our simulations because they are already targeted by 
federal basic income programs: children and seniors. Those programs have a total cost 
to B.C. of about $0.7 billion.  
Another group specifically targeted by several programs is people with disabilities. In 
addition to Disability Assistance cash transfers and supplements that are already 
accounted for as part of Income Assistance, disability-specific programs include 
Community Living BC and several housing programs specifically for those with 
disabilities, with a total cost of about $1.1 billion. 
 
93 The treatment of current Income Assistance supplemental benefits under a basic income or a reformed system to 
expand access for a wider group of the low-income population is assessed in Kesselman and Mendelson (2020). 
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Also included in our definition of income and social support programs is the support 
provided by WorkSafeBC to injured workers, a basic service that benefits both workers 
and employers, with a total cost of about $1.1 billion.  
Together these program categories account for the full $12 billion of B.C.’s spending on 
income and social support programs discussed in Part 4.  
For some advocates, the basic income concept, founded on freedom of choice and 
personal autonomy (and responsibility) associated with unconditional cash transfers, is 
a better option for meeting basic needs than conditional in-kind benefit and basic 
service programs that meet specific basic needs when they arise. Following that logic, 
many of these programs would be candidates for elimination if a basic income were 
introduced, creating savings that would offset the budgetary cost of the basic income. 
Other basic income advocates take a less libertarian approach, recognizing that some 
basic services are a needed adjunct to a basic income, providing among other things 
protection against low-likelihood, high-cost occurrences that would otherwise be 
catastrophic to those with relatively low incomes.  
In our view, from the justice-based perspective that underlies our analytical framework, 
both basic services and cash transfers are needed to ensure broad coverage of basic 
needs—in part because of the importance we place on balancing autonomy with the 
other characteristics we have identified, which we believe leads to the conclusion that 
basic service and cash transfers are both required. In fact, we believe that true 
autonomy requires that certain services be available to provide supports needed to 
prevent adverse events from limiting people’s actual freedom of choice, despite 
receiving cash payments on a regular basis. 
As a result, it is also our view that this group of programs offers little scope, aside from 
the home owner grant, for funding a material portion of the cost of a basic income by 
reform measures, reduction, or elimination. As our detailed analysis of the current 
system in Part 4 makes clear, there is scope for improvement across the system, but 
funding a basic income by eliminating elements of the current system would not be 
consistent with our justice goal. 
Taking the programs one group at a time, the reasons why elimination of programs as a 
method of funding a basic income is not advisable in our opinion are as follows: 
• Tax expenditures would need to be integrated into the basic income design 
because of the combined incentive impacts. The one exception on the list of tax 
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expenditures is the home owner grant, which, as discussed in Part 4, accounts 
for over $800 million in spending that, although popular, fulfills no clear public 
policy objective. 
• Income Assistance cash-transfer costs would be reduced by a basic income 
depending on the type and design specifications of the program. A UBI would be 
prohibitively expensive, it is unlikely that a responsive NIT could be implemented 
by the province, and an RTC is not sufficiently responsive to address the needs 
of people with quickly changing circumstances. All of this implies that Temporary 
Assistance would have to be retained in some form to meet those changing 
needs. Indeed, at least one proposal for a Canadian RTC basic income would 
not eliminate provincial IA benefits (Stevens & Simpson, 2017). On account of 
the additional costs faced by those with disabilities, some programs of targeted 
cash and in-kind benefits would still be required, even if a general basic income 
were instituted. 
• Basic services for low-income people would continue to be needed to protect 
against adverse events and support true autonomy even if a basic income were 
implemented. It is telling that almost no proposals for a Canadian basic income 
have identified significant savings that could be achieved by retrenchment of 
basic service or in-kind benefit programs.  
• It would not be appropriate to eliminate income and social support programs that 
target children and seniors, as these would not be replaced by a basic income 
targeting working-age adults. 
• The only basic service program targeting people with disabilities is Community 
Living BC. The beneficiaries of this program depend on this program because of 
the level and type of care that they require. It obviously would not be just or 
publicly acceptable to eliminate or reduce funding for this program in particular, 
or the other basic service programs targeting those with disabilities. 
• WorkSafeBC is an independent authority that provides services to injured 
workers, funded by employers through premiums, specifically for the purpose of 
making and keeping workplaces safe and enabling those injured to be 
compensated without involving the courts, as is done in every Canadian 
jurisdiction. Eliminating this program would result in no savings, as it is fully 
premium funded, and the alternative would be unthinkably expensive and 
disruptive to society. 
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Although almost $12 billion is spent on income and social support programs in B.C., in 
our opinion there is little scope to fund a basic income by eliminating some of these 
programs, without doing significant harm. We analyzed these programs in detail in Part 
4, showing how this set of programs could be improved. The point here, though, is that 
a basic income only provides cash, which makes it simple, but there are many basic 
needs that cannot be met without additional, responsive resources and services in 
some form. 
6.4 Summary 
This section has expanded the sole focus on basic income in the earlier sections of Part 
5, where we showed that specific design choices can make a big difference in terms of 
trade-offs among basic income principles. Indeed, different designs will have very 
different costs, economic incentives, and consistency with a broader set of attributes 
and characteristics, particularly responsiveness.  
We’ve shown that focusing just on a basic income itself is not enough. Every basic 
income with a high enough guarantee to significantly reduce poverty will have a 
substantial budgetary cost. That cost can be covered only by either increasing revenues 
or by reducing spending. These cost considerations raise questions about B.C.’s fiscal; 
capacity, potential funding sources, and how utilizing those funding sources would 
interact and combine with a basic income, especially in terms of incentives.  
When combined with the need to finance a basic income, it becomes clear that every 
basic income design will create significant economic distortions, including disincentives 
to work. Claims made by basic income advocates, particularly those who favour a UBI, 
that a basic income does not distort decisions about work and other major processes in 
the economy ignore the fact that financing the cost will inevitably create those 
distortions. UBIs are several times as expensive as comparable income-tested basic 
incomes with the same effectiveness in terms of poverty reduction. It is therefore 
impossible to avoid the incentive effects. Distortions will arise whether as a result of 
financing a UBI with few intrinsic incentive effects, or of the incentives inherent in an 
income-tested basic income that match or exceed those created by Income Assistance. 
Lowering distortions for beneficiaries by reducing the BRR (ultimately to zero for a UBI) 
inevitably means increasing distortions for taxpayers as the cost rises. 
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7. Should B.C. pilot a basic income? 
Our terms of reference specifically ask us to assess whether any aspects of a basic 
income could usefully be explored through a B.C. pilot program. Many such pilot 
projects and experiments94 of a basic income have been undertaken since the late 
1960s, and the number of evaluations and critiques of them is even larger.95 The 
programs have varied in their benefit parameters, their target groups and locales, their 
institutional and market settings, and the quality of their experimental design and 
operational implementation. We have reviewed the results of previous pilots and 
experiments and considered this issue in the context of our analysis of basic income, 
presented in this part of the report. We have concluded that a basic income pilot would 
not be a worthwhile undertaking for B.C. for several reasons. 
First, we do not believe that basic income pilots provide information that accurately 
reveals the effects that a permanent, ongoing, fully implemented basic income would 
have on people’s behaviour. By definition, basic income pilot programs are limited in 
duration and scope to those affected, which means that people will not respond in the 
same way as they would to a permanent basic income available to all eligible persons 
rather than a sample. Well-established habits and norms can mutate over longer 
periods in response to a major change in benefit programs with the associated incentive 
effects, induced institutional changes, and social network effects (Lindbeck, 1995a, 
1995b). When all lower income workers in a community are subject to a basic income 
over a generation rather than a subsample for a few years, changes in norms, habits, 
and tastes are more likely to emerge. Employers might shift workplace hours and 
arrangements in response to changing worker preferences. Or youth maturing into 
adulthood under a permanent program might choose different lifetime paths in 
education, occupation, work patterns, and lifestyles.  
Second, on a related point, as we have discussed, a basic income would have 
complicated interactions with other elements of the income and social support system 
that would be important for the ultimate impacts of an entire system that included a 
 
94 The terms “pilot” and “experiment” are sometimes used interchangeably with respect to basic income projects. A 
pilot does not necessarily employ the careful experimental design of a random control trial study, but we also use the 
terms together here and assume that the mandate to explore a “pilot” for B.C. was not meant to be simply a 
demonstration project. 
95 For a review of past and current basic income pilots and experiments and their evaluation, see Simpson (2020). 
The pitfalls and problems of such experimentation have been identified even from the first project; see Rossi and 
Lyall (1977). 
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basic income. But it would not be feasible to integrate fully a temporary and limited 
basic income, making changes in other systems to accommodate the presence of a 
basic income. That implies that a pilot would be of limited usefulness in providing 
evidence on the ultimate impacts of including a basic income in British Columbia’s 
actual support system.  
Third, and equally concerning, as we have emphasized a basic income must be 
considered in the context of how it is financed and how the changes made to taxes and 
programs to cover its costs combine with the incentive effects of the basic income itself. 
Impacts of the financing aspects of a major basic income could exceed the incentive 
and economic effects posed by the benefits alone. Some of the past basic income pilots 
secured explicit provision for tax exemption on program benefits, which is totally 
unrealistic for a real-world fully implemented basic income. It is not practical to operate 
a temporary pilot program that fully includes basic income financing mechanisms, and 
the pilot projects to date have eschewed all considerations of program financing.  
Fourth, many past basic income pilots have been complicated or disrupted by various 
changes during their limited course, and we have no assurance that any other pilot 
would not suffer such problems. The first carefully designed basic income pilot, the New 
Jersey experiment in the United States in the 1960s, was tainted by unanticipated 
changes in the state’s welfare system that interacted with the pilot. The Mincome basic 
income in Manitoba in the 1970s was affected by a premature termination of funding 
that prevented systematic evaluation. Most recently, the Ontario basic income pilot 
project was terminated early on account of the priorities of a change in provincial 
administration; this also raised ethical issues for program participants who had been 
expecting benefits to continue longer. 
There are other ethical considerations as well. Basic income pilots often set up winners 
and losers based on their experimental designs. Pilot administrators have to determine 
who will be in the test group and who will be in the control group, leading many to 
continue to live in severe poverty and in very dangerous situations while others receive 
significant cash transfers. These situations carry more than just theoretical implications. 
While insights might be gained from a temporary pilot that only partially captures the full 
range of changes from implementing a permanent basic income, many pilot programs 
are available for study. We have rich data from past experiments, as well as relevant 
empirical information from other studies, and we cannot justify the cost and disruption of 
a pilot program simply to add to that database. The data from past pilots and other 
sources has already provided us with evidence about the significant implications of a 
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basic income, such as its impact on labour supply albeit short run, but not the related 
impact of financing. Previous basic income pilots have failed to result in actual 
programs, and many have been either terminated before their conclusion or 
contaminated by concurrent policy or economic changes. In other words, we found 
sufficient information about basic income effects from previous pilots to be confident in 
our decision that B.C. should not undertake a basic income pilot. We also conclude that 
B.C. should not pursue a widely applicable basic income but rather emphasize some 
key principles of basic income within a systematically reformed provincial income and 
social support system. 
Nevertheless, should the government decide to pursue a general basic income, we 
would advise that it proceed to design and implement a permanent program without the 
intermediate step of a pilot project. If that is done, the program should be designed to be 
regularly and rigorously evaluated within the context of a clear objective and an 
analytical framework, such as the one we have proposed. That means better collection 
and more integrated availability of data than we were able to access as part of our 
research program. The result would be the ability to adjust the basic income design over 
time to make it as effective as possible as circumstances change.  
  
Part 5: Basic Income 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 375 
 
8. Conclusion 
Our first task, as set out in our terms of reference, is to “consider the viability of a basic 
income in B.C. and support the simulation of various basic income models in B.C. to 
identify impacts and financial implications.”  
Our summary conclusion after completing this task is that we do not support the 
introduction of a widely applicable basic income as the core of B.C.’s income and social 
support system. Despite this conclusion, Part 4 raises issues with the current system 
that should be addressed with a suite of reforms, and targeted basic income programs 
could be utilized as elements of such a reform package. System reforms should be 
guided by the objective of moving B.C. toward being a more just society, balancing the 
characteristics that make up our analytical framework. Doing so will have the effect of, 
among other things, increasing the emphasis in the current system on important 
characteristics aligned with basic income principles, like simplicity, respect, economic 
stability, and social inclusion, but not to the exclusion of the rest of our analytical 
framework. 
The following observations and insights arise from our examination of a basic income in 
Part 5 and support the foregoing conclusion: 
1. The principles underlying a basic income are important and align well with the 
justice-based objective and framework that form the foundation for this report. But 
too often basic income proposals do not address important considerations related to 
responsiveness to personal change, supporting transitions, and maintaining public 
trust. The difference to us is between a basic income focus on personal dignity, 
respect, and freedom of choice, and a broader balance of self- and social respect 
that acknowledges the need for a greater public role to move toward a more just 
society. 
2.  A basic income is not a single, simple, easily implemented program but rather an 
extensive set of design parameters that require important trade-offs to be made in 
the design and implementation of a practical basic income. These trade-offs 
inevitably lead to the introduction of at least some of the complexity and stigma that 
a basic income was originally conceived to avoid.  
3. As a practical consequence of our second point, the type of basic income epitomized 
by basic income principles, a universal basic income, is shown by simulations and 
common sense to be impractical as a use of taxpayer funds, because it is much less 
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effective than an income-tested alternative at delivering resources to those in need 
for a given budget constraint, a constant for governments.  
4. The income-tested alternative formats are primarily distinguished by their 
responsiveness to changes in personal circumstances. The negative income tax 
form of a basic income can in principle respond rapidly, but the existing income 
information and benefit delivery infrastructure in Canada, the tax system operated by 
the Canada Revenue Agency, cannot in practice deliver such responsiveness. We 
also believe that it is impractical for a province to build such infrastructure on its own. 
Therefore, in the short term, the only feasible alternative is a refundable tax credit 
approach, which would inevitably deliver resources to some who do not meet the 
needs test at that moment, while leaving others who are in genuine need without 
resources.  
5. To focus resources through an income-tested basic income on those most in need 
and use taxpayer resources as efficiently as possible, a relatively high benefit 
reduction rate (BRR) would be needed. This is a logical extension of the observation 
that a universal basic income with a zero BRR is not practical. But the need for a 
high BRR belies the claim that a basic income avoids the disincentives associated 
with high BRR rates in traditional income support programs generally and Income 
Assistance in particular. Especially when the distortions associated with funding a 
basic income are included in the analysis, practical basic income designs have little 
or no advantage over welfare programs in this respect. 
6. Basic income cash transfers are, in our opinion, not desirable or practical as a full 
substitute for the basic services part of the income and social support system. Our 
justice-based analysis, rather than a freedom of personal choice-based approach, 
means that a balanced system is needed in terms of both the design of individual 
programs and the program mix, with both cash transfers and effective basic services 
required. 
7. A basic income would not be the panacea that some advocates believe, with many 
of the claims about the social issues that a basic income would address unlikely to 
be true in practice—or, at least, it is unclear that a basic income would be the best 
way to address the issues, if justice is the objective. 
8. These observations apply mostly to widely applicable basic incomes. Targeted basic 
incomes that are carefully designed could improve the delivery of cash transfers to 
specific populations in need due to specific conditions, such as people with 
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disabilities, or populations undergoing specific transitions, such as youth aging out of 
care. 
9. Finally, we do not recommend that a pilot project be undertaken in B.C. We do not 
believe it would provide useful information or that additional information is needed 
before government can make an informed decision about whether to implement a 
basic income. Moreover, we believe that the operation of basic income pilot projects 
raise significant ethical concerns. 
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Appendix 5-A: Comparative responsiveness of RTC and NIT 
formats 
An example can illustrate the extreme lags in responsiveness of the refundable tax 
credit (RTC) model of basic income to variations in individual income. Take an individual 
whose normal full-year earnings are above the annual break-even level of a 
hypothetical RTC. Then the following events arise: 
• Year 1: The person earns an amount equal to or exceeding the annual break-
even level entirely in the first half of the year through June and then loses all 
income indefinitely.  
• Year 2: The person files an income tax return in April, which leads to a 
calculation of zero RTC entitlement because the previous year’s income equalled 
or exceeded the break-even level. 
• Year 3: The person files an income tax return in April, showing zero income in 
Year 2 and yielding a calculation of entitlement to the maximum RTC guarantee 
amount. 
• Year 3: In July the monthly payment of RTC benefits begin at the maximum 
annual rate. 
In this example, a full two years pass between the person’s loss of all income and the 
initiation of RTC benefit payments at the maximum rate. Many other scenarios involving 
long lags between declines or increases in earnings and the corresponding adjustment 
of benefit payments can occur with the RTC. 
The negative income tax (NIT) model of a basic income can adjust benefits much more 
quickly in relation to variations in a person’s income than the RTC model can. However, 
that increased responsiveness comes at a cost, both literally and in terms of trade-offs 
with other objectives.  
Consider an income-tested basic income with a $20,000 annual guarantee, a benefit 
reduction rate (BRR) of 50%, and thus a break-even income of $40,000 per year. 
Assume that the NIT uses quarterly income report forms, so that on a quarterly basis 
the break-even level is $10,000 (one-quarter of the annual break-even). Two similar 
persons each earned a total of $40,000 in the previous year. Person A earned at a 
steady rate throughout the year, while Person B earned that amount in the first three 
quarters and zero in the last quarter. 
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In the numerical example, Persons A and B would both receive the same benefit (zero) 
for the following year with the RTC model, since each had earned at the break-even 
level. With the NIT model, though, Person B would start getting the maximum benefit 
early in the fourth quarter after reporting zero income. This example illustrates the 
greater responsiveness of the NIT model, but it also illustrates the NIT’s differential 
treatment for the two individuals if their need is assessed over a full year.  
Extending that example, next assume that Person B, who had lost all income in the 
fourth quarter of the first year, remains without income throughout the following year 
and also through the first quarter of the subsequent year. With the RTC model, that 
person would continue to receive zero benefits through the second year and would start 
receiving the maximum benefit only in July of the third year after assessment of zero 
income in the second year based on income tax filing. That would constitute a delay in 
the start of benefits of at least a year and a half after losing all income. In contrast, the 
benefit under the NIT would start shortly after the income loss. 
Next, consider Person A, with continuously steady income at an annual rate equal to the 
break-even income, and Person B, with the same average annual income but 
fluctuating month to month within the year. Fluctuations in earnings are common due to 
seasonal, cyclical, and idiosyncratic factors. The RTC model of basic income would give 
each person a zero benefit, because their income did not fall below break-even for any 
year. However, with an NIT assessed and paid monthly, Person B would receive 
benefits in those months with income dipping below the break-even level.  
This example shows why the NIT model with monthly responsiveness will have higher 
total costs and more beneficiaries than the RTC format, even when both embody the 
same values of parameters G and BRR on an annual basis. An early example using 
particular parameters for a mooted NIT program in the United States computed that 
monthly accounting relative to annual accounting (as in the RTC model) increased total 
cost by 70% and the number of beneficiaries over the year by 140% (Allen, 1973; also 
see Kesselman, 2020, for further analysis of these issues and hybrid accounting 
systems for the NIT).  
It is possible to design accounting systems that could be included in an NIT to improve 
the fairness of treatment accorded to people with the same annual income level but 
differences in the timing of income payments, such as a moving average income 
approach. However, that would add complexity and, depending on how such a 
mechanism is designed, could result in people being required to repay previous basic 
income benefits.  
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Appendix 5-B: Proposals for funding a basic income by 
eliminating personal income tax credits 
The elimination of personal income tax (PIT) credits can be used to assist in financing a 
basic income, and this is a common element in almost all Canadian basic income 
financing proposals.96 The precise way in which these non-refundable and refundable 
tax credits are used for finance, either alone or in combination with other tax changes 
and funding sources, can affect the overall impacts and incentive effects of a basic 
income. Table 5-B1 summarizes key elements of several basic income proposals that 
utilize this approach to funding, with a focus on their design parameters and financing 
provisions.97 All take the form of a refundable tax credit (RTC) except for one universal 
basic income (UBI) proposal.  
Some of the proposals claim to be “self-financing,” in the sense of not requiring tax rate 
increases to fund the budgetary cost,98 while others include a variety of additional tax 
funding sources, such as increasing rates, modifying brackets, expanding the PIT tax 
base (e.g., by fully including capital gains), and suggesting new taxes (e.g., a carbon 
tax).  
The “federal/provincial” schemes are led by a federal benefit financed by federal tax and 
program changes supplemented by provincial benefits financed by provincial tax and 
program changes. The proposals vary in whether they subsume seniors’ cash-benefit 
programs (Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement—OAS/GIS) or social 
assistance and in other ways that are not detailed here. Most of the schemes would 
retain the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) as the basic income for children, and some 
would retain existing seniors’ programs as the basic income for seniors (our simulations 
do both and limit basic incomes to those aged 18–64. All of the schemes except the UBI 
 
96 Pohler and Koebel (2019) propose an RTC also relying on elimination of the non-refundable tax credits for finance. 
Their benefit structure differs from the others in offering a low guarantee to replace income assistance, accompanied 
by an earnings supplement scheme to reward labour force entry and earnings. 
97 For greater detail on the proposals, see Tedds and Crisan (2020) or the original studies. Each proposal simulates 
the impacts using the SPSD/M, similar to what we’ve done in this part of the report, except that Proposals A, B, and E 
incorporate modelling of labour supply responses. Proposal A confines analysis to the work hours response, while 
Proposals B and E also model the labour force participation response.  
98 For example, Boadway et al. (2018, p. 105) state that their scheme is “virtually self-financing. … No tax rate 
increases are required.” 
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use the scaled guarantee for families, and all RTCs test for income on a family basis, 
although some use expanded definitions of income for income-testing purposes. 
If the basic income were strictly a provincial scheme, B.C. and Ontario would garner 
much less per taxpayer than other provinces (see Table 5-7) and thus fund a lower 
guarantee amount than Alberta or Manitoba, for a given set of other parameters. 
Proposals E and F in Table 5-B1 provide an idea of the order of magnitude. In Proposal 
E, elimination of tax credits funds a guarantee of about $6,400. Applying the 
proportional difference in per-taxpayer funding in Alberta and B.C. suggests a B.C. 
guarantee of less than $2,000. The same is true for Proposal F, a Manitoba provincial 
RTC, although that incorporates additional revenue sources for financing purposes. 
Table 5-B1: Basic income proposals funded by tax credit elimination 




 G = $20,000  
 Federal component 
$14,300 and average 
provincial component 
$5,600  
 BRR = 30% 
 Funding: eliminate 
social assistance, 
OAS/GIS, RTCs 
 MBM poverty rate 
down 73% (from 
11.9% to 3.2%) 
Boadway, Cuff, 




 G: federal $6,700 + 
provincial from $2,100 
to $7,300 
 BRR: 15% federal + 
9% provincial 
(weighted average) = 
24% 
 Funding: eliminate 
RTCs 
 MBM poverty rate 
down 40% (from 






 G = $22K  
 BRR = 40% 
 Includes CCB and GIS 
in income test 
 Funding: eliminate 
social assistance, 
RTCs  
 PIT base expansion; 





99 G = guarantee; BRR = benefit reduction rate 
100 All proposals would eliminate the basic personal amount and certain other non-refundable tax credits (varies by 
proposal). 
101 This is Option 1 in the study; their Option 2 has the same basic parameters except that it also subsumes the Old 
Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement programs; as a result, it reduces the LICO poverty rate by 75% 
(from 12.5% to 3.1%). 
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 Type BI parameters99 Comments100 Reference 
 LICO poverty rate 
down 52% (from 




 G = $22,000  
 BRR = 0% 
 Funding: PIT base 
expansion and bottom 
bracket rate of 75%; 
eliminate OAS/GIS 
and social assistance; 
cost of $638 billion 
 LICO poverty rate 
down 76% (from 






 G = $6,400 
 BRR = 10% 
 Provincial MBM 
poverty rate down 23% 






 G = $7,300  
 BRR = 13.5% 
 Expands income test 
to include OAS/GIS, 
CCB, and workers’ 
compensation 
 Funding: increase top-
bracket rate; add 
$50/tonne carbon tax 
 MBM provincial adult 
poverty rate down 41% 
(from 8.5% to 5.0%) 




102 This is Option 1 in the study; their Option 2 also replaces provincial refundable tax credits and has a guarantee of 
$6,801 but yields virtually the same impact on the poverty rate. 
Part 5: Basic Income 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 383 
 
References 
Akee, R., Copeland, W. E., Keeler, G., Angold, A., & Costello, E. J. (2010). Parents’ 
incomes and children’s outcomes: A quasi experiment using transfer payments 
from casino profits. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1), 86–
115. 
Allen, J. T. (1973). Designing income maintenance systems: The income accounting 
problem. In Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 5 (Part 3), 47–97. Joint 
Economic Committee, US Congress. 
https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/92nd%20Congress/Studies%20in%20Public
%20Welfare%20Paper%20No.%205%20(567).pdf  
Beaudry, P., Green, D. A., & Sand, B. (2012). Does industrial composition matter? An 
empirical evaluation based on search and bargaining theory. Econometrica, 
80(3), 1063–1104. 
Boadway, R., Cuff, K., & Koebel, K. (2018). Designing a basic income guarantee for 
Canada. In E. Goodyear-Grant, R. Johnston, W. Kymlicka, & J. Myles (Eds.), 
Federalism and welfare state in a multicultural world (pp. 101–129). McGill-
Queen’s University Press. 
Calnitsky, D., & Gonalons-Pons, P. (2020). The Impact of an Experimental Guaranteed 
Income on Crime and Violence. Social Problems, March.  
Campolieti, M., Gomez, R., & Gunderson, M. (2009). Volunteering, income support 
programs and people with disabilities. Industrial Relations, 64(2), 189–208. 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). (2017). Barriers associated with tax filing in vulnerable 
populations (executive summary). https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-
agency/services/about-canada-revenue-agency-cra/public-opinion-research-
executive-summaries/barriers-tax-filing-vulnerable-populations.html 
Costello, E. J., Erkanli, A., Copeland, W., & Angold, A. (2010). Association of family 
income supplements in adolescence with development of psychiatric and 
substance use disorders in adulthood among an American Indian population. 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 303(19), 1954–1960. 
Forget, E. L. (2011). The town with no poverty: The health effect of a Canadian 
guaranteed annual income field experiment. Canadian Public Policy, 37(3), 283–
305. 
Forget, E. L. (2018). Basic income for Canadians: The key to a healthier, happier, more 
secure life for all. James Lorimer & Company. 
Part 5: Basic Income 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 384 
 
Green, D. A. (2020). A re-examination of Mincome hospitalization patterns. Research 
paper commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia.  
Green, D. A. (2020b). Claims made for or about a basic income. Research paper 
commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia.  
Green, D. A. (2020c). Labour supply issues related to a basic income and Income 
Assistance. Research paper commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic 
Income, British Columbia. 
Green, D. A., Gutierrez, P., Milligan, K., & Snowberg, E. (2020). Characteristics related 
to presence in and absence from the tax system. Research paper commissioned 
by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Green, D. A., Hicks, J., Warburton, R., & Warburton, W. (2020). BC Income Assistance 
trends, dynamics and policy implications. Research paper commissioned by the 
Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Green, D. A., Kesselman, J. R., & Tedds, L. (2020). Considerations for basic income as 
a COVID-19 response (SPP briefing paper). University of Calgary, School of 
Public Policy Publications, 13(11). https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/Basic-Income-Green-Kesselman-Tedds.pdf  
Green, D. A., Kesselman, J. R., Tedds, L., Crisan, D., & Petit, G. (2020). Basic income 
simulations for the Province of British Columbia. Research paper commissioned 
by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia.  
Green, D. A., & Townsend, J. (2009). Understanding the wage patterns of Canadian 
less skilled workers: The role of implicit contracts. Canadian Labour Market and 
Skills Researcher Network, Working Paper No. 38. 
http://www.clsrn.econ.ubc.ca/workingpapers/CLSRN%20Working%20Paper%20
no.%2038%20-%20Green%20and%20Townsend.pdf  
Green Party of Manitoba. (2019, August 11). Greens release costed proposal for a 
basic income and a more progressive tax system for Manitoba.  
https://greenparty.mb.ca/news/greens-release-costed-proposal-for-basic-income-
and-a-more-progressive-tax-system-for-manitoba/  
Jager, S., Schoefer, B., Young, S. G., & Zweimuller, J. (2019). Wages and the value of 
nonemployment. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 25230. 
Jones, L., Milligan, K., & Stabile, M. (2019). Child cash benefits and family 
expenditures: Evidence from the national child benefit. Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 52(4), 1433–1463.  
Part 5: Basic Income 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 385 
 
Jones, L., & Stabile, M. (2020). Cash transfers and child outcomes. Research paper 
commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Kesselman, J. R. (2018). Can “self-financing” redeem the basic income guarantee? 
Disincentives, efficiency costs, tax burdens, and attitudes. Canadian Public 
Policy, 44(4), 423–437. 
Kesselman, J. R. (2020). Design choice for income-transfer programs: Structural, 
economic, and operational aspects. Research paper commissioned by the Expert 
Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Kesselman, J. R., & Mendelson, M. (2020). In-kind versus cash benefits in social 
programs: Choices, structures, and delivery. Research paper commissioned by 
the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Koebel, K., & Schirle, T. (2016). The differential impact of Universal Child Benefits on 
the labour supply of married and single mothers. Canadian Public Policy, 42(1), 
49–64. 
Lester, J. (2020). Self-employment and British Columbia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
Research paper commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British 
Columbia. 
Lindbeck, A. (1995a). Welfare state disincentives with endogenous habits and norms. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(4), 477–494. 
Lindbeck, A. (1995b). Hazardous welfare-state dynamics. American Economic Review, 
84(2), 9–15. 
McIntyre, L., Kwok, C., Emery, J. C. H., & Dutton, D. J. (2016). Impact of a guaranteed 
annual income program on Canadian seniors’ physical, mental and functional 
health. Quantitative Research, 107(2), 176–182. 
Milligan, K. (2020). Participation tax rates in British Columbia. Research paper 
commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Milligan, K., & Stabile, M. (2011). Do child tax benefits affect the well-being of children? 
Evidence from Canadian child benefit expansions. American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, 3, 175–205.  
Najjarrezaparast, P., & Pendakur, K. (2020). How did the Canada Child Benefit affect 
household spending? Research paper commissioned by the Expert Panel on 
Basic Income, British Columbia.  
Pasma, C., & Regehr, S. (2020). Basic income: Some policy options for Canada. Basic 
Income Canada Network. https://www.basicincomecanada.org/policy_options  
Part 5: Basic Income 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 386 
 
Petit, G., & Tedds, L. (2020g). Systems-level reforms to B.C.’s income and social 
support programs along basic income lines. Research paper commissioned by 
the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Petit, G., Tedds, L. M., Green, D. A., & Kesselman, J. R. (2020). Re-envisioning the 
Canada Revenue Agency: From tax collector to benefit delivery agent. University 
of Calgary, School of Public Policy. 
Pohler, D., & Koebel, K. (2019). Expanding the Canada Workers Benefit to design a 
guaranteed basic income. Canadian Public Policy, 45(3), 283–309.  
Richardson, L. (2019). The Cheque Day Study community impact statement: 
Perspectives on changing the timing and frequency of income assistance 
payments. British Columbia Centre on Substance Abuse. 
https://www.bccsu.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Cheque-Day-Study-
Community-Impact-Statement.pdf 
Riddell, C., & Riddell, W. C. (2020). Does a universal basic income 
reduce labour supply for all groups? Evidence from Canada’s negative income 
tax experiment. Research paper commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic 
Income, British Columbia. 
Robson, J., & Shaban, R. (2020). Basic income, financial literacy and financial 
capability: How do we get better alignment? Research paper commissioned by 
the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia.  
Robson, J., & Schwartz, S. (2020). Who Doesn’t File a Tax Return? A Portrait of 
Nonfilers. Canadian Public Policy. 
Rothstein, J. (2010). Is the EITC as good as an NIT? Conditional cash transfers and tax 
incidence. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(1), 177–208. 
Rossi, P. H., & Lyall, K. C. (1977). Reforming public welfare: A critique of the negative 
income tax experiment. Russell Sage Foundation. 
Schirle, T. (2015). The effect of universal child benefits on labour supply. Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 48(2), 437–463. 
Segal, H., Forget, E., & Banting, K. (2020). A federal basic income within the post 
COVID-19 economic recovery plan. Royal Society of Canada Policy Briefing. 
Simpson, W. (2020). Basic income experimentation yesterday and today: Challenges, 
achievements and lessons. Research paper commissioned by the Expert Panel 
on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Simpson, W., & Stevens, H. (2019). An Alberta guaranteed basic income: Issues and 
options. School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, SPP Research Papers 
Part 5: Basic Income 
 





Stevens, H., & Simpson, W. (2017). Toward a national universal guaranteed basic 
income. Canadian Public Policy, 43(2), 120–139. 
Sweetman, A. (2020). Government-Sponsored Training and Employment Programs: 
Actively Serving Those Near a Basic Income Threshold in British Columbia. 
Research paper commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British 
Columbia. 
Tedds, L. M. (2017). Implementing a Basic Income Guarantee Through the Personal 
Income Tax System: Benefits, Barriers, and Bothers. Northern Policy Institute, 
Basic Income Guarantee Series, Research Paper 25. 
https://www.northernpolicy.ca/upload/documents/publications/reports-
new/tedds_big-and-pit-en.pdf  
Tedds, L. M., & Crisan, D. (2020). Evaluating the existing basic income literature. 
Research paper commissioned by the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British 
Columbia. 
Tedds, L. M., Crisan, D., & Petit, G. (2020). Basic income in Canada: Principles, design 
features, and Canadian political commitments. Research paper commissioned by 
the Expert Panel on Basic Income, British Columbia. 
Van Parijs, P., & Vanderborght, Y. (2017). Basic income: A radical proposal for a free 
society and a sane economy. Harvard University Press. 
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 







Part 6: Vision and 
Recommendations 
  
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 389 
 
Part 6 Contents 
1. Vision and conclusions ............................................................................................... 391 
1.1 Conclusion: B.C. should not implement a basic income for all ............................ 392 
1.2 Conclusion: B.C. should reform the current system ............................................ 392 
1.3 Conclusion: B.C. should not conduct a basic income pilot .................................. 397 
1.4 Approach to recommendations ............................................................................. 397 
1.5 Our vision .............................................................................................................. 398 
2. Reforms targeting people with disabilities ................................................................. 399 
2.1 Context .................................................................................................................. 400 
2.2 Eligibility reform ..................................................................................................... 402 
2.3 Cash-transfer reform for people with disabilities .................................................. 410 
2.4 Basic services for those with disabilities .............................................................. 415 
2.5 Public and community employment ...................................................................... 416 
2.6 Community building .............................................................................................. 417 
2.7 Addiction as a disability......................................................................................... 419 
3. Reforms targeting single working-age adults ............................................................ 421 
3.1 Context .................................................................................................................. 421 
3.2 Single adult poverty .............................................................................................. 422 
3.3 Temporary Assistance eligibility ........................................................................... 423 
3.4 Temporary Assistance benefit structure ............................................................... 430 
3.5 Training support .................................................................................................... 432 
3.6 Public and community employment ...................................................................... 433 
3.7 Earnings supplement ............................................................................................ 433 
4. Extended health basic service ................................................................................... 436 
5. Housing support reform .............................................................................................. 438 
5.1 Income Assistance shelter allowance .................................................................. 439 
5.2 Low-income housing supports .............................................................................. 440 
5.3 Reforming demand-side supports ........................................................................ 441 
5.4 Implications for Income Assistance and existing programs ................................. 443 
5.5 Funding.................................................................................................................. 445 
6. Assisted to Work basic service .................................................................................. 447 
7. Reforms targeting families with children .................................................................... 449 
7.1 Background ........................................................................................................... 449 
7.2 Child Opportunity Benefit refocus ......................................................................... 450 
8. Reforms targeting young adults ................................................................................. 452 
8.1 Youth aging out of care ......................................................................................... 452 
8.2 Youth from low-income backgrounds, not in care ................................................ 463 
9. Reforms targeting people fleeing violence ................................................................ 467 
9.1 Current supports for people fleeing violence in B.C. ........................................... 467 
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 390 
 
10. Labour regulation reforms ........................................................................................ 472 
10.1 Employment standards issues ............................................................................ 473 
10.2 Labour relations issues ....................................................................................... 477 
11. System and Income Assistance cross-cutting reforms ........................................... 480 
11.1 Tax system accessibility reforms ........................................................................ 480 
11.2 Making programs into a system.......................................................................... 484 
11.3 Income Assistance cross-cutting reform ............................................................ 487 
11.4 Consultation and program evaluation................................................................. 489 
12. Summary of Recommendations............................................................................... 494 
References...................................................................................................................... 513 
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 391 
 
1. Vision and conclusions 
A vision of a more just society in British Columbia underlies all the work that has gone 
into developing our advice to government in response to the tasks set for us in the 
terms of reference. A society of mutual respect and mutual concern. A society that 
recognizes the richness of life so eloquently described by Chief Joseph Gosnell (2003) 
at the beginning of this report, by acting so that “no one gets left behind.” A society 
where, as Adam Smith (1759) put it, the reciprocal support we all need from each other 
is given “from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem.” While there are almost 
as many visions of what a just society looks like as there are people in this province, we 
believe that the shared vision of these expressions of hope and principle coming from 
such different cultures and times points to a way forward. All notions of justice arise 
from the idea that we owe each other self-respect and dignity, treating each other as 
equals who deserve our respect.  
The American philosopher Elizabeth Anderson (2018, p.1) provides a more concrete 
description of these bases of self- and social respect: “We owe each other the rights, 
institutions, social norms, public goods, and private resources that people need to avoid 
oppression (social exclusion, violence, exploitation, and so forth) and to exercise the 
capabilities necessary for functioning as equal citizens in a democratic state.”  
Clearly, government policy on its own cannot provide everything that we owe each 
other. But we believe that making positive changes in government policy can help move 
us toward being a more just society. That is what is being proposed by proponents of a 
basic income. Our charge was to think about both whether a basic income in and of 
itself is the most positive change we can make and how the principles that underlie 
support for a basic income can be used to guide other changes in policy.  
In more specific terms, we were guided by notions of what constitutes a just society to 
compare existing and potential policies against a list of (sometimes conflicting) 
characteristics that define just policies and programs: adequacy, accessibility, security, 
responsiveness, opportunity, social connection, policy stability, and reciprocity.  
Taking a justice-based view of our goals entails a shift in perspective. It means asking 
not “How do we help the most vulnerable among us?” but “How do we create a more 
just society together?” It means a shift from seeing the most vulnerable among us as 
others in need of our help, to seeing them as equal participants in creating a better 
society. Throughout our recommendations we have woven the theme that these 
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proposals should be the first step in a consultation with affected groups as well as with 
people who can bring useful evidence and data to the table. These consultations should 
be ongoing. We recommend mechanisms that involve continuing adjustments 
accompanied by continuing consultations—mechanisms ultimately rooted in human 
rights recognized by Canada in its signature on international agreements. The result will 
be a messier process than simply defining and implementing a pre-specified efficient 
solution to a narrow issue, but it will be more just. It will also, likely, be more effective 
and have fewer unintended consequences. 
1.1 Conclusion: B.C. should not implement a basic income for all 
We have concluded that moving to a system constructed around a basic income for all 
as its main pillar is not the most just policy change we can consider. The needs of 
people in our society are too diverse to be effectively answered simply with a cheque 
from the government. Our conclusion is partly reflected in the fact that a basic income is 
a very costly approach to addressing any specific goal, such as poverty reduction, but 
also in the way a basic income would try to accomplish those goals. It is an approach 
that supports individual autonomy—which is one element of our set of just 
characteristics—but does it to the exclusion of approaches that emphasize social 
interactions and co-operation. It seems to us to be more individualistic than the way we 
believe British Columbians see themselves, placing too little emphasis on the 
communities in which they live and that help define them. Nonetheless, we see targeted 
basic incomes for some groups as a useful tool that can be applied in some cases to 
help achieve what we are trying to accomplish.  
Our suite of recommended reforms could be seen as building the necessary platform on 
which a basic income could stand if this or a future government decided on a general 
basic income as a policy approach. Nevertheless, for all the reasons set out in Part 5, 
Section 8 (Conclusion), we do not believe a basic income for all is the best approach 
now or in the future for B.C.  
1.2 Conclusion: B.C. should reform the current system  
We have concluded that reforming the current system by applying basic income 
principles within the context of the justice-based analytical framework we have 
proposed is the preferred policy alternative to a basic income. 
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Through our investigations, we realized that the changes we would recommend stand 
on a solid base of existing policies. Existing social programs (a system that includes 
universal basic service elements, such as medicare, education, justice, child protection, 
and family services, and income-tested transfer and service pieces, such as Income 
Assistance, PharmaCare, child care, and housing) provide a sound foundation generally 
consistent with our justice-based analytical framework. These policies have been 
introduced by various governments over time and, in our opinion, have been 
substantively improved by changes in recent years.  
Nonetheless, the set of income and social support policies in B.C. does not constitute a 
system, per se, but a collection of disparate cash-transfer and basic service programs 
that would benefit from greater coordination to reduce inconsistency and increase 
access throughout. More importantly, the system—built like a house with many 
renovations undertaken without an overall plan—treats some people without the dignity 
they deserve, in spite of the best efforts of the people working within the system. A 
guiding principle of our recommendations is that we find ways to help people with 
dignity, including making sure the affected people have a strong voice in ongoing policy 
change. One of our goals is to propose changes that create a more complete, 
purposeful, and interactive approach to fulfill our common aims. 
Our recommendations are closely aligned with the government’s poverty reduction 
targets, though our goals extend beyond simply reducing the poverty rate. One 
important issue that we do not address directly is food insecurity. This is clearly a 
serious and important issue, but we believe it is best addressed by relieving people of 
the other pressures that lead them to have to cut back on food—housing, health, and 
income being among the most central. The alternative is to build a food delivery system 
or transfers linked to food expenditures. We view that alternative as overly invasive, and 
we are reluctant to institutionalize something like the food-bank system that originally 
arose because of failures in the rest of the support system.  
Income Assistance reform 
Building on the current system involves filling gaps in the federal/provincial safety net 
that leave certain groups vulnerable or imply inadequate protection against some types 
of adverse events. In particular, Income Assistance, the core provincial program, is 
based on a principle of “funder of last resort.” That results in shortfalls in terms of some 
of our characteristics of a just system (characteristics that are often also attributed to a 
basic income): autonomy, accessibility, and stability. On the other hand, Income 
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Assistance is much more responsive to sudden changes in circumstances for people 
than we believe any feasible provincial basic income could be at present.  
A major drawback of the current Income Assistance system is the “welfare wall”—the 
very high effective tax rates that recipients face on earned income. In B.C.’s case, the 
wall is particularly high: benefits are reduced by a dollar for each dollar of earned 
income above the earnings exemption (a 100% benefit reduction rate, in the 
terminology of economists) combined with losing access to health and other 
supplements. The wall reflects an attempt to focus benefit payments on those most in 
need, but it also acts to discourage recipients from exiting the program for work. We 
found that any basic income that is designed to minimize cost as well as reduce poverty 
and benefit those in need will also create a welfare wall with similar work disincentives, 
while at the same time lacking the responsiveness of Income Assistance. Moreover, our 
simulations using administrative data indicate that meeting any particular poverty target 
is much more expensive under a basic income scheme, challenging public trust in and 
support for redistribution. We believe it is possible to reform Income Assistance to 
improve autonomy, accessibility, and stability while avoiding the shortcomings of a basic 
income approach.  
Basic services and labour market reform 
Our vision is of a mixed system, with basic services such as extended health 
supplements available to all low-income individuals (regardless of whether they are 
receiving government cash benefits), targeted supports for groups like youth aging out 
of care, targeted basic incomes where they are most helpful (such as for people with 
disabilities), and moves toward a more just labour market to underpin it all. An important 
goal of our approach is to help build supportive, mutually beneficial communities. In 
keeping with that goal, we believe all of this should be done with careful concern for 
building public trust—not just among those who most need support but also among 
those who will see themselves mostly as paying into the system. Our guiding philosophy 
is one of reciprocity.  
We believe that many of the reforms we propose would be needed even if this or a 
future government decided that a universal basic income were a worthwhile approach. 
As many proponents of a basic income recognize, true autonomy is found only partly in 
monetary resources. It is built on a base of supportive communities and families, on a 
fair labour market, and on specific services such as health care and education. In the 
most extreme versions of a basic income, those services are expected to be bought in 
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the market using, in part, the money distributed through the basic income. We see this 
as misguided.  
A prime example is youth aging out of foster care—perhaps the strongest example of a 
longstanding failure of the existing system to meet standards of justice. For these young 
adults, financial security is part of the way forward, but cash transfers without also 
helping them form supportive attachments are simply not enough. The first steps have 
recently been taken to address the needs of this group, but there is much more to be 
done.  
Another example is labour market reform. Basic income proponents argue that cash 
transfers will allow workers to walk away from bad work situations, forcing employers to 
offer better working conditions and wages. But labour regulation changes aimed at 
finding a better balance between the interests of workers and firms would be a much 
more direct and effective approach. Moreover, building a more just labour market could 
provide the underpinning for a basic income or other cash-transfer programs, since 
people are more likely to choose work over receiving cash when the jobs on offer are 
good jobs. Recent reforms to labour regulation have begun to move B.C. closer to that 
balance but there is more to be done. 
Tax system reform 
Building the basis for a basic income would also involve a major overhaul of the tax and 
transfer system—another reform that is needed whether or not a basic income is 
chosen as the main policy approach. Of course, this is something that needs to be 
initiated at the federal government level, though B.C. could add its voice to the calls for 
reform. Useful advances would include simplifying tax filing for low-income persons and 
making the system responsive to intra-year income variations. More generally, the 
federal government already delivers most existing targeted basic incomes in Canada 
and would be best placed fiscally and administratively if a basic income were, 
eventually, to be implemented. This would mean a division of responsibility in which the 
federal government delivered cash benefits through a reformed tax system while the 
provinces focused on their comparative advantage in the area of delivering needed 
social programs and services.  
Focus on work 
Another way to look at our conclusions is from the perspective of work incentives and 
disincentives, which are an important theme running throughout this report. The 
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disincentive effects cash transfers can have on work are important. Any people who 
choose not to work as a result of such disincentives experience a loss of the dignity and 
self-respect work brings. Collectively there are economic and fiscal consequences of 
reduced labour force attachment. Minimizing these effects is an important consideration 
for us. 
Our work has led us to three conclusions which, on their face, may be surprising. The 
first is that, despite claims that a basic income would reduce the work disincentive of 
earnings clawbacks under Income Assistance (the welfare wall), that is not so under 
feasible versions of a basic income. High rates of benefit clawbacks are a problem with 
the current Income Assistance system, but a feasible basic income program would take 
an income-tested form with high clawback rates to meet poverty reduction targets. 
Reducing clawback rates is a valuable goal of either a basic income or a reformed IA 
system, but it is not a relative advantage of a basic income.  
Our second conclusion is that it is not only the earnings clawback that affects work by 
making it hard for recipients to choose to take a job. Losing the valuable non-cash 
benefits such as health supplements that come with receiving Income Assistance 
benefits raises a wall of its own. On top of that is the prospect of Income Assistance 
eligibility tests being reapplied on re-entry, which makes taking the types of unstable 
jobs available to less-skilled workers a risky proposition.  
Thirdly, the popular idea that technological change is fundamentally changing the nature 
of work is not supported by the evidence, at least not yet, but precarious work remains 
persistently high. We therefore reject the idea, at least in the foreseeable future, that we 
must turn to a basic income because work-related approaches to supporting people will 
be unavailable on account of the end of paid work as we know it. 
These conclusions guide much of our approach to recommendations. Proposed Income 
Assistance reforms and a generally available extended health benefits program for 
those with low incomes will lower the welfare wall to reduce work disincentives. 
Effective work assistance will lower barriers to employment and bring people the hope 
of accessing new work opportunities. Labour regulatory reform will improve wages and 
working conditions for low-wage, low-skill jobs, improving the attractiveness of work 
relative to receiving benefits. Enhanced earnings supplement benefits will provide direct 
benefits to an important group—low-income earners. This group consists predominantly 
of women and Indigenous and racialized people whose importance and vulnerability 
have been revealed by COVID-19.  
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Our approach in all of this is not to use work as a punitively enforced requirement to 
access benefits but, rather, to offer people the supports, incentives and conditions of 
work that will make it possible to access the dignity of work that we believe people 
value. Overall, we are confident that these measures will significantly increase supports 
for working and greatly reduce the disincentives in the current system, enhancing the 
ability of those in or near poverty to access good jobs.  
1.3 Conclusion: B.C. should not conduct a basic income pilot 
Finally, part of our mandate was to consider the effectiveness of a basic income pilot 
study. We do not believe this is an effective use of government money. Many of the 
claims that truly differentiate a basic income from other approaches—claims about the 
way having a guaranteed and permanent source of income would change decision-
making—cannot be fully evaluated using a pilot that lasts three or five years. A longer 
pilot could be undertaken, but it is unlikely to continue that long for political reasons. 
Moreover, waiting for the results of an experiment before making policy changes would 
delay what needs to be done by too long. Another deficiency of a pilot study is that it 
cannot include the changes needed to finance a real-world basic income, and the 
behavioural responses of taxpayers may be even more salient than those of program 
beneficiaries.  
However, we do believe strongly in the need for policy evaluation to guide effective 
policy-making. Our preferred approach involves implementing policy changes in an 
incremental way, building in mechanisms for evaluation. The evaluations would then 
provide feedback and, along with ongoing consultations with affected groups, be part of 
a continual process of policy improvement.  
1.4 Approach to recommendations 
In the rest of Part 6, we set out our recommendations to reform the current system, 
building on these considerations of how to help create a more just society. Our specific 
approach involves identifying some specific groups that need targeted attention, as well 
as identifying ways that programs and the overall system can be improved for all. Our 
main recommendations concern provincial programs, but we include some 
recommendations for reforming the benefit delivery platform used throughout Canada, 
the federal income tax system. That combination of reforms that target specific groups 
and reforms that improve the system in a more general, cross-cutting way is illustrated 
in Figure 6-1. 
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 398 
 
We have divided our recommendations between short- and medium-term, based on our 
assessment of both the effort required to develop the recommendations into 
implementable measures and the order of magnitude of the cost. Cost estimates have 
been developed in concert with affected government agencies and are included in 
Section 12 (Summary of Recommendations). 
Figure 6-1: Recommendation grid 
 
1.5 Our vision 
What does the future we envision look like? It is a province that continually strives to 
use the power of government and the full set of tools at its disposal to balance our 
desires for individual autonomy and our need for community. It is a place where 
evidence, outcomes, and the lived experiences of those most affected drive changes. 
And it is a place where the reciprocity needed to build and maintain public trust is at the 
core of public discourse. In short, it is a vision of a society that always seeks the elusive 
balance inherent in a just society, knowing that is a never-ending quest.  
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2. Reforms targeting people with disabilities  
This section describes a set of proposed policy reforms that we believe will improve the 
current system’s support for people with disabilities in a way that is more consistent 
both with basic income principles and with our description of the characteristics of a just 
system. We deliberately use the term “people with disabilities” here to distinguish them 
from the “Persons with Disabilities” (PWD) designation in B.C.’s Income Assistance (IA) 
program. PWD is also sometimes used to refer to the Disability Assistance (DA) 
program itself. Our perspective here is both wider than IA and wider than the current 
PWD category, so “people with disabilities” refers to the group of people with any type 
of impairment that affects their life, regardless of how severe it is, how long it lasts, or 
whether the condition will improve. 
IA is the major program supporting people with disabilities. Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income 
Assistance), provides a description and analysis of IA, including DA and other parts of 
IA that assist people with impairments that affect their ability to work. Here we build on 
that work to discuss ways to improve the program for people with disabilities. Our 
discussion of improvements and recommendations relies heavily on a report prepared 
for the Ministry of Social Development and Social Innovation, a precursor to the current 
Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction, by an expert panel of physicians 
specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation, referred to as the 2016 Expert Panel 
Report (Dunn et al., 2016). Although not confidential, the report has never been 
published, so we have made a copy available on our website, with permission. We are 
indebted to the panel for its comprehensive and insightful work. 
We see the combined set of our recommendations as amounting to establishing a basic 
income for people living with a disability, setting their guarantee level to above the 
poverty line. This basic income would by no means be the sum total of what would be 
done for people living with disabilities—it would be complemented with a set of services 
and supports described in our other recommendations. To repeat a recurrent theme, we 
see these recommendations as suggestions for starting a focused conversation that 
must include the community of people with disabilities. Among our proposals is one for 
a mechanism to ensure that policy-making involves considerable consultation on an 
ongoing basis. 
This section briefly sets our recommendations in the context of our analytical 
framework. We then discuss parameters related to the benefit structure of IA as it 
applies to people with disabilities, including the definition of income, earnings 
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exemption, and rate at which income above the threshold is clawed back. We next 
address services provided to people with disabilities, including extended health in-kind 
benefits, work supports (which also follows Dunn et al., 2016), and other basic services, 
including housing. 
We have chosen to begin our discussion of specific groups with people with disabilities 
because of their importance as a group with clear and significant unmet needs—despite 
being the largest group served by the current system. This section lays the foundation 
for recommendations addressing other identified groups and for our sections on cross-
cutting program areas. 
2.1 Context 
Our general conclusion is that B.C. needs a set of cash-transfer and basic service 
programs that work together to provide people with adequate resources and the 
autonomy to use them, but also services targeted to address both the needs of specific 
groups and the specific needs of individuals within those groups. People with disabilities 
are an important example, as a group characterized by generally higher needs than the 
general population, facing higher rates of poverty and less capacity to work overall, but 
also with an incredible diversity in terms of individual circumstances. This is clearly a 
group requiring both targeted cash transfers and basic services, some of which (in 
principle) are already in place under the current system. But Part 4 makes it clear that 
there are opportunities to improve the alignment of the current system with our 
analytical framework and better achieve our justice-based goal, including those 
programs for people with disabilities. 
IA provides both the cash-transfer element and much of the basic service capacity of 
the current system for people with disabilities. The analysis in Part 4 led us to conclude 
that there are three main areas on which to focus our recommendations for 
improvement. 
The first is determining eligibility. Much of the argument in favour of generally applicable 
basic incomes is that they avoid the barriers to access and lack of respect inherent in 
programs that target specific groups and therefore require eligibility to be established. 
We have concluded that despite these characteristics, a generally applicable basic 
income is, overall, not the right solution for B.C. at this time. Even if we were 
recommending a basic income, additional resources and therefore programs would be 
required to meet the additional needs of people with disabilities. While the need to 
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determine eligibility cannot be avoided, eligibility requirements also affect barriers to 
both entering and exiting the program, as pointed out in Part 4; accessibility and the 
respect inherent in the process of determining eligibility can be improved. We make 
recommendations to increase accessibility and respect associated with the program, as 
well as to reduce incentives not to work. 
Second is the structure of the cash-transfer part of IA. Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing 
and Effective Tax Rate Implications), established a general approach to income-tested 
program structures and effective tax rate-induced incentive effects of income testing. IA 
cash transfers are income-tested, and that general approach applies with a distinctive 
set of parameters:  
• maximum benefit amounts that vary across IA categories, directly related to the 
adequacy of the resources provided 
• income exemption levels, below which the maximum benefit is paid and above 
which benefits are reduced as income rises, with exemptions that also vary by 
subcategory 
• a 100% benefit reduction rate that reduces benefits dollar for dollar above the 
income exemption level for all subcategories 
• resulting break-even levels that equal the sum of the income exemption and the 
maximum benefit amount for each subcategory 
Not only does this benefit structure affect adequacy, but it also affects two elements that 
can affect public trust—the cost and work disincentives—as well as stigma associated 
with how benefits are delivered. Our recommendations seek a better balance in the 
trade-offs among adequacy, respect, security, cost, and work disincentives. 
Third, we make recommendations to improve the basic services available to address 
the diverse needs of people with disabilities, which cannot be appropriately addressed 
by cash transfers. These include services related to health and other costs of living with 
a disability, barriers to employment for those wanting to work, and housing. Most of 
these reforms fill gaps that will benefit people with disabilities as well as people with 
other needs that should be addressed through services in responsive ways. 
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2.2 Eligibility reform 
We start by addressing the question of how to determine which people should qualify for 
IA because of impairments that affect their ability to work, including IA categories for 
people with disabilities, eligibility tests, and the process for applying those tests. As 
discussed in Section 3.2 (Background Patterns), with 73% of recipients excused from 
work for a medical reason, IA has effectively become a disability program. That makes 
the ability to fairly and accurately determine eligibility for a disability designation of 
utmost importance. 
Disability Assistance categories 
The current system has three relevant categories of IA for people with health and 
disability issues. Expected to Work—Medical Condition (ETW-MC) is for people with 
impairments that are expected to be short in duration and so are addressed mainly by 
suspending work-search requirements. Persons with Disabilities (PWD) is for people 
with high severity of impairment and long expected duration. Persons with Persistent 
Multiple Barriers (PPMB) is for people with moderate severity of impairment, where 
there is some prospect of work but likely not for the next two years. Its definition 
involves at least one health condition plus at least one other barrier to work (such as 
being homeless) and is often a stepping-stone to PWD.  
The 2016 Expert Panel commented that “the most problematic part of the current 
structure in terms of encouraging self-sufficiency is the PPMB category, which 
effectively parks many of the people with moderate disabilities who might be able to 
return to work but has no employment obligations.” The panel made a number of 
recommendations based on the principle of applying established medical concepts and 
objective medical evidence to determine how likely people with impairments are to 
achieve self-sufficiency. The key concepts set out by the panel (Dunn et al., 2016, p. 3) 
are as follows: 
• Work itself is therapeutic. From a psycho-social and medical perspective, there is 
a strong justification for supporting safe and appropriate employment for all those 
with the potential to achieve self-sufficiency.  
• “Impairment” and “disability.” Impairment is an actual physical/psychological loss, 
which can be assessed by a physician, more or less objectively. Disability relates 
to how that loss impacts an individual’s ability to carry out a particular task or 
participate in a particular activity, which is a more subjective question.… 
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• “Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI).” Whether a person’s medical condition is 
temporary or permanent is important in disability assessment....103  
• Objective medical evidence. It is important that findings of impairment by 
physicians be supported by objective medical evidence to the extent possible. 
Many common disability conditions are subjectively self-reported … (but) use of 
validated psychological testing and mental status examinations can provide 
important objective support for self-reported conditions.  
Applying these concepts, the 2016 Expert Panel designed a set of reformed IA 
categories together with significant process recommendations and supports for work, 
intended to provide those with the potential to work the opportunity to do so. We find 
that this approach would serve to improve the IA program in terms of its treatment of 
people with disabilities in several important ways, including improving access, treating 
people with disabilities with more respect by being more objective and through process 
improvements, and enhancing social inclusion by providing greater opportunity. 
We support in principle the advice given by the 2016 Expert Panel on how to think about 
the different groups of people who have medical impairments that affect their ability to 
work—that is, people who have disabilities with respect to work. There are three broad 
groups:  
1. A Severe-Persistent Disability (SPD) group, which corresponds to a reformed 
PWD designation—This consists of people who have reached MMI at a level of 
impairment that is expected to severely constrain their everyday life and their 
ability to work, and that is expected to persist.104 The 2016 Expert Panel defines 
this as “the person has reached MMI and has severe impairment that directly and 
significantly affects the person’s ability to perform daily living activities.” Severe 
impairment would be defined as recommended by the 2016 Expert Panel. 
2. A Moderate-Persistent Disability (MPD) group, which corresponds to people who 
have reached their MMI at a level of impairment that imposes moderate 
constraints on daily functioning and the ability to work, and that is expected to 
persist (i.e., applying the 2016 Expert Panel definition of moderate impairment)—
People in this category will often require supports and accommodations in order 
 
103 The report also notes that MMI is “a status where the person is as good as they are going to get from the health 
and program care available to them” (p. 14). 
104 Persistence does not preclude conditions that are episodic or cyclical. 
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to work and may not be able to work full-time or may need to take lengthy 
periods of time away from work, particularly if their condition is episodic. In 
contrast to the current PPMB designation, entering this category depends only on 
medical conditions and not on additional circumstances that are potentially 
arbitrary and require an admission of issues that some people may find 
demeaning.  
3. A Temporarily Unable to Work (TUW) category, which includes people in two 
different circumstances—The first covers those with impairments that are severe 
enough that they would have difficulty working but that are not expected to 
persist. This is essentially unchanged from the current ETW-MC category. There 
are other, non-medical reasons why work obligations of ETW recipients may be 
waived, and recommended changes would not affect that aspect of the ETW 
category. The second circumstance relates to those who are assessed as likely 
having a persistent impairment, either moderate or severe, but who have not yet 
reached MMI and thus cannot be given a final designation. The main goal for this 
group is to support people with living expenses (through cash, housing, etc.), 
therapy, and medical supports and services to improve their medical outcomes 
as much as possible, including a requirement for ongoing assessment up to the 
point where MMI can be declared. Once MMI is declared, these people would 
move to a disability category if their impairment is moderate and persistent, or 
severe and persistent. Otherwise, they would move to the ETW category. 
While there are three disability-related groups, as discussed later, in the spirit of 
reducing complexity we are recommending only two benefit levels and no distinction in 
access to services or in-kind benefits.  
Recommendation 1 (medium term): Replace the current Persons with Disabilities, 
Persons with Persistent Multiple Barriers, and Expected to Work—Medical Condition 
categories with two disability categories: one for those with long-term disabilities, 
Moderate-Persistent Disabilities (MPD) and Severe-Persistent Disabilities (SPD) 
designations combined into an MPD/SPD category, and a second for those with short-
term disabilities or disabilities where the severity and duration have not yet been 
determined, a Temporarily Unable to Work category, all based on the definitions 
recommended by the 2016 Expert Panel. 
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Application process 
Under the current system, there is an online portal through which those seeking IA, 
whether Temporary Assistance (TA) or DA, apply. The initial assumption, though, is that 
the application is for TA. Those in search of DA benefits can file a separate application 
for PWD designation at any time, and doing so freezes the requirement to divest 
themselves of assets in excess of the TA asset exemption. Applying for TA requires that 
a three-week job search be completed prior to receiving benefits, although applicants 
can be excused from that requirement for several reasons, including certain medical 
conditions. Most people who have disability-related barriers to employment would be 
excused from work-search requirements, but that decision is unrelated to applying for 
the PWD designation. 
We are concerned that the initial assumption that the application is for TA reinforces 
concerns among people with disabilities that the system will not fully recognize their 
needs and may eventually require them to meet conditions in the TA system. On the 
other hand, completely separating the TA and DA application processes would tend to 
increase the stigma associated with TA, isolating them as the “undeserving poor.” In 
addition, with the approach we are recommending, those found to have short-duration 
and/or low-severity disabilities through the assessment system would ultimately be 
required to seek work, with work-related assistance, under the TA program. Instead of 
separating the application systems, an initial triage step would be implemented to 
stream applicants appropriately and ensure that each is treated with appropriate 
respect. For those with a disability, once triaged into the disability stream, only disability-
related eligibility conditions would apply. 
The 2016 Expert Panel recommended a complete overhaul of the relevant application 
forms. The current forms require applicants to report extensively on their condition and 
then separately require the health-care professional completing the form to provide an 
assessment. However, the forms neither focus on important questions related to 
impairment severity and persistence, and MMI, nor use common medical terminology. 
The panel recommended that revised forms be developed based on examples provided 
in Appendix D of their report, and that physicians provide objective medical evidence. 
While more onerous for physicians, the result will make adjudication more objective 
and, in many cases, faster and less intrusive. 
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Recommendation 2 (medium term): Implement an initial triage step within the common 
application portal, in which people with disabilities are guided to an evaluation system 
specifically for them, essentially separating the application streams early in the process. 
Recommendation 3 (medium term): Revise application forms as recommended by the 
2016 Expert Panel and require objective medical evidence to be provided. 
Effective implementation of these recommendations would require having more people 
involved through an increase in the number of offices and staff, an issue discussed in 
more detail in Section 11 (System and IA Cross-Cutting Reforms). 
Asset test 
There is currently an asset test for PWD, though the limits are high ($100,000, with 
several exemptions) and there are mechanisms to ease those limitations further. We 
believe this relatively non-binding asset test contributes to applicants seeing the system 
as overly intrusive and making potentially inappropriate decisions about assets based 
on misinformation about the test. We note that some other jurisdictions in North America 
do not impose asset tests for disability benefit systems. There is an obvious balance to 
be struck between allowing people to build up and keep assets that can help them 
support themselves through difficulties and the inequity of people with different amounts 
of wealth getting the same benefits. For disabilities, which are both persistent and 
expensive, we believe the benefit of this recommended change outweighs the equity 
concern.  
Recommendation 4 (short term): Eliminate the asset test for disability categories.  
Income test 
Eligibility for DA requires that the applicant’s income be below the amount of benefits 
payable for their family size and IA category. For PWD-designated single adults, that 
amount is currently $1,183.42 per month ($14,201 annually). As discussed in Part 4, 
Section 5.1 (Income Assistance), this barrier to entry contributes to the welfare wall by 
requiring earnings to fall sharply for those earning income above the break-even level 
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(currently $26,201 for a single adult, increasing to $29,201 in 2021),105 before they are 
eligible to reapply for DA.  
There are three options for reforming the approach to income testing. The first is the 
current test, where income must be below the maximum benefit level. The second 
would be that income must be below the break-even level, the amount of income at 
which benefits are fully phased out. A third option would be to eliminate the income test 
and allow anyone who believes their disability would qualify to apply, regardless of their 
current income. Those who qualify would not receive a benefit payment unless their 
income dropped below the break-even level. That would effectively provide insurance 
against future loss of income for those with disabilities, but that function is already 
provided by the Employment Insurance program. Although it would simplify the system 
and reduce stigma somewhat, the third option would likely result in increased 
applications and pressure on the adjudication system. We therefore support the second 
approach initially, which would be a major step toward turning the disability system into 
a basic income for people with disabilities, with the potential for going further in future if 
warranted based on evaluation of the results of the change. 
Recommendation 5 (short term): Set the income test applied at the time of application 
for disability categories at the break-even level (i.e., the point at which benefits are fully 
phased out under the reformed benefit structure), so that people can apply so long as 
they would receive any amount of benefit if their application is successful. 
Note that the break-even level depends on the maximum benefit, the income 
exemption, and the benefit reduction rate, as well as family make-up, as recommended 
in Section 2.3 (Cash-Transfer Reform for People with Disabilities). 
Adjudication process 
Under the current system, assessments of disability status are done by adjudicators 
who apply the eligibility criteria based on information provided in applications, with two 
possible levels of appeal. There is no medical advice available to ministry staff during 
the initial adjudication or either level of appeal. 
 
105 For DA the break-even level of income at which benefits are phased out by the clawback of earned income from 
benefits so that the person no longer is eligible for DA is equal to the earnings exemption ($12,000 for single adults in 
2020, increasing to $15,000 in 2021) plus maximum annual benefits ($14,201) for a total of $26,201 in 2020, and 
$29,201 in 2021. 
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The adjudication process has the potential to make the system seem arbitrary and 
inflexible. It also appears to be inefficient in its use of information and unnecessarily 
lengthy in many cases. Decisions made in other related systems and medical diagnoses 
had traditionally been given no weight in the adjudication process, although that began 
to change in 2016. There is room to expand recognition of other medical assessments 
that indicate disability without a full assessment under the DA program. 
The 2016 Expert Panel recommended creating a new adjudication process that starts 
with a triage stage, moves to an information-gathering stage, and then moves on to an 
adjudication stage. The process would include what the 2016 Expert Panel calls “auto-
ins”—that is, using decisions in other government systems on disability status to 
expedite decisions within the B.C. system. For example, the Canada Pension Plan 
disability benefits (CPP-D) system has a stricter definition of disability, so if a person 
has a disability designation under that system, then that should be used to grant 
immediate designation under the B.C. system, a change that was implemented in 
September 2016. The panel identified additional auto-ins that should be considered. For 
example, the assessment system would make use of “presumptive diagnoses,” 
described in the report as follows: “Where a person has been diagnosed with a 
condition that generally means that the person does or will soon meet the PWD 
disability threshold, require less information about impairment related to daily living 
activities and focus on the medical condition itself instead” (Dunn et al., 2016, p. 25). 
This involves the use of a list of diagnosed conditions that, if present, would imply an 
immediate SPD designation.  
A key reform of the adjudication system is to set a professional standard for disability 
adjudicators—either a disability-management professional designation or a regulated 
health-care professional designation. Such a requirement would have to be phased in 
and could be augmented by enhanced on-the-job training for current adjudicators 
without a designation. Having a separate triage system in the disability part of the 
system will allow for training of these workers and a buildup of further expertise on their 
part.  
In addition, following the recommendations of the 2016 Expert Panel, adjudicators 
should have access to physicians for consultation on difficult cases. Appeal boards 
should also include people with lived experience with disabilities.  
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Recommendation 6 (medium term): Implement the recommendations of the 2016 Expert 
Panel related to the adjudication process. In addition, create a chief medical officer 
position for the disability system. 
The chief medical officer position would be similar to the equivalent position in the 
workers’ compensation system. This person would be in charge of reviewing and 
improving the adjudication system and ensuring the proper use of medical advice. They 
would also be responsible for assessing the effectiveness of ongoing rehabilitation 
services, discussed below.  
Maintaining eligibility—reassessment 
While the ministry maintains the authority to review a person’s eligibility, there is 
currently no designated reassessment period once a person attains a PWD designation. 
For the PPMB category, until changes were made in 2019 there was officially a two-
year reassessment period. In practice, PPMB reassessments were infrequent. 
However, a history of reassessments in the past and reassessments in other (federal) 
systems appears to have contributed to a climate of fear about reassessment. The fact 
that the ministry’s authority to review eligibility is discussed in online program 
information (presumably to discourage fraud) leads to ongoing fears about 
reassessment and losing access to benefits for both PPMB and PWD benefit recipients. 
We heard that fear loud and clear in some of our consultations. It is a fear that 
undermines the usefulness of the benefits as a secure base from which to make 
decisions and creates a barrier to access.  
Our recommendations would see an initial assessment and rehabilitation period for 
applicants unless they are quickly approved through an auto-in or presumptive 
diagnosis. This provides an extended opportunity to make sure that there is no fraud 
associated with disability assessment. As a result, while having the authority to review 
eligibility is an important protection against fraud, there should be no need to review a 
person’s impairment and resulting disability designation once the person has been 
designated with either SPD or MPD status, which requires that they have reached MMI. 
There might be some undetected fraud but that should be small enough that doing 
reassessments would bring small benefits relative to the cost of negatively affecting 
recipients’ sense of security and comfort in applying. Reviews of other eligibility criteria 
would continue to be within the program’s purview. 
In the case of those who have impairments but not an SPD or MPD designation, the 
2016 Expert Panel said:  
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For those who have not reached MMI, reaching the highest level of 
improvement possible will depend on how well they adhere to 
recommended treatment … The Panel suggests that anyone in the ETW-
MC (our TUW) subcategory should be required, as a condition of eligibility, 
to adhere to a reasonable evidence-based treatment plan if one applies, 
whether the treatment plan is intended to bring a person to MMI or 
maintain them at MMI. (Dunn et al., 2016, p. 23) 
We echo that sentiment but feel loss of benefits would be disproportionate and subject 
to arbitrary decisions. Consistent with basic income principles, there would be no 
specific penalty or threat of losing status or benefits related to compliance with 
recommended treatment for those not yet at MMI. 
Recommendation 7 (medium term): Limit eligibility review for people designated as 
MPD/SPD to factors other than their disability designation. People who have not 
reached MMI should be expected to commit to pursuing recommended treatment to the 
best of their ability. 
2.3 Cash-transfer reform for people with disabilities 
In principle, our approach to benefits for people with disabilities is that the support 
provided should be consistent with that provided to low-income seniors, treating the 
permanent disability community as equivalent to the retired population. Both are groups 
of people for whom paid work may or may not be a part of their lives, but society has a 
lower expectation of work than it does for the working-age population generally.  
Largely because of the federal Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement 
(OAS/GIS) program, a basic income, seniors have poverty rates of 6% to 7% (see Part 
3), which are below the rate of 10% for working-age adults without disabilities. In 
contrast, working-age adults with severe disabilities are almost three times as likely as 
those without disabilities to live in poverty (28.3%) and twice as likely as those with mild 
disabilities (14.2%) (Brisebois et al., 2018). Patterning disability benefits on aspects of 
the OAS/GIS will provide consistent, fair, and respectful treatment for those with 
disabilities, with design differences as appropriate to recognize differences between the 
two groups. 
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Payment method 
In the current system, benefit payments to DA recipients are made by the province 
through the Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction. Compared with the 
less-intrusive payment mechanisms associated with federal benefits delivered by 
Service Canada, such as CPP and GIS, or the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), such 
as refundable tax credits, this can be seen as stigmatizing. 
Recommendation 8 (medium term): Reform Moderate-Persistent Disabilities/Severe-
Persistent Disabilities benefits (or, if those categories are not adopted, Persons with 
Disabilities benefits) into a targeted basic income, delivered by the Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA) as a refundable tax credit, subject to federal government agreement. The 
Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction would continue to be responsible 
for eligibility adjudication. On designation, the CRA would be responsible for calculating 
benefits and delivering payments, as with other refundable tax credits. Recipients 
experiencing an income drop could opt out of CRA benefit delivery, reverting to monthly 
benefit calculation and delivery by the ministry until revoked in a subsequent tax filing.  
There are two issues associated with delivering cash transfers through the income tax 
system. As discussed in Part 4, Section 3.5 (Institutional Framework), for a variety of 
reasons many vulnerable and low-income individuals do not file income tax returns. 
That includes those with PWD designations, many of whom currently have no obligation 
to file since they pay no tax even though they thereby lose out on benefits. In 
Recommendation 54 we propose seeking federal co-operation for automatic tax-filing to 
overcome these barriers. That will be especially important for those receiving this 
targeted basic income, and in particular those who have little or no earned income. 
The second issue, discussed in Part 5, Section 3.3 (Types of Basic Income), is that the 
income tax system responds only annually to changes in income, which can result in a 
delay of up to two years before benefits are adjusted after a change. The evidence 
suggests that few people designated as having persistent disabilities will have income 
exceeding the exemption level of $12,000 per year (increasing to $15,000 in 2021), and 
it is expected that for the small number who have higher levels of income, many will 
have relatively stable income. For these recipients, the stability and automated nature of 
a CRA-delivered refundable tax credit would be very beneficial. 
However, for those who have income that exceeds the exemption level and fluctuates, it 
is important that the benefit payments increase quickly to prevent economic instability 
from sudden income drops, while avoiding requirements to repay overpayments from 
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sudden income increases and maintaining fairness across recipients. The program must 
do this without imposing undue compliance and reporting burdens on those with low or 
stable income. 
As indicated in Recommendation 8, we propose that this would be addressed by giving 
recipients the ability to opt out of CRA benefit delivery. That would result in the ministry 
calculating and delivering benefits monthly based on requirements to report income 
monthly. Exemptions and application of the benefit reduction rate to phase out benefits 
as income increases would be done monthly rather than using annual amounts—
benefits would adjust each month.  
This option would likely be exercised only by those suffering a significant drop in 
income. Having opted out, the recipient would not be able to opt back in to CRA delivery 
until a subsequent tax filing, with CRA benefit delivery taking effect in the subsequent 
July, as with other refundable tax credits. This would avoid overpayments that become 
repayable and allow for responsive benefit delivery during periods of instability, at the 
cost of monthly reporting and benefits varying with monthly income. Such an approach 
would be subject to federal agreement. 
Unless the income tax system is reformed to be more responsive (see 
Recommendation 55), it is unlikely that CRA benefit delivery would be an appropriate 
approach for the TUW group, which would by default continue to have benefits provided 
by the ministry. The fact that the ministry would continue to provide monthly ETW and 
TUW benefits means that the infrastructure would be in place to deliver responsive 
benefits to SPD/MPD clients who opt out of CRA benefit delivery. 
Benefit levels 
The current PWD maximum benefit amount (G), set in 2019, is $14,201 if received for a 
full year (this does not include the temporary COVID-19 top-up of $300 per month,106 
which annualized would make the rate $17,801). Even leaving out the extra expenses 
associated with the person’s disability, this leaves recipients with no income well below 
the Market Basket Measure (MBM) poverty line of $19,128 (for towns with populations 
of 30,000 to 99,000 in B.C.) or $21,807 (for Vancouver).107 In comparison, the maximum 
combined OAS/GIS benefit including the B.C. Senior’s Supplement is $18,950.52 as of 
 
106 Note that the top-up amount is set at $150 per month for January–April 2021 in conjunction with the B.C. 
Recovery Benefit of $500 for single adults and $1,000 for families. 
107 2016 census MBM poverty lines updated to 2019 using the BC All Items CPI. 
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June 2020, and the maximum CPP-D benefit, which depends on pensionable earnings 
over the past five years, is $16,651.92. 
Given that the PWD designation is intended to provide long-term benefits mostly to 
recipients with little or no income, this amounts to permanently consigning them to 
poverty. In contrast, a conscious policy decision has been made by the federal 
government, with supplements from the provinces, to establish an income floor for those 
over age 65 that is approximately at the MBM poverty line. That is, for seniors who are 
also long-term benefit recipients, many of whom earn little or no other income, 
maximum benefits have been set to approximately eliminate poverty. We believe the 
same should be done for people with disabilities.  
Setting the guaranteed income level for a person with persistent disabilities that are 
moderate or severe and with no other source of income at the poverty line is justified by 
providing a minimal level of adequacy that gives recipients a modicum of freedom of 
choice. We feel it is also appropriate to bring people who are temporarily unable to work 
because of a medical condition, whether the disability is temporary or MMI has not been 
reached, to the poverty line during this period. Paying them a lower amount than people 
designated with the other disability statuses would provide an unfortunate incentive to 
shortchange their rehabilitation in order to be designated with one of the other statuses.  
However, we recommend that the benefit amount for those who are in the initial stage of 
assessing whether they should be given any disability designation should be provided 
with benefits using the ETW benefit structure. Without this, there would be an incentive 
for everyone to apply initially to the disability program in order to receive the higher 
disability benefit amount while being assessed, even if they know the assessment will 
be negative.  
Recommendation 9 (short term): Move the monetary benefit for those on Disability 
Assistance at least to the poverty line by increasing the maximum benefit amount: 
• for single people in the Severe-Persistent Disability, Moderate-Persistent Disability, 
and Temporarily Unable to Work categories by $500 per month, to $20,196 annually, 
and  
• for couples and other family types proportionately. For couples in which both people 
have a disability use a scale factor of 1.41, for an annual benefit amount of $28,560. 
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The recommended low-income housing benefit would be integrated with IA by making it 
deductible from the IA benefits received, discussed further in Section 5 (Housing 
Support Reform). 
To really avoid poverty, extra expenses associated with each person’s specific disability 
would need to be addressed. We propose doing so through basic services directed at 
health-care and employment–related costs, discussed in Section 4 (Extended Health 
Basic Service). 
It is worth noting that moving the disability amounts to the MBM poverty line may put it 
above the amounts under the CPP-D program for some people, depending on their 
previous pensionable earnings. The province encourages people to apply for CPP-D if 
they are likely to qualify and pays any top-up to reach the applicable IA benefit payable. 
(Recommendation 61 is that benefit levels and income exemptions be indexed to 
inflation using annual changes to the MBM poverty line.) 
Income exemption and the benefit reduction rate 
In the current system, the annual earnings exemption for DA for a single adult is 
$12,000 and will be increased to $15,000 as of January 2, 2021. For a family with at 
least one person with a PPMB designation, the monthly earnings exemption is $700 per 
month, or $9,400 per year (increasing to $900 per month in January 2021). For earnings 
above the exemption, the benefit reduction rate (BRR) is 100% for both groups.  
B.C.’s BRR is much larger than for comparable provinces (in both Alberta and Ontario, 
the BRR is 50% for the people in the DA components of their systems, and 70% in 
some other provinces) and for GIS, which has a 50% BRR. High BRRs are typically 
established, in part, to discourage people who would otherwise work more hours and 
not qualify for benefits from cutting their work hours in order to qualify. Since those 
receiving disability benefits have established a medical basis for eligibility, this concern 
is not strongly relevant in this case. As discussed in Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing 
and Effective Tax Rate Implications), and shown by Campolieti and Riddell (2012) in the 
context of disabilities, a lower BRR provides an incentive for people to work, with 
benefits for their self- and social respect.  
The BRR applies only above the earnings exemption. Earnings exemptions also vary 
across provinces and programs, and B.C. has a relatively high earnings exemption 
(some have none). Part 3, Section 5.2 (Income Testing), showed that, for a given break-
even (BE) level and maximum benefit amount, the BRR and the income exemption are 
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related: the higher the income exemption, the higher the BRR required to phase out the 
benefit by the BE level. In general, a lower BRR has a smaller disincentive effect, but 
the income exemption can be thought of as a range of income over which the BRR is 
zero. We are aware of no research on how the income exemption and BRR work 
together in terms of incentive effects and whether there is an optimal combination of 
BRR and exemption level, a question that should be explored further as the results of 
implementing changes are evaluated, in accordance with Recommendation 63. 
We therefore believe that as a first step in changing the benefit structure, the income 
exemption should remain at the amount announced in 2020 to take effect in January 
2021 ($15,000 for singles, $30,000 for a couple with both people having a PWD 
designation), but that the BRR be lowered to 70%. Assuming the maximum benefit 
proposed in Recommendation 9, the BE level for a single person would be $43,851 and 
for a couple with both people having a PWD designation the BE level would be $70,800. 
Recommendation 10 (short-term): Lower the Disability Assistance benefit reduction rate 
at which benefits are reduced as income increases from 100% to 70%, and maintain the 
earnings exemption at levels taking effect January 2021 (e.g., $15,000 for singles). 
2.4 Basic services for those with disabilities 
Access to work 
The 2016 Expert Panel recommended an Assisted to Work basic service program that 
provides intensive job supports and accommodation, incorporating both additional 
specialized staff resources and tangible supports to help people with disabilities work if 
they choose. A similar program targeting people with disabilities plus youth aging out of 
care and long-term unemployment is discussed in detail and recommended in Section 6 
(Assisted to Work Basic Service). 
Extended health coverage 
People with disabilities face costs specific to their disability, such as specific medical 
equipment and the services of professionals like physiotherapists. Income Assistance 
health supplements currently provide this type of service to PWD recipients and those 
who have recently exited to employment. Addressing these needs is important for 
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 416 
 
actually getting people to the poverty line.108 However, adverse medical events can 
detrimentally affect anyone, and those living in or close to poverty can fall into poverty 
or be unable to escape poverty because of unmet health-care needs, despite universal 
MSP coverage. In Section 4 (Extended Health Basic Service) we recommend that 
income assistance health supplements be reformed into generally available income-
tested extended health coverage as a basic service across all low-income populations. 
Housing 
One marker of the inadequacy of current benefit rates is the extent of problems with 
housing among people with disabilities. Zwicker et al. (2020b) show that over 20% of 
people with severe or very severe disabilities are in core housing need, compared to 
10% of people without a disability. In Section 5 (Housing Support Reform) we 
recommend a housing benefit integrated with IA to provide housing support for low-
income people with disabilities. We also recommend continued focus on increasing the 
supply of social housing, including housing that meets the needs of people with 
disabilities. 
2.5 Public and community employment 
An MPD/SPD designation, by definition, implies limited potential for most to engage in 
stable, long-term work patterns. People with this designation, however, may well have a 
desire to make a contribution, gain personal satisfaction, and increase their income and 
social inclusion through productive work.  
For this group and, possibly, some of those with moderate disabilities and some still 
progressing toward MMI, there should be a community-based program offering 
employment opportunities. Taking part in those opportunities would likely require 
considerable supports and commitment from all involved—recipients, supporters, and 
directors of projects. This and, for some, the Assisted to Work program recommended 
in Section 6 (Assisted to Work Basic Service} highlights our emphasis on justice over 
efficiency. It is likely not possible to justify the cost of a jobs program of this type based 
on expectations that participants will be transformed into independent, tax-paying 
workers or an expectation that projects will be self-funding. Instead, the opportunity to 
 
108 According to Brisebois et al. (2018), “four in ten (38%) persons with disabilities aged 15 years and over who were 
living below Canada’s official poverty line reported an unmet need due to cost for an aid, device, and/or prescription 
medication.”  
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have an ongoing job that contributes to one’s community is the outcome itself and the 
justification for funding the net cost.  
One possible model for this is the Community Employment Innovation Project (CEIP), 
an experiment run by the federal government in Cape Breton in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. It involved enlisting a set of six Cape Breton communities to design community 
projects. IA and EI recipients were then given the opportunity to shift off their regular 
benefits and instead take jobs with a regular wage carrying out the community-
determined projects. The idea of the project was both to develop community capacity 
and networks and to provide useful work experience (and networking) for those 
receiving benefits. The approach was based on the communities creating 
democratically elected boards that were expected to work with the community to 
develop a strategic plan and a specific set of community projects. Workers in the 
projects were paid and took part voluntarily, moving off income support or Employment 
Insurance while involved in the experiment. Most participants’ wage earnings were 
close to what their income assistance benefits would have been. Participants could 
therefore be paid the minimum wage without considerable extra cost relative to the 
payments in the existing income assistance system. The successful operation of the 
CEIP indicates that some portion of those receiving income assistance benefits (at least 
20% in the CEIP) would voluntarily take the option to work and contribute to their 
community rather than just receiving benefits.  
This approach not only would have benefits in providing people with meaningful 
activities, generating improvements for the community, but would be in itself an exercise 
in community building.  
Recommendation 11 (medium term): Design and implement a program that funds 
community groups for projects that provide jobs to people with disabilities (and some 
other targeted groups), with lower expectations than market jobs, and with wages 
integrated into their Income Assistance benefits. 
2.6 Community building  
Finding mechanisms through which participants can feel that they have meaningful 
input into the programs that affect them is important. In the context of DA, this means 
engaging with the community of people with disabilities when deciding how to design 
services. It also means helping to set up mechanisms for the community to meet and 
make decisions.  
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One possibility is to create more community centres that house practical supports, such 
as for job searches, but that are also, themselves, where community jobs are done. The 
goal is to provide the physical infrastructure that can serve as the basis for building and 
supporting community. CEIP-type decision-making committees and the projects 
determined by them could be located at the centres.  
Community input 
People with disabilities need to be systematically engaged in designing basic services 
as well as in the cash-transfer adjudication and administrative system. All of these 
design issues have direct effects on their lives, and they are best situated to know what 
will work. Any consultation mechanisms need to give the community more than just lip 
service and to be clearly seen to be doing so by the community.  
One intriguing model is the 2019 National Housing Strategy Act, as explained by van 
den Berg (2019):  
The National Housing Strategy Act creates a Federal Housing Advocate 
and a National Housing Council to further the housing policy and strategy. 
Together, the housing advocate and council are mandated, among other 
duties, to monitor the implementation of the National Housing Strategy; 
consult stakeholders; study systemic housing issues, including by 
establishing a review panel to hold hearings; and advise the designated 
minister on systemic housing issues, including by preparing reports with 
recommendations for housing matters over which Parliament has 
jurisdiction. The designated minister must respond to the reports prepared 
by the housing advocate and review panels and, every three years, must 
report to Parliament on the effectiveness of the National Housing Strategy. 
(p. 6) 
This approach is rooted in the goal of creating policy to meet Canada’s international 
obligations on housing rights as a signatory to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. In essence, it gives teeth to those rights, requiring a 
purposeful approach by the government to honouring them. However, it does not make 
the rights enforceable in courts, but instead creates a separate adjudication process 
that addresses systemic issues (as opposed to individual cases). The creation of the 
council provides a venue for bringing together people with lived experience and people 
with expertise in the legal context to provide input that can be expected to have impact 
through the requirement that the relevant ministry respond to reports and 
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recommendations. There is no requirement for the government to adopt 
recommendations, but by requiring a response the mechanism serves to establish the 
notion of the right to housing.  
We believe that there is scope for a similar approach in the area of disability supports. 
Canada (and through it, B.C.) is also a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. A similar structure, with a council and advocate, could operate 
in this sphere. The council and advocate could be located within the B.C. Human Rights 
Commissioner’s office in order to emphasize the rights-based approach. Recent 
changes to the B.C. Human Rights Act directing the commissioner to examine B.C.’s 
obligations under international rights conventions are very much in the same spirit as 
this recommendation.  
2.7 Addiction as a disability 
In a recent public letter, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police called for 
decriminalization of small amounts of currently illegal drugs, arguing that drug 
dependence should be treated as a public health problem, not a criminal matter. The 
Globe and Mail responded with an editorial backing this position. When institutions such 
as these see the issue in these terms, there is a clear opportunity to make progress.  
A complete plan for addressing addiction and the opioid crisis that is a crucial part of it 
would involve several parts: decriminalization, the establishment of a safe drug supply 
(something long advocated by B.C.’s public health officers), and supports for people 
with drug dependence that recognize addiction as a potentially debilitating condition that 
circumscribes people’s ability to take a full part in society. The latter description fits, in 
broad terms, with descriptions of disability under IA, where addiction has long been 
recognized as a source of impairment in the PWD program.  
As with other disabilities, addiction can vary from something a person can function with 
to severe forms that make activities like holding a regular job all but impossible. And as 
with other disabilities, people with drug dependencies could therefore be triaged into 
moderate and severe groups. For those with a moderate but persistent dependence-
based disability, an Assisted to Work program tailored to them could be possible. For 
those with severe dependency, public employment would likely function better. Again, 
the mechanism could be community-based projects that involve jobs and support for 
work as well as community building.  
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 420 
 
Addiction had long been recognized as a potential source of impairment for the 
purposes of PWD, but in the summer of 2019, for the first time, B.C. included addiction 
as a condition that meets the definition of a disabling health issue for the purposes of 
PPMB eligibility. So far, this has apparently not led to a material increase in the PPMB 
caseload—perhaps because many of those involved already had a mental health–
related disability designation, or because information about this change has not been 
fully circulated and understood in the affected community.  
We believe that people with addictions and mental health conditions should be fully 
included in the disability support system, but there is much more involved with 
managing addictions and mental health issues than just providing income support and 
in-kind benefits. Harm reduction measures have evolved over time, but further initiatives 
have been proposed, such as a safe drug supply, and balanced provision of DA to 
those with addictions, integrated into a full opioid crisis mitigation plan, is important. The 
sharp spike in overdose deaths since the pandemic began re-iterates the need for such 
an approach. 
Recommendation 12 (medium term): Integrate the provision of Income Assistance 
benefits to people with addiction and mental health issues with the full range of 
measures addressing the opioid crisis as they evolve over time, with involvement from 
other social policy areas, such as public health and the justice system. 
Since the PPMB designation began to recognize addiction as a medical condition that 
can result in severe disabilities, in July 2019, there has been low take-up by those with 
addictions. For both the PWD and PPMB programs, it would be useful to better 
understand how effectively the IA system currently supports those with addictions and 
how well it integrates with broader health and other supports for this group. 
Recommendation 13 (short term): Undertake an independent program evaluation of how 
Income Assistance supports those with addictions in the context of the full set of 
supports and approaches focused on this population to inform detailed design of 
Disability Assistance program reforms. 
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3. Reforms targeting single working-age adults 
3.1 Context 
In Part 3, Section 2 (Poverty in British Columbia), we examined poverty among different 
demographic groups. One of the most striking observations from that work was that 
single working-age adults are the broad demographic group with the highest rate and 
greatest depth of poverty in the province. Children, seniors, and working-age couples all 
fare better in terms of poverty and have benefited more from government policy 
changes in recent years. Our analysis of the current system in Part 4 revealed a 
significant gap in the system as it applies to this group, in terms both of the inability of 
the Temporary Assistance component of Income Assistance (IA) and Employment 
Insurance to protect it from loss of income, and the gaps in services related to basic 
needs such as housing and health care. 
Our overall objective is to move toward a more just society, through a reformed income 
and social support system that balances self- and social respect. The most salient 
characteristics identified in our analytical framework and applied in developing 
recommendations focused on the single-adult demographic group are as follows: 
• Adequacy—We recommend an increase in transfers through a combination of 
housing-related policy, extended health benefits, and making the current $300 
COVID-19 emergency top-up to IA monthly benefits permanent. When combined 
with a reduced benefit reduction rate (BRR), this would provide benefits to people 
further up the income distribution. We note that how IA eligibility is handled 
determines how close IA is to a basic income, and gradually relaxing eligibility 
limits is a potential path toward a basic income. For low-income earners not 
receiving IA benefits, we recommend an enhanced earnings supplement 
• Access and security—We recommend removing the three-week job search 
requirement for IA applicants. This would eliminate some contradictions in the 
system, making it simpler and enhancing the dignity of those who need to use it. 
We also recommend keeping case files open for two years for people over age 
50 (initially) in order to facilitate their taking jobs, and to provide true security if 
those jobs end.  
• Opportunity—We recommend reductions in the BRR for IA benefits in order to 
reduce effective tax rate barriers to working. We also recommend an evaluation 
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of the Single Parent Employment Initiative, extending its support of one-year 
educational opportunities if the evaluation indicates it has been successful.  
• Social connection—We recommend supports for community engagement and 
community building. As in our reforms for the Disability Assistance system, we 
recommend the creation of public/community programs that include jobs that 
could be taken voluntarily for those on IA for extended periods. These programs 
would both directly build community infrastructure and give people the 
opportunity to contribute to their community.  
Another element of our framework is the importance of gaining and maintaining public 
trust. That requires both the people directly affected by a program and others in society 
to have direct input into policy design, a principle well understood in other social policy 
areas. This involves a rights-based approach to discussions of changes in these 
policies and in how those discussions are conducted.  
3.2 Single adult poverty 
In order to frame our policy recommendations in this area, it is useful to synthesize our 
background discussion of poverty in Part 3 with our discussion of the current system 
and particularly IA in Part 4 to focus on the single working-age adult group, especially 
those not covered by Disability Assistance and other disability-targeted programs.  
As shown in Part 3, poverty rates for single adults are high and persistent, falling from 
41.5% in 2006 to 31.4% in 2018, while the poverty rate for single parents fell from 
62.3% to 18.6% over the same period. The income and social support system largely 
supports this group through IA. 
In February 2020,109 73% of IA recipients had a Persons with Disabilities (PWD), 
Persons with Persistent Multiple Barriers (PPMB), or Expected to Work—Medical 
Condition (ETW-MC) designation (Petit & Tedds, 2020g), parts of the system covered 
under our policy recommendations for people with disabilities. The rest of the cases fit 
in the Expected to Work (ETW) category, broken down between those with an obligation 
to seek employment and those designated as Temporarily Excused from Work. Two-
thirds of the latter category are single parents, mostly with a youngest child under the 
 
109 DataBC:  https://catalogue.data.gov.bc.ca/dataset/bc-employment-and-assistance-program. We multiply case 
numbers for couples by 2 to get total recipient numbers. 
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age of three, a group for which poverty has been reduced by federal and provincial 
refundable tax credits.  
The ETW category is dominated by single males without children (48% of recipients in 
the category) and single females without children (25% of recipients in the category), 
accounting for 24% of single men and 18% of single women in the total IA caseload. 
From this we can conclude that the reforms to disability-related policies discussed in 
Section 2 (Reforms Targeting People with Disabilities) have the largest impact on the 
poverty rate for single adults, but there is a significant minority of the single working-age 
adults in poverty who need effective non-disability support. 
As discussed in Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance, under Background Patterns), 
the group of single adults with an ETW designation is characterized by intermittent 
employment and IA benefit spells, to some extent mitigating Employment Insurance (EI) 
system inaccessibility for those with insufficient hours of work. The policy reforms for the 
ETW category need to provide dignified supports for long-term repeat TA users, 
including design elements and options that support choices to work when work may be 
sporadic for the foreseeable future. The COVID-19 pandemic has shone a light on the 
extent of precarity in employment that has existed for a long time in the B.C. workforce, 
as discussed in Part 3, Section 4 (Labour Market Trends). Helping workers between 
employment spells—especially employment spells that do not qualify for EI—is an 
important goal in its own right that could be partly met through short-term IA benefits. 
The use of short-term IA benefits will be lessened to the extent that the federal 
government extends and strengthens the EI program. 
There is also a significant group of low-income earners who rarely qualify for IA and 
who are in or near poverty despite working 40 weeks or more per week. This group 
could be most effectively assisted with an enhanced earning supplement program that 
augments their wages and provides incentives to remain in the workforce.  
3.3 Temporary Assistance eligibility 
Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance), outlined the eligibility requirements for 
Temporary Assistance (TA) and discussed how those eligibility requirements contribute 
to the welfare wall. Consistent with the funder-of-last-resort principle underlying Income 
Assistance, eligibility requirements related to the mandatory job search, income test, 
and asset test act to limit eligibility to those in the most desperate circumstances. Other 
eligibility requirements put in place in 1996 and 2002 to reduce the caseload have been 
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adjusted in reforms introduced since 2017, such as the requirement to demonstrate two 
years of financial independence prior to being eligible for IA.  
The discussion in Part 4 pointed out that these eligibility requirements not only act as a 
barrier to entering the program but also act as a barrier to exiting the program once a 
person is receiving benefits. Eligibility combines with the benefit structure, the need to 
re-establish eligibility after exiting IA, and the loss of basic services available only to 
those receiving IA benefits or those who have recently left, to erect a substantial barrier 
to exit. 
In our view, reducing these barriers to TA is the best way to provide better coverage for 
the single adults we have been discussing, within the context of our analytical 
framework, as such changes would improve accessibility, respect, and stability. The 
result would be to make it easier to both gain access to TA and exit the program for 
work, a further move in the direction set by IA reforms since 2019. We believe that a 
focus on both entry and exit, together with EI reform that is already underway, and post-
pandemic recovery will prevent the caseload from becoming unacceptably high, as it did 
in the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, there is a trade-off between accessibility, adequacy, 
and stability on one hand and public trust on the other. Our recommendations will 
clearly impose a fiscal cost, although much more manageable one than any comparable 
basic income alternative. 
Job search requirement 
The first step in establishing eligibility is to have completed a three-week job search 
requirement (or have it waived). This step has the potential to look at best 
counterintuitive and at worst punitive, given that in the second assessment stage the 
applicant may be deemed not to be job ready. Indeed, the majority of IA cases appear 
to be designated as not close to job ready. This may reflect actual job-ready applicants 
finding work during the three-week search, but it is not a reason to deny support to them 
during that search. It is possible to receive hardship assistance in that period if need 
can be proven, yet another eligibility adjudication process. 
In our view, eliminating the three-week search period would close a gap in support, 
starting those who need it on a job-readiness program faster and supporting those who 
are job ready while they search. Of course, the cost would be the benefits paid to both 
groups during that three weeks. In addition, some of those who take jobs quickly during 
the three-week search period because of their lack of income might search for longer 
when on benefits. It is hard to know the extent of any such behavioural response, but its 
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costs could partly be offset by the job seekers being able to take the time to find a better 
job. Such a change might also draw some job seekers into the system who are not 
currently applying for IA.  
This reform would also help the long-term, repeated users of the IA system who 
currently have to go through a three-week job-search period each time they reapply if 
their intervening job lasted more than six months, incentivizing shorter-duration job 
spells. At the same time, concern over the three-week job search without income 
support may keep some individuals receiving IA benefits from taking up job offers since 
in the low-skilled labour market those jobs are likely not to be permanent, good jobs.  
Recommendation 14 (short term): Eliminate the three-week work-search requirement by 
combining the current Stages 1 and 2 in the application process. Applicants should be 
immediately assessed for job readiness and moved onto employment plans to help with 
job preparation while receiving benefits. Those deemed job ready should be given 
immediate, lighter-touch support while also receiving benefits.  
It is possible to envision an arrangement in which the federal government ultimately 
pays benefit amounts for all unemployed people and others needing cash-transfer 
support, through a combination of an expanded EI and other new programs, while the 
provinces focus on providing basic services. Older, long-duration unemployed single 
adults are a prime example of where coordination is needed.  
Recommendation 15 (short term): Engage in immediate talks with the federal 
government around reforms to the Employment Insurance system and broader supports 
that are likely to arise as Canada emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic. The goal 
would be to create an integrated system with a clear statement about which program 
and level of government is helping which population group.  
Income test 
Currently, IA recipients are required “to pursue, accept, and use all other income to 
support themselves before receiving assistance,” and there is an income test to 
determine eligibility.110 The definition of income for this purpose is a long, 
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exempt for income-testing purposes.111 As with Disability Assistance, discussed in 
Section 2 (Reforms Targeting People with Disabilities), to be eligible for Temporary 
Assistance, non-exempt monthly income must be below the payment the applicant 
would receive from IA (i.e., the regular monthly cash benefit).  
Among our recommendations in Section 3.4 (Benefit Structure) are an increase in the 
base benefit amount for ETW and a reduction in the BRR applied to income above the 
earnings exemption, so recipients with monthly income up to about $2,000 (the break-
even level) will receive some IA benefits.  
The choice of income test for TA eligibility is similar to that described in relation to DA. 
While three options were discussed for DA, only two apply to TA: using the maximum 
benefit amount as the income test level (as at present), and using the break-even level. 
Using the break-even level would make TA more like a basic income and would reduce 
a barrier to both access and exit, making it easier to leave because it would be easier to 
get back in. Using the maximum benefit as the income test instead means the IA 
system is more like an insurance system that individuals access when their earnings fall 
to a particularly low level in a month.  
Using the break-even level would make all households with monthly income between 
the maximum benefit plus the earnings exemption (approximately $1,500) and the 
break-even level ($2,000) eligible in terms of the income test. This would be quite 
expensive but would have enhanced poverty reduction effects. It would also generate 
other fundamental changes in the system. The non-disabilities part of the current 
system is dominated by the ETW stream, and it focuses on job search and improving 
job readiness. Given the low benefit rate, low earnings exemption, and 100% BRR, this 
is reasonable: the people who are receiving benefits under such a system will tend to 
have low or sporadic employment. But the break-even level in our proposed system is 
approximately 20% above the MBM poverty line, and if eligibility is based on that level 
then the system will include people with much greater work attachment. In our analysis 
of single adults living below the poverty line (in Part 4, Section 5.1, Income Assistance), 
we noted that approximately 20% of this group works more than 40 weeks a year—the 
majority of them at full-time hours, so job-search and job-readiness requirements would 
not be relevant. Instead, the IA system could become both an income support program 
 
111 See Section 11.3 (Income Assistance Cross-Cutting Reform) for discussion and a recommendation on the income 
definition. 
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and a gateway to targeted training programs. Given that the full-year workers with 
earnings near the poverty line are disproportionately females in sales and service jobs, 
and that we know from COVID-19–related events that these tend to be jobs with poor 
working conditions, the IA system could make it less risky for these employees to 
complain to the labour regulator to enforce employment standards, as discussed in Part 
4, Section 5.7 (Labour Market Regulation). In Section 10 (Labour Regulation), we make 
recommendations to improve labour regulations to reduce precarious employment and 
poverty among those with jobs. We also recommend an earnings supplement scheme 
in Section 3.7 (Earnings Supplement) that targets low-income earners with substantial 
weeks of work during the year. 
We believe that it is best to proceed in stages. In the first stage, increase access and 
benefits but maintain the income test at the maximum benefit level. This would allow an 
investigation of any issues that might arise from increasing accessibility, enhancing 
benefits, and making health supplements more generally available to reduce the welfare 
wall. In a future stage, moving the income test to the break-even level would effectively 
create a combined basic service/basic income system. The move to that system could 
be done gradually by raising the eligibility line from the basic grant value to the break-
even level of income.  
As we have discussed in other parts of the report, we believe that a basic income will 
only work if it is part of a complete system, including support for transitions out of care 
for youth, a safe drug supply, and effective labour market regulation. A purposeful but 
gradual approach allows for all of the supporting infrastructure to be built along the way. 
Recommendation 16 (short term): Initially, continue to use the maximum benefit level as 
the income eligibility test for Temporary Assistance. 
Recommendation 17 (medium term): Gradually raise the income eligibility test amount, 
eventually reaching the break-even income level, learning from experience to adjust the 
system along the way.  
Asset test 
In the current system, applicants must also have assets below specified limits for TA, 
similar to the DA asset test, as discussed in Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance). 
Assets include cash, equity in property, investments, or other financial instruments, but 
there is also a long list of exclusions and exemptions. A single adult cannot have non-
exempt assets over $5,000, and a couple or single parent cannot have non-exempt 
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assets over $10,000—much lower than the DA thresholds, which are high enough to 
effectively not matter in practice for most applicants. 
The main argument in favour of an asset test is that it ensures that people exhaust their 
available resources before turning to the government, consistent with the funder-of-last-
resort principle. The arguments against the asset test are:  
• eliminating tests makes the system easier to understand and to implement  
• such tests are intrusive and stigmatizing  
• the test forces recipients to liquidate and use assets, with potentially adverse 
long-term consequences  
The Guaranteed Income Supplement does not have an asset test, and asset tests have 
been eliminated in income support programs in a number of U.S. states. 
There is very little relevant empirical evidence on the impact of removing an asset test 
(Petit & Tedds, 2020g). Evidence from the American welfare systems indicates that 
relaxing asset tests related to vehicles (already exempt in B.C.) leads to an increase in 
vehicle ownership, while relaxing tests related to liquid assets has insubstantial effects 
on holdings of those assets. There is no credible evidence for Canada on whether 
eliminating the asset test would lead to a substantial increase in the number of people 
receiving IA.  
We believe that eliminating as many barriers to access as possible will improve the 
effectiveness of the TA program and its alignment with our analytical framework. On 
balance, the substantial reduction in complexity and reporting combined with benefits 
from any asset accumulation among people with low incomes support the elimination of 
the asset test for TA. (This is a somewhat different rationale for eliminating the asset 
test than the one discussed for DA in Section 2.2, Eligibility Reform.) 
Recommendation 18 (short term): Eliminate the asset test for Temporary Assistance. 
Streamlined reapplication 
In Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance), we discussed the barrier to exiting IA for 
work caused by eligibility requirements that make the prospect of having to reapply for 
benefits uncertain and financially less attractive in many cases than simply staying on 
IA. Under the current system, a case is closed either if the recipient requests closure or 
if there are two consecutive months in which no cheque is issued (which can happen if 
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the person has earned enough to no longer qualify for benefits). To regain benefits 
there is a six-month period during which a streamlined application process applies but 
some of the eligibility requirements continue to apply, such as the full income and asset 
tests discussed earlier in this section. Applicants returning under the streamlined 
application process are not required to complete a three-week work search. 
Respondents to outreach from the Poverty Reduction Initiative confirm that the 
complexity of and uncertainty about even streamlined reapplication provides recipients 
with an incentive not to work as much or at all, out of fear of losing access to benefits 
(Hertz et al., 2020). 
As described above, there is a pattern of long-term repeated TA use. We believe that 
the system should respond to long-term repeated TA use by recognizing both these 
users’ evident efforts to work and the irregular and temporary nature of their job options. 
Rather than pretending that work supports will move them permanently off IA benefits 
and into lasting employment spells, the system should be set up to facilitate re-access. 
Doing that will encourage people to take jobs by reducing the reapplication risk, creating 
a sense of security through the knowledge that the backstop of TA is readily available.  
The EI system has a mechanism for “Working While on Claim” that allows recipients to 
extend their eligibility period when they take on paid work. This will not work for the IA 
system, since it does not have fixed eligibility periods. The alternative in the TA context 
would be to maintain the streamlined ability to reapply that is currently in place open for 
a longer period of time and, crucially, relaxing the income test during that period—
effectively keeping the case open. The recommended elimination of the asset test 
(Recommendation 18) and the removal of the job search requirement 
(Recommendation 14) increase accessibility generally, including for former recipients, 
but we believe that the clear signal of keeping a case open longer is important to reduce 
the welfare wall’s barrier to exit.  
Keeping cases open longer could also reduce administrative costs associated with 
people who make repeated use of the system and fits with the goal of simplifying the 
system. That simplification will make the system seem less arbitrary to recipients who 
fear different decisions when they reapply for benefits. This is in keeping with our goal 
of enhancing self-respect.  
As with Recommendations 16 and 17, related to the income test, we envision this 
change being undertaken in stages. In the current system, streamlined reapplication is 
available for only six months and the income test applies without adjustment. Our 
argument is that this is too short, particularly for long-term repeat TA users over age 50. 
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At the same time, there could be concerns that younger workers would be induced to 
develop more sporadic employment patterns if benefit re-entry were too easy. Results in 
Green and Warburton (2004), examining the effects of a tightening of IA eligibility, 
indicate that increasing accessibility does not create long-term dependence on benefits 
among young people. Nonetheless, we suggest a gradual approach, with streamlined 
reapplication and a relaxed income test (i.e., cases kept open) for two years, applying 
initially only to recipients over age 50. The impacts of this approach could be evaluated 
and, based on that evaluation, a decision made on extending the longer case-opening 
period to younger age groups.  
Recommendation 19 (short term): Keep the case files of recipients open for two years 
after income rises above the break-even level for recipients over age 50, allowing 
streamlined reapplication with the income test threshold set at the break-even level. 
Consider reducing the age limit in future, based on evaluation of results. 
3.4 Temporary Assistance benefit structure 
Benefit levels 
Under the current system, maximum ETW benefits for single adults amount to 
approximately 45% of the MBM poverty line. This is clearly very low as a standard of 
support for people in need. Relatively low benefit levels are consistent with the funder-
of-last-resort principle underlying Income Assistance. They act as a disincentive for 
people to apply for assistance and as an incentive for people to leave assistance as 
soon as possible for work. Thus, low benefit rates are not part of the welfare wall. 
However, they are not consistent with our analytical framework, especially the 
characteristics of adequacy and autonomy.  
The poverty line for a single person in Vancouver is roughly equivalent to the earnings 
of a person working 30 hours per week (the lower threshold of Statistics Canada’s 
definition of a full-time worker) for 50 weeks per year at the current B.C. minimum wage. 
Clearly, benefit levels of 45% of the poverty line are well below where they would 
provide incentives to give up such work. We believe, therefore, that there is room to 
increase IA benefits and that this should be done to move toward meeting the adequacy 
requirement of a just system. The exact level to choose is, admittedly, arbitrary, but the 
COVID-19 pandemic has presented a natural focal point: making the $300 COVID-19 
top-up to IA payments permanent. For single ETW benefit recipients, this would imply a 
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benefit at approximately 63% of the poverty line (and of the associated level of earnings 
from full-year, full-time, minimum-wage work mentioned above).  
Recommendation 20 (short term): Make the $300 per month COVID-19 emergency 
increase in Temporary Assistance benefits a permanent increase. 
For the sake of planning for the people receiving benefits and to maintain adequacy 
levels, benefits need to be indexed to inflation. Recommendation 61 would index all 
benefits to movements in the MBM poverty line, which is in effect an inflation index 
based on spending patterns and prices for people at or near poverty level incomes.  
Earnings exemptions and BRR 
In Part 3, Section 5 (Income Testing and Effective Tax Rate Implications), we set out a 
general approach to the parameters associated with income testing. In Part 4, Section 
5.1 (Income Assistance), we discussed how income testing together with other design 
features of IA combine to create a welfare wall intended to limit access to IA but that 
equally makes exit from the program difficult.  
Under the current system, single adults have an earnings exemption of $400 per 
month—that is, a person can earn up to $400 in a month without any reduction in their 
IA benefits. For single parents, the exemption is $600 per month. 112 For earnings in 
excess of the earnings exemption, IA benefits are decreased dollar for dollar, a 100% 
BRR. The BE level for a single person on TA is the earnings exemption plus the 
maximum benefit, currently $1,160 per month, assuming full shelter allowance. 
The 100% BRR is effectively a 100% tax on additional income above the exemption, by 
far the highest tax rate faced by anyone at any income level in our tax system (Milligan, 
2020). Its existence implies that IA is a perverse system in which recipients are 
“expected to work” and given job-search and job-readiness supports but then face a 
100% tax rate on earnings when they do work. As discussed in Part 3, and in Section 2 
in relation to Disability Assistance, lowering the BRR is expected to encourage some TA 
recipients to accept work, especially in conjunction with our eligibility recommendations. 
A reduction of the BRR is also consistent with our justice-based perspective. A 100% 
BRR effectively tells people on IA that their work is not required in the paid sector (even 
while they are being required to look for work). A lower BRR fits with providing a greater 
 
112 These exemptions will be increased to $500 and $750 per month, respectively, in January 2021. 
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opportunity for them to incorporate paid work, with its accompanying enhancement of 
self-respect. 
Recommendation 21 (short term): Lower the rate at which Temporary Assistance 
benefits are reduced as income increases from 100% to 70%, and maintain the 
earnings exemption at levels taking effect in January 2021. 
Combined with our recommended increase in the basic benefit amount and upcoming 
increases in the earnings exemption, this implies that single adults with earnings up to 
$2,014 per month ($24,171 on an annualized basis) would remain eligible for benefits. 
For comparison, the break-even level is about 26% above the MBM poverty line of 
$19,128 for towns with populations of 30,000 to 99,000 in B.C., or 11% above the 
poverty line of $21,807 for Vancouver.113  
Non-cash supplements 
The current TA program has supplemental benefits for health-related supports, 
including emergency dental work, glasses, and nutritional supplements, with more 
extensive health supplements available to DA and PPMB recipients and children. In 
Part 4, Section 5.1 (Income Assistance), we pointed out that these benefits are also part 
of the welfare wall because the loss of these benefits reduces the attractiveness of 
leaving IA for work. In Section 4 (Extended Health Basic Service), we recommend that 
these supports be made generally available on an income-tested basis rather than 
being limited, for the most part, to IA recipients. 
We see it as crucial to coordinate those steps with the move toward increasing access 
to and the adequacy of TA benefits, because otherwise health supplements limited to 
those on IA will become the main remaining component of the welfare wall.  
3.5 Training support 
A key difference between a basic income and IA, even after accessibility is increased by 
reforming eligibility requirements and adequacy is addressed by changing the benefit 
structure, is that basic income is strictly a cash-transfer concept, while IA integrates 
services with cash support. One of those services is employment assistance provided 
through WorkBC. 
 
113 2016 census MBM poverty thresholds updated to 2019 using the BC All Items CPI. 
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Self-respect and resilience can be better supported, in part, by providing people with 
more opportunities to improve their education and training. The Single Parent 
Employment Initiative allows single parents to keep their IA benefits at their current level 
for the duration of an education program of up to 12 months duration. Given the 
relatively low education levels of many ETW benefit recipients, the focus on 12-month 
programs is likely appropriate. We believe this program, which is funded through the 
Labour Market Development Agreement between Canada and B.C., should be 
evaluated. If it is proving successful, then it should be extended to all ETW recipients. 
Recommendation 22 (short term): Evaluate the Single Parent Employment Initiative. If it 
is increasing education levels and post-education employment, earnings, and self-
respect, expand the program to offer it to all recipients of Expected to Work benefits.  
3.6 Public and community employment 
Another extension of current employment-related services is that long-term recipients of 
ETW benefits could be offered opportunities to take part in public and community 
employment projects, as discussed in Section 2.5 (Public and Community Employment) 
and Recommendation 11. The general idea is for community organizations to generate 
project ideas for local improvements, applying to government for money to fund work on 
the projects.  
This approach would have multiple benefits, including providing people with meaningful 
activities and generating improvements for the community, and would be in itself an 
exercise in social inclusion with community building. Basic income proponents often 
argue that basic income cash transfers would support and recognize non-market work, 
but we believe a community employment plan would do this much more directly, and 
could be made available to long-term TA benefit recipients as well as people with 
disabilities. 
3.7 Earnings supplement  
Another approach that could be designed to benefit single adults would be an earnings 
supplement program, as discussed in Part 4, Section 5.8 (Earnings Supplements). 
Earnings supplements offer an attractive way to reduce the rate and depth of poverty for 
low-income earners who are not IA recipients. They reward work, help reduce the 
welfare wall, and enjoy wide public support. They also promote self- and social respect 
and reciprocity, characteristics of a more just society. Well-designed earning 
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supplement programs that provide adequate benefits could be particularly beneficial for 
the B.C. group with the highest poverty rate, childless single workers, who receive very 
limited benefits from other programs. Earnings supplement provisions in the United 
States have proven effective in reducing poverty and in raising labour force participation 
of low-income earners (Kesselman, 2020a; Petit & Kesselman, 2020a). However, the 
scale and cost of the U.S. program is far larger in relative terms than the current 
Canadian federal and provincial counterparts, and unconditional cash transfers in the 
United States are much smaller than in Canada. Currently only a small federal program, 
the Canada Workers Benefit (CWB) provides any earnings supplement for B.C. 
workers, and it is particularly limited for childless single persons. 
 Our analysis suggests that for IA beneficiaries the existing earnings exemptions plus a 
BRR reduction would have a more salient effect on work incentives than refining or 
targeting earning supplement provisions for that group. The immediacy and 
transparency of a reduced BRR based on monthly income reporting under TA are more 
effective than retaining a 100% BRR and partially offsetting it through an earning 
supplement provision that may be delayed in its ability to respond to earnings variations. 
We have therefore recommended a reduction in the BRR to 70% for IA beneficiaries, 
but that will not help low-income earners not receiving IA benefits. 
The CWB has modest expenditures for B.C. workers, at just under $300 million 
annually. Its maximum annual benefit per childless single worker is just $1,381, which is 
about $1,000 less than for couples (regardless of children) and single parents. A 
majority of beneficiaries are unattached single persons with a heavy tilt toward those 
under age 30. Low-income earners in B.C. who are independent of IA typically work 
more than 40 weeks per year at low wages; they are disproportionately single women 
employed in the service sector (Green, 2020a). The basic CWB therefore offers very 
limited assistance for the group of low-income earners most in need of support in B.C., 
although it could serve as a platform for the province to expand earning supplement 
provisions. Federal administration of the CWB as a refundable tax credit could also be a 
convenient mechanism for a province to enhance the benefits. 
The federal government gives each province an option to “reconfigure” the CWB on a 
cost-neutral basis, which allows for variations in the benefit structure for workers in that 
province. Based on simulations undertaken for the panel (Petit & Kesselman, 2020b), 
we find that reconfiguration alone would offer B.C. little scope for poverty alleviation. 
Because of the cost-neutrality constraint, the small gains achievable for some groups 
would simply be a shift that had to be offset by losses for other groups; single workers 
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could gain only at the expense of couples and households with children. Our 
simulations confirm this expectation, with the feasible gains for single childless workers 
very limited. 
We can also draw on extensive simulations of alternative provincial variations to 
augment the CWB (Petit & Kesselman, 2020b), summarized in Part 4, Section 5.8 
(Earnings Supplements). Of greatest interest are the results based on a combination of 
reconfigured CWB with B.C. top-ups targeted for maximum benefits at annual earnings 
of $18,000. The CWB reconfiguration is, by construct, costless to the province, while the 
top-up would cost B.C. an estimated $400 million annually. These top-ups are designed 
to augment benefits for childless workers (singles and couples) but leave single parents 
and couples with children essentially unaffected. For the proposed policy design, the 
number of single adults in poverty could be reduced by an estimated 9%, or about 
18,000, with many more having their depth of poverty reduced. The suggested B.C. 
earnings supplement would more than double the current $300 million of CWB 
payments currently going to B.C. residents, mainly single childless workers. 
In terms of the structure and administration of a provincially augmented earning 
supplement program, B.C. would do best to adopt a refundable tax credit format and 
CRA operation. The benefits of this approach are simplicity, automatic enrolment and 
payment to all eligible persons filing tax returns, and low administrative cost. Alberta’s 
earnings supplement program uses the CRA for benefit assessment and payment; 
Quebec’s earnings supplement program does the same, using the province’s tax office. 
The only potential drawback of using a refundable tax credit structure with CRA 
administration is the slow responsiveness of benefits to earnings variations and thus 
lower salience for beneficiaries. However, Green (2020a) finds that workers with 
earnings near poverty thresholds tend to have earnings consistently year after year, so 
that responsiveness may not be a material concern.  
Recommendation 23 (medium term): Expand earnings supplements targeting low-
income-earning adults with no children, using a revenue-neutral reconfiguration of the 
Canada Workers Benefit combined with a provincial top-up delivered as a refundable 
tax credit administered by the Canada Revenue Agency. 
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4. Extended health basic service 
As discussed in Part 4, Section 2 (Defining the B.C. Income and Social Support 
System), B.C. has a broad set of universal basic services, coupled with cash transfers 
and income-tested services in its income and social support system. Health care–
related programs form a large part of this web of available services. The province’s 
Medical Services Plan (MSP) has wide coverage of physicians, laboratory tests, 
surgeries, and services provided in hospitals. While those benefits are provided 
universally and most drugs are partially subsidized through Fair PharmaCare, the B.C. 
medical and health-care system has major exclusions. Key omitted areas are dental 
care, professional health-care services (e.g., physiotherapy),114 most medical supplies, 
and equipment such as eyeglasses and wheelchairs. 
Beneficiaries of Income Assistance (IA) are entitled to fairly extensive coverage of most 
of the items that are not covered by MSP, although there are fee limits, barriers to 
access, and what appear to be caseworker and medical practitioner discretion in the 
approval for some items. In 2019/20, the budget for IA general and health supplements 
totalled $380 million, and health supplements were likely the larger component.  
Other low-income people not receiving IA benefits have much narrower access to these 
medical, dental, and health benefits, through MSP supplementary benefits and the 
Healthy Kids Program, discussed in detail in Part 4, Section 5.2 (Health-Care Services). 
Unlike higher earners, very few low-income earners have access to medical or dental 
insurance through work. 
Access to a much wider range of health-care services, dental care, and medical devices 
is needed for the entire low-income population—and not solely those on IA—to help 
them cover their individual costs and escape poverty or prevent them from falling into 
poverty because of health-related issues and costs. Broader coverage will augment 
employability for many low-income people and thus reduce reliance on IA and other 
public benefit programs.115 Access to many of these services is a primary requisite for 
the personal dignity dictated by our principles for a just society, and a component of 
having true autonomy. As noted in Section 3 (Reforms Targeting Single Working-Age 
Adults), the fact that IA health supplements are limited to IA recipients acts as a barrier 
 
114 Except for the limited coverage provided by MSP supplementary benefits—see Part 4, Section 5.2 (Health-Care 
Services). 
115 For example, Glied and Neidell (2010) find that fluoridation of water when a person is young leads to increases in 
adult earnings for women from low socio-economic backgrounds.  
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to leaving the program. This issue would be resolved with a generally available, income-
tested, extended-health basic service. This reform was also recommended by the 2016 
Expert Panel whose work contributed to our recommendations in Section 2 (Reforms 
Targeting People with Disabilities).  
We recommend moving toward the goal of accessible health supplements for all low-
income households in steps. The first step would be to move administration of extended 
health coverage into a separate agency. The new agency would administer IA health 
supplements, MSP supplementary benefits, and the Healthy Kids Program, which would 
initially remain separate. The agency would operate under clear and transparent rules 
for access and covered services, and disability assessments would be done by staff 
trained in extended health benefits administration. Even with covered services and 
devices differing by IA status, this would be a constructive first step toward a fairer, non-
stigmatizing administrative system. 
Subsequent steps would involve extending particular parts of what is covered for IA 
recipients to the wider, low-income population. A high priority for immediate extension of 
coverage would be basic dental services for more low-income adults. Basic dental 
services are now available only for PWD and PPMB recipients and children of low-
income families (through either IA or Healthy Kids). Poor dental care can produce 
barriers to employability as well as wide-ranging, long-term adverse health impacts, 
such as inflammation-inducing strokes and coronary disease.116 Missing or unsightly 
teeth can also affect self-image and thereby a person’s sense of dignity.  
Various methods for extending these health benefits to a wider low-income population 
based on low income and not IA status have been assessed by Kesselman and 
Mendelson (2020). The income-related benefit schedule used by B.C. Fair Pharmacare 
might pose a worthwhile model to pursue. 
  
 
116 Relevant studies include Blomquist and Woolley (2018), Singhal (2015), and Wallace (2010). 
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Recommendation 24 (medium term): Establish an income-tested extended benefits 
system for all low-income households and individuals regardless of their Income 
Assistance status, with the following features: 
• phased implementation, starting with joint administration of IA health supplements, 
MSP supplementary benefits, and the Healthy Kids Program 
• benefits administered independently from IA through a dedicated extended health 
benefits administration agency, and ultimately funded separately from IA 
• expansion of coverage to a wide range of medical and health services, supplies, and 
devices, with standardization of dental services a priority 
• reduction of extended benefits coverage as income rises, using an approach similar 
to Fair PharmaCare (i.e., there would be no deductible or co-payment for those with 
income below the MBM, and recipients’ share of costs would increase smoothly with 
additional income until the subsidy is ultimately phased out) 
 
5. Housing support reform 
Adequate shelter is a basic human right, one acknowledged in international agreements 
to which Canada (and through it, B.C.) is a signatory. As stated in Canada’s National 
Housing Strategy Act of 2019, “housing is essential to the inherent dignity and well-
being of the person and to building sustainable and inclusive communities” (section 
4[b]).117 Adequate housing is therefore a cardinal component of a just set of income and 
social support programs. Cash support alone does not fulfill the right to housing unless 
its level is sufficient to secure adequate shelter or unless that shelter is provided 
through more direct policies.118 Moreover, maintaining inclusive communities in which 
people can live where they work requires policy intervention in areas like the Lower 
Mainland and Victoria. The significance of this point has been highlighted during the 
COVID-19 pandemic by the critical role of low-wage workers. 
 
117 Also see the discussion in National Right to Housing Network (2019). 
118 See Kesselman and Mendelson (2020) for elaboration of the human rights and in-kind benefits perspectives on 
the requisites of a just society beyond cash supports alone. 
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Identifying when this human right is not being respected is in some ways 
straightforward—people living on the street are clearly not having their right to housing 
respected. For many others, housing costs are so high relative to their incomes that, 
while they may be housed, their housing is not adequate, and it comes at the expense 
of food security and other shortfalls in meeting essential needs. A common international 
standard for core housing need is a household spending more than 30% of its regular 
income on housing, with spending more than 50% defined as severe housing need 
(Kneebone and Wilkins, 2020).  
The B.C. housing policy landscape is as varied as the different levels of housing need in 
the population and the diverse types and costs of available housing. For the homeless 
population and people with extreme housing insecurity, the government’s purchasing of 
single-room occupancy (SRO) buildings in recent years and converting hotels to SROs 
in response to COVID-19 have been significant actions. However, with the latest B.C. 
Homelessness Count still recording about 7,000 people as homeless—and this is likely 
an underestimate—much work remains. The extremely high poverty rate among single 
childless working-age adults is another indicator of unmet housing needs, and indeed 
this group is disproportionately represented among the homeless. 
5.1 Income Assistance shelter allowance  
For those receiving Disability Assistance (DA) or Temporary Assistance (TA) benefits, 
the cash benefit is divided into separate components for support and shelter. The 
shelter portion is paid only for those who either rent or own a dwelling and requires that 
the beneficiary document those costs. As Mendelson and Kesselman (2020) report, 
68% of Income Assistance (IA) recipients incur rents that exceed their shelter 
allowance, so they must be dipping into their support allowance or other sources. This 
situation is not surprising, as the shelter allowance amounts of $375 per month for a 
single or $570 for a family of two are far below median rents for units of the appropriate 
sizes. The IA shelter allowance clearly falls well short of the rents needed for decent 
housing in almost any part of the province. 
A constructive reform of the provision for housing costs of IA beneficiaries would be to 
combine the support and shelter amounts into a single sum and to pay the full amount 
for those who are incurring any shelter costs. In addition, it would move the system 
closer to the principles of a basic income by increasing autonomy and simplicity for 
beneficiaries and providing them with freer choice over how much to spend on rent; the 
current shelter allowance is “use it or lose it.” However, the current low level of the IA 
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shelter allowance relative to available rents for most beneficiaries would limit their 
degree of increased autonomy.  
New Brunswick and Quebec already pay their IA benefits as one flat-rate sum that 
combines the support and shelter amounts. Both provinces pay the total benefit without 
regard to whether the recipient reports any rental agreement or any other shelter costs. 
That approach would also be an option for IA reform in B.C., and it would make the full 
benefit available for homeless recipients. It would also be most consistent with the basic 
income principles of autonomy and simplicity, since it would no longer require obtaining 
any information or verification on individual rent payments, and it would give all 
recipients unconstrained choice over the spending of their benefits.  
Amalgamating the IA support and shelter benefits would entail a relatively limited 
incremental cost on account of the small proportion of IA beneficiaries who spend less 
than the support allowance on rent. Applied to the current system and limiting the full 
benefit to those who incur some rent would increase program costs by an estimated $13 
million annually; making it available irrespective of any rent paid would cost an 
additional $38 million (Mendelson & Kesselman, 2020). Merging the benefits might have 
other consequences. Landlords who currently charge only the maximum shelter amount 
might be inclined to increase their rents, knowing that the benefit is delivered as a cash 
payment. Providing additional cash transfers to homeless people with addictions could 
also negatively affect them.  
Recommendation 25 (short term): Combine the support and shelter components of 
Income Assistance cash benefits into a single payment that is not conditional on having 
shelter costs. However, if our later recommendation for a B.C. Rent Assist program is 
implemented, the programs should be integrated by deducting the B.C. Rent Assist 
benefits from the Income Assistance benefit. 
For those who need assistance in managing their affairs, EAWs would retain the ability 
to pay rent directly to landlords on behalf of recipients and to manage the way payments 
are distributed to, for example, those who are homeless and have addiction issues, as 
at present. 
5.2 Low-income housing supports 
In Part 4, Section 5.3 (Housing Programs), we described the current set of housing 
programs, which includes both supports for low-income people to obtain affordable 
housing (demand-side supports) and provision of funding to increase the availability of 
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affordable housing (supply-side supports). The main demand-side programs are the 
Rental Assistance Program (RAP), which subsidizes rent for low-income families with 
children; Shelter Aid for Elderly Renters (SAFER), which subsidizes rent for seniors; 
and Rent Geared to Income (RGI), which subsidizes rent in provincially funded social 
housing.  
We concluded that both demand-side and supply-side programs are required to target 
those most in need of housing. However, demand-side programs, especially the RGI 
program, which is linked to provincially funded social housing, is limited by the supply of 
units, and RAP covers only families with children. As a result, many who would be 
eligible are excluded because of lack of supply. In addition, lack of integration with IA 
means that the lack of affordable housing support for some leaving IA for work can act 
as a barrier to exiting the program.  
Stop-gap reforms could be undertaken to address the deficiencies in B.C.’s current 
demand-side programs. RAP could be extended to include singles and couples without 
children; RAP and SAFER could have their benefit formulas revised for greater 
simplicity and adjust their maximums to more realistic levels. Shelter allowances in IA 
could also be increased to more realistic levels, and they could be made more 
accessible and flexible for beneficiaries by the types of reforms we have already 
discussed. 
Undertaking such reforms would be relatively straightforward and is clearly a feasible 
option. The alternative would be a rental assistance benefit that is easier to access and 
that applies more generally to all those who meet income-based eligibility tests and 
whose benefit phases out as income increases. We believe that the latter approach 
would provide a better solution in terms of adequacy, accessibility, respect, stability, and 
ultimately public trust—all key elements in our analytical framework. 
5.3 Reforming demand-side supports 
Our general approach is modelled on Manitoba’s Rent Assist program,119 which 
provides low-income renters with a regular cash payment based on their income and 
family size but unrelated to their actual rent payment. It is therefore a relatively 
straightforward income-related basic income. In essence, it is in the spirit of RAP—
 
119 For descriptions of Manitoba’s Rent Assist program, see Brandon et al. (2017) and Cooper et al. (2020). For 
analysis of adapting the Manitoba model to B.C., see Mendelson and Kesselman (2020). 
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expanding its reach to non-seniors without children—but it avoids the complicated 
incentives and sometimes inequitable patterns of RAP benefits (Mendelson & 
Kesselman, 2020). Manitoba’s program is administered by the province; if possible, a 
B.C. program should be administered by the Canada Revenue Agency as a refundable 
tax credit. 
Manitoba’s Rent Assist program covers the gap between an assumed rental amount 
and 30% of household income. Instead of using the beneficiary’s actual rent payment, 
the formula uses 75% of a benchmark rent based on median market rent (MMR) for a 
size of unit appropriate to the household size. For example, the benchmark for a single 
person is taken to be a bachelor suite, for a couple a one-bedroom suite, and so forth. 
The benefit formula is structured like a basic income, with a smooth phase-out to a 
break-even income equal to the maximum benefit (75% of the benchmark rent) divided 
by the benefit reduction rate (30% or 0.30). This benefit structure removes any incentive 
for the beneficiary to seek a unit that maximizes their benefit or for the landlord to set 
rent so as to secure the maximum allowable amount (as in the IA shelter allowance). 
Such a program is a targeted basic income rather than an in-kind benefit program 
because it is not conditional on the recipient paying rent. The in-kind format alters the 
relative cost of a target item, such as housing, to induce additional spending on it 
beyond what an equivalent amount of pure cash transfer would induce (Kesselman & 
Mendelson, 2020). So, for example, an in-kind housing benefit would provide a subsidy 
based on the beneficiary’s income and the rent paid for the apartment they choose. In 
contrast, a cash transfer like Rent Assist would give the person an amount of cash 
based on their income alone and not related to what they pay in rent. With the in-kind 
benefit structure, the beneficiary has an incentive to spend more of their income on rent 
than they would with an equivalent pure cash transfer. 
Some cash-transfer programs labelled as having a specific purpose have been 
observed to induce more spending for that purpose. For example, a study of the 
impacts of the Canada Child Benefit program found that half of the induced spending by 
lower-income beneficiaries was on housing (and most of the rest on other items of 
benefit to their children), even though the cash was unrestricted and could have been 
spent on anything (Najjarrezaparast & Pendakur, 2020). Thus, much of the increased 
cash transfers under a Rent Assist program are likely to be spent on housing, even 
though the benefit per se is not tilted toward housing. 
One issue in the design of a B.C. Rent Assist program is whether the benchmark for 
median market rent should refer to a beneficiary’s area of residence or a uniform figure 
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for the province as a whole. The IA shelter allowance does not provide any regional 
variation, and RAP and SAFER provide only moderate variation in base benefit levels 
across three zones within the province. But median rents for a dwelling unit of any given 
size vary sharply across the province, and some have argued that the adequacy 
criterion would support the choice of a beneficiary’s regional MMR, with such variations 
instituted in B.C.’s IA program (Kneebone and Wilkins, 2020).  
An opposing consideration is that some people at higher incomes will elect to move out 
of Vancouver or even to another province where they can better afford housing; 
reciprocity suggests that taxpayers may not wish to pay more to support low-income 
individuals in their choice to live in high-cost locales like Vancouver. Another 
consideration is that varying the benefits by local rental rates would provide an incentive 
for submission of false addresses and thus an intrusive auditing burden. Yet another 
factor is the high budgetary cost of a housing benefit that could meet the high rents in 
major urban areas of B.C.  
For all these reasons and for simplicity, we opt for a uniform MMR benchmark across 
the province, which is close to current practice in B.C. programs.  
5.4 Implications for Income Assistance and existing programs 
A B.C. Rent Assist program could encompass a wide range of existing demand-side 
housing programs. A person with income below the program’s break-even level would 
file an application. If the program worked like Manitoba’s, the benefit would be based on 
income from the most recent annual tax return. Benefits would then be paid monthly 
and adjusted only with the next filing of the annual tax return, and they would be paid 
regardless of whether the person is an IA beneficiary. The system could allow for within-
year adjustments of the Rent Assist benefits if a household suffers an income drop. 
Under the current structure, for IA beneficiaries, the program would be offset dollar for 
dollar against the shelter allowance portion of the IA benefit. If, instead, our suggestion 
of rolling the shelter and support allowances into one amount is accepted, then the 
offset would be against the total IA benefit.  
Within a year, when the amount of the Rent Assist payment is fixed, earnings above the 
exemption level would cause a reduction in IA benefits according to our recommended 
benefit reduction rate (BRR) of 70%. However, this reduction would only apply to the 
amount of IA benefits above the Rent Assist payment, since the Rent Assist amount is 
fixed for a year at a time. This has the effect of greatly reducing the range of earnings 
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over which the IA BRR is applied before the individual earns enough to leave the 
system. In this sense, the Rent Assist payment has the potential to have the salutary 
effect often attributed to a universal basic income: individuals can feel free to take a job 
without fear that this part of their income will change. Of course, the Rent Assist 
payment will be reassessed at the next tax filing, implying that its 30% BRR will be 
applied to earnings, but this happens six to 18 months after the income was earned. We 
expect that, for most people, this lag is sufficiently long that it may not affect their 
decision as to whether to take a job and/or to work more hours.  
The proposed Rent Assist program for B.C. would be available only for applicants who 
can demonstrate that they are renters, and it would collect information including their 
landlord’s name, address, and phone number. That information would serve for audit 
purposes and could also assist in ensuring declaration of rental income for tax 
purposes. Adults living in the home of their parents, other relatives, or friends and not 
paying rent would not be eligible for the benefit. Other details of the program design for 
B.C. could draw on the Manitoba experience.  
Doubtless, a move to the proposed B.C. Rent Assist program would face various 
administrative and policy issues. For example, the full integration of IA beneficiaries with 
other low-income beneficiaries would have to overcome a variety of obstacles that have 
already been acknowledged for the Manitoba program. RGI housing arrangements have 
their own income-related rent subsidies that are a function of both rent and income, 
unlike the recommended B.C. Rent Assist benefit structure; whether those tenants 
would be permitted to benefit from both programs is a policy issue.120 Moreover, a 
variety of B.C. housing programs operate by public underwriting of certain costs of 
suppliers, and how the Rent Assist program would affect those arrangements would 
need to be settled.  
The fact that Manitoba’s Rent Assist program has survived a change in provincial 
government and is highly popular attests to its potential political appeal and 
sustainability in the B.C. context. It has proved particularly effective in assisting low-
income single adults, a group that has been underserved by many social programs and 
for which public support is hard to gain. The fact that the program operates outside of 
 
120 Since the B.C. Rent Assist benefit would be insensitive to a beneficiary’s actual housing needs and rental 
requirement, it could not fully substitute for the subsidy component of RGI housing. 
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the IA program and assists in lowering the welfare wall is another aspect underlying 
public support. 
Finally, we want to emphasize that we do not see a Rent Assist program on its own as a 
complete answer to housing issues for low-income households. In major urban markets 
of B.C. with a limited supply of affordable rental units, the increased income from the 
Rent Assist program could partly be captured by landlords through higher rents. The 
supply initiatives undertaken by the province and municipalities should continue, though 
we do not have the expertise to evaluate them. We leave the resolution of exactly how a 
Rent Assist program would interact with subsidized housing programs for further 
analysis.  
Recommendation 26 (short term): Continue expanding the amount of supportive housing 
targeting individuals with mental health and addiction issues as well as housing 
initiatives directly addressing homeless persons. 
Recommendation 27 (medium term): Create a B.C. Rent Assist program as a refundable 
tax credit, with a benefit based on the difference between a set fraction of the median 
provincial rent for a household-appropriate unit and 30% of household income for all 
low-income households that incur rent. For people receiving Income Assistance (IA) 
benefits, the Rent Assist benefit would displace IA payments dollar for dollar without 
affecting IA eligibility. The specific details, including the fraction of median rent to be 
used as the target amount, remain to be determined along with other program design 
details. 
5.5 Funding 
Given that we are not recommending specific values for the parameters of a B.C. Rent 
Assist program, we cannot provide reliable cost estimates for the program. However, we 
can provide cost estimates for a B.C. program with the same parameters as are used in 
Manitoba’s Rent Assist program—in particular, using 75% of median rents for the 
province. The values for the maximum possible subsidies for different household sizes if 
the Manitoba program were implemented in B.C. are provided in Mendelson and 
Kesselman (2020, Table 8). Using those values along with the distribution of household 
income for B.C. renters calculated from the 2016 census public-use microdata, we can 
estimate the total that would be paid in benefits under this program. The public-use 
census microdata includes data on total household income from all sources before 
taxes and on total market income (i.e., income from sources other than government 
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transfers). The former encompasses too much, since IA benefits would not count as 
part of income in the calculation of the Rent Assist benefit, but the latter encompasses 
too little, since it excludes, for example, Employment Insurance benefits that would be 
counted as part of income for the calculation. Working with Total Household Income, 
our cost estimate is $832 million. Working with Household Market Income, our estimate 
rises to $1.25 billion. The administrative costs of the new program should be not much 
greater than those of the displaced programs. B.C.’s Rent Assist program would be a 
sizable program but still much less costly than the basic income variants we considered 
in our simulation exercises.  
One natural source to consider for meeting this projected outlay would be in existing 
housing demand-side programs. The Rent Assist program would replace RAP and 
SAFER, which together cost $141 million. Rent Assist benefits would also replace the 
total cost of IA shelter allowances, although we do not have an accurate estimate of 
those cost savings. Replacing the RGI program might be problematic because of how 
that program makes payments to the providers of housing units rather than to the 
renters who occupy the units. Because of those factors, we can’t provide an estimate of 
net cost of the Rent Assist program, though it would be a significant increase relative to 
the existing regime.  
Another large current provincial expenditure on housing is the home owner grant 
(HOG), discussed in Part 4, Section 5.4 (Home Owner Grant). This is a provincial grant 
to most homeowners in B.C. The HOG applies to principal residences and offsets the 
provincial school tax portion on the property tax bill. The regular grant amount is a flat 
amount of $570 per year, with additional amounts for certain regions and classes of 
owners. The HOG phases out for higher-valued homes, but it is not affected by 
household income even at the highest levels. The HOG cost the provincial government 
$838 million in 2019/20. As detailed in the final report of the MSP Task Force (Tedds et 
al., 2018), the HOG is an inefficient, unfair, poorly targeted, and administratively 
burdensome program. In the majority of municipalities, the HOG more than fully offsets 
the provincial school tax portion of the property tax bill, therefore reducing municipal 
property taxes as well. The HOG disproportionately benefits middle- and high-income 
homeowners, neglecting lower-income households who are disproportionately renters 
ineligible for the HOG. For all of these reasons, eliminating the HOG would be an 
attractive way to finance the proposed BCRA program or other parts of the panel’s 
recommended reforms. 
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6. Assisted to Work basic service 
In the current system, Income Assistance (IA) recipients are classified in tiers based on 
job readiness. Tier 1 includes people who are deemed job ready and offers supports 
such as clothing, tools, and transportation supplements for confirmed new jobs, as well 
as some targeted training for those jobs. People in Tier 2 are near job ready and are 
offered services such as counselling and some training to get them job ready. People in 
Tiers 3 and 4 are further from job ready and in need of more comprehensive supports to 
establish labour market attachment. Importantly, the 2016 Expert Panel pointed out that 
almost no IA recipients are in Tier 1, 20% are in Tier 2, and the vast majority are in Tiers 
3 and 4. Further, access to the supports embedded in this structure, such as clothing 
and tools supplements, is through a caseworker in a complex system that can feel 
arbitrary in its decisions (Petit & Tedds, 2020g).  
Supporting people with moderate disabilities to establish themselves in the labour 
market is a costly but important part of helping them secure their sense of self- and 
social respect. Our proposed Moderate-Persistent Disability (MPD) category would 
consist of people who have reached Maximum Medical Improvement with a moderate 
but persistent disability. For this group, the goal would be to provide them with 
opportunities to work. The 2016 Expert Panel recommended an Assisted to Work 
program that incorporates both supports in terms of staff time and tangible supports to 
help people work. These supports may need to be permanent. The goal would be to 
provide people with the opportunity to experience the dignity of work and to make their 
greatest contribution to society. The Assisted to Work program would be voluntary—that 
is, an offered support, not a requirement to get benefits.  
The program would be designed primarily for those in the MPD category, but access 
would also not be limited to that group. The support scheme would include an initial 
assessment stage followed by development of a set of supports and services to enable 
participants to engage with the labour market. There would be support in locating 
appropriate jobs and helping to set up necessary accommodations for disabilities. At 
least for some participants, attachment to the workforce will require long-term support 
that is likely best carried out with an assigned caseworker rather than through self-help 
portals and a varying set of contacts. The 2016 Expert Panel suggested workers’ 
compensation rehabilitation programs as a model, combining management of rehab and 
work support.  
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We have also targeted other groups for specific support. Two of these in particular may 
experience barriers to work that might require the same level of intensive individualized 
support: youth aging out of care and the long-term unemployed. 
Recommendation 28 (medium term): Create a voluntary Assisted to Work program 
similar to that suggested by the 2016 Expert Panel, for people experiencing barriers to 
employment and who need individualized and ongoing support to achieve labour force 
attachment—specifically people with moderate and persistent disabilities but also for 
those with severe and persistent disabilities, youth aging out of care, and the long-term 
unemployed.  
Recommendation 29 (medium term): Consider creating a specialized government 
agency to provide assessment, rehabilitation, and work support services to serve 
people with disabilities being served by Income Assistance, WorkSafeBC, and ICBC.  
We see several advantages to a joint specialized agency providing similar services to 
different client groups with similar needs. One is the ability to gather and expand 
specific expertise and specialized facilities in this area—economies of scale. The 
second is that it would enable the opening of support centres even in smaller 
communities where none of the three agencies would be able to maintain a centre on its 
own. The third is that it would reduce any stigma for IA recipients, since they would be 
part of the same general program as workers receiving WorkSafeBC benefits, even if 
the programs tailored to them were different. 
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7. Reforms targeting families with children  
7.1 Background 
Children are a central focus of social policy because of their dependence on others and 
their being society’s future adults. The familial, community, and societal conditions in 
which they develop have a major influence on their physical, intellectual, mental, moral, 
and productive attributes as adults. Poverty can hinder children’s development in all of 
these dimensions, as verified in extensive economic, sociological, and health research. 
So it is natural that public policies focus on income, housing, medical, nutritional, and 
educational resources for families with children.  
Past policies at the provincial and federal levels, as well as growing prosperity, have led 
to significant decreases in poverty rates for families with children, as shown in Part 3, 
Section 2 (Poverty in British Columbia). Two-parent families now have poverty rates 
well below the population-wide poverty rate, with the poverty rate for these families in 
B.C. at 5.2%, slightly below the national rate of 5.4% for this group. Single-parent 
families have experienced a dramatic decline in poverty rates, from having the highest 
of all groups, at 62.2% in B.C. in 2006, to 18.6% in 2018. Yet the poverty rate for single-
parent families remains high, both in B.C. and nationally, second only to single working-
age adults. 
Increasing levels and improved targeting of cash benefits have played a significant role 
in the reduction of child poverty. Rising employment rates for women, particularly single 
mothers, have also played an important role, likely partly facilitated by cash benefits 
making child care more affordable. Federal cash benefits have evolved over decades to 
provide increased support for families with children, with the latest significant reform 
being the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) in 2016. A study of the impacts of the CCB found 
that families that rent and have below-median income received an average $4,300 
increase in benefits, of which they spent $3,000, about half on shelter and one-quarter 
on food. Their additional spending on clothing was all for their children’s needs 
(Najjarrezaparast & Pendakur, 2020). The added income from CCB thus went 
overwhelmingly to improving living conditions that benefit children. 
B.C. was a pioneer in introducing cash benefits for children outside the income support 
program with its Family Bonus in 1996. That set the path for the National Child Benefit 
System and child benefit programs in other provinces in the following years, leading 
ultimately to the Canada Child Benefit. By 2018, B.C. had become the laggard among 
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the provinces in its child benefits program, with a relatively low benefit level and 
eligibility limited to children under age six, while other provinces extended their benefits 
to children up to age 18 (Kesselman & Mendelson, 2019). 
7.2 Child Opportunity Benefit refocus 
In its 2019 budget, B.C. announced a new Child Opportunity Benefit (COB) that 
enlarges the payments and extends eligibility for children through age 17; the new 
program became effective October 2020, as discussed in Part 4, Section 5.6 (Provincial 
Refundable Tax Credits). 
What B.C.’s new program fails to do is target benefits much more effectively on poverty 
reduction. For a family with one child, the maximum annual benefit of $1,600 does not 
fully phase out until their income reaches $97,500; for larger families, the net benefits 
are paid at even higher income levels (for four children up to almost $150,000). That is, 
the program has a low benefit reduction rate (BRR) of 4% over most of its income 
range. In contrast, the child benefit programs of the other provinces except Quebec 
phase out their payments at incomes that are one-quarter to one-half of the B.C. level. 
The consequence of this limited income testing of B.C. child benefits is that the program 
has less impact on families below and near poverty levels for its projected $400 million 
annual cost (up from $140 million under the predecessor program) than it potentially 
could. 
Since the COB operates in the shadow of the much larger federal CCB, it is hard to 
justify the limited income targeting embodied in the COB. The CCB has total annual 
expenditures of $25 billion, with about $2.8 billion going to B.C. families (seven times 
the COB outlays). The CCB pays much larger maximum benefits to the lowest-income 
families than the COB does: $6,765 for a child under six for the CCB versus $1,600 for 
the first child and $800 for the second child under the COB. It also extends net benefits 
far higher up the income scale than the COB—to $200,000 for one child under six for 
the CCB versus $97,500 for the COB. Since the CCB spends far more on B.C. children 
and extends to far higher incomes than the COB, there is a strong case for B.C. to 
recast the COB more as an anti-poverty policy, as the other provinces have already 
done. In essence, it could be argued that the CCB addresses affordability issues related 
to caring for children through a broad swath of the income distribution. With the CCB 
tackling that issue as well as child poverty, B.C. should focus the COB to supplement 
the benefits for children living below and near the poverty line.  
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 451 
 
B.C. could easily improve the targeting of its program on people living in poverty simply 
by increasing the BRR for larger families and eliminating the span of incomes over 
which benefits are flat. These changes would parallel the approach of other provinces, 
and the tax-back rates would still be much lower than in the CCB. Kesselman (2020b) 
assesses the impact of such a reform, showing that it could allow for an increase in 
basic benefits by nearly 50% without requiring any additional funding. Total benefits for 
families with incomes below $40,000 would increase from the status quo $126 million to 
$185 million, with more than half of the gain going to low-income single-parent families. 
It would still pay net benefits up to incomes of $73,000 for families with two children and 
to higher levels for larger families (Kesselman, 2020b). Although better targeting low-
income families, it would still deliver money to families above poverty levels.  
This example is just one of many possible ways of better focusing COB on poverty 
reduction. The province could choose to increase the base benefit per child by less than 
50%, thereby reducing the total cost of the program, and use the savings to spend on 
other poverty reduction initiatives. Alternatively, focusing the COB reform on raising 
base benefits would offer the opportunity for B.C. to replace the limited remaining extra 
cash associated with children in the Income Assistance benefit structure. That would 
complete the task of “taking the kids off welfare” and further reduce the welfare wall. 
Recommendation 30 (short term): Adjust the B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit by both 
increasing its benefit reduction rate and having it vary with the number of children in the 
family to better target low-income single parents in a cost-neutral fashion.  
Of course, just as the COB could be reformed to better target children living in poverty, 
so could the much bigger CCB. The B.C. government could lobby the federal 
government to provide the provinces with greater discretion over the CCB parameters 
as applied within their jurisdiction on a cost-neutral basis. That change would parallel 
the flexibility already provided for provinces to vary the parameters of the Canada 
Workers Benefit.   
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8. Reforms targeting young adults  
We will split this discussion into a component examining policies for youth aging out of 
the government’s care and a component focusing on other young adults from low-
income backgrounds.121 Youth transitioning out of care face a set of distinct issues that 
call for setting up specific supports for them, but other young adults from low-income 
backgrounds need help with education, and that is the focus of our recommendations 
for that group.  
There are several programs for young adults currently in place; these were described 
and analyzed in Part 4, Section 5.7 (Youth Aging Out of Care). They include the 
Agreements with Young Adults (AYA) program; the tuition waiver program, which 
waives mandatory fees, including tuition, at all B.C. public post-secondary institutions 
for eligible youth in care and youth aging out of care; and the Youth Education 
Assistance Fund, which provides grant funding to eligible former children in care who 
are attending post-secondary education on a full-time basis.  
Improving youth transitions involves many organizations, including multiple ministries, 
Delegated Aboriginal Agencies, and other agencies. Resources and mandates are 
siloed, and it is difficult for youth and young adults to know how to navigate government 
resources.  
8.1 Youth aging out of care  
The Ministry of Children and Family Development (MCFD) is responsible for, among 
other things, supporting children and their families where the safety and well-being of 
children may be at risk. The stated goal of the ministry is to support families to reduce 
the vulnerability of these children wherever possible, keeping children safe within their 
family home environment. If a child or youth cannot stay safely with their family, they are 
placed in an out-of-care arrangement (e.g., with extended family). If an out-of-care 
arrangement is not possible, then a child will be “taken into care”—that is, legal 
guardianship for the child is taken over by the Director of Child Welfare and the child is 
placed with a foster family, contracted residential agency, or another arrangement. Both 
out-of-care and in-care arrangements can continue until the youth’s 19th birthday, at 
which point they “age out” of the system.  
 
121 Youth are defined as being under 19 years of age and young adults are defined as being 19 years and over. 
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One alternative to being taken into care for vulnerable youth aged 16–18 is Youth 
Agreements. These are agreements that may be entered into with youth who 
“experience a significant adverse condition such as homelessness, behavioural or 
mental disorders, severe substance abuse or sexual exploitation and they cannot live 
with their family and government care is not the best option” (Turpel-Lafond, 2014). 
These agreements are for youth with “out-of-care” status, and they specify financial and 
caseworker supports and a plan for moving toward independence. The initial plan is for 
three months and is then renewable for six-month spells but, like foster care, ends at 
the youth’s 19th birthday. The corresponding agreement for youth in care is called an 
Independent Living Agreement and includes the same components as a Youth 
Agreement. For simplicity, we refer to both as Youth Agreements. 
Approximately 1,000 young people age out of the system each year, including from in-
care and out-of-care status. It is important to note that Indigenous children are vastly 
over-represented. Of the 7,210 children and youth in care in B.C. in 2015, 61% were 
Indigenous, while only 8% of children under age 18 in the overall provincial population 
are Indigenous (Shaffer et al., 2016). 
There is no government agency with a specific mandate to support youth aging out of 
the system or who have been under the system’s jurisdiction for significant parts of their 
childhood. Many youth who are in the system at their 19th birthday have no financial 
support or family connection. To get support, many of these youth have to turn to the 
Income Assistance system as young adults. As noted by the former Representative for 
Children and Youth, Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, though, the needs of young people 
aging out of care are “profoundly different from those of the general population of 
unemployed adults” (Turpel-Lafond, 2014, p. 29).  
The AYA program provided by MCFD supports education, rehabilitation, and life-skills 
development programs for former youth in care,122  but there is not a general mandate 
from government for the ministry to support this group, and the program is not fully 
funded. Agreements under the AYA program provide maximum financial benefits of up 
to $1,250 a month for periods of up to six months at a time and 48 months in aggregate 
for the period up to the recipient’s 27th birthday. Changes made in 2018 extended the 
 
122 Cultural programs are also now included under the AYA life-skills program policy to help Indigenous young adults 
connect with their culture and traditions. 
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program’s original maximum duration and the maximum age of access, as well as 
increasing the maximum monthly benefit.  
In addition to access to supplemental benefits to pay for extra living costs, such as a 
baby crib or extra costs for medications, AYA funding can be used to cover monthly 
living costs, such as rent, transportation, and tuition that is not covered by the tuition 
waiver program. Several post-secondary institutions, including the University of British 
Columbia, initially took up Turpel-Lafond’s 2014 challenge and made tuition free for 
former children in care. The initiative has now been extended to all post-secondary 
institutions in B.C.  
There are only a few social workers dedicated to the AYA program for the whole 
province. Some guardianship social workers and youth workers also participate in 
administering the program in addition to their caseload of children and youth under 19 
years. Seven out of 24 Delegated Aboriginal Agencies also administer AYAs. The AYA 
program has a component which funds recipients to participate in life-skills programs 
but there is no direct funding for life-skills service providers. Changes have been made 
to life-skills programs in response to the pandemic, working to make the AYA program 
more accessible through low-barrier life-skills programs that also included a component 
of cultural education for Indigenous participants. COVID-19 emergency measures also 
included temporary changes to the rehabilitation stream to allow young adults to access 
AYA funding through a broader range of mental health supports and services. 
Take-up rates of AYA are low—only 12% of eligible young adults in 2015 rising to 16% 
in 2019. Currently 35% of youth who age out of care go on an AYA within 12 months, 
but this still leaves nearly two-thirds who do not access this program. Moreover, of 
those who take up the program, 34% are Indigenous and 66% are non-Indigenous—
almost exactly the reverse of the composition of the former youth in care population as 
a whole (Shaffer et al., 2016). AYA support for post-secondary education is particularly 
unbalanced relative to the eligible population, with the program being heavily and 
disproportionately taken up by non-Indigenous females, although that has shifted 
somewhat under the COVID-19 emergency measures.  
It is certainly good that such a program is being offered and used, but the numbers point 
to a large disconnect between the program and the majority of former youth in care. 
Many require social supports in order to get to the point where they can reasonably 
consider post-secondary education, life-skills programs only partially provide these 
supports, and many people require more wraparound support to prepare themselves.  
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In addition, failure to succeed in any of the education or program streams under AYA 
results in loss of support as a breach of their agreement under AYA, and no support is 
provided to help them try again or try something else. Adequacy could be improved by 
providing stable, ongoing support in terms of cash transfers and basic services sufficient 
to meet basic needs for a reasonable period to enable people to transition into 
independent adulthood. 
Recommendations 
The outcomes described in Part 4, Section 5.7 (Youth Aging Out of Care), make it clear 
that it would be valuable to provide considerable additional resources for young adults 
who have had previous experience with the child welfare system. Most importantly, this 
is a matter of justice, and there is room to improve the current program framework in 
that respect, as established in Part 4.  
For these youth to meet our hoped-for goals of self-efficacy and a feeling of social 
inclusion, they will need support that gains their trust. For them to truly have the same 
opportunities as youth who did not experience their tumultuous childhoods, the 
government needs to provide the same kinds of supports that any parent would give to 
their young adult children. Secondarily, given the rates of Income Assistance use and 
low educational completion rates among these youth, there is surely an argument for 
later cost savings from investing in them when they are young.  
To understand how to address these problems, it is instructive to turn to the voices of 
the youth themselves and those of people who work with them. The following are some 
of the quotes gathered from MCFD engagement data received by the Strategic 
Initiatives Branch between 2018 and 2019: 
“We have nobody to help us with anything if we don't have a support 
worker to help us. We didn't have parents helping us before and we still 
don't after we turn 19. Funding to help with schooling, activities like going 
to the gym or a movie, driving lessons - any of that would of course be 
beyond awesome, but we also really need someone to help us along the 
way because I have nobody to turn to. I have been lucky to have my 
support worker but not everyone has one. I couldn't have made any of this 
progress without my support worker and get to go to college now, but no 
funding for it because I did not turn 19 in care, but I was in care for 5 
years. I wish I could get AYA, that would be so appreciated and helpful, so 
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I hope they change their eligibility criteria. I really hope Bridges doesn't go 
away because I'll be hooped without my support worker.” (Young person) 
“Should be more attention paid to mental health, depression and funding 
issues—AYA should not be just a cheque.” (Young person) 
“Program [Agreement with Young Adults] needs to be about more than 
finance benefit, needs to be a relational program that helps the young 
person transition to independence.” (Delegated Aboriginal Agency staff 
member) 
“Young people ‘aging out’ require support with life skills, not just financial 
support.” (Delegated Aboriginal Agency staff member) 
And from Doucet et al. (2017)—a collaborative video project with a group of co-
researchers who were former youth in care: 
“All co-researchers expressed frustration with the cut-off of supports at the 
age of majority. They emphasized that the lack of guidance and support 
received during their time in care in preparation for their transition to 
adulthood negatively affected their lives after ‘aging out’ of the system. 
Many felt a sense of loss and isolation after leaving care, as they had no 
continued support system despite still being at risk of experiencing 
significant difficulties.” (p. 53) 
“All co-researchers expressed that the child welfare system’s sole focus 
on independent living prevents youth ‘aging out’ of care to form lasting and 
healthy relationships, and forces them into isolation and to grow up too 
fast. While learning life skills such as budgeting, cooking, and cleaning 
were deemed important to a young person’s functioning, being connected 
to others who can provide continuous mentoring, support and nurturing 
throughout adulthood was considered equally as important.” (p. 56) 
These quotes present a common theme: young people aging out of care are certainly 
lacking resources, but what they need to make any financial resources useful is true 
personal support and attachment. To us, this is clearly a situation where offering a basic 
income alone would fall far short of what is needed. What these youth appear to be 
looking for is not simply independence—financial or otherwise—but the combination of 
the opportunity to try out their independence with a feeling they have a true base of 
support that other youth enjoy. 
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Shaffer et al. (2016) discuss the concept of “connected autonomy” and state that while 
the system emphasizes independence, “a consistent theme emerging from a broad 
range of studies: youth aging out of care, while striving to live independently, require 
social supports and community connections that facilitate relationship-building and 
improved mental wellbeing, among other important benefits” (vol. 3, p. 20).  
Based on this, the Vancouver Foundation’s Fostering Change Initiative argue 
that “young people leaving foster care should be confident they have at least 
three things to count on until age 25. 
1. Consistent financial support with basic living costs like housing, transit, and food 
while they attend school, learn skills, and find work. 
2. Long-term relationships with caring dependable adults for support, advice, and 
references, so that they always have somewhere to turn. 
3. A chance to connect and contribute to their communities through creative, 
cultural, and volunteer activities, so that they feel like they belong.” (Shaffer et al., 
2016, vol. 3, p. 21). 
This way of looking at what is required fits closely with the joint goals of autonomy, 
efficacy, and social connection underlying our justice-based objective, set out in Part 2, 
and we agree with Shaffer et al.’s assessment. We recommend reforms in four main 
areas. Given the very substantial over-representation of Indigenous children, families, 
and youth in these systems, any change should be done in the context of partnerships 
with Indigenous communities both on and off reserve. We note that new federal 
legislation, An Act Respecting First Nations, Métis and Inuit Children and Youth, 
includes national principles and standards, along with providing communities jurisdiction 
over child and family services. This legislation will change the system for Indigenous 
children and youth. 
MCFD resources 
Truly addressing the issues for youth aging out of care requires continuous 
improvement of the system supporting them before age 19. The existing system seems 
to be under-resourced to the point where the balance between addressing emergency 
child protection issues and providing proactive family and child support services is 
skewed to the former. We are not expert in these systems, and this area is beyond the 
scope of our mandate, so we don’t provide specific recommendations for change.  
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Nevertheless, some themes seem obvious. Children (and their families) would benefit 
from consistent support from one support worker over time, allowing real connections to 
be made and providing the child with at least one reliable personal connection whatever 
other tumult they face, if permitted by the resources available. Doing that almost 
certainly requires substantially increasing the number of staff to the point where their 
caseloads are small enough that they are able to spend more time with the children in 
their charge.  
Recommendation 31 (short term): Increase Ministry of Children and Family Development 
funding related to child protection and family services, increasing social worker 
resources with the objective of establishing longer-term continuity of contact between 
families, vulnerable children and children in care, and ministry social workers. 
Community support and engagement 
As Shaffer et al. (2016) point out, there is an existing network of community 
organizations helping youth aging out of care. The government should determine which 
organizations are being the most effective and provide them with the resources to 
provide a reliable network of options for these youth. It is important that efficacy should 
not be measured just in terms of independence-related outcomes, such as education 
completion, employment, and earnings, but in terms of whether the organizations 
provide a secure community as a basis for youth to make autonomous decisions (and 
sometimes fail in those decisions).  
There are strong advantages to working with community organizations rather than trying 
to create a government agency. In particular, the youth can take part in determining the 
direction of these organizations, enhancing their sense of self-efficacy and giving them 
a voice in the balance of autonomy and support that is right for them. The organizations 
also tend to have staff who have lived experience, which makes them a natural source 
for mentoring. This is important because one key emphasis for the programs should be 
establishing a stable relationship between the youth and a mentor/caseworker. This is 
being done successfully elsewhere; for example, Big Brothers and Sisters of Canada 
has a working relationship with the Ontario government to establish long-term support 
relationships for youth aging out of care in that province (Rennie, 2016). Although there 
are community organizations in B.C. that are funded to support former youth in care, 
they are not funded to support them in transitioning to self-reliance, including transition 
planning. 
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Recommendation 32 (short term): Provide core capacity funding for the most effective 
community organizations helping former youth in care—those that provide a secure 
environment and base of support from which the youth can make autonomous decisions 
related to outcomes such as education and employment—to create capacity for 
transition planning and support.  
Educational and life-skills support 
The AYA program includes support for those engaged in post-secondary education and 
training, which was extended in 2018 to allow for up to 48 months of support in 
aggregate under Agreements with Young Adults. Many university students take more 
than four years to complete their undergraduate education, while others may choose to 
combine both academic and trades training, or to change their educational direction as 
they search for their best path forward. We also know that former youth in care tend to 
need more time than others to achieve their educational goals and that it is important to 
give them the flexibility to fail.  
Recommendation 33 (short term): Extend the number of allowed months for education 
and rehabilitation under Agreements with Young Adults beyond 48 months. 
The life-skills support component of the AYA program should be expanded. Given the 
low high school graduation rate for youth in care at age 19 and the trauma they have 
experienced, a post-secondary academic or trades-training option, or possibly even 
completing high school, are not immediately accessible goals for many of them. 
Changes to the non–post-secondary education component of AYA need to be made in 
consultation with youth, the organizations mentioned under Recommendation 32 and, in 
particular, Indigenous communities. AYA services have very low take-up rates, 
suggesting that their current form is not attracting many of the youth who need help, 
which further suggests that enhancing the range of assistance provided would be 
helpful. 
Recommendation 34 (short term): Expand and enhance the life-skills support component 
of the Agreements with Young Adults program in consultation with affected young adults 
and organizations that support them. 
Our recommended Assisted to Work program (Recommendation 27) will have the ability 
to provide intensive, customized supports to overcome barriers to work for populations 
that experience the greatest difficulties in achieving long-term labour force attachment. 
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In addition to people with disabilities and women escaping domestic violence, we 
believe that youth aging out of care would also benefit from access to this program. 
Recommendation 35 (medium term): Make former youth in care eligible for the Assisted 
to Work program (Recommendation 27), established to provide intensive work supports 
to overcome significant barriers to accessing good jobs. Design eligibility details in 
consultation with affected young adults and organizations that support them. 
Financial supports 
We believe that more readily accessible financial support for youth aging out of care 
would be beneficial. This set of people is defined by events not under their control that 
occurred before age 19. Thus, the government can afford to be generous with financial 
support without concern that such support will draw others into the system. Indeed, 
drawing more of these youth into support is clearly a goal. About 1,000 youth age out of 
care each year in B.C., and the vast majority of them do not access the available 
supports. In addition, 74% of former youth in care receive Income Assistance benefits at 
some point by age 34. Those who are in the AYA program are currently receiving up to 
$1,250 a month in support, so expenditures on transfers targeting these youth will partly 
replace existing expenditures. 
At the same time, encouraging moves toward autonomy is important, and financial 
supports should be set up to encourage that. Shaffer et al. (2016) recommend a system 
with gradual reductions in guaranteed payments until age 25, and this makes sense to 
us. In the current system, access to AYA is restricted to those who were in government 
care or in a Youth Agreement on their 19th birthday. This cuts out youth who might have 
been in care earlier in their childhood but happened not to be in care at age 19. We 
believe extending eligibility to these youth will increase the number of youth eligible by 
about 10% over the number currently eligible for an AYA. 
Recommendation 36 (short term): Implement a new targeted basic income benefit for all 
youth formerly in care, with the following features: 
• benefit at least equal to the Market Basket Measure poverty line  
• 0% benefit reduction rate  
• full amount paid for ages 19–21, reduced by 25% per year and phased out at age 25  
• reduction suspended up to two years for education and training  
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• eligibility for youth in care or in Youth Agreements at 19 or in care for at least two 
years at a younger age 
• entering into a young adult agreement not required for eligibility 
• Agreements with Young Adults program adjusted accordingly and accessible to at least age 
27, ensuring that current program participants receive at least as much financial support 
• must be combined with community supports (Recommendation 37) 
We cannot stress enough that a guaranteed income without youth-driven community 
supports is not enough to make a difference. Indeed, it would have the potential to drive 
youth away from community resources that come with the attachment and social 
connection they need. Moreover, the youth support workers quoted above expressed 
concern that some of the youth may not be ready for the responsibility of an income 
without supports.  
The following two recommendations are intended to ensure that participants have at 
least a minimum reciprocal requirement to engage with these supports enough to 
understand what is available, and to ensure that the delivery of financial aid and other 
supports are delivered in an integrated fashion. This may be seen by some as 
paternalistic, but it is much less so than the requirements now imposed by agreements 
under the AYA program. Also, while allowing individuals the autonomy to choose what 
and how much support to utilize, it reflects the importance that they understand the 
availability of supports for them and that they have every opportunity to access them.  
Recommendation 37 (short term): Design the financial support program for youth aging 
out of care so that financial payments and the offered support services would be 
initiated through a youth contacting one of the service delivery organizations (of the 
youth’s choice) and would involve an initiation session to give the youth information on 
available supports. 
Quite apart from the recommendation to deliver transition support and planning through 
community organizations, the whole program for former youth in care should be 
organized for delivery in an integrated fashion so as to avoid barriers to access and 
stigmatization, including the principle of meeting the young adults where they are. 
Current programs have low take-up levels, likely due in part to lack of trust among 
former children in care wanting to separate themselves from the system that formerly 
acted as their guardian. Instead, these former children in care are now adults and 
should be provided with services in a way similar to those provided to other adults, 
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through a seamlessly integrated approach. It is crucial that reformed supports be 
designed using a collaborative and consultative process with former children in care and 
other stakeholders, including youth under age 19, youth-serving organizations, 
Indigenous communities, MCFD’s provincial youth advisory council, and advocacy 
groups. 
Recommendation 38 (short term): Establish a specific legislative mandate and funding 
allocation for a designated ministry or other government agency to support former 
children in care. Currently, no single ministry has such a mandate, but it is necessary to 
ensure that all programs focused on this group are designed and administered in a 
coordinated, seamlessly integrated fashion. This is particularly important because the 
list of supports is long, including financial aid, life-skills support, education support, 
social work assistance, and funding for/operations of community organizations providing 
support. All of this must be based on ongoing collaboration and consultation with former 
children in care and other stakeholders. 
 
A key input to public trust is cost. What we propose in Recommendations 32 to 38 in 
terms of creating a wraparound system to help youth aging out of care through the 
transition to adulthood would cost on the order of $120,000 to $190,000 per young 
adult. These are significant costs, but it is helpful to put them in the context of costs 
associated with these vulnerable young adults under the current system. As discussed 
in Part 4, Section 5.7 (Youth Aging Out of Care), the fiscal costs associated with the 
extremely poor health, justice, education, and financial outcomes that this group 
experiences are roughly estimated to be $320,000 per person in net present value 
terms at age 19. We don’t see this as an estimate of the savings that would result from 
our recommendations, since we do not know what their effects will be on these various 
outcomes, but it provides context for the spending we propose.  
Perhaps more importantly, 31% of the children of people who were formerly in care are 
taken into care themselves, compared to 1.5% of the rest of the population, and former 
children in care have much higher fertility rates than the general population. This implies 
that any cost estimates have to be projected across generations—a particularly 
important consideration given evidence of strong associations between childhood 
poverty and health outcomes through the rest of life (Schmidt et al., 2020). There is a 
clear need to help the families of people formerly in care to escape this cycle. We 
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believe that if this alone were known, there would be considerable public support for 
sizable expenditures in this area. 
While we recognize that these recommendations will require significant effort and 
changes to implement, this is an area that we regard as being of high priority; we have 
therefore put these recommendations into the “short-term” category. 
8.2 Youth from low-income backgrounds, not in care 
Substantial gradients by family socio-economic status (defined by parental education 
and income) persist in Canada in high school completion rates, college and university 
attendance, and college and university graduation (Foley & Green, 2016). These 
differences in educational outcomes represent a substantial inequality in opportunities 
and lifetime income between children from lower-income and higher-income 
backgrounds. 
However, eliminating differences is not entirely straightforward because the differences 
do not appear to be due only to differences in income. Foley et al. (2014), for example, 
find that the higher dropout rate for boys from low socio-economic backgrounds is 
largely eliminated once researchers control for parental attitudes toward education. 
Transfer programs or even free tuition are unlikely to resolve that issue. Indeed, since 
higher-income families take greater advantage of educational opportunities, policies 
such as greater subsidization of post-secondary education or universal free tuition may 
exacerbate rather than reduce inequality in education and income (Foley & Green, 
2016).  
What is needed are policies targeting children and youth from low-education 
backgrounds and that not only make post-secondary education more affordable but also 
help bridge the socio-economic gap in the attention and value assigned to education 
(Robson, 2017). 
B.C. has several initiatives aimed at helping youth from low-income backgrounds 
choose to access post-secondary education.  
The B.C. Access Grant, effective August 1, 2020, will support 40,000 post-secondary 
students from low- and medium-income backgrounds.123 It is meant to address financial 
disincentives for low- and middle-income youth to access post-secondary education. 
 
123 See https://studentaidbc.ca/news/grants-scholarships/new-bc-access-grant 
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The grant amounts to a maximum of $4,000 per year for educational programs lasting 
two years or less, and $1,000 per year for programs lasting four years or longer. It is 
important that this support be in the form of a grant, since prior research indicates that 
potential students from low-income backgrounds are less likely to enrol in more 
education when offered even a low- or no-interest loan than a grant. The 2020/21 
mandate letter for the Minister of Advanced Education and Skills Training states that the 
minister is expected to “Expand the B.C. Access Grant program by increasing eligibility 
to reduce barriers and make sure more people are able to access the skills they need 
for the jobs of the future.” 
The B.C. Training and Education Savings Grant is a one-time $1,200 contribution to a 
child’s Registered Education Savings Plan (RESP) with no matching parental 
contribution required. It is available to all families regardless of income, though it will be 
of greater relative value to low-income families. In that sense, it reinforces the incentives 
in the RESP program, including the Canada Learning Bond (CLB), through which the 
federal government deposits $500 in the first year and $100 in subsequent years in the 
RESPs of children from low-income households. Importantly, CLB take-up is low. For 
B.C., only 41% of eligible families take part in CLBs, even though it is essentially free 
money (Robson, 2017). This fits with Robson’s point that money is only part of 
increasing educational participation for children from low-income households.  
This level of support is well below that in, for example, Ontario, through the Ontario 
Student Assistance Program (OSAP). Through OSAP a post-secondary student from a 
family with an income of $30,000 a year without any other issues or conditions is eligible 
for $7,000 in grants and $7,600 in student loans for a year. The online calculator for the 
system is clear and shows potential students how the grants plus loans will cover their 
necessary expenses. The B.C. offerings do not come close to doing so.  
B.C.’s support is also offered in a way that has built-in barriers. The B.C. Training and 
Education Savings Grant has a several-step application process that includes getting a 
Social Insurance Number for both parents and children, providing proof of residence, 
filling out an application form, and having that form evaluated by Knowledge First 
Financial. For low-income families who are uncertain about taking the gamble of 
sending their child to post-secondary education in the first place, this is hardly a blazing 
neon sign beckoning them in.  
Robson (2017) reviews evidence on policies that have been tried around North America 
to encourage post-secondary education among children from low-income families and 
concludes that the most effective policies engage children and their families from the 
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 465 
 
time children are young. In particular, education bonds that the family owns (but that 
can only be used for the child’s education) can be effective if introduced early in the 
child’s life and if the family and child are clearly aware of their ownership of the bonds. 
RESPs and the CLB have some of this feature but clearly not in a form that encourages 
take-up for the majority of low-income households. 
Recommendation 39 (short term): Implement a $1,000 B.C. Learning Bond account that 
is automatically created for children from low-income families at birth or a year after 
immigration, which can be used only for education.  
The bond would be deposited in a notional account and would supplement the CLB so 
that by age 18, there will be over $4,000 available to help cover education costs 
(Robson, 2017). Families should be clearly notified of the bond when it is given, and 
new notices of the existence and value of the bond should be sent every year. It would 
be treated as taxable income for the child when used, as for current RESPs.  
Recommendation 40 (short term): Automatically create a learning bond when children 
are first taken into care, if a learning bond is not already in place. 
As mentioned earlier, engaging children from low socio-economic circumstances in 
moving to post-secondary education is about more than just money. Several provinces, 
including B.C., have programs designed to help children understand the opportunities 
that are available to them, including mandatory high school courses and initiatives 
undertaken by community organizations. Manitoba’s Career Trek, for example, has 
programs that specifically help low-income children and youth “discover who they are 
and what occupation they might want to pursue.”124 It emphasizes engaging parents, 
guardians and extended family in career discussions, since family support is important 
for success. Robson (2018) reviews the available literature and notes several studies 
that evaluate these types of interventions and find them effective. These programs tend 
not to be expensive.  
Recommendation 41 (short term): Create a B.C. version of Manitoba’s Career Trek to 
support low-income children in moving to post-secondary education and training by 
encouraging increased family engagement.  
Geographic differences also lead to unequal access to education. Rural education 
completion rates are much lower than urban completion rates, with high school dropout 
 
124 See https://careertrek.ca/about-us/who-does-career-trek-serve/ 
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rates in rural areas being about double those in Canadian cities (Uppal, 2017). B.C. has 
built a web of colleges and universities around the province that, in principle, make it 
easier for youth from all communities to get a post-secondary education. We believe it 
would be worthwhile to re-examine that system and its funding to make sure that it is 
able to deliver on its promise of province-wide access to advanced education, which is 
also a priority set out in the minister’s mandate letter. 
Finally, in any tabulation of educational outcomes, Indigenous youth appear as under-
represented and lagging behind. Addressing this is the highest priority but requires a 
process that fully engages the Indigenous communities; we are therefore not in a 
position to make recommendations on it.  
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9. Reforms targeting people fleeing violence 
Although the plight of people fleeing violence has been brought into the public spotlight 
by COVID-19, it is not a new problem. In 2018, there were 9,161 police-reported female 
victims of intimate and non-intimate partner violence in B.C., a rate of about 427 women 
out of 100,000 women, with rates of violence higher in rural areas (Statistics Canada, 
2019b).125 Further, it is estimated that 30%–74% of people who experience intimate 
partner violence have a traumatic brain injury (TBI; Valera & Berenbaum, 2003). The 
precise number is hard to pinpoint, as most go undiagnosed, reducing their quality of life 
and their opportunities to seek improvement in their situation or recovery (Owen, 2019).  
9.1 Current supports for people fleeing violence in B.C. 
The Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General allocates over $40 million in funding 
for more than 400 victim services and violence against women programs across the 
province, and provides several other supports to victims through the Crime Victim 
Assistance Program, Court Support Program, Restitution Program and Victim Safety 
Unit.126 Many of these programs focus on providing support, information, referrals, 
counselling, and advocacy.127  
While there are programs directed generally at victims of crime, such as the Crime 
Victim Assistance Program, very few services directly target people fleeing violence. 
Two such programs are BC Housing and VictimLinkBC. BC Housing is responsible for 
transition houses (temporary shelter for people fleeing violence) and supports over 100 
transition houses, safe homes, and second- and third-stage homes. VictimLinkBC is a 
toll-free, confidential, multilingual service available across B.C., 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, and can be accessed via phone, text, or email. The service provides 
information and referral services to all victims of crime and immediate crisis support to 
victims of family and sexual violence, including referrals to government and community-
based services and resources. It also provides information about federal and provincial 
legislation, the Canadian criminal justice system, crime prevention, and safety planning.  
 
125 It is important to note here that the vast majority of domestic violence is not reported to the police. Statistics 
Canada (2016) estimates that 70% of spousal violence is not reported to the police. 
126 See Rossiter (2011) for an overview of community- and government-based supports for women fleeing violence.  
127 See https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/justice/criminal-justice/bcs-criminal-justice-system/if-you-are-a-victim-of-
a-crime/victim-of-crime/victim-services-directory 
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However, there are no government-provided income support programs specifically for 
people fleeing violence, although Income Assistance (IA) does have specific provisions 
to accommodate this group.128 The eligibility assessment process is expedited to ensure 
that immediate needs are met. Applicants do not have to meet the work-search 
requirement or make an employment plan for up to six months, but they must still meet 
the income and asset tests, with some accommodations. Income and asset tests are 
modified to exclude the income/assets of the perpetrator unless it is income that the 
applicant is receiving (i.e., child or spousal support). Jointly held assets can be excluded 
if it is determined that the other owner will not co-operate or contacting them would 
cause a safety issue. If an applicant is not eligible for Temporary Assistance or 
Disability Assistance because of income or assets, and they have dependent children, 
they may still be eligible for hardship assistance. Abuse or violence does not have to be 
verified at the time of application; it must only be disclosed. Abuse can be physical, 
psychological, or emotional and include intimidation, threats, stalking, unreasonable 
restriction on financial or personal autonomy, or intentional damage to property. If minor 
children are involved, the Ministry of Children and Family Development (MCFD) must be 
contacted.129 
When viewed through our justice-based analytical framework, available government 
supports for people fleeing violence are inadequate for both the number and needs of 
people fleeing violence, and have barriers to access that prevent them from fully 
supporting a person’s autonomy from the abuser. First, prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic, an average day saw more than 200 women and children turned away from 
transition houses in B.C. because of lack of space (Steacy, 2020). Second, there is no 
specific support to help people experiencing or fleeing violence get assessed for TBI, let 
alone become informed about the possibility that they are suffering from TBI, although 
there are more general TBI-related programs across the province.130 
Further, those who do manage to escape their abuser have a serious lack of access to 
money. Just over 50% of people fleeing violence in Canada experience financial abuse 
(Moreau, 2019). This suggests that many people fleeing violence have little or no 
financial independence. Their only apparent recourse is applying to IA. However, IA 
does not provide sufficient income for a person who has fled with nothing with which to 
 
128 The Crime Victim Assistance Program may be able to provide financial support in some cases. 
129 All information on IA in this paragraph was collected from the BC Employment and Assistance Policy and 
Procedure Manual (Government of British Columbia, 2020) 
130 See https://www.braininjurycanada.ca/abi-associations/british-columbia/ 
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re-establish their own home, such as furniture, clothes for their children for school, and 
food for the pantry. If the person does not have sufficient income to clothe, bathe, and 
feed a child, and IA is aware of the situation, their children may be taken by MCFD. This 
makes victims fearful of applying for IA in the first place. 
Supply-side housing supports 
The government should provide more funding for both short- and long-term housing 
facilities for people fleeing violence. Transition houses are turning people away at an 
alarming rate, and those who have completed their stay in a transition house must find a 
longer-term rental, move in with family/friends, move back with their abuser, or become 
homeless. Of those who leave a transition house, 21% move back into a residence 
where their abuser lives (Moreau, 2019). Providing more short-term and long-term 
housing for people fleeing violence can help end the cycle of abuse. Focus should be 
on providing housing in areas where there is an inadequate supply of affordable 
housing, particularly in rural areas; if a domestic violence victim must travel to escape 
their abuser, they may be unable to escape because of a lack of transportation.  
The government could use short-term rentals (such as Airbnb’s) as short-term housing 
for people fleeing abuse. The large number of them in urban areas make them well-
suited to providing a measure of safety for people fleeing violence. Crisan (2020) details 
how the government and non-governmental organizations can work with short-term 
rental platforms to make temporary housing available to those fleeing violence, building 
on Airbnb’s existing Open Homes programs. 
Recommendation 42 (short term): Increase funding for both short- and long-term 
housing facilities for people fleeing violence, especially in areas where there is a lack of 
access to appropriate temporary housing, particularly rural areas, and consider making 
use of short-term rentals. 
Income plus wraparound supports 
Once a person has left their abuser and moved into a transition house, to ensure that 
they do not have to return they must have supports to establish their own household 
and be able to do so as quickly as possible. One monthly IA benefit payment is not 
sufficient to establish a household. The government should introduce a new program 
that provides a one-time lump-sum payment of about three to four months’ worth of IA 
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to people fleeing violence to assist them in establishing their own household.131, 132 This 
should not require IA eligibility/receipt (although it could still be income-tested). 
Domestic violence victims should be made aware of this program, and eligibility should 
be assessed on entry into a transition house. For those who apply for this new program, 
additional wraparound supports should be provided. These would include information on 
and assessment for TBI, and a dedicated caseworker from the community with 
knowledge of community- and government-provided supports the people may have 
access to, as well as an understanding of the local culture (particularly the culture of the 
person fleeing violence). Those who apply for the lump-sum payment should also be 
automatically assessed for IA eligibility (if they are not already receiving it).  
These reforms to Income Assistance and the lump-sum provision would result in a 
three-tiered support for people fleeing violence, as shown in Figure 6-2.  
Figure 6-2: Three-tiered domestic violence program 
  
First, IA should be redesigned to include a new category for people with high needs who 
are not necessarily disabled (though domestic violence victims may have a temporary 
 
131 A similar program currently exists in Alberta, but the amount given is based on the actual cost of the immediate 
needs. We find this to be limiting because it is unclear what costs are considered reasonable/unreasonable and it 
requires people fleeing violence to assess their costs before applying, unnecessarily adding complexity. See 
https://www.alberta.ca/family-violence-costs-leave.aspx for more information on the Alberta program. 
132 This lump-sum payment should be in addition to IA monthly payments. 
Transitioning into ETW after securing permanent, stable housing. Continued wraparound supports.
Transitioning onto IA in an Expected to Work category with no employment obligations (excused from work) to provide a 
stable stream of monthly payments. Continued provision of wraparound supports that address medical conditions, 
permanent stable housing, employment training (if desired), child care and transportation needs. No requirement to meet 
medical recovery conditions but continuous support to encourage meeting recovery appointments/conditions.
One-time, lump-sum payment for immediate needs, with wraparound supports (traumatic brain injury assessment, other 
medical needs/assessment, emergency transportation, transition housing, or Airbnb).
Supporte
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disability, especially if they have a TBI). Those fleeing violence would fit into this 
category. Employment requirements should be more flexible; people fleeing violence 
would work with their dedicated caseworker to decide when and if they are ready to 
apply for paid work. The current six-month time limit may not be adequate for all 
domestic violence victims.  
Second, this new category of IA should provide access to more wraparound supports in 
an integrated fashion, such as supports that address TBI and other medical conditions, 
permanent housing, and transportation needs (e.g., extend the Disability Assistance 
transit pass). Finally, for both the lump-sum provision and this new branch of IA, a 
person fleeing violence should not have to prove that they have experienced violence: if 
someone claims they are fleeing violence, they should be believed. This will help 
encourage people to leave their abusers and reduce the associated with income 
programs and/or being a person fleeing violence.  
Recommendation 43 (short term): After consultation with domestic violence experts on 
program design, introduce a three-tiered program to address domestic violence: 
1. Provide a substantial initial lump-sum payment equivalent to three to four months of 
Income Assistance benefits, accessible without proof of violence 
2. Enhance hardship assistance for people with transitional high needs that integrates 
cash benefits with access to wraparound supports to address, for example, 
traumatic brain injury and other medical conditions, permanent housing, and 
transportation needs 
3. Transition people into the Expected to Work category of Income Assistance after 
securing permanent stable housing, with continued wraparound supports 
For all of the reforms discussed above, before design and implementation, experts in 
the field of domestic violence, as well as experienced people who work directly with 
people fleeing violence should be consulted. 
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10. Labour regulation reforms 
Our justice-based framework has led us to focus on working conditions for a number of 
reasons. First, both self- and social respect are rooted in our places in the productive 
structure of society. People need to work and feel productive to have a sense of self-
efficacy and to feel respected by those around them. Of course, the work does not have 
to be paid work in the labour market, but a considerable portion of it will be there. 
Second, we spend a large portion of our lives at work, and if the conditions there are 
such that we feel a lack of control and dignity, then a crucial component of our society is 
less than just. Third, low worker power will also show up in unequal wage bargaining 
that contributes to inequality.  
We examined the B.C. labour market in detail in Part 3, Section 4 (Labour Market 
Trends), based on Green (2020d), to address the question of whether and how work is 
changing. Data for B.C. does not point to a recent trend toward more precarious work, 
but it does show a structural shift toward less worker control and more inequality during 
the weak labour markets of the 1990s that has not been reversed. Those shifts 
coincided with a weakening of protections provided by Unemployment Insurance133 and 
Income Assistance, followed later by reductions in labour regulation protections.  
The result was a shift toward more precarity in work in many forms, such as part-time 
work, gig work and, importantly, a more fissured workforce in which more work is done 
through contracting agencies. Workers in jobs such as janitorial services and food 
service are often no longer direct employees of the firms where they do their work. In 
many cases, precarious work equates to reduced worker rights and benefits because 
labour regulation applies imperfectly.  
For example, fissured work reduces regulatory protections because the firm setting 
working conditions in the workplace is not the employer to whom the regulations apply. 
There is also evidence that fissured work reduces wages by segregating lower-paid 
workers organizationally from the higher-paid employees conducting the core business 
of the workplace. The trend toward fissured work may be ongoing (at a slower rate than 
in the late 1990s), but whether increasing or not, its level is concerning. 
Added to these issues are growing concerns about systemic racism in workplaces and 
the fact that fissured jobs are disproportionately held by racialized and female workers. 
 
133 EI’s predecessor program in effect at the time. 
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About one in five single adults living in poverty work more than 40 weeks in the year, 
and these are disproportionately female workers in the sales and service sectors. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has served to both exacerbate and expose these inequalities, with 
the majority of job losses happening among female workers in the service sector.  
Increasing the proportion of better-paying jobs with good working conditions will 
significantly bolster the beneficial impact of the broad income and social support system 
reform program we are recommending. A sound system of government support can be 
a basis for individuals developing skills and finding employment, as well as helping them 
through bad times. But if available jobs are unattractive in terms of work conditions and 
wages, that acts as a strong disincentive for those receiving support to move back into 
the workforce. Reforming the government support system and reforming labour markets 
therefore are complementary policies.  
Reforming labour regulation is ultimately about readjusting workers’ power over their 
work toward a place of greater balance. As Anderson (2017) points out, firms always 
need a certain level of control over workers in order to effectively coordinate work, but 
this must be balanced against workers’ rights and their need for dignity if workplaces 
are to take their place as a fundamental element of a just society. We believe that, in 
recent decades, this balance has been lost in B.C., with policy changes that 
substantially weakened the worker side of the equation. Not only does that affect the 
proportion of “good” jobs, but it can also create a tilted competitive playing field for 
business in many cases. To be clear, the goal of our recommendations is to find a 
better balance, not to create an imbalance in favour of workers. This fits with our notions 
of reciprocity and public support as part of a just society. 
As discussed in Part 4, Section 5.7 (Labour Market Regulation), labour regulation in 
B.C. falls under the Employment Standards Act (ESA) and the Labour Relations Code. 
The provisions set out in the legislation attempt to find the balance we have discussed, 
reflecting a long process of negotiations and consideration of standards that are fair to 
both workers and firms. Amendments to the ESA (in 2019) and the Labour Relations 
Code (in 2018, 2019 and 2020) were important steps toward restoring balance, but we 
believe that further steps are called for.  
10.1 Employment standards issues 
One important employment standards issue concerns whether all relevant workers are 
covered by employment standards and are able to ensure that those standards are 
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followed, through effective enforcement. Attention has been focused on which workers 
should be covered by the ESA through the recent emergence of ride-sharing companies 
in B.C. and other disruptive labour models, an issue faced by many jurisdictions. There 
is a risk that widespread use of these work arrangements beyond ride-sharing firms and 
the other firms using disruptive work models could remove many workers from the 
protection of the fair provisions that have been embodied in the ESA. That shift could 
increase precarity for those workers and, and make them more likely to fall into and be 
unable to escape from poverty. 
The ESA definition of an employee, on which ESA coverage turns, is broad, with a 
default presumption that any questions about the definition of “employee” in unclear 
situations will be determined in favour of the worker. This may mean that many gig 
workers, including ride-share workers, will ultimately be determined to be employees 
under the act, but this determination awaits specific decisions of the regulatory agency 
(the Employment Standards Tribunal) and subsequent court rulings.  
Given the potential importance of gig work in the future, we believe that it would be 
preferable to proactively consider what the most appropriate employment standards 
regime would be for workers in these work arrangements. Ride-sharing, while not 
involving a large group of workers, can be used as an example for developing specific 
employment standards principles, policy, and potentially legislation that would be 
applicable generally to these arrangements as well as specifically applicable to ride-
sharing. In addition to addressing whether or not these workers are employees, this is 
an opportunity to consider what specific employment standard protections gig workers 
need, which standards may be inappropriate given the business model, and what 
criteria should apply to determine that for future novel gig work arrangements. 
Recommendation 44 (short term): Develop policy and legislation that apply appropriate 
employment standards to gig work arrangements in a consultative process that includes 
businesses and workers associated with both disruptive and traditional business 
models/work arrangements. 
Workers can also be excluded from the protection of the ESA because their jobs are 
specifically excluded from its provisions. The British Columbia Law Institute (2018, p. 
xviii) calls existing exclusions under the ESA “bewildering in their number and 
complexity,” while  
no readily discernible principle explains why some occupations and job 
situations are excluded from the Act entirely (e.g., some professions, 
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sitters, students employed by their schools, registered investment 
dealers), others from specific parts of the Act (e.g., managers, resident 
caretakers), others from parts of the Act except certain provisions (e.g., 
fishers, farm workers, election workers), others from specific sections 
(e.g., taxi drivers, livestock brand inspectors, loggers). (p. 44) 
Recommendation 45 (short term): As recommended by the British Columbia Law 
Institute, undertake a thorough review of exclusions under the Employment Standards 
Act, with a view to establishing clear principles for exclusions, in particular farm workers 
and fishers. 
Enforcement of the legal standards for workers acknowledged as employees under the 
ESA is a further important element of establishing fair workplaces. The 2019 changes to 
the ESA included important steps toward a more proactive approach to enforcement by 
eliminating worker self-help kits and requiring the Employment Standards Branch to 
investigate all complaints accepted for resolution by the branch. Previously, the 
approach had been to emphasize speedy resolutions of cases, with an implication that 
investigations should be limited. One benefit of a move toward a more proactive 
approach would be relieving workers of the burden of filing complaints in order to 
determine whether workers are employees within the meaning of the legislation and are 
thereby covered by the ESA.134 
Recommendation 46 (short term): Continue the move toward a proactive stance on 
enforcing regulations, including providing enough resources for the Employment 
Standards Branch to make random regulatory compliance reviews stratified on the basis 
of industries’ compliance histories, including reviews of whether workers are classified 
as employees under the Employment Standards Act. 
The province has made steps toward limiting fissured work arrangements, particularly 
with amendments to the Labour Relations Code extending successorship protections to 
contract retendering. However, we believe that more should be done in this area, 
especially since there are concerns that fissured work arrangements are, in part, 
attempts to avoid the regulations under the ESA.  
 
134 Complaint mechanisms will still be available for workers and complaints might even be expected to increase in the 
near term because of increased educational outreach. 
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Suggestions for changes that others have made and that we see as potentially fruitful 
directions include the following:135 
• Treat all firms related to the work conducted at a workplace as jointly and 
severally liable for meeting employer obligations under the ESA. Since the 
intermediary firms are often smaller and less stable, this could greatly heighten 
effective worker coverage. As far as we understand, B.C. already has a provision 
that extends responsibility for unpaid wages beyond the intermediary firm in 
situations where there is contracted work in some sectors. This proposal would 
involve extending this protection to all provisions of work arrangements covered 
by the ESA.136 
• Increase regulatory enforcement of the licences (and, especially, operating 
without a licence) for temp agencies and increase the penalties for infractions 
when recently passed licensing requirements are brought into force. Most 
importantly, impose penalties on the final-level firms for using unlicensed or 
otherwise non-compliant intermediary firms.  
• Apply severance pay and severance condition standards to temp agencies and 
their employees. They are currently exempt from those conditions in some 
specific circumstances. 
• Eliminate buy-out clauses that prohibit workers from shifting from the temp 
agencies to working for the client firm. Removing these clauses will give workers 
more power and reduce the extent to which they are treated as indentured assets 
owned by the intermediary firm in the work interactions.  
Apart from issues related to coverage and enforcement of existing regulations, the 
ongoing concerns about precarious worker arrangements raise questions about whether 
special treatment is needed for part-time, part-year, and other variable-hours workers. 
To address that, we believe the government should carry out an evaluation of the 
usefulness and feasibility of changes in legislation related to specific issues facing 
workers in part-time jobs and jobs with hours uncertainty. Areas of potential 
 
135 These recommendations come mainly from Johal et al. (2019) and Ivanova (2019). 
136 Section 30 of the ESA provides that producers and farm labour contractors (the one form of temporary help 
agency that is currently subject to regulation under the ESA) are jointly and separately liable for wages. The proposal 
could extend the application of Section 30 to all temporary help agencies. A 2002 amendment that weakened this 
provision could also be revisited. 
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investigation include hourly pay rates for part-time workers, providing notice to workers 
for hours changes, and minimum shift-length provisions.  
Recommendation 47 (short term): In coordination with the Recommendation 45 review, 
build on recent employment standards legislative changes to further improve 
employment standards and their application, with particular attention to fissured work 
and variable-hours workers (e.g., part-time and part-year workers) through a 
consultative process with broad terms of reference. That includes considering joint and 
several liability for employment standards, enhanced enforcement of temp agency 
licensing, applying severance standards to temp agencies, eliminating temp agency 
buy-out clauses, regulating equity of wage rates, and setting scheduling standards. 
10.2 Labour relations issues 
Balance in worker-firm relations is, of course, also directly affected by worker 
representation at the workplace. Private sector unions have seen a long, steady decline 
in B.C. Some of that decline is a result of changes in the industrial structure, with a shift 
away from capital-intensive industries, where workers could threaten to idle the capital, 
to more service and trade industries, where turnover is high, but some may also stem 
from policy changes that have made certification more difficult. The 2019 changes to the 
Labour Relations Code reversed some of those policy effects, including shortening the 
time between an application for union certification and an employee vote from 10 days 
to five days.  
Recommendation 48 (short term): Investigate options for increasing worker access to 
unionization, especially in sectors like the service sector, where high turnover has made 
unionization difficult. This could include sector-level unionization, such as already exists 
in the construction and health-care sectors.  
Related to this recommendation is the creation of industry advisory councils. These 
were a key element the B.C. Advisory Panel on the Labor Relations Code 
recommendations for amendments to the code, intended to put labour relations in a 
more co-operative stance. We believe that this is a particularly important 
recommendation, fitting with our overall goal of a more just society founded in principles 
of reciprocity. Establishing councils with both employer and employee representation 
could be an important first step toward an environment in which workers feel that they 
are partners in enhancing the viability of industry. We view this as likely to be of 
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practical usefulness in spurring increased productivity, but also to be a real step in 
enhancing workers’ sense of dignity and participation in a key part of their lives.  
The 2019 Labour Relations Code amendments included a provision enabling the 
minister to direct the Labour Relations Board to help the parties establish an industry 
council. The description of the goals of such councils in the amendment are exactly the 
same as in the advisory panel’s recommendations. The councils would enhance 
union/employer collaboration on issues such as coordinating efforts at training and 
technology adoption as well as work standards. We believe that the next step is for 
government to take a proactive role in creating industrial advisory councils and 
providing them with governance infrastructure resources, such as meeting space and 
secretariat services. 
Recommendation 49 (short term): Immediately direct the Labour Relations Board to 
encourage and facilitate the establishment of industry advisory councils, not waiting for 
applications from employers or unions, and provide funding to support the governance 
of the councils.  
One key point at which existing unionization is often lost is when the firm holding a 
contract for work changes. Indeed, in some instances, a change in contracting is seen 
as an opportunity to eliminate unionization. The Expert Panel on Modern Federal 
Labour Standards (Johal et al., 2019) saw the issue of maintaining worker 
representation and worker rights through such contracting changes (what they called 
the continuity of work) as particularly important. Employees covered by federal 
regulations were not protected from having their job tenure clock restarted when 
contracts were rolled over, even if they continued to do the same work.  
The 2019 Labour Relations Code amendments strengthened successorship rights (the 
right of a union to continue to represent workers through a firm change) for a set of 
specified contracted services in contract retendering situations. The list of covered 
services can be expanded by regulation, but it is not clear to us why this does not 
simply apply to unionized workers in all sectors. Moreover, the provision that worker 
contract conditions be continued even if there is a retendering of a contract should be 
extended to non-union workers.  
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Recommendation 50 (medium term): Amend the Labour Relations Code to extend 
successorship rights for specific sectors to all sectors, subject to exemptions granted in 
accordance with clear, objective criteria. Examine the possibility of establishing 
protections similar to worker continuity rights for non-union workers in the Employment 
Standards Act or other legislation.  
Finally, workers are affected by a variety of provincial and federal policies, including 
regulations under the ESA, workers’ compensation, federal disability benefits, and tax 
provisions through the Canada Revenue Agency. As the Expert Panel on Modern 
Federal Labour Standards pointed out, the definition of an employee varies across the 
different policies, creating gaps that workers can fall through.  
We believe there should be an examination of all definitions of “employee” in B.C. 
statutes and regulations, with the aim of developing a single, provincial definition. That 
definition should directly address definitions of independent and dependent contractors, 
taking—as in the ESA—as inclusive a stance as is reasonable in defining who is an 
employee. We believe a coordinated definition could be helpful for workers, but it could 
also allow for a more coordinated approach to supporting workers’ rights and 
entitlements and level the competitive playing field for business by ensuring that they all 
provide working conditions consistent with ESA standards. 
Recommendation 51 (medium term): Rationalize definitions of “employee” across the 
different parts of the B.C. government, and initiate discussions with the federal 
government to coordinate definitions across levels of government.  
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11. System and Income Assistance cross-cutting reforms 
The purpose of this section is to recommend a set of reforms to the income and social 
support system in general and the Income Assistance (IA) program in particular, with 
the intention of creating a more just system. In keeping with our approach of considering 
both how to address the needs of specific identified groups (targeted reforms) and how 
to improve the system generally (cross-cutting reforms), this section outlines cross-
cutting reforms, some of which are also discussed in other sections, such as Section 2 
(Reforms Targeting People with Disabilities), where the context requires. This section 
relies heavily on two research papers that we commissioned: Systems-Level Reforms to 
British Columbia’s Income and Social Support Programs Along Basic Income Lines 
(Petit & Tedds, 2020g) and Income Assistance in British Columbia: Reforms along 
Basic Income Lines (Petit & Tedds, 2020b). 
One of the principles underlying these recommendations is the proposed shift in 
provincial programs from a cash-transfer system with added services and in-kind 
benefits to a basic services system that also provides cash transfers as needed to fill 
gaps in the federal government’s cash-transfer programs. That will help prepare the 
B.C. system to integrate with a federal system with fewer gaps, our vision for a 
federal/provincial income and social support system better aligned with our analytical 
framework and a just society. 
Some of these recommendations may seem like details, but it is the details that often 
make the difference in terms of whether a program treats users with dignity. We have 
likely overlooked many details, but we hope these can and will be addressed through 
ongoing reforms informed by consultation with affected groups and by the framework 
we have proposed. 
11.1 Tax system accessibility reforms 
Accessibility of benefits is key to providing people with adequate resources, thereby 
promoting autonomy and self-respect. A program that provides needed resources may 
have benefits at an adequate level, but that is neither effective nor fair if barriers prevent 
those the program is supposed to help from accessing benefits. One of the claims made 
for a basic income is that its relative simplicity greatly enhances access. Across the 
current income and social support system, accessibility is limited by: 
• inconsistent eligibility criteria  
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• siloed programs that do not share system knowledge or data, or provide access 
to other relevant programs 
• an extremely high level of complexity, due to many complex programs 
• high levels of skill and knowledge needed to successfully complete applications 
for most programs, with few having automatic enrolment 
• operational complexity and lack of transparency that make it difficult for 
successful applicants to comply with and manage their ongoing relationships with 
programs 
Over the past few decades, the personal income tax (PIT) system has increasingly 
become a vehicle for delivering income and social support programs by both the federal 
and provincial governments, usually in the form of refundable or non-refundable tax 
credits. It is useful because it covers a significant proportion of the population and 
already collects the financial information needed to provide income testing. PIT data-
sharing is also used for many income-tested programs not delivered via PIT. Changes 
could be made to more effectively use the PIT benefit delivery and PIT data to enhance 
the accessibility of the B.C. system, as outlined in the following recommendations. 
Dogwood Benefit 
Tedds et al. (2018), in the report of the MSP Task Force commissioned by the B.C. 
Ministry of Finance, recommended combining and enhancing the two then-existing 
provincial refundable PIT tax credits—the sales tax credit and the climate action tax 
credit—and branding it as the Dogwood Benefit. In this report, we are also 
recommending enhanced tax credits related to children, housing, and low-income 
earnings supplement. We support the MSP Task Force’s recommendation of combining 
B.C. refundable tax credits and continuing to deliver them jointly through the CRA. 
Recommendation 52 (short term): Combine B.C. refundable tax credits—including the 
sales tax credit, the climate action tax credit and the Child Opportunity Benefit—as well 
as any new tax credits implemented as part of recommended income and social support 
reforms, such as B.C. Rent Assist and an enhanced earning supplement, in a new 
Dogwood Benefit. 
Harmonize the definition of income 
In order to apply income testing to the benefits of any specific program, “income” must 
first be defined for that specific purpose. As discussed in Part 4, many different 
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definitions of income are used throughout the system, which can result in unintended 
program interactions, where a change in one benefit can affect the amount of or 
eligibility for another benefit. It affects accessibility by contributing to complexity and 
making it difficult to predict the total impact of, for example, working more hours. 
Although most programs use income tax concepts and definitions in calculating income 
for their purposes, IA is the most significant outlier. In Section 2 (Reforms Targeting 
People with Disabilities), we recommended that a reformed benefit be delivered by the 
tax system and that the definition of income used for the benefit match the definition 
used by the federal government to provide assistance to seniors through Old Age 
Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement. That definition uses only elements that are 
defined for PIT purposes, so it can be calculated using income tax data. 
Recommendation 53 (short term): Adopt the definition of income used by the federal 
government for Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement income-testing 
purposes as the definition used for all provincial programs, adjusted only where the 
purpose of a program dictates the use of an alternative. 
Automatic tax filing 
While the tax system has considerable advantages for delivering cash transfers as part 
of the income and social support system, it has one significant drawback: low tax-filing 
rates among the most vulnerable population, as discussed in relation to a basic income 
in Part 5, Section 5 (Claims Made For or About a Basic Income), and to the current 
system in Part 4, Section 3.3 (Programs by Method of Delivery). Low tax-filing rates 
arise both from barriers to tax filing and the fact that only people who have taxes owing 
need to file. Not filing a tax return excludes many people from benefits for which they 
qualify, including both those delivered by the tax system and those that use tax data to 
determine eligibility or benefit levels. The number of these programs has increased over 
the years, and our recommendations would increase them further. 
However, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) receives information about many people 
who do not file taxes as part of the system’s payroll deduction and withholding tax 
requirements. As discussed by Petit et al. (in press), this could be used in two ways. A 
first step would be for the CRA to provide all IA recipients issued a T5007 slip with pre-
populated tax returns that can easily be filed, either as provided or with amendments to, 
for example, declare self-employment earnings or provide other information not already 
collected by the CRA. Limiting this to IA recipients would enable the IA program to help 
ensure that recipients receive and file the tax return, reducing barriers to filing for at 
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least that group. A more fundamental reform would be to expand the idea to a broader 
class of people who are not required to file tax returns because they owe no tax but 
would or could benefit from doing so, and exploring automatic deemed filing for some 
people. That would require more extensive administrative and likely statutory change. 
Recommendation 54 (short term): Engage with the Department of Finance Canada and 
the Canada Revenue Agency to develop mechanisms to lower barriers to tax filing, 
especially pre-populated tax returns for Income Assistance recipients and potentially 
others not required to file tax returns, and automatic tax filing. 
Increased tax system responsiveness 
Part of the reason for our conclusion that a basic income should not be implemented 
now as the basis for B.C.’s income and social support system is that it is not cost-
effectively practical to implement and administer a basic income that is responsive to 
within-year variations in individuals. However, if the income tax system were more 
responsive to within-year changes in income, it would be more feasible for the province, 
or preferably the federal government, to consider a basic income. Basic income aside, 
increased income tax system responsiveness would improve the effectiveness of 
existing benefits and, as some other countries already do, allow for automated tax 
collection and filing for many tax filers. That is a logical extension of our previous 
recommendation. In effect, it would require the current payroll deduction system to be 
expanded in terms of employers reporting monthly by employee rather than just 
aggregate totals, and by requiring monthly reporting also on other payments to 
individuals that should be included in income. The result would be reduced compliance 
burdens for taxpayers, increased benefit accessibility and reduced non-compliance. 
Such a change would represent a fundamental reform in terms of both tax policy and 
tax administration that would have many implications and take considerable time to 
design and implement (Petit et al., in press). Nevertheless, it is the direction required to 
make Canada’s 20th-century tax system into the 21st-century tax and benefit system it 
has been evolving toward. 
Recommendation 55 (short term): Engage the federal government on reforming the 
personal income tax system to be more responsive to within-year changes in income, 
and thereby improving it as a benefit delivery platform. 
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Improved administrative access to income tax data 
For programs not delivered through the tax system—especially programs that provide 
services and in-kind benefits rather than cash transfers—tax data is nevertheless the 
best source of income information for eligibility and benefit-level purposes. Generally, 
tax data can be shared with programs for this purpose only with express written 
permission of the applicant/user. An example of this is Fair PharmaCare, which has a 
deductible based on income. To ensure that permission to access the data is obtained, 
people must apply for the program and explicitly give their permission, even though the 
program is universal. An alternative that should be considered would be to provide 
permission as part of the annual tax return, enabling programs to move to automatic 
enrolment and provision of benefits. 
Recommendation 56 (short term): Engage the Canada Revenue Agency on taxpayers 
giving permission on their annual tax return to share tax data for benefits-administration 
purposes generally or for specific programs, instead of requiring program applications to 
establish data-sharing permission. 
11.2 Making programs into a system 
Overcoming tax system–induced program inaccessibility 
Recommendations 54, 55, and 56 are directed at dealing with the inherent difficulties 
imposed by use of the tax system as a benefit platform, but these are all matters of 
federal jurisdiction where the province has limited influence at best. In addition, even if 
some or all of the issues these recommendations are intended to address are resolved 
in a timely way, that will not fully resolve the root of the accessibility issue—many 
people do not and will not file income tax returns. There are many reasons for that, but 
lack of personal capacity, lack of needed information, and lack of trust in the system are 
common. Not everyone can be in the income tax system and it is not a moral failing. In 
particular, tax-filing is a challenge for people with developmental and cognitive 
disabilities, people in long term care, and people with episodic hospitalizations. Making 
it easier to file or even having deemed filing will help, but there will always be a 
population with significant unmet needs and for whom a tax-filing requirement will be an 
insurmountable barrier to accessing income-tested support. 
We believe that what is needed is a way to identify people who do not file income tax 
returns and provide them with access to benefits and services for which they are 
eligible. That objective would significantly increase the effectiveness of the current set of 
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programs in dealing with many of the most vulnerable and with the greatest unmet 
needs. The difficulty is in verifying people’s identities to prevent fraud and maintain 
public trust. Of course, that is the value of the income tax system, because it takes care 
of verification for those that comply with the requirement to file, or who choose to do so 
when not legally required to. Income Assistance undertakes this function directly for 
applicants and recipients, providing a mechanism for applicants without identification to 
be verified and using the monthly reporting process to minimize fraud. It is limited to a 
relatively small population of active applicants and recipients, but over time the program 
does come in contact with many in the vulnerable, non-tax filer group. But there is still a 
population, the size of which is unknown, that has no contact with either Income 
Assistance or the income tax system and therefore misses out on benefits for which 
they qualify. 
This problem is also an issue for emergency preparedness. In a disaster like an 
earthquake or a pandemic, it is also important to be able to accurately identify those 
with little contact with these two administrative systems and to be able to verify their 
eligibility for cash transfers or in-kind benefits that need to be mobilized quickly to 
mitigate the disaster’s effects. 
We think the basis for addressing this problem lies in the BCID card, an identification 
card that can stand alone or be incorporated in the driver’s licence that is required for 
access to Medical Services Plan (MSP) health-care resources. Essentially, because 
MSP is universally available to all B.C. residents, most people have contact with the 
health-care system, and that requires verified identification. This provides an opportunity 
to at least close some of the gap between the tax-filing population and the population 
eligible for income-tested benefits. 
Recommendation 57 (medium term): Develop a platform for the identification and 
verification of residency and income of non–tax filers using Income Assistance and 
BCID card/Medical Service Plan data that would be used across the system of income-
tested cash transfers and basic services and for the purpose of disaster response. 
Successful implementation of such a platform would significantly enhance accessibility 
across the system. The platform would have to be administered in the spirit of balancing 
access to benefits and prevention of fraud, with at least an initial emphasis on trusting 
the person. It would require significant resources to reach out to underserved 
communities to find and inform people of the advantages of being registered with this 
platform and to convince them that they can trust it. That would be an extension of the 
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role currently played by the community integration specialists described in Part 4, 
Section 5.1 (Income Assistance). It would also require resources to conduct the same 
type of verification already undertaken for Income Assistance applicants for the 
additional population of non-IA recipients/non-tax filers. Note that Recommendation 62 
calls for additional Income Assistance resources.  
Cross-program accessibility 
Impediments to data sharing combined with a siloed approach contribute significantly to 
program accessibility barriers. In addition to the tax data sharing issues discussed 
above, explicit permission is also required to share data among programs.  
One way to help people better navigate a complex system would be to apply an 
automated approach that assesses data collected by each program to determine which 
other programs, if any, the applicant is reasonably likely to qualify for. The applicant 
would be informed of the results and given the option of receiving fully or partially pre-
populated applications for the programs, along with information about how the program 
works, how to apply, and what additional information is required. The advantage of this 
proposal is that it does not require any sharing of personal information, but simply uses 
information provided to make the applicant aware of other potential programs and 
makes it easy for them to apply. An extension of that concept would be to also use tax 
data in the assessment if the person had already given permission to use tax data for 
the purposes of the program. Once again, data would not be shared. Finally, where no 
additional information is required to assess eligibility, there could be automatic 
enrolment in additional programs, which would require data sharing and thus 
permission. 
Recommendation 58 (medium term): Consider developing a system that uses data 
provided for one program to inform people about other programs they may be eligible 
for, and provides pre-populated applications and, where possible, automatic enrolment 
with data-sharing permission. 
Making silos more transparent 
Another cross-program accessibility measure would be to treat income and social 
support programs as a system, with common features, such as a common online 
information and application portal and cross-training of caseworkers and administrators, 
to better help people navigate more than just the one program for which they are 
responsible.  
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 
December 28, 2020           Final Report of the Expert Panel on Basic Income 487 
 
We do not believe that there should be one big program administered by one agency. 
The complexity of B.C.’s programs arises because many of them provide services and 
in-kind benefits for particular groups and circumstances that are, for the most part, 
better served by separate programs. But having programs within opaque silos is also 
not effective, and a balance must be achieved. 
Recommendation 59 (medium term): Enable programs to work together and make the 
points of access for the various programs also points of access for the rest of the 
system, through the use of technology and through staff training and job descriptions. 
System governance 
Complexity in the system also arises because income and social supports address a 
wide range of needs, many of which are also aligned with other service areas covered 
by government, such as health, education, post-secondary education and training, 
justice services, child welfare, and labour. That results in many different agencies and 
ministries managing parts of a system that is rarely recognized as such. Changing how 
all those pieces are managed is not an option, but recognizing the system through a 
system-wide governance structure is possible. 
Recommendation 60 (short term): Establish a governance structure within which policy 
development and administration across the income and social support system can be 
coordinated and overarching direction can be applied to implementing government’s 
priorities and policy decisions. 
11.3 Income Assistance cross-cutting reform 
Section 2 (Reforms Targeting People with Disabilities) and Section 3 (Reforms 
Targeting Working-Age Adults) set out a range of recommendations that would 
significantly reform Disability Assistance (DA) and Temporary Assistance (TA), 
respectively, with the specific changes tailored to the diverse nature of the two parts of 
Income Assistance (IA). However, there are also some elements of IA that apply equally 
across the whole program and where there is no reason for taking a different approach 
in reforms for DA and TA. It is these issues that we address in this section. 
Indexing Income Assistance cash to the Market Basket Measure 
The purpose of cash benefits is to provide people with adequate financial resources to 
exercise their agency and make decisions about how to live their lives. In other 
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sections, we’ve made recommendations about the level of benefits for different groups, 
always in relation to the Market Basket Measure (MBM) poverty line. But once the 
provincial government sets benefit levels, it frequently does not change them for 
extended periods. Because the cost of basic needs increases with inflation, the 
adequacy of the benefits decreases over time, defeating the purpose of the benefits. 
The MBM poverty line is specifically designed to measure the cost of basic needs, as 
opposed to, for example, the Consumer Price Index, which is designed to measure the 
cost of an “average” basket of goods purchased by consumers at significantly higher 
income levels. Since MBM thresholds differ geographically within B.C., an average of 
B.C. MBM threshold changes would need to be used to establish an indexing factor for 
benefit levels. 
Recommendation 61 (short term): Index Income Assistance benefit levels to inflation, as 
measured by changes to Market Basket Measure thresholds, with regular annual 
increases required in legislation. 
Increased staff resources 
In the 2002/03 IA reforms, B.C. moved its administrative approach to IA from one 
involving considerable face-to-face contact with staff to one that focuses on online 
applications with less staff interaction and fewer office locations. Between 2000 and 
2014, the number of IA-specific offices fell from 128 to 77. The decline most affected 
small communities—closing their only office—but also the biggest cities (the number of 
offices in Vancouver declined from 22 in 1991 to 6 in 2019). The closings reduced costs 
of delivery, of course, and for some applicants the online application is convenient. But 
Green, Hicks, et al. (2020) shows that areas defined by Forward Sorting Areas—the first 
three digits of a postal code—that lost their closest office saw a 6% decrease in the 
caseload associated with people living in the area, compared with similar areas where 
the closest office did not close. That is, closing offices reduced access to benefits.  
A key concern is that this reduced accessibility has been felt more by vulnerable 
populations. Respondents to the outreach conducted as part of the Poverty Reduction 
Initiative stated that the requirement to apply and answer questions mainly online or by 
telephone was viewed as a significant barrier (Hertz et al., 2020).  
More recent actions have improved the user experience, especially in some locations. 
These include providing access to computers in IA offices for use of the online system, 
and increases in community integration specialist staff specifically to assist clients. But a 
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more extensive readjustment, providing more in-person support, is needed. This can be 
seen as a process of bringing support work that has been offloaded onto non-
governmental organizations back into the Ministry of Social Development and Poverty 
Reduction, where training standards for staff can be enforced and the location for 
applying to the system becomes clearer. Hertz et al. (2020) summarize the Poverty 
Reduction Initiative (PRI) responses regarding access as follows: “Ultimately, the PRI 
data reveals three main types of front-end barriers: technological infrastructure barriers; 
conflicting alternative service providers and external application processes; and 
complex application processes with variable front-line discretion” (p. 12). The goal must 
be to reduce all of these barriers by simplifying the system and providing more in-
person support. 
The shift in emphasis that we are suggesting—from cash transfers to basic services—
requires additional human resources associated with the program, and a program 
focused not only on supporting people with the resources they need but on supporting 
them in accessing those resources. That applies equally to extended health services, 
Assisted to Work programs, and community-led public employment. 
Recommendation 62 (short term): Enhance Ministry of Social Development and 
Poverty Reduction staff resources by: 
• making additional community integration specialists widely available at points of 
access to help people navigate and understand the system  
• including more ministry staff with lived experience related to poverty  
• funding non-governmental organizations to provide additional services to overcome 
lack of trust of the ministry and of program staff, with appropriate processes in place 
to ensure effective communication and working relationships between ministry and 
organization staff 
11.4 Consultation and program evaluation 
Effective policy change requires a combination of rigorous evaluation of available 
evidence and ongoing consultation with affected groups. Both are crucial, as is 
providing those participating in consultation with the evidence arising from program 
evaluation 
Rigorous evaluation of policies can be done in different ways. One approach is through 
pilot projects. We were charged with considering whether B.C. should undertake a basic 
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income pilot project, and in Section 1 (Vision and Conclusions) we concluded that B.C. 
should not. Our multiple reasons for reaching this conclusion are detailed in Part 5, 
Section 7 (“Should B.C. Pilot a Basic Income?”). However, we are strong believers in 
the importance of careful ongoing evaluation of existing programs and the initiatives that 
we have proposed.  
Pilot projects are similar to scientific experiments: Individuals (or, sometimes, 
communities) are randomly assigned to either get the new policy treatment or to be 
monitored as part of a “control” sample. The core idea is that the control sample allows 
us to see what would have happened to the “treatment” sample in the absence of the 
new policy and thus to measure its net effect. This allows us to address issues of 
selectivity, where simply comparing those who choose to take up a program with those 
who don’t confounds the actual effects of the policy with underlying differences between 
those who take up the program and those who don’t.  
The controlled experiment approach has been described as the “gold standard” of policy 
evaluation by some policy analysts, but it has a number of shortcomings. First, it often 
ignores community-level effects—spillovers to relatives and others in recipients’ 
communities. Some of these spillover effects can be subtle, such as a policy that helps 
IA recipients with their resumés, improving their job access to the detriment of others 
who don’t get this help, or altering the set of wages and prices in the economy. Second, 
experiments have fixed durations that are often relatively short. In the case of a basic 
income, where some of its projected impacts arise through people choosing a different 
path in life based on having a permanent income backstop, this is particularly 
problematic. However, the same issue applies to most policies. Third, implementing 
experiments and taking the time to analyze them rigorously delays policy action in the 
short term. And fourth, a pilot of a basic income would not permit the large tax policy 
changes needed to finance a real-world program to be undertaken, and as our analysis 
has suggested, the behavioural responses on the funding side could exceed those on 
the beneficiary side. 
Our preferred approach is one in which the first step is to determine a policy direction 
based on existing empirical evidence and consultation with affected groups. Once the 
direction is determined, the policy would be rolled out incrementally with both rigorous 
empirical evaluation and consultation with affected groups at each step. Systematic roll-
outs can be done in a way that allow us to evaluate impacts while addressing the 
selectivity issue described earlier. They also allow us to observe wider (and sometimes 
unintended) impacts on communities.  
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The following recommendations are intended to enable our continuous improvement 
based on evaluation and consultation to be effectively implemented. 
Program evaluation and data access 
Regardless of whether this specific approach is followed, careful empirical evaluation of 
policies is necessary to create effective programs. The lifeblood of such evaluation is 
data. Our analyses have greatly benefited from access to linked data created by the 
B.C. government’s Data Innovation Program (DIP). To the greatest extent possible, our 
specific recommendations are based on evaluations using the DIP data and other data 
such as from the census and Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey. All of this data 
is de-identified—that is, there are no names and data can be used only in ways that do 
not present observations on individuals or even small groups who might be identified 
from their data patterns. Future evaluations will also need the DIP data, which allows 
analysts to study a range of outcomes, including high school completion, IA receipt, 
interactions with the criminal justice system, and health outcomes. Complete analysis of 
a program requires taking account of all of these outcomes.  
For all of its advantages, the DIP data to which we were given access had two 
shortcomings. First, it contained a linkage of records ending in 2017. Because much of 
what we wanted to examine was earlier policy changes, this did not pose substantial 
problems for us, but using the data to study recently rolled-out programs obviously 
requires data that is as recent as possible from an administrative and technical point of 
view. Future evaluations will require more timely, ongoing updating of linked, de-
identified data.  
The second issue pertains to the specific data. DIP is unable to include income tax data 
for reasons related to federal/provincial tax administration agreements as well as federal 
and provincial legislation. Income tax data is among the most important data for 
evaluations and so must be part of the data environment. Making this happen will 
require extra effort—possibly including changes in legislation—but is absolutely crucial.  
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Recommendation 63 (short term): Design all income and social support system reforms 
with the explicit intention of rigorously evaluating the outcomes as input to further policy 
changes, including ensuring that the data needed to evaluate the reforms is collected as 
part of the policy design. 
Recommendation 64 (short term): Create de-identified linked databases using 
administrative data that is updated in an ongoing, timely manner, with appropriate 
access protocols to allow programs to be designed and evaluated based on quantitative 
evidence without risking individuals’ private information. Crucially, this must include 
income taxation data, which will require federal agreement and potentially legislative 
change. 
Human rights–based consultation 
Deriving directly from the public trust characteristics that are a fundamental part of our 
justice-based framework, effective and ongoing consultation is a theme that runs 
through our recommendations. In Section 2.6 (Community Building) we discuss the 
particular importance of including those who will be affected by policy changes and 
others with an interest in the process of changing policy and administration. Doing so 
effectively is, of course, necessary throughout the government policy realm and is well 
recognized by most governments, including the B.C. government. It means more than 
pro forma engagement with those directly affected. It also must include other groups, 
such as advocacy and service delivery groups, and those who are more likely to be 
funders through their taxes than beneficiaries. It also means more than discussing 
policy proposals about to be enacted or implemented: it means ongoing engagement. It 
is not easy to do that effectively. People burn out from too much consultation, especially 
when they don’t feel like they are being heard or making a positive difference by 
engaging. 
As discussed in Section 2.6 (Community Building), a human rights approach such as 
that implemented by the federal government with the National Housing Strategy Act 
provides a potential model, especially to the extent that Canada, and therefore B.C., 
have obligations under international agreements like the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities—recognizing that meeting basic needs in a just manner is a human 
right. The model puts a positive responsibility on government to respect those rights, but 
without making them enforceable in court or for individuals. Rather, the approach 
operates at the systemic level through an independent advocate and a representative 
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council able to make non-binding recommendations to government, which of course 
must make the ultimate decisions.  
Recommendation 65 (medium term): Consider adopting a human rights–based 
approach to consultation that would apply across the income and social support system. 
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12. Summary of Recommendations  
Section 1 (Vision and Conclusions) established the basis for our recommendations as 
the means to take the next step toward achieving the vision we have laid out. We have 
concluded that justice-based reforms to the existing system are a better approach to 
moving B.C. policies forward than implementing a basic income for all as the core of the 
income and social support system. 
Our recommendations are an attempt to set out a comprehensive but feasible suite of 
short- and longer-term reforms to both the system and the set of individual programs 
that it comprises, based on our analysis of the system and with the objective of making 
B.C. a more just society. Many of the changes are intended to improve cash transfers 
and basic services directed at particular groups that have clear but distinctive unmet 
needs—people with disabilities, low-income single adults (the group with the worst 
poverty outcomes), former youth in care, women fleeing abusive relationships, and 
families with children. Others strengthen the basic services safety net by improving 
services related to housing and health care for all low-income households, supporting 
those with barriers to employment to work, and using labour regulation to reduce the 
precarity and increase the dignity associated with many low-wage jobs. These changes 
will be particularly beneficial for the people whose often precarious situations have been 
highlighted by COVID-19—women and Indigenous and racialized people. Finally, we 
recommend changes that will improve the system itself, making programs simpler, more 
accessible, more responsive, and better co-ordinated. In many cases, we recommend 
changes affecting cash transfers that directly incorporate basic income elements and, 
where appropriate, targeted basic incomes.  
Overall, the 65 recommendations we make represent a challenging and comprehensive 
reform to B.C.’s income and social support system. In many cases, much detailed 
design work and extensive consultation and collaboration with interested parties will be 
needed to implement the changes. For that reason, we have divided our 
recommendations among those we believe can be implemented in the short term (43 
recommendations) and those that will take longer to fully develop (22 
recommendations). Fiscal realities and the difficult decisions associated with allocating 
funds among innumerable competing public policy priorities may delay or preclude 
making all of the recommended changes, but many have little cost, or significant benefit 
given the cost. We recommend that any implementation be done in a purposeful, 
incremental manner, involving both empirical evaluations and extensive consultation at 
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each step. We believe that, taken as a whole, the path that we have sketched out will 
move B.C. considerably toward a more just society.  
The following table lists our recommendations consecutively by section, with cost 
estimates provided by relevant ministry staff and an indication of how the 
recommendations would be implemented. For costs, we considered any estimated cost 
of less than $400,000 to not be material.  
The total of the estimated annual costs shown in the summary table is about $3.3 to 
$5.0 billion, a substantial portion of which could be offset by eliminating the home owner 
grant,137 which has a current annual cost of over $800 million. In terms of timing, the 
cost of the recommendations we have categorized as short-term would be about $1.4 
billion, and the cost of medium-term recommendations would be $1.9 to $3.6 billion. 
In comparison, according to simulations presented in Part 5, Section 4 (Simulation 
Results), an income-tested basic income with a similar budget would have a maximum 
benefit amount of less than $10,000 if applied to family income with a benefit reduction 
rate of 30%. Such a basic income would reduce the poverty rate by nearly two 
percentage points, a tangible amount. However, the recommended targeted basic 
income approaches and targeted basic services, together with significant improvements 
to existing programs we are recommending, would direct those tax dollars much more 
effectively to address unmet basic needs. We are confident that our proposed approach 
would move British Columbia further down the path to a just society than the basic 
income alternative.  
 
 
137 See Part 4, Section 5.4 (Home Owner Grant). 
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Reform Disability Assistance (DA) into a targeted basic income 
   
 
1. Replace disability subcategories 
   
  
Replace the current Persons with Disabilities, Persons with Persistent Multiple Barriers, and 
Expected to Work—Medical Condition categories with two disability categories: one for those with 
long-term disabilities, Moderate-Persistent Disabilities (MPD) and Severe-Persistent Disabilities 
(SPD) designations combined into an MPD/SPD category, and a second for those with short-term 
disabilities or disabilities where the severity and duration have not yet been determined, a 










2. Reform application process 
   
  
Implement an initial triage step within the common application portal, in which people with 
disabilities are guided to an evaluation system specifically for them, essentially separating the 
application streams early in the process. 
Medium 
term 
Not material Refinement of 
existing practice 
 
3. Revise application forms 
   
  
Revise application forms as recommended by the 2016 Expert Panel and require objective 
medical evidence to be provided. 
Medium 
term 
Not material Regulation and 
system change 
 
4. Eliminate DA Asset test 
   
  
Eliminate the asset test for disability categories. Short term Not material Legislation and 
regulation 
change 
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5. Relax DA income test 
   
  
Set the income test applied at the time of application for disability categories at the break-even 
level (i.e., the point at which benefits are fully phased out under the reformed benefit structure), so 
that people can apply so long as they would receive any amount of benefit if their application is 
successful. 






6. Reform adjudication process 
   
  
Implement the recommendations of the 2016 Expert Panel related to the adjudication process. In 
addition, create a chief medical officer position for the disability system. 
Medium 
term 





7. Eliminate reassessment 
   
  
Limit eligibility review for people designated as MPD/SPD to factors other than their disability 
designation. People who have not reached MMI should be expected to commit to pursuing 
recommended treatment to the best of their ability. 
Medium 
term 




8. Convert DA to a targeted basic income 
   
  
Reform Moderate-Persistent Disabilities/Severe-Persistent Disabilities benefits (or, if those 
categories are not adopted, Persons with Disabilities benefits) into a targeted basic income, 
delivered by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) as a refundable tax credit, subject to federal 
government agreement. The Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction would 
continue to be responsible for eligibility adjudication. On designation, the CRA would be 
responsible for calculating benefits and delivering payments, as with other refundable tax credits. 
Recipients experiencing an income drop could opt out of CRA benefit delivery, reverting to 
monthly benefit calculation and delivery by the ministry until revoked in a subsequent tax filing. 
Medium 
term 
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9. Increase DA benefit to MBM threshold 
   
  
Move the monetary benefit for those on Disability Assistance at least to the poverty line by 
increasing the maximum benefit amount: 
• for single people in the Severe-Persistent Disability, Moderate-Persistent Disability, and 
Temporarily Unable to Work categories by $500 per month, to $20,196 annually, and  
• for couples and other family types proportionately. For couples in which both people have a 
disability use a scale factor of 1.41, for an annual benefit amount of $28,560. 







10. Lower DA BRR and maintain income exemption 
   
  
Lower the Disability Assistance benefit reduction rate at which benefits are reduced as income 
increases from 100% to 70%, and maintain the earnings exemption at levels taking effect January 
2021 (e.g., $15,000 for singles). 





11. Create public and community employment 
   
  
Design and implement a program that funds community groups for projects that provide jobs to 
people with disabilities (and some other targeted groups), with lower expectations than market 








12. Integrate support for addiction and mental health disabilities 
   
  
Integrate the provision of Income Assistance benefits to people with addiction and mental health 
issues with the full range of measures addressing the opioid crisis as they evolve over time, with 
involvement from other social policy areas, such as public health and the justice system. 




13. Review addiction support  
   
  
Undertake an independent program evaluation of how Income Assistance supports those with 
addictions in the context of the full set of supports and approaches focused on this population to 
inform detailed design of Disability Assistance program reforms. 
Short term Not material 
for review 
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Reform Temporary Assistance (TA) to reduce the “welfare wall” 
   
 
14. Eliminate work-search requirement 
   
  
Eliminate the three-week work-search requirement by combining the current Stages 1 and 2 in the 
application process. Applicants should be immediately assessed for job readiness and moved 
onto employment plans to help with job preparation while receiving benefits. Those deemed job 
ready should be given immediate, lighter-touch support while also receiving benefits. 






15. Engage federal government about COVID-19 recovery benefit rationalization 
   
  
Engage in immediate talks with the federal government around reforms to the Employment 
Insurance system and broader supports that are likely to arise as Canada emerges from the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The goal would be to create an integrated system with a clear statement 
about which program and level of government is helping which population group. 
Short term No cost Engagement 
ongoing 
 
16. Initially maintain current TA income test 
   
  
Initially, continue to use the maximum benefit level as the income eligibility test for Temporary 
Assistance. 
Short term No cost None 
 
17. Increase TA income test threshold in medium term 
   
  
Gradually raise the income eligibility test amount, eventually reaching the break-even income 








18. Eliminate TA asset test 
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19. Extend TA streamlined reapplication 
   
  
Keep the case files of recipients open for two years after income rises above the break-even level 
for recipients over age 50, allowing streamlined reapplication with the income test threshold set at 
the break-even level. Consider reducing the age limit in future, based on evaluation of results. 
Short term Not material Regulation 
change 
 
20. Increase TA benefit levels by making COVID-19 emergency $300 supplement permanent 
   
  
Make the $300 per month COVID-19 emergency increase in Temporary Assistance benefits a 
permanent increase. 







21. Lower TA BRR and maintain income exemption 
   
  
Lower the rate at which Temporary Assistance benefits are reduced as income increases from 
100% to 70%, and maintain the earnings exemption at levels taking effect in January 2021. 





22. Evaluate training support 
   
  
Evaluate the Single Parent Employment Initiative. If it is increasing education levels and post-
education employment, earnings, and self-respect, expand the program to offer it to all recipients 
of Expected to Work benefits. 






23. Expand earnings supplement 
   
  
Expand earnings supplements targeting low-income-earning adults with no children, using a 
revenue-neutral reconfiguration of the Canada Workers Benefit combined with a provincial top-up 
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Provide extended health-care benefits to all low-income individuals  
   
 
24. Convert extended health supplements to a basic service 
   
  
Establish an income-tested extended benefits system for all low-income households and 
individuals regardless of their Income Assistance status, with the following features: 
• phased implementation, starting with joint administration of IA health supplements, MSP 
supplementary benefits, and the Healthy Kids Program 
• benefits administered independently from IA through a dedicated extended health benefits 
administration agency, and ultimately funded separately from IA 
• expansion of coverage to a wide range of medical and health services, supplies, and devices, 
with standardization of dental services a priority 
• reduction of extended benefits coverage as income rises, using an approach similar to Fair 
PharmaCare (i.e., there would be no deductible or co-payment for those with income below 
the MBM, and recipients’ share of costs would increase smoothly with additional income until 
the subsidy is ultimately phased out) 
Medium 
term 







Provide housing support to all low-income renters 
   
 
25. Combine support and shelter allowance 
   
  
Combine the support and shelter components of Income Assistance cash benefits into a single 
payment that is not conditional on having shelter costs. However, if our later recommendation for 
a B.C. Rent Assist program is implemented, the programs should be integrated by deducting the 
B.C. Rent Assist benefits from the Income Assistance benefit. 





26. Expand targeted supportive housing  
   
  
Continue expanding the amount of supportive housing targeting individuals with mental health 
and addiction issues as well as housing initiatives directly addressing homeless persons. 
Short term TBD None 
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 









27. B.C. Rent Assist refundable tax credit 
   
  
Create a B.C. Rent Assist program as a refundable tax credit, with a benefit based on the 
difference between a set fraction of the median provincial rent for a household-appropriate unit 
and 30% of household income for all low-income households that incur rent. For people receiving 
Income Assistance (IA) benefits, the Rent Assist benefit would displace IA payments dollar for 
dollar without affecting IA eligibility. The specific details, including the fraction of median rent to be 
used as the target amount, remain to be determined along with other program design details. 
Medium 
term 
$0.8 to $1.0 




Provide intensive work support to targeted groups 
   
 
28. Assisted to Work basic service 
   
  
Create a voluntary Assisted to Work program similar to that suggested by the 2016 Expert Panel, 
for people experiencing barriers to employment and who need individualized and ongoing support 
to achieve labour force attachment—specifically people with moderate and persistent disabilities 










29. Joint rehabilitation and work support agency 
   
  
Consider creating a specialized government agency to provide assessment, rehabilitation, and 
work support services to serve people with disabilities being served by Income Assistance, 






Enhance support for low-income families with children 
   
 
30. Refocus Child Opportunity Benefit 
   
  
Adjust the B.C. Child Opportunity Benefit by both increasing its benefit reduction rate and having it 
vary with the number of children in the family to better target low-income single parents in a cost-
neutral fashion. 
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Enhance financial and support services for young adults 
 
Overall cost 





31. Increase MCFD resources 
   
  
Increase Ministry of Children and Family Development funding related to child protection and 
family services, increasing social worker resources with the objective of establishing longer-term 
continuity of contact between families, vulnerable children and children in care, and ministry social 
workers. 






32. Enhance transition planning and community support capacity 
  
  
Provide core capacity funding for the most effective community organizations helping former 
youth in care—those that provide a secure environment and base of support from which the youth 
can make autonomous decisions related to outcomes such as education and employment—to 
create capacity for transition planning and support. 





33. Extend AYA education and training duration 
   
  
Extend the number of allowed months for education and rehabilitation under Agreements with 
Young Adults beyond 48 months. 





34. Enhance AYA life-skills support 
   
  
Expand and enhance the life-skills support component of the Agreements with Young Adults 
program in consultation with affected young adults and organizations that support them. 




Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 









35. Former youth in care Assisted to Work eligibility 
   
  
Make former youth in care eligible for the Assisted to Work program (Recommendation 27), 
established to provide intensive work supports to overcome significant barriers to accessing good 










36. Targeted basic income for former youth in care 
   
  
Implement a new targeted basic income benefit for all youth formerly in care, with the following 
features: 
• benefit at least equal to the Market Basket Measure poverty line  
• 0% benefit reduction rate  
• full amount paid for ages 19–21, reduced by 25% per year and phased out at age 25  
• reduction suspended up to two years for education and training  
• eligibility for youth in care or in Youth Agreements at 19 or in care for at least two years at a 
younger age 
• entering into a young adult agreement not required for eligibility 
• Agreements with Young Adults program adjusted accordingly and accessible to at least age 
27, ensuring that current program participants receive at least as much financial support 
• must be combined with community supports (Recommendation 37) 
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37. Initiate basic income with community support engagement 
   
  
Design the financial support program for youth aging out of care so that financial payments and 
the offered support services would be initiated through a youth contacting one of the service 
delivery organizations (of the youth’s choice) and would involve an initiation session to give the 
youth information on available supports. 







38. Mandate a ministry to support former youth in care 
   
  
Establish a specific legislative mandate and funding allocation for a designated ministry or other 
government agency to support former children in care. Currently, no single ministry has such a 
mandate, but it is necessary to ensure that all programs focused on this group are designed and 
administered in a coordinated, seamlessly integrated fashion. This is particularly important 
because the list of supports is long, including financial aid, life-skills support, education support, 
social work assistance, and funding for/operations of community organizations providing support. 
All of this must be based on ongoing collaboration and consultation with former children in care 
and other stakeholders. 







39. Establish B.C. Learning Bond 
   
  
Implement a $1,000 B.C. Learning Bond account that is automatically created for children from 
low-income families at birth or a year after immigration, which can be used only for education. 








40. Contribute B.C. Learning Bond for children in care 
   
  
Automatically create a learning bond when children are first taken into care, if a learning bond is 
not already in place. 
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41. Create B.C. Career Trek program 
   
  
Create a B.C. version of Manitoba’s Career Trek to support low-income children in moving to 







needed to scale 
up/expand 
program. 
Enhance financial and support services for people fleeing violence 
   
 
42. Enhance housing for people fleeing violence 
   
  
Increase funding for both short- and long-term housing facilities for people fleeing violence, 
especially in areas where there is a lack of access to appropriate temporary housing, particularly 
rural areas, and consider making use of short-term rentals. 
Short term TBD Practice change 
 
43. Create three-tiered domestic violence program 
   
  
After consultation with domestic violence experts on program design, introduce a three-tiered 
program to address domestic violence: 
1. Provide a substantial initial lump-sum payment equivalent to three to four months of Income 
Assistance benefits, accessible without proof of violence 
2. Enhance hardship assistance for people with transitional high needs that integrates cash 
benefits with access to wraparound supports to address, for example, traumatic brain injury 
and other medical conditions, permanent housing, and transportation needs 
3. Transition people into the Expected to Work category after securing permanent stable 
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Improve precarious employment through labour regulation reform 
   
 
44. Develop gig work employment standards 
   
  
Develop policy and legislation that apply appropriate employment standards to gig work 
arrangements in a consultative process that includes businesses and workers associated with 
both disruptive and traditional business models/work arrangements. 




45. Review Employment Standards Act exclusions 
   
  
As recommended by the British Columbia Law Institute, undertake a thorough review of 
exclusions under the Employment Standards Act, with a view to establishing clear principles for 
exclusions, in particular farm workers and fishers. 




46. Enhance proactive Employment Standards Act enforcement 
   
  
Continue the move toward a proactive stance on enforcing regulations, including providing 
enough resources for the Employment Standards Branch to make random regulatory compliance 
reviews stratified on the basis of industries’ compliance histories, including reviews of whether 
workers are classified as employees under the Employment Standards Act. 
Short term TBD 
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47. Improve employment standards for fissured work 
   
  
In coordination with the Recommendation 45 review, build on recent employment standards 
legislative changes to further improve employment standards and their application, with particular 
attention to fissured work and variable-hours workers (e.g., part-time and part-year workers) 
through a consultative process with broad terms of reference. That includes considering joint and 
several liability for employment standards, enhanced enforcement of temp agency licensing, 
applying severance standards to temp agencies, eliminating temp agency buy-out clauses, 
regulating equity of wage rates, and setting scheduling standards. 




48. Review Labour Relations Code unionization provisions 
   
  
Investigate options for increasing worker access to unionization, especially in sectors like the 
service sector, where high turnover has made unionization difficult. This could include sector-level 
unionization, such as already exists in the construction and health-care sectors. 




49. Proactively facilitate Industrial Councils 
   
  
Immediately direct the Labour Relations Board to encourage and facilitate the establishment of 
industry advisory councils, not waiting for applications from employers or unions, and provide 
funding to support the governance of the councils. 
Short term TBD 
 
 
50. Extend Labour Relations Code successor rights 
   
  
Amend the Labour Relations Code to extend successorship rights for specific sectors to all 
sectors, subject to exemptions granted in accordance with clear, objective criteria. Examine the 
possibility of establishing protections similar to worker continuity rights for non-union workers in 
the Employment Standards Act or other legislation. 
Medium 
term 
Not material Legislation 
change 
 
51. Rationalize employee definitions across programs 
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Rationalize definitions of “employee” across the different parts of the B.C. government, and initiate 





Improve the way benefit delivery platforms function 
   
 
52. Combine refundable tax credits into Dogwood Benefit 
   
  
Combine B.C. refundable tax credits—including the sales tax credit, the climate action tax credit 
and the Child Opportunity Benefit—as well as any new tax credits implemented as part of 
recommended income and social support reforms, such as B.C. Rent Assist and an enhanced 
earning supplement, in a new Dogwood Benefit. 
Short term Not material Legislation 
change 
 
53. Rationalize income definition for income testing purposes 
   
  
Adopt the definition of income used by the federal government for Old Age Security/Guaranteed 
Income Supplement income-testing purposes as the definition used for all provincial programs, 
adjusted only where the purpose of a program dictates the use of an alternative. 




54. Engage federal government to reduce tax filing barriers 
   
  
Engage with the Department of Finance Canada and the Canada Revenue Agency to develop 
mechanisms to lower barriers to tax filing, especially pre-populated tax returns for Income 
Assistance recipients and potentially others not required to file tax returns, and automatic tax 
filing. 
Short term Not material 
 
 
55. Engage federal government to increase benefit delivery responsiveness 
  
  
Engage the federal government on reforming the personal income tax system to be more 
responsive to within-year changes in income, and thereby improving it as a benefit delivery 
platform. 
Short term Not material 
 
 
56. Engage federal government to streamline administrative tax data–sharing 
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Engage the Canada Revenue Agency on taxpayers giving permission on their annual tax return to 
share tax data for benefits-administration purposes generally or for specific programs, instead of 
requiring program applications to establish data-sharing permission. 
Short term Not material 
 
 57. Develop an identification and verification platform for non-tax filers to increase benefits access   
  Develop a platform for the identification and verification of residency and income of non–tax filers 
using Income Assistance and BCID card/Medical Service Plan data that would be used across the 








58. Automate informing applicants of eligibility for other programs 
  
  
Consider developing a system that uses data provided for one program to inform people about 
other programs they may be eligible for, and provides pre-populated applications and, where 






59. Enhance cross-program system navigation 
   
  
Enable programs to work together and make the points of access for the various programs also 
points of access for the rest of the system, through the use of technology and through staff 
training and job descriptions. 
Medium 
term 
TBD System and 
practice change 
 
60. Establish system governance 
   
  
Establish a governance structure within which policy development and administration across the 
income and social support system can be coordinated and overarching direction can be applied to 
implementing government’s priorities and policy decisions. 
Short term TBD 
 
 
61. Index Income Assistance rates to changes in the poverty line 
   
  
Index Income Assistance benefit levels to inflation, as measured by changes to Market Basket 
Measure thresholds, with regular annual increases required in legislation. 
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the base  
 
62. Increase Income Assistance staff resources 
   
  
Enhance Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction staff resources by: 
• making additional community integration specialists widely available at points of access to 
help people navigate and understand the system  
• including more ministry staff with lived experience related to poverty  
• funding non-governmental organizations to provide additional services to overcome lack of 
trust of the ministry and of program staff, with appropriate processes in place to ensure 
effective communication and working relationships between ministry and organization staff 




63. Rigorously evaluate major reforms 
   
  
Design all income and social support system reforms with the explicit intention of rigorously 
evaluating the outcomes as input to further policy changes, including ensuring that the data 
needed to evaluate the reforms is collected as part of the policy design. 
Short term Not material 
 
 
64. Create linked administrative data for policy development 
   
  
Create de-identified linked databases using administrative data that is updated in an ongoing, 
timely manner, with appropriate access protocols to allow programs to be designed and evaluated 
based on quantitative evidence without risking individuals’ private information. Crucially, this must 
include income taxation data, which will require federal agreement and potentially legislative 
change. 
Short term TBD Legislative 
change 
Make ongoing engagement a permanent part of all policies 
   
 
65. Set up a human rights–based approach to engagement with those affected 
   
Part 6: Vision and Recommendations 
 









Consider adopting a human rights–based approach to consultation that would 
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